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Can a constitution commit suicide? How should a liberal democratic state respond when social movements 
threaten war with one another and against the state itself? How should liberal democrats respond when extremist 
parties are strong enough to cooperate in parliament and obstruct essential legislation? Can an illiberal 
antidemocratic party legitimately obtain power through elections and then kick the ladder down by legally 
amending democracy and liberalism out of the constitution entirely? 
Beginning in 1929, theoretical questions like these suddenly became both practically and existentially relevant for 
Weimar Germany. The share of the vote Nazis and Communists received in elections swelled until, combined, they 
were the majority. Neither movement accepted the legitimacy of liberal democracy and both were explicit that 
their only goal in running for seats in parliament was to gain a strong enough majority to amend the Weimar 
Constitution out of existence. Until then, they cooperated across the aisle, so to speak, to constitute negative 
majorities and prevent the SPD, Zentrum, and other parties from being able to pass legislation to respond to the 
economic, social, and political crises Weimar faced. By 1932, the Nazis held a plurality. In January 1933, exhausted 
with alternatives, Hindenburg appointed Hitler Chancellor. 
 This dissertation extrapolates Carl Schmitt’s state theory and looks at how it was conceived in response to 
Weimar’s legitimation crisis. It shows how Schmitt looks back to the tradition of state theory to address this crisis. 
In particular, it shows how he models his solution on Thomas Hobbes, whose Leviathan was also a response to civil 
war and the breakdown of political order. This dissertation argues Schmitt updates Hobbes’ state theory to 
respond to the unique problems of the 20th century, especially modern mass democracy. Modern mass 
democracy was the product of universal suffrage, mass media, and advances in psychology. Disingenuous social 
movements exploited the media and whipped up an emotionally charged base, obtaining for themselves a veneer 
of democratic legitimacy and the means to parliament. Once in parliament, they exacerbated Weimar’s crises and 
struggled against each another to advance their particular goals. Schmitt saw these conflicts as the 20th century 
equivalent of the Confessional Civil Wars and he saw himself as the 20th century Hobbes. He theorized ways to 
neutralize those conflicts and restore the state’s sovereign authority. 
But, besides that, Schmitt thought these issues begged the basic question of constitutionalism: are there any 
objective limits to a goal “the people” want, even if 99 percent of citizens support that goal? Can “the people” 
legitimately be bound to the mast? Can democracy be tyrannical? 
Schmitt’s peers, such as Hans Kelsen and Richard Thoma, answered in the negative and argued that there was no 
basis to deny a democratic will that had formed through proper procedures. 
Schmitt disagreed. He argued the constitution imposed hard limits on democracy. Through this answer, this 
dissertation argues Schmitt’s state theory anticipated what is today known as militant democracy. Militant 
democracy is a type of liberal democratic constitution that guards against certain forms of popular sovereignty and 
prevents constitutional suicide. Its institutional mechanisms include the entrenchment of core constitutional 
principles, such as basic rights, and political bans on certain illiberal and antidemocratic parties. Although one finds 
militant democracy embedded in constitutions around the world today, it has been undertheorized. Because 
Schmitt’s theory of militant democracy rests on his substantive state theory, this dissertation concludes he offers 
us a foundation for developing a normative theory of militant democracy – something invaluable for making sense 
of its legitimacy and its limits today.  
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Introduction: Constitutionality and the Weimar Crisis 
 
 
Rumor Schmittianus iniucundus bonis  
– Unknown 
 
There is nothing people would rather believe than that the author of a book about the Leviathan 
licks the blood-stained boots of his subject. 




1. “Was ist verfassungsmäßig?” 
Late in his life, Carl Schmitt looked back and argued the political situation of January 1933 
represented a constitutional crossroads. The dilemma Reichspräsident Paul von Hindenburg 
faced over who should be appointed chancellor, which stemmed from the recent Reichstag 
elections, was a microcosm of Weimar’s broader problem: the legitimation crisis of the twentieth 
century state. On one horn of this dilemma stood Kurt von Schleicher. Although he was a 
politically reliable figure, von Schleicher’s appointment would require Hindenburg to exercise 
Article 25 (the dissolution of parliament for reelections) and Article 48 (presidential emergency 
rule) to overcome the “negative majority” of the Nazi Party and the Communist Party in the 
Reichstag. This would mean – again – overriding democratic elections and instituting a crisis-
driven executive custodial government. On the other horn stood Adolf Hitler. Hitler led the 
Reichstag’s largest democratically elected party and promised Hindenburg a workable majority 
coalition, something Weimar had not had for years. But it was unclear what Hitler would 
actually do – and whether he could be controlled – were he appointed Chancellor. The Nazi 
Party’s explicit political platform included instrumentalizing democratic amendment procedures 
to abrogate Weimar’s liberal democratic constitution and replace it with a totalitarian state, not to 
mention the party’s clear racist, bigoted, and violent intentions. Yet, despite Hitler’s potential 
threat to the constitution, Hindenburg had grown weary of Articles 25 and 48, worrying 
Weimar’s constitutional legitimacy was being undermined by their overuse. Thus, toward the 
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end of January 1933, Hindenburg opted for the dilemma’s latter horn. And although Weimar’s 
liberal democracy would formally survive two more months, this decision was its death sentence.  
Hindenburg’s decision to appoint Hitler has often been attributed to senility. Schmitt rejected this 
explanation, arguing instead that Hindenburg was confused about the substantive meaning of 
Weimar’s constitution and mired in an “oath trauma [Eidestrauma].”
1
 Article 42 of the Weimar 
Constitution bound the Reichspräsident, Hindenburg, by oath to defend the constitution. And, 
Schmitt thought, Hindenburg sincerely did his best to abide by that oath. But, Schmitt argued, he 
had no idea what the Weimar Constitution meant concretely. His confusion over his oath became 
especially acute when faced with a situation in which a clear majority of voters elected parties 
committed to dismantling liberal democracy.
2
 Did defending the constitution mean adhering to 
the outcome of democratic elections and guaranteeing the largest party, however illiberal and 
antidemocratic its goals may be, its right to form a governing coalition? Or did it mean 
exercising his constitutional authority to preemptively deny illiberal and antidemocratic parties, 
whatever the outcome of democratic elections, the opportunity to govern and refashion the state 
after their goals? Hitler or von Schleicher? Searching for an answer to this dilemma, Schmitt 
says Hindenburg repeatedly asked “what is constitutional [Was ist verfassungsmäßig]?” And, as 
we shall see, a lack of clarity stemming from indecision within the liberal democratic state itself 
was the source of his confusion. Because both horns seemed legitimate, Hindenburg thought to 
seize either exclusively would mean violating the constitution. Thus, without clarity on the 
fundamental meaning of the Weimar Constitution, Schmitt argued, how could Hindenburg be 
expected to uphold his oath?
3
 Schmitt thus concludes it was Hindenburg’s confusion about the 
                                                             
1 Frank Hertweck, Dimitrios Kisoudis, and Gerd Giesler, eds., "Solange Das Imperium Da Ist": Carl Schmitt im 
Gespräch mit Klaus Figge und Dieter Groh 1971 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010), 59ff; cf. William L. Shirer, The 
Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany  (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), 173. 
2 Hertweck, Kisoudis, and Giesler, Solange Das Imperium Da Ist, 67; cf. Carl Schmitt, "The Legal World Revolution 
(1978)," Telos 72(1987): 83. Interestingly, Hindenburg’s “oath trauma” also involved his earlier military oath to 
Kaiser Wilhelm II. Hindenburg – like many other Germans – did not think it was inconsistent with the Weimar 
Constitution to seek a legal, democratic way to restore the Monarchy (thus upholding his earlier oath). The second 
aspect of the oath trauma came to light through Brüning’s plan to prevent Hitler from seizing power. Brüning (also 
a monarchist, in the end) believed he had found the necessary two-thirds super-majority in the Reichstag to make 
a massive constitutional change. His plan meant first cancelling the 1932 presidential elections and extending 
Hindenburg’s term. Then, the Reichstag would declare a monarchy with Hindenburg as “regent.” When 
Hindenburg died, one of Wilhelm’s sons would resume the throne and Germany would revert to a constitutional 
monarchy similar to England’s. Implausibly, it seems Brüning had the necessary two-thirds in the Reichstag, 
including the backing of the SPD and the trade unions (opposed were the Nationalists, the Nazis, and the 
Communists). Apparently, an overwhelming majority agreed that, combined with thwarting Hitler’s rise, a 
constitutional monarchy was the best solution to Weimar’s Constitutional Crisis. Brüning’s plan fell apart because 
Hindenburg could not reconcile his oaths. From his perspective, Brüning’s plan may have been simultaneously too 
far (in abandoning Weimar) and not far enough (in not restoring Wilhelm to the throne) for Hindenburg. Schmitt, 
"The Legal World Revolution," 83; Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 153; William L. Patch,          
   ning and the Dissolution of the Weimar Republic  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 302. 
3 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 81. “[An oath] 
signifies an acknowledgement of the fundamental political decisions contained in the Weimar Constitution.” 
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substance of the constitution and exhaustion with Weimar’s crises – not mental infirmity – that 
led him to appoint Hitler Chancellor.  
The dilemma Hindenburg faced stemmed from the outcome of a series of German elections as 
the popularity of liberal democratic parties, like the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands – the Social Democratic Party), declined and they became unable to form working 
majority coalitions. This crisis peaked in Weimar’s election before the dilemma of January 1933. 
In November 1932, the NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei – the Nazi Party) 
obtained approximately 33% of the vote and the KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands – 
the Communist Party) 17%. The SPD, in contrast, obtained 20%. That is, the majority of seats in 
parliament were held by the NSDAP and the KPD, two parties representing diametrically 
opposed total movements, each with paramilitary wings. Their only overlapping interest lay in 
their shared desire to annihilate the core values of the Weimar Constitution: democracy, equal 
chance, liberal basic rights, and parliamentary representation itself.
4
 Taken at face value, the 
German people had decided against liberalism and against democracy. Although it was only a 
majority vote against Weimar, that majority could and did cooperate negatively against 
Weimar’s republican defenders by opposing the positive decisions they attempted to enact, 
including efforts by Reichstag Chancellors to resolve Weimar’s emergencies.
5
 Thus, at that time, 
liberal democratic parties like the SPD simply could not govern through the Reichstag because 
they lacked requisite democratic legitimacy. Something had to give for the balance of power to 
shift. But, at least until Weimar’s voters ceased electing illiberal and antidemocratic parties, it 
seemed that a liberal democratic coalition would not materialize in the Reichstag.  
After two years of continually overcoming Weimar’s problems by seizing the dilemma’s first 
horn, Hindenburg no longer seemed to believe circumventing parliament offered a real solution 
and he was worried about the constitutionality of his repeated exercise of emergency powers. 
Moreover, it seemed likely parliament would simply be back where it started after the reelections 
in 60 days, with a new “negative” majority of the NSDAP and the KPD.
6
 Although dissolving 
parliament, calling for new elections, and using the interim to rule by executive ordinances 
temporarily overcame Weimar’s parliamentary impasses, this path offered no long term solutions 
and was at best controversial. And, no matter what was accomplished with a custodial 
government, in the short term Article 25 eventually meant returning to the status quo ante until 
something changed in German voting behavior. 
Thus, in January 1933, Hindenburg tried the second horn of the dilemma.
7
 And because Hitler 
could most plausibly argue he could form a working majority coalition (with the conservative 
nationalist Deutschnationale Volkspartei or DNVP
8
), Hindenburg appointed Hitler Chancellor 
                                                             
4
 Hertweck, Kisoudis, and Giesler, Solange Das Imperium Da Ist, 68. 
5 Hertweck, Kisoudis, and Giesler, Solange Das Imperium Da Ist, 70. 
6 Hertweck, Kisoudis, and Giesler, Solange Das Imperium Da Ist, 70-71. 
7 Hertweck, Kisoudis, and Giesler, Solange Das Imperium Da Ist, 68. 
8 The leaders of the DNVP, Hugenberg and von Papen, believed they could contain the NSDAP. 
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constitutionally – according to the “rules of the game.” But, Schmitt argued, in placing 
democratic procedure above the constitution’s deeper commitments, Hindenburg effectively 
“relativized” the constitution. And in this case the practical outcome of a relativized constitution 
was, paradoxically, the decision to totally revise the nature of the game itself – Hindenburg set 
the wheels in motion for a legal constitutional revolution.  
For Schmitt, a decision to revolutionize the constitution could in no way be consistent with an 
oath to defend it. Moreover, he argued the Reichspräsident’s oath included identifying domestic 
threats to the constitution, and acting appropriately in response to them. Schmitt believed the 
opposition of the NSDAP, not to mention the KPD, to the basic principles of Weimar’s 
constitution made their very presence in parliament – not to mention their having obtained 
overwhelming power within it – profoundly unconstitutional. It was too obvious that they were 
enemies of Weimar. Under no circumstances should Hindenburg have granted either party “the 
political premium of the legal possession of power [die politische Prämien auf dem legalen 
Machtbesitz]” – which in the case of the Chancellor and his cabinet included control over both 
the police and the military, power to dissolve the Reichstag (through the exercise of Article 25) 
and the possibility (with presidential approval) to legally govern without liberal checks and 
balances before the Reichstag could reconvene, and finally a foothold into the presidency itself.
9
 
To grant that much power to parties politically and existentially opposed to Weimar’s “Absolute 
Constitution,” which Schmitt believed was above all a political and existential phenomenon, was 
too obviously incoherent with an oath to defend it.
10
  
Schmitt believed Hindenburg could not uphold his oath and serve as Weimar’s guardian because 
he ultimately had no idea what constitutionality meant. Schmitt, of course, had that insight. He 
believed he clearly saw Weimar’s enemies and could navigate it out of its legitimation crisis. 
Any constitution or defender of that constitution must be able to prevent movements deeply 
opposed to it from gaining power. In Weimar this meant, the Nazis and Communists, because 
their values were existentially antithetical to Weimar’s Absolute Constitution, to its political 
“status.” And, Schmitt believed, the dilemma between the Absolute and Relative Constitution, 
between substance and procedure or legitimacy and legality, was the dilemma of the twentieth 
century state. A relativized state and constitution was a threat to itself. It allowed its “enemies” 
historically unprecedented access to its heart by way of democratic amendment procedures and 
equal chance.  
Schmitt would turn out to be right: the NSDAP and the KDP were indeed enemies of the Weimar 
constitution. And the NSDAP, having obtained the political premium of the legal possession of 
power, would quickly use Weimar’s Constitution as a weapon against liberal democracy for the 
sake of its own fascist goals. 
                                                             
9 Hertweck, Kisoudis, and Giesler, Solange Das Imperium Da Ist, 70. 
10 Reinhard Mußgnug, Dorothee Mußgnug, and Angela Reinthal, eds., Briefwechsel: Ernst Forsthoff - Carl Schmitt 
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a. Left-Wing Extremism: The Communist Movement and the KPD 
German Communism was the first militant revolutionary movement to threaten Weimar. Across 
Germany in 1918, before the Weimar Republic was even declared, communists rebelled and 
founded soviet republics, modeling their actions on Lenin’s recent success. They were successful, 
at least briefly, in major cities, including Kiel, Berlin, München, Bremen, Frankfurt, Hannover, 
Braunschweig, Straßburg, and Würzburg. Stationed in München when the communists rebelled 
and declared the Bayerische Räterepublik, Schmitt directly witnessed the pitched street battles 
between communists and the police and, later, the Landwehr and Freikorps sent to crush them.
11
 
Both communists and their conservative reactionary opponents sought out political enemies and 
summarily executed them in the aftermath of their respective victories. Schmitt himself 
experienced insurrectionary violence firsthand when communist revolutionaries stormed his 
office and shot the officer at the desk beside his.
12
 This experience undoubtedly contributed to 
his unrestrained contempt for communism. And the ideologically-driven civil war out of which 
Weimar emerged represented a microcosm of the instabilities and deep-seated tensions among 
movements and parties that would characterize the rest of its brief life – not to mention Schmitt’s 
perception of it. 
Although the use of direct force by paramilitary groups like the Sparticist League and the 
Rotfrontkämpferbund was a strategy pursued throughout the span of the Weimar Republic, it was 
in the early years of Weimar that the communist party most actively pursued revolution through 
strikes and paramilitary revolutionary activities. As Weimar stabilized in the mid-20s, 
communists refocused their efforts on legal revolution. This shift was based on Leninist ideology, 
which advocated – contrary to “orthodox” Marxism – active participation in “bourgeois” 
institutions to subvert them from within.
13
 Accordingly, the KPD sought to win seats in 
parliament democratically. The party’s platform explicitly included the legal abrogation of the 
Weimar constitution in order to replace it with a communist state.  
Beyond these goals, the KPD was also considered to be a threat to German sovereignty because 
it did not represent German voters per se but instead, through the centralizing policies of the 
Third International, it was merely an extension of Moscow’s political will.
14
 And guided by their 
Soviet leadership, German communists believed anything short of total revolution was unjust. 
They believed compromise, even socialistic concessions from the SPD-led parliament, would 
                                                             
11
 Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall  (München: C.H. Beck, 2009). 
12
 Jan-Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought  (New Haven: Yale University, 
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Lenin, V.I. Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder. “Should We Participate in Bourgeois Parliaments?” 
14 This was because a core tenet of the Third International was that “stringently centralized leadership” to guide all 
global revolutions. The rationalistic dictatorship of the Soviet Union was reproduced globally. J. L. Talmon, The 
Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 437-438. 
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merely perpetuate their oppression. They believed that compromising with liberal democrats 
(“social fascists”) would prolong Germany’s prerevolutionary state. In a strange twist, the KPD 
thought liberal democratic parties like the SPD – and not the NSDAP – were their greatest 
enemy. Even as the NSDAP began to gain substantially in elections and showed signs of seizing 
control of Weimar, the KPD was unwilling to cooperate with the SPD against their shared enemy. 
In fact, the KPD would even cooperate “across the aisle” with the NSDAP to thwart the SPD and 
further delegitimate its “bourgeois” parliament.  
Their utter unwillingness to compromise and the threat to German sovereignty they represented 
did much to characterize Schmitt’s impressions of the nature of political parties in 20
th
 century 
Germany and the viability of Weimar’s parliament. Schmitt believed communism was symbolic 
of 20
th
 century disenchantment and the widespread cultural slide into atheism and materialism. 
This perspective was, no doubt, also informed and reinforced by Catholic theory, especially that 
of the counter-revolutionaries like Donoso Cortés who had made similar arguments. More 
alarming on a practical level for Schmitt, however, was the KPD’s Leninist strategy of legal 
revolution and its leadership’s subordination to another sovereign state. Here was an open enemy 
of Weimar taking advantage of Weimar’s democratic neutrality and openness for the sole 
purpose of obliterating it and replacing it with a new constitution.  
b. Right-Wing Extremism: The Nazi Movement and the NSDAP 
Linked to Schmitt’s experience with extremism on the left was his experience with right-wing 
extremism. Like the communists, radical conservative movements attempted their own violent 
revolutions, especially in the early years of the Weimar Republic. The paramilitary Freikorps – 
large segments of which were incorporated into the Nazi’s militant SA and SS branches – were 
particularly violent. Their most well-known revolutionary act was the 1920 Kapp Putsch, which 
aimed at resurrecting the German empire under an authoritarian government. It even succeeded, 
for a few days, in ousting Weimar’s legitimate government from Berlin. German fascism also 
predated the Nazi movement in phenomena like 19
th
 century völkisch sentiment and in non-
communist, nationalistic lower class parties like the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP).  
The Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) NSDAP emerged in the mid-
1920s as a revolutionary movement devoted, in addition to anti-Semitism and nationalism, to 
overthrowing Weimar. Seeing parallels between the Nazi movement and Mussolini’s Partito 
Nazionale Fascista and inspired by Mussolini’s successful 1922 “March on Rome,” Hitler led 
his “Beer Hall Putsch” in 1923. He hoped this coup d’état would consolidate the legitimacy of 
Nazism and embolden its members. But Hitler’s Putsch failed fantastically. Yet, precisely 
because it failed, Hitler became convinced he needed to adjust his approach. Declaring publically 
the Nazi movement to no longer be a revolutionary organization, Hitler had decided to adopt any 
and every means available. He incorporated nonviolent, legal revolutionary methods into his 
repertoire, just as the communists had. Hitler too recognized the revolutionary potential within 
liberal democracy itself – legal amendments to the constitution could be used to overthrow the 
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liberal democratic substance of Weimar: the Weimar Constitution’s absolute neutrality – even 
toward its own values – would be its Achilles’ heel. To overthrow the constitution, he needed 
wide popular support and sought to capture the middle class’ dissatisfaction with Weimar’s 
political and economic institutions and direct them toward Nazism.
15
  
The economic instability following the global crash of 1929 threatened the wealth and status of 
those middle classes, which gave the Nazis the base they needed to become a serious power.
16
 
Around this time, the NSDAP began to successfully market itself as a populist party and the 
party most capable of overcoming this crisis.
17
 The NSDAP’s völkisch propaganda about 
reclaiming German greatness, foreign enemies, and messianic rejuvenation resonated with the 
middle classes, traditional conservatives, and veterans.
18
 And by 1932, the NSDAP held a 
plurality in parliament and was restrained only by their inability to form a stable coalition with 
the second and third largest parties, the SPD and the KPD.   
c. Hindenburg’s Oversight and Hitler’s Insight 
Building up to Hitler’s Machtergreifung, Schmitt repeatedly warned against the possibility of a 
legal seizure of power, most explicitly in Der Hüter der Verfassung (1931) and Legality and 
Legitimacy (1932). But its prospects were theorized already in texts such as his Constitutional 
Theory (1928) and The Concept of the Political (1928/1932). This argument will be developed 
more fully in subsequent chapters but, briefly, Schmitt was most explicitly concerned about the 
possibilities offered by the “value-neutrality” of the First Principle Part of the Weimar 
Constitution.
19
 He believed this part of the constitution had been interpreted as elevating positive 
law and democratic proceduralism above any other principles or values of the Weimar 
Constitution. This was evident to him most of all in how his contemporaries, such as Richard 
Thoma and Gerhard Anschütz, approached Article 76.
20
 Article 76, which deals with 
constitutional amendment, states that “the Constitution can be amended via legislation. However, 
a decision of the Reichstag regarding the amendment of the Constitution only takes effect when 
two-thirds of those present consent…”
21
 The problem with his contemporaries’ interpretations, 
Schmitt argues, was that it “deprived the Weimar Constitution of its political substance and its 
foundation, making it into a neutral amendment procedure that is indifferent toward every 
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content.”
22
 In other words, “no parties, aspirations, organizations, or associations can be illegal 
because of their goals or the content of their goals.”
23
 They had, as he put it in 1928, relatived 
the constitution.
24
 Their interpretation amounted to reducing the basic principle of the 
constitution to merely the possibility for emendation based on democratic legitimation. The 
constitution itself offered no positive values or principles, these were merely accidental; the core 
of the constitution, insofar as it could be called that, was merely a procedure. But value-
neutrality was, in itself, incapable of preventing its own suicide if it fell into the wrong hands. 
Value-neutrality and emendation could be amended just like the rest of the constitution. 
Anticipating Hindenburg’s trauma and the dilemma that it spawned, Schmitt wrote in 1928 “one 
cannot swear an oath to an amendment procedure”
25
 – Weimar’s political status had to come 
from something besides value-neutrality.  
Schmitt warned the “National Socialists, Communists, the godless, whatever,” would be able to 
exploit precisely this value-neutral procedure to realize their substantively unconstitutional goals. 
He goes on to argue that, although liberal democrats like Thoma formally disagreed with his 
alternative interpretation – which would seek the substance of the Weimar Constitution outside 
of its amendment procedure and bar the participation of certain parties based on that substance – 
when the chips were down, many would not allow political decisions that would trample 
“principles of freedom and justice,” namely what we understand today to be the core tenets of 
liberal democracy. And Schmitt thought that this was the correct interpretation – but the refusal 
of thinkers like Thoma to openly commit to it sowed confusion among Weimar’s defenders 
about how to respond to those “unconstitutional” parties. 
The looming question for Schmitt, both at the time and afterwards, was whether a constitutional 
interpretation of 20
th
 century liberal democracy existed that would allow for a defense of its 
absolute constitution. In other words, was there a way to limit the scope of the amendment 
power of Article 76 that was consistent with the Weimar Constitution? Schmitt insisted there was. 
He argued that such a basis could be found in the substantive values Weimar had committed to in 
its Second Principal Part and this basis could be used to thwart the unconstitutional but formally 
legal goals of parties like the NSDAP and the KPD. Schmitt believed the only course of action 
open to Hindenburg – the only course consistent with what the constitution meant substantively 
and thus with Hindenburg’s oath – was this interpretation. In addition to committing above all to 
the Second Principal Part of the constitution, his interpretation meant grasping the first horn of 
the constitutional dilemma described above to overcome immediate threats to the state: 
dissolving parliament according to Article 25 and declaring another state of emergency 
according to Article 48.
26
 And it included barring “unconstitutional” parties from Reichstag 
                                                             
22 Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung, 4th ed. (Berlin: Dunker & Humblot GmbH, 1931), 113; quoted in Schmitt, 
Legality and Legitimacy, 49. 
23 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 49. 
24 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 67ff. 
25 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 81. 
26 Hertweck, Kisoudis, and Giesler, Solange Das Imperium Da Ist, 72, 153.  
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participation altogether. Schmitt’s interpretation is clearly opposed to that of his contemporaries, 
especially the legal positivists. But he thought the alternative, appointing an insurrectionary like 
Hitler Chancellor, could not be serious. 
As noted above, Schmitt argued Hindenburg’s lack of understanding of “constitutionality” led 
him away from the exercise of Article 25 and Article 48 and toward Hitler’s January 30
th
 
appointment as Chancellor. Once appointed, Hitler immediately used the very same political 
premiums of legal power Schmitt had advocated using against him. Invoking Article 25 on 
January 30
th
, Hitler dissolved the Reichstag and “without one word of protest from the guardians 
of the constitution, on February 2
nd
 he issued an emergency decree (according to Article 48)” to 
consolidate his power as Chancellor.
27
 Schmitt declared this was Hitler’s first act of legal 
revolution. The second began the day after the February 27
th
 Reichstag fire: Hitler’s 
Reichstagsbrandverordnung “temporarily” suspended the basic rights enumerated in Article 48 
to deal with a possible communist insurrection. Using the power granted by that measure and the 
suspicion that the communist movement was somehow responsible for the fire, Hitler suppressed 
the KPD, focusing especially on its leadership – effectively excising the Reichstag’s third largest 
party. In doing so, Hitler realized a stable majority coalition. Exploiting every opportunity, legal 
and otherwise (including, violence, intimidation, and propagandistic appeals to the fire and 
communist menace), the NSDAP won additional seats in the subsequent March 5
th
 elections. 
Now, with a two-thirds majority in the Reichstag, Hitler committed his second act of legal 
revolution: passing the Ermächtigungsgesetz, which effectively turned Weimar into a one party 
totalitarian state.
28
 In other words, in this second act of legal revolution Hitler used Article 76 to 
abrogate the Weimar Constitution – including the NSDAP’s need for political cooperation and 
Article 76 itself. Hitler clearly understood the political premiums of the possession of legal 
power. As Schmitt had warned. 
When Hitler was sworn in on January 30
th
, Schmitt’s friend Popitz advised him that he too – as 
von Schleicher already had – must “disappear” from politics [Jetzt müssen Sie von der Bildfläche 
verschwinden].
29
 Notoriously, Schmitt did not disappear from politics at all. Regardless of what 
his underlying motive was,
30
 the fact remains that Schmitt openly embraced his former “enemy” 
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and on May 1
st
 1933 became the 2,098,860
th
 member of the Nazi party.
31
 This decision led to the 
most despicable acts of his life, which included publically justifying the Night of Long Knives 
(which included the assassination of Schmitt’s former employer, von Schleicher) and the explicit 
incorporation of anti-Semitism into his writings, such as his “third most important book” The 
Leviathan in the State Theory of Hobbes. His failure to disappear from politics and his 
subsequent acts tainted his reception for generations and still affects how he is read.  
Schmitt defended himself in 1971 by claiming he was no hermit and wanted to remain 
practically involved. Moreover, with the Reichstag fire and the Ermächtigungsgesetz, Schmitt 
claims he had encountered an entirely new situation in his career as a jurist – that is, as a 
positivist.
32
 Schmitt wonders what Kelsen, “who was indeed a committed positivist, would have 
done” while going on to argue that, however, “although [I] was not a positivist in the sense 
Kelsen was. But, on the other hand, there is nothing other than positive law [Nun bin ich kein 
Positivist im Sinne von Kelsen. Aber es gibt andererseits auch kein anderes als positives 
Recht].”
33
 This claim hints at something important about Schmitt’s understanding of law. He 
seems to be invoking a right-Hegelian belief that positive law [Gesetz] is law [Recht], but only 
when it possesses certain requisite validity and is recognized as such (as Recht).
34
 This claim 
suggests that he felt obliged – as a jurist – to recognize the legitimacy of the new constitutional 
situation.
35
 Yet at the same time, his critique of Kelsen suggests that Schmitt unconsciously 
recognized he should have drawn a far different conclusion than a dogmatic positivist – Hitler’s 
“legal” assumption of power was substantively illegitimate and Schmitt should not have allied 
himself with such a man and regime, no matter the circumstances under which he seized power. 
But setting aside his absurd and incoherent defense, these remarks are valuable for shedding light 
on Schmitt’s constitutional theory by following the logic of them: while Recht must by definition 
be rational, it is nothing if it is not also real.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
S  m tt's “Co   pt of t   Pol t  al” a d T     L tt  s f om St auss to S  m tt by Heinrich Meier," The Journal of 
Modern History 69, no. 4 (1997); Joseph W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich  (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983); Mehring, Carl Schmit. 
31
 Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, 204. 
32 Hertweck, Kisoudis, and Giesler, Solange Das Imperium Da Ist, 91. “Der Februar, Reichstagsbrand, und [es] kam 
also das Ermächtigungsgesetz, nun, vom 24. März. Damit begann natürlich für mich als Juristen 'ne völlig neue 
Situation als Positivist.” 
33
 Hertweck, Kisoudis, and Giesler, Solange Das Imperium Da Ist, 92. 
34 Hertweck, Kisoudis, and Giesler, Solange Das Imperium Da Ist, 170. 
35 In fact, Schmitt argued that the Enabling Act constituted a new Constitutional Situation and the death of the 
Weimar Republic. Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk: Die Dreigliederung der Politischen Einheit von Staatsrat  
(Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1935), 43.  
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2. Si fractus illabatur orbis: Assessing Schmitt’s State Theory 
Diagnosing the latest iteration of the Weimar state and constitutional crisis in 1930, Carl Schmitt 
wrote “The constitutional situation of today is characterized first by the fact that numerous 
institutions and standards of the 19
th
 century have remained unchanged, while the current 
situation has changed completely.”
36
 He would continue to voice similar thoughts throughout his 





 century changes undermined the ability of that state form to function.
37
 Above 
all, Schmitt believed these changes stemmed from the advent of modern mass democracy, 
writing in 1926 that “the crisis of the modern state consists in the fact that no state, not even a 
democratic state, can realize a mass democracy, a democracy of mankind.”
38
 He thought mass 
democracy was a qualitatively different form of democracy but it tended to be treated as if it 
were merely a classical form of democracy with expanded suffrage. Weimar’s architects and 
defenders had failed to see this difference and how destabilizing mass democracy would be when 
forced into institutions designed for democracy in its classical form. This oversight was the root 
of Weimar’s crisis. To overcome that crisis meant looking back at the original idea and purpose 
of the state, beginning with Thomas Hobbes. But it also meant adapting classical state theory to 
meet the novel challenges posed by the 20
th
 century. Only by taking into account those changes 
could Weimar, or any 20
th
 century state for that matter, be stabilized and its authority restored.  
Schmitt’s state theory has been the subject of countless misinterpretations, by both his “friends” 
and his “enemies.” Throughout, I engage with Schmitt, critically reinterpreting core concepts 
ranging from “political theology” to his stance toward liberalism and democracy to “the political” 
and the Friend-Enemy distinction. Beyond this, and pace those who argue he was “deliberatively 
unsystematic,”
39
 I show a coherent core extends throughout Schmitt’s writings. Schmitt himself 
acknowledges his thought stood between system and aphorism – meaning between Hegel and 
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Nietzsche.
40
 And his work bears unmistakable signs of internal coherence and integration into a 
conceptual system despite the aphoristic appearance his many short publications may give.
41
  
Schmitt’s style coupled with postwar “denazification” dismissals are some causes of these 
misinterpretations. His aphoristic style may also be to blame. And his past, which could be 
briefly described as first a critic of Weimar Germany, then as a Nazi party member and apologist, 
and finally as a disgraced, unapologetic former professor. Schmitt's extremely complicated and 
extremely complicated relationship with both Weimar liberal democracy and Nazism is too often 
reduced to this over simplified biography, which is in turn used as an ad hominem dismissal of 
his political and constitutional theory. Finally, the general unavailability of English translations 
has muddied the waters in interpreting him in English. Fortunately, this situation is changing 
now. Particularly in the last decade, there has been an explosion in English translations of his 
work. And because more time has passed, we can approach Schmitt with more distance and 
disinterest than before. Finally, important biographical work is now appearing in the form of 
journals, letters, and comprehensive biographies, such as Reinhard Mehring’s recent 
groundbreaking book. These developments are revolutionizing the picture we have of Schmitt. I 
take advantage of this revolution to read Schmitt fresh and to attempt to understand him as he 
understood himself – something Schmitt himself seems to have hoped later readers would do.
42
 
This is not to say Schmitt’s work is beyond reproach. But any serious critique requires a 
stationary and accurately reproduced target. Thus, one aim of this dissertation is to set the record 
straight by providing this systematic reinterpretation of his state theory. Rather than reading him 
as a sort of proto-fascist theoretical aberration, emerging ex nihilo out of the chaos of Weimar 
and Nazi Germany, I look at the sources of Schmitt’s work in seminal texts of political and legal 
thought – spanning from the Ancients to Hobbes and Hegel to Weber. In doing so, I show that 
Schmitt is no irrationalist, sophist, or Catholic mystic. He is a rationalistic conservative juridical 
thinker, deeply grounded in the history of western political thought – especially what he himself 
calls classical occidental rationalism.  
There is reason to discuss Schmitt’s state theory besides setting the record straight. Schmitt’s 
state theory is valuable for its originality. There is a reason why Schmitt – despite his personal 
failures and controversial nature – remains well read and perhaps even seminal today. Schmitt 
articulated the core constitutional and political problems facing twentieth, and now twenty-first, 
century liberal democratic states. And he did it far more seriously than critics sometimes like to 
admit. He arguably offered the best problematization of the domestic problems facing 
democratic states today. This boils down to an intrinsic tension between democracy and the 
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constitution, whose core enshrines basic individual rights. Schmitt’s underlying critique of the 
modern state is that it has lost sight of how to distinguish tyrannical from legitimate regimes. 
This, he believes, is an effect of a positivistic worldview and the triumph of democratic 
proceduralism over all other principles of state. Thus, today, a transitory democratic majority or 
super-majority can legally amend an otherwise legitimate constitution out of existence and 
replace it with whatever that majority wants at that moment. The only rationale it needs is the 
fact that it has voted to do so. Schmitt’s original theory of this dynamic may offer new insights 
into contemporary discussions about the relationship of constitutionalism, rights, and democracy. 
Schmitt was in the unique position of being a policy maker and a constitutional theorist during 
Weimar’s collapse. As an opponent of both Weimar’s extremist parties, Schmitt theorized 
constitutional ways to halt the collapse of Weimar into either a fascist or bolshevist state. But 
Schmitt also played a practical role political and constitutional theorists rarely have. In the early 
1930s, Schmitt was an advisor to von Schleicher who, besides serving as the Chancellor briefly 
in 1932, orchestrated much of Weimar’s politics from the crisis of 1929 to his downfall in 1933 
through his influence on Hindenburg. By serving von Schleicher, Schmitt had the opportunity to 
influence major events at the end of Weimar. In addition, Schmitt represented Weimar in the 
infamous trial Preußen contra Reich. His constitutional and political theory was deeply involved 
in liberal democracy’s most desperate moment and provides insights into the practical limitations 
of applying ideal liberal democratic theory to modern mass democracy.  
We have the fortune of living in a comparatively stable period of modern history. But even now 
the threats to liberal democratic states Schmitt articulated – such as populism, extremism, and 
democratic disenchantment with basic liberal freedoms – are resurging, especially in Europe. 
Even if states today do not show Weimar’s symptoms, Schmitt believed the problems he 
articulated were intrinsic to constitutional democracy. Can a constitution legally commit suicide? 
How should a liberal democratic state respond when social movements threaten war with one 
another and against the state itself? How should liberal democrats respond when extremist 
parties are strong enough to cooperate in parliament and obstruct essential legislation? Can an 
illiberal antidemocratic party legitimately obtain power through elections and then kick the 
ladder down by legally amending democracy and liberalism out of the constitution entirely? Can 
a majority ever be wrong? Are positivism and facticity the only sources of legitimacy in 
modernity? Which ought to have priority when the two reach an impasse and a democratic 
majority or super-majority seeks to amend rights out of existence: liberal basic rights or 
democratic procedures? As long as constitutional amendments can be made that cast the core 
tenets of what we understand to be liberalism aside, these questions will remain important. And 
Schmitt’s struggles to answer them will continue to be informative. Few authors have been able 
to match his theoretical prowess and ability to articulate these problems. For this reason, 
Schmitt’s theory too remains valuable today.  
But beyond Schmitt’s insights into the dilemmas of liberal democratic states, I argue Schmitt’s 
state theory anticipated an institution found in varying degrees in many liberal democratic states 
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today: “militant democracy.” As I show, because Schmitt anticipates militant democracy and 
links his interpretation into his broader state theory, he offers us a normative theory of militant 
democracy – something Jan-Werner Müller recently argued was conspicuously absent.
43
 
Moreover, I conclude that because Schmitt’s state theory stands outside the liberal tradition of 
the state, militant democracy too is best conceived as standing outside that tradition. Because of 
the light it sheds on both tensions within liberal democracy and militant democratic states, my 
extrapolation and analysis of Schmitt’s state theory is both an important historical work as well 
as a valuable tool for understanding pressing questions of liberalism, democracy, 
constitutionalism, and states today. 
This dissertation extrapolates and analyzes Schmitt’s state theory in six chapters. The first 
chapter sets the foundation for Schmitt’s state theory by describing the intellectual context out of 
which it developed. It looks at four predominant political and legal theories of the interwar 
period, neo-Kantianism, neo-Hegelianism, Pluralism, and Revolutionary Conservativism, and 
discusses Schmitt’s relationship to them. 
The second chapter turns to his well-known concept of political theology. It argues that political 
theology has not yet been properly understood. Political theology, for Schmitt, is a critique of 
positivism. Above all, he argued theology (or metaphysics) and politics (and jurisprudence) were 
deeply entwined, a claim directed against positivistic beliefs, such as Kelsen’s, that one value 
sphere could be understood “purely.” For the state, this meant among other things that crises 
occur when institutions and metaphysical concepts of legitimacy no longer cohere with one 
another. This chapter traces Schmitt’s account of legitimacy, crisis, and historical change and the 
role Weberian disenchantment plays in the shifting terms of political legitimacy. 
Building off the arguments of the second chapter, the third chapter looks at how Schmitt argues 
Weimar was based on conceptions of legitimacy that were no longer capable of achieving either 
political legitimacy or stability. That is, Weimar’s institutions presupposed a situation that no 
longer existed. Schmitt argues “mass” democracy overheats the 19
th
 century “bourgeois 
Rechtsstaat,” the state form on which Weimar was modeled, and drives state and society into a 
Hobbesian state of nature. This chapter argues that democracy – not liberalism – was the focus of 
Schmitt’s criticism and lays the groundwork for his solution to the crisis of the 20
th
 century state. 
The fourth chapter analyzes Schmitt’s concept of the political from a new perspective. Without 
ignoring enmity, it looks at how Schmitt also defines the political in terms of friendship and 
“status par excellence,” the status that relativizes other statuses. This reinterpretation ties the 
political more strongly into political theology. This chapter also examines how reinterpreting the 
political affects another of his core concepts of the state: representation. 
                                                             
43 Jan-Werner Müller, "A “Practical Dilemma Which Philosophy Alone Cannot Resolve”? Rethinking Militant 
Democracy: An Introduction," Constellations 19, no. 4 (2012). 
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Using the reinterpreted “political” from the previous chapter, the fifth chapter outlines Schmitt’s 
state and constitutional theory by closely examining how he theorizes the “qualitative” total state 
as a means of containing the indirect powers that he believed were driving the state into a state of 
nature. It also looks at the role his constitutional theory, especially his constitutional typology of 
Absolute and Relative Constitution play, plugging them both into his concept of the political and 
his concept of the state. Finally, it concludes by looking at the role dictatorship plays in his state 
theory and how he aimed to define Weimar’s Reichspräsident as a commissarial authority 
instituted as the Absolute Constitution’s guardian of last resort. 
The sixth and final chapter looks at how Schmitt state and constitutional theory anticipates 
militant democracy. Militant democracy is when a democratic regime has mechanisms 
preventing its own democratic subversion. These pre-emptive mechanisms may appear to be 
illiberal and/or undemocratic. Examples include “entrenchment” of basic constitutional laws 
against emendation and the outright banning of certain unconstitutional extremist parties. This 
chapter shows how, as Schmitt plugged his theories of the Absolute Constitution and “the 
political” into the Weimar state, he developed an original defense for it. Schmitt’s account offers 
a way of reformulating debates about the legitimacy of militant democracy and advances it 
beyond the current discussion of constrained versus unconstrained democracy. This chapter 
concludes by discussing how militant democracy, especially when understood through the lens 
of Schmitt's state theory, stands in a different tradition than traditional liberal democratic, 
contractarian, state theory. 
In the end, Schmitt seems to want to force liberals and democrats out of their comfort zone by 
arguing that all political theory implies a certain concept of order. He believes that the 20
th
 
century triumph of democracy and liberalism led many, thinkers and lay people alike, to forget 
that both are constraints on society – they just happen to be legitimate constraints. As a corollary, 
he believes there are still means to distinguish tyranny from legitimate government. No matter 
how liberal or democratic one is, he argues there are limits to what is tolerable and permissible 
within a state. And this limit is where state authority kicks in. Although there are exceptions, 
Schmitt argues the vast majority of liberal democrats would not, when pressed, agree that, should 
a Nazi super-majority legally seize parliament and meet whatever threshold requirements are 
necessary to rewrite the constitution, their decision would be legitimate. He aims to show those 
who admit legitimacy is more than mere will and positive law that some degree of state authority 
is necessary and right eventually draws limits to individual freedom. Were everything merely 
(aggregated) will or the “normative power of the factual,” there would only be the state of nature. 
That is, Schmitt believes even a liberal democratic state presupposed some underlying 
conception of legitimacy, no matter how minimal, which provided political limits to which 
actions and laws were tolerable. The goal of his state theory is to check the unbridled celebration 
of universal suffrage and provide stability to the state in times of transition and crisis. 
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Like many others his age, Carl Schmitt was defined culturally and politically by Europe’s fin-de-
siècle atmosphere, the war, and the ideas they gave birth to.
1
 Born in 1888, Schmitt was in his 
late 20s when the First World War began. It was a period of disarming change. The ancien 
régime was in its death throes. And then it died. Europe had been brutalized by “the war to end 
all wars.” The Soviet Union was established in 1917. The Second Reich collapsed. Its successor, 
Weimar, was economically and politically bankrupted by the Treaty of Versailles. European 
society was strained by democratization, liberalism, innovations in science and technology, and 
urbanization. Radical economic changes, caused by the advent of advanced capitalism, 
international high-finance, and global credit systems, exacerbated the already tense relations 
among different segments of society. Yet underneath all these “20
th
 century” changes, the 19
th
 
century continued to resonate. For German Catholics, memories of Bismarck’s Kulturkampf 
lingered.
2
 And the failure of the Revolutions of 1848 informed early 20
th
 century politics and 
culture much as the Second World War continues to inform our own today. A culture of despair 
and pessimism had arisen around the turn of the century and lingered into the 1930s.  
Although he was an original thinker in his own right, everything Schmitt wrote was in dialogue 
with the events, thinkers, and ideas around him. Yet Schmitt’s intellectual context and 
development are often overlooked by political and legal theorists engaging with him. To make 
matters worse, many of the disputes and problems that early 20
th
 century German political and 
                                                             
1 Cf. Roger Woods, The Conservative Revolution in the Weimar Republic  (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 1. For 
German men born in the last decade of the 19th Century, the First World War was formative and its experience 
characterized their mature thought. The war’s effect is clear on Schmitt: he dedicates two of his most important 
works, both published in 1928, to friends who died in the war. And his life immediately following it is indicative of 
its impact. Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall  (München: C.H. Beck, 2009), 76ff. 
2 Schmitt said, growing up, he heard more about the Kulturkampf than the war of 1870. Frank Hertweck, Dimitrios 
Kisoudis, and Gerd Giesler, eds., "Solange Das Imperium Da Ist": Carl Schmitt im Gespräch mit Klaus Figge und 
Dieter Groh 1971 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010), 37. 
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 Schmitt’s state theory 
is best flushed out by situating it among the theories influencing him as he matured. Schmitt 
wanted to solve the problems he saw stemming from these theoretical movements’ attempts to 
understand and address the crisis constitution and state faced in light of 20
th
 century changes. At 
the same time, Schmitt was deeply influenced by how these movements framed issues. To 
provide the best foundation with which to understand Schmitt’s state theory, this chapter situates 
his thought and discusses the intellectual movements most significant to its formation. 
The most significant legal theory at the turn of the 20
th
 century was neo-Kantianism. Neo-
Kantian philosophy of law grew on a foundation of neo-Kantian epistemology. Throughout his 
mature life, Schmitt’s attacked neo-Kantian jurisprudence, especially the work of Hans Kelsen. 
He believed the movement theoretically mirrored Weimar’s weaknesses. Yet Schmitt himself 
was trained as a neo-Kantian. And while his very early work is clearly locatable within that 
tradition, on careful examination one finds even his later writings bear its imprint. In particular, 
his intellectual debt to and lifelong engagement with Max Weber, which continued to appear 
even in his very late writings, such as Die Tyrannei der Werte (1967), shows just how important 
this movement was to Schmitt’s intellectual identity. Yet Schmitt’s neo-Kantian debts have been 
largely ignored – with notable exceptions.
4
 Situating Schmitt’s thought within neo-Kantianism, 
particular ideas derivative of the Baden School, provides one of the most important bases for 
understanding Schmitt himself. 
Hegel, through neo-Hegelianism, experienced a renaissance in German political and legal 
thought around the turn of the century. Yet, with the exception of a few thinkers like George 
Schwab, Carlo Galli, and, very recently, Nehal Bhuta, Schmitt’s relationship to Hegel is rarely 
discussed.
5
 Yet Schmitt clearly drew on both Hegel and neo-Hegelianism in formulating his state 
and constitutional theory. Similarities in his style with Hegelian thought and its derivatives were 
sufficient for the SS to ideologically denounce him as a “Hegelian.” Schwab argues Schmitt 
understands the state as “a realm of objective reason,” allowing him to be classified as a neo-
Hegelian. Bhuta similarly argues he stands within the Hegelian tradition of 19
th
 century German 
                                                             
3
 It is not uncommon to encounter political and legal theorists who are not even aware that neo-Kantian positivism 
was the predominant position of the day, and against which Schmitt’s works were oriented. Neo-Kantianism, as a 
comprehensive philosophical movement, remains largely inaccessible in English. The majority of the texts that 
actually were translated were done so a century ago and many seminal texts by core thinkers can only be accessed 
indirectly through commentary or summaries.  
4 G. L. Ulmen, "The Sociology of the State: Carl Schmitt and Max Weber," State, Culture, and Society 1, no. 2 (1985): 
12ff; William E. Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law  (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 1999), 
19ff; George Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt  
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1989), 13-14; Joseph W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), 10. 
5 Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception, 26-28; Carlo Galli, La Genealogia della Politica: Carl Schmitt e la Crisi del 
Pensiero Politico Moderno  (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996), 13-33; Nehal Bhuta, "The Mystery of the State: State-
Concept, State-Theory and State-Making in Schmitt and Oakeshott," Department of Law (EUI, 2014), 11ff. 
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state theory. Schmitt’s writings before and after the rise of Nazism do suggest that, although 
Schmitt was clearly not a dogmatic Hegelian, there may have been something to the SS’ claims.
6
  
Schmitt consistently attacks the pluralist movement as an example of political theory’s 
debilitated condition during the Weimar Republic. For this reason, it is clearly one of his most 
important theoretical antitheses. Yet, aside from Schwab’s analysis, that Schmitt wrote many of 
his most important works in direct dialogue with and critical of pluralism has gone undiscussed.
7
 
Schmitt devoted his energy to attacking Harold Laski, who he saw as the movement’s leader.  





 summarily argue Schmitt was no revolutionary conservative. 
Yet Schmitt had close friendships with some of its core thinkers, including Arthur Moeller van 
den Bruck and Ernst Jünger. And, as will become apparent, there are relevant overlaps between 
Schmitt’s thought and this movement. Thus, regardless of whether Schmitt is best categorized 
ideologically as a “Revolutionary Conservative,” the movement is a point of orientation for 
developing Schmitt’s state theory. 
 
1. Neo-Kantianism: Kantian Method without its Metaphysics 
Neo-Kantianism became Europe’s dominant philosophical movement in the mid to late 19
th
 
century. It emerged, in part, over questions about the epistemological validity of traditional 
philosophy, especially metaphysics, as modern science framed by the philosophical views of 
positivism took hold.  
a. Neo-Kantian Philosophy  
By the 19
th
 century, scientific method was rapidly eclipsing other theories of knowledge. 
Thinkers’ struggles to come to terms with modern science, positivism, and “scientism” would 
characterize many important works of the 19
th
 century, affecting disciplines like philosophy and 
economics, such as by Marx’ historical materialism, or theology, by Comte’s “Religion of 
Humanity.” It was believed that, by extending the methods of natural science into every 
discipline, humanity really could overcome its problems. As a consequence of this expectation, 
positivism and related movements began a sustained attack on traditional philosophy, arguing in 
particular that metaphysical speculation, or any “unscientific” speculation for that matter, was 
                                                             
6
 Carl Schmitt, "Die Andere Hegel-Linie: Hans Freyer zum 70. Geburtstag," Christ und Welt, July 25, 1957; Hertweck, 
Kisoudis, and Giesler, Solange Das Imperium Da Ist, 14. 
7 Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception, 55-59. 
8 Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, 137ff.  
9 Galli, La Genealogia della Politica, 152. 
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unnecessary for understanding truth and the world.
10
 These movements argued legitimate 
knowledge consists only in what is empirically observable and that anything beyond 
“phenomena,” especially metaphysics, could not be legitimately known.
11
 
Neo-Kantianism arose out of this context. It attempted to restore the legitimacy of philosophy by 
reigning in the excesses of German Idealism, especially Hegel’s system. To do so, neo-
Kantianism avoided metaphysics altogether and focused instead on epistemology – the bases of 
knowledge and its limits – and logic as a way to ground philosophical legitimacy and show its 
relevance to a world increasingly reliant on knowledge established through scientific method.
12
 
Neo-Kantianism did not dispute scientific method but instead focused on the limits of scientific 
knowledge (as well as philosophy) and what positive contributions philosophy could make, a 
method modeled on Kant’s critical philosophy.
13
 Neo-Kantianism became the dominant 
philosophical movement in Germany by the early 20
th
 century, playing an important role in 
debates across Europe. Its epistemological orientation shaped many disciplines, including 
constitutional and legal theory, in which it also became a dominant school in its own right.  
Aiming to philosophize in the spirit rather than the letter of Kant, neo-Kantians radicalized 
Kant’s transcendental idealism by coupling its idealistic core with the Platonic theory of forms 
and insights from post-Kantian philosophy while striving to avoid lapsing into subjectivism.
14
 In 
agreement with Kant, neo-Kantians argued one can infer things-in-themselves exist from 
                                                             
10 This 19th century movement has recently been rediscovered in new bottles under the label of “scientific 
naturalism.” cf. Mario De Caro and David MacArthur, eds., Naturalism and Normativity (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010). 
11 Cf. John H. Hallowell, The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology with Particular Reference to German Politico-Legal 
Thought  (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1946), 68-69. Advocates of positivism never vanished 
from European discussions of methodology of science and social science. For example, there was the 
Methodenstreiten of the late 19th century (between Menger and Schmoller and between Meinecke and Lamprecht, 
as well as many others) that debated the validity of natural scientific method in the social sciences.  
Despite the criticisms leveled against positivism through the late 19th and early 20th centuries, its appeal never 
disappeared completely. In the 1920s, it would experience a resurgence as philosophers and scientists, including 
former neo-Kantians like Carnap and Hempel, reacted to the changes in Europe following the Great War by 
articulating a scientific conception of the world. Logical Empiricists or Logical Positivists, particularly the schools of 
the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Circle, argued that expanding scientific knowledge and scientific method as the 
legitimate basis for knowledge. As the name of the school suggests, logical empiricism rejected most if not all of 
the non-empirical aspects of philosophy, including metaphysics, for theoretical as well as political reasons, as they 
believed the expansion of science would prevent the turmoil that had disrupted European society from occurring 
again. Logical empiricism meant reviving the positivistic traditions of the nineteenth century – only the scientific 
aspects of philosophy were worth retaining. Cf. Richard Creath, "Logical Empiricism," in The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy ed. Edward N. Zalta (2011).  
Thus, the work of neo-Kantianism and other movements in critiquing positivism was grounded in an environment 
of rich debate over the validity of principles like metaphysics, belief, and value against the assertion that validity 
could only be accorded to what could be established empirically.  
12
 Peter Gordon, Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 53. 
13 Gordon, Continental Divide, 54. 
14 Manfred Kühn, "Interpreting Kant Correctly: On the Kant of the Neo-Kantians," in Neo-Kantianism in 
Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 
116. 
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phenomena
15
 but one cannot have direct knowledge of them because experience is strictly 
limited to how one’s senses have been affected by a thing’s phenomenal nature.
16
 Thus, readers 
of Kant concluded an epistemological “hiatus irrationalis”
17
 exists between phenomena and 
things-in-themselves. This barrier cannot be crossed by human reasoning; what lies beyond 
empirical sensation cannot definitively be known. This hiatus affects one’s ability to understand 
phenomena because one cannot link phenomena to underlying concepts, values, essences, or 
abstract laws, which lie on the other side of this hiatus. 
Drawing upon the concept of the hiatus irrationalis, neo-Kantian schools radicalized the division 
between phenomena and things-in-themselves. Even more so than Kant, they admit the 
difficulties modern scientific method poses for non-empirical things, insisting noumena cannot 
be apprehended by scientific methodology at all.
18
 The hiatus results in a strong fact/value divide. 
Neo-Kantians concluded from this the irrationality of the world: the divide between facts and 
values is so strict no definite relation between phenomena and our evaluation of them can be said 
to exist. This irrationality has two aspects. The first is that any phenomenon or event presents an 
infinity of successively and co-existently emerging and disappearing empirical facets and is 
infinitely describable as such.
19
 Thus any factual description or analysis of any phenomenon 
necessarily implies idealization and rationalization. No representation of the world is true or real 
because it presupposes an evaluation, which reflects the bias of the agent who idealizes and 
rationalizes. Moreover, there is no inherent rationality in a phenomenon, only what the observer 
deduces from it – the world is descriptively irrational. The second aspect of irrationality is that 
the world is ethically irrational.
20
 Logically, there is no way to link values to phenomena or 
events. Of course, phenomena or events can be evaluated but neo-Kantians argue that such 
judgments cannot be epistemologically legitimated because they cross this hiatus.
21
 The world is 
                                                             
15 Although this inference has also been criticized, most famously by Nietzsche. But neo-Kantians like Vaihinger, 
standing in Nietzsche’s wake, have also argued that Kant himself believed that the thing-in-itself was not a valid 
epistemological inference but merely a conscious heuristic fiction. 
16
 E.g. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Bedford St. Martins, 1965), 
92 (B74). 
17
 This term originates in the later Fichte to describe the problematic relationship Kant articulated between 
phenomena and the Dinge-an-sich or noumena. The term was popularized by the neo-Kantian Emil Lask in his 
dissertation Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte to describe the problematic relationship between phenomenal 
entities (that is, beings in history) and their relationship with concepts and general laws. That is, the relationship 
between empirical and transcendental, historical individual and abstract universal, intuition and concept, and 
facticity and validity cannot be bridged logically and this generates the fundamental problem of philosophy, how 
human beings can orient themselves correctly in the world. Cf. Frederick Beiser, "Emil Lask and Kantianism," The 
Philosophical Forum 39, no. 2 (2008): 39; Guy Oakes, Weber and Rickert: Concept Formation in the Cultural 
Sciences  (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988), 51. 
18 Kühn, "Interpreting Kant Correctly," 124. 
19 Max Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy," in The Methodology of the Social Sciences, ed. 
Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (Jaipur: ABD Publishers, 2004), 72-73, 78, 111, 130. 
20 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber, ed. H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1959), 361 (Cambridge History Text); Oakes, Weber and Rickert, 51-53.  
21 Cf. Hans Vaihinger, T   P  losop y of ‘as If’, trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1965), 84; 
Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy," 55.  
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nothing more than a chaos of sensations and no ‘things’ may be discerned in these perceptions 




The hiatus irrationalis was anticipated by Kant, particularly in his “Antinomies of Pure 
Reason.”
23
 There, Kant describes how answers to the questions that bear most on human life are 
beyond the limits of reason. For example, one cannot know whether there is a god; one cannot 
know whether we are simply causally determined or free agents, and thus morally accountable at 
all. The existence of the hiatus undermines the possibility for human reason to understand the 
most important things for human life because we stand on the wrong side of this hiatus. 
Intelligible perception can only be of phenomena. With the limited evidence available, human 
observers can endless speculate about what stands on the other side but never conclusively prove 
anything. Meanwhile, modern science narrowed further and further the rational grounds for 
belief in metaphysical questions such as human agency, god, or the immortality of the soul. Yet, 
without these irrational beliefs, meaningful human action is difficult if not impossible. Kant 
overcame this problem by arguing reason’s necessary presupposition of these beliefs, even if 
their truth cannot be empirically evaluated.
24
 However, beginning with Hegel, many thinkers 
criticized Kant’s ethics, despite whatever formal legitimacy he may have constructed, for being 
wholly unable to provide determinate ethical norms.
25
 And then later Nietzsche lambasted Kant 
precisely for the metaphysical presuppositions of practical reason – arguing, had Kant truly 
followed his critical philosophy, he would have abandoned his Second Critique altogether.
26
  
Neo-Kantians tried to salvage Kant’s philosophy by adapting his system to these criticisms. 
Making concessions to Kant’s critics, they accepted that, despite the epistemological and logical 
problems metaphysical presuppositions present, agents’ metaphysical presuppositions were a 
necessary aspect of human experience. They believed that, if agents were to have a meaningful 
experience of the world, they would need to act as if their metaphysical presuppositions were 
valid and bridge the hiatus irrationalis between the noumenal world and the phenomenal world – 
even though this was logically impossible. According to this neo-Kantian reading of Kant’s 
system, his presuppositions of practical reason were not wrong per se, as Nietzsche had argued, 
                                                             
22 Cf. Vaihinger, T   P  losop y of ‘as If’, 157, 169; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 104-106 (B192-195).  
23
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 384 (B433)ff. 
24
 Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason," in Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 231-247 (235:113-235:134); Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals," 
95 (94:448).  
25 Most famously, in G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1967), §135, §135A (pp. 189-190). 
26 In particular, see Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1994), §335 
(pp. 263-266)., and Kaufmann’s note 65 to this aphorism: “It makes me think of the old Kant who had obtained the 
“thing in itself” by stealth – another very ridiculous thing! – and was punished for this when the “categorical 
imperative” crept stealthily into his heart and led him astray – back to “God,” “soul,” “freedom,” and “immortality,” 
like a fox who loses his way and goes astray back into his cage. Yet it had been his strength and cleverness that had 
broken open the cage!” 
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but were actually necessary fictions that enabled meaningful human action.
27
 Neo-Kantians 
moved beyond Kant in claiming that the distinction between phenomenon and thing-in-itself was 
not existential or ontological but, following the regulative role it played, normative.
28
 That is, 
some neo-Kantians interpreted the thing-in-itself not as a metaphysical claim but as a limiting 
concept of reason.
29
 By reinterpreting the thing-in-itself in normative rather than metaphysical 
terms, they felt they could salvage Kant’s system without glossing over its problems.  
Neo-Kantians went on to theorize how metaphysical presuppositions were akin to faith. An 
individual necessarily believed – despite whatever logical dilemmas belief presented – that some 
metaphysical Idea ordered her reality, allowing her to engage meaningfully with reality and 
represent it to herself and others. These “regulative” ideas allowed the subject to behave as if 
norms and representations – which, according to the conclusions of the epistemological hiatus, 
have no actual relation to the empirical, causal world – did in fact affect it, allowing for agents to 
perform normatively meaningful actions.
30
 And regulative ideas allowed her to distill out 
normatively or factually insignificant data, overcoming the descriptive and ethical irrationality of 
a world comprised strictly of phenomena. Without them, intentional action would be impossible 
despite the unreality of metaphysical presuppositions they play an important role in grounding 
agents’ meaningful acts in the world, enabling their conscience to represent moral norms as real 
responsibilities, in the face of logical and ontological problems like causality and determinism 
and the logical barrier separating facts and norms.
31
 
In light of the role they play in an agent’s perception of the world, Neo-Kantians came to see 
regulative ideas (such as God, the will, normative order, and the soul) as a necessary part of 
experience.
32
 They argued that humans must and do behave as if regulative ideas or 
metaphysical presuppositions exist, despite the logical problems of such behavior.
33
 Human 
thought cannot reproduce reality nor can it adequately conceptualize it – only value-laden 
representations of reality allow meaningful engagement with reality.
34
 Neo-Kantians responded 
to critics essentially by saying, ‘it doesn’t matter whether metaphysical suppositions are false, 
they are normatively necessary and will occur anyway.’ 
                                                             
27
 Vaihinger, T   P  losop y of ‘as If’, viii, 47, 285-291. 
28
 Steven G. Crowell, "Transcendental Logic and Minimal Empiricism," in Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary 
Philosophy, ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 156; Gordon, 
Continental Divide, 54-55; Cf. Vaihinger, T   P  losop y of ‘as If’, 320. 
29 Gordon, Continental Divide, 53; Cf. Vaihinger, T   P  losop y of ‘as If’, 74, 314. 
30 Kühn, "Interpreting Kant Correctly," 274-275. Neo-Kantians did, however, find a basis for this in Kant, looking to 
passages in the Critique of Pure Reason where he suggests that practical utility (or even necessity) of regulative 
Ideas. Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 532 (A624/B670) and 564-565 (A694-696/B722-724).  
31 Cf. Vaihinger, T   P  losop y of ‘as If’, 311.  
32 Cf. Vaihinger, T   P  losop y of ‘as If’, 306-307.  
33 Cf.Hallowell, The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology, 88.  
34 Vaihinger, T   P  losop y of ‘as If’, 8.  
Leviathan Run Aground: Chapter 1 
Page | 23  
Hans Vaihinger, the renowned philosopher and editor of Kant-Studien, the most important neo-
Kantian journal of the early 20
th
 century, articulated one influential version of this belief at the 
turn of the century, arguing that the philosophical presence of these “as-if” fictions extended 
back to the scholastics and found important shape in the work of Thomas Hobbes, such as his 
ideal of the social contract, the state of nature, and Leviathan.
35
  
Thus, neo-Kantians found a way to continue using Kant’s presuppositions of reason in a way that 
overcame 19
th
 century criticisms. They asserted that, even though such presuppositions may be 
logically untenable, they play an important role for human life nonetheless as regulative ideas 
bridging the hiatus. The “fictions” of regulative ideas are necessary to make sense of an 
otherwise irrational and meaningless series of phenomena. For neo-Kantians, regulative ideas 
overcome the infinitude of phenomena and the otherwise ethical irrationality of the world.
36
  
Later figures whose ideas were profoundly shaped by neo-Kantianism, including Max Weber, 
built off the relationship between regulative ideas and phenomenal reality by outright rejecting 
theoretical claims to perfectly portray or reproduce reality, arguing that such claims are logically 
impossible and inherently misleading for being incapable of producing meaningful knowledge 
precisely because of the qualitative infinity of phenomena.
37
 Weber, in fact, argued that science 
seeks only valid representations abstracted out of reality for the sake of understanding how best 
to affect phenomenal reality.
38
 Conceptual abstractions enable meaningful action not only by 




But the validity of the abstractions was still a sort of faith, premised on the relative accuracy of 
induced judgments agents believed were good enough for the purpose at hand; they were nothing 
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more than a postulate of practical reasoning.
40
 While the Idea supplements the perception of 
external reality, about which we can never have any certainty, serving to provide order and 
meaning to our experience of things, it is supplied from within, as it were, because it does not 
derive from knowledge of the world but from necessary regulative presuppositions. Thus, one’s 
perception of a meaningful reality is a reflection of whatever regulative Idea one holds. “It is 
nothing but the formal unity of consciousness expressing itself through the categories, and now 
reflecting itself back from the objective world of perception thus constituted.”
41
 But because of 
this hiatus, because our knowledge is limited to phenomena and we can only presuppose the 
answers to the questions essential to human life, there emerge irreconcilable pluralistic 
suppositions about the nature of this normative Idea. Weber suggested that the ethical 
irrationality of the world, resulting from the epistemological hiatus, coupled with the recognition 
of the epistemic value and importance of regulative Ideas, leads to multiple Weltanschauungen – 
that is, to polytheism and warring gods.
42
 Irreconcilable Ideas, allowing subjects to make sense 
of reality, tend to conflict over their fundamental presuppositions, and there is no way to 
reconcile them because the validity of one’s fundamental presuppositions is a matter of faith.
43
  
b. Neo-Kantian Legal Theory 
Neo-Kantian legal theory grew out of this earlier epistemological-philosophical movement. In 
general, it tended toward a sort of theoretical pragmatism. Because the epistemological 
assumption of the hiatus undermines definitive knowledge of absolute normative standards, legal 
theorists focus on other aspects of the law, like whether some set of presuppositions ‘works.’
44
 
Pragmatism led to positivism, and strict adherence to the hiatus drove legal theorists to consider 
the sheer facticity of law and how it worked causally. The hiatus allowed legal theorists to work 
on constructing a scientific account of the law by focusing on strict causal, empirical relations 
among “legal” phenomena, abstracting out “meta-jurisprudential” considerations, such as 
morality, metaphysics, and power and politics, altogether. The positivistic bent of neo-Kantian 
legal theory drives it toward proceduralism – as long as a law conforms to logical, procedural 
requirements, it is legitimate law.  
The work of Hans Kelsen exemplifies neo-Kantian legal positivism.
45
 His juridical thought is 
grounded in the idea that a legal system must ultimately be grounded in a “transcendental-logico” 
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 Andrew Seth, "The Epistemology of Neo-Kantianism and Subjective Idealism," The Philosophical Review 2, no. 3 
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presupposition he calls the Basic Norm (Grundnorm), which is logically required to render the 
validity of law intelligible – but whose content cannot be established through reason.
46
 The 
Basic Norm itself cannot be determined because of the limits of reason to go beyond observable 
legal phenomena. That is, Kelsen theorizes the Basic Norm as a sort of noumenal entity: a 
necessary presupposition but one about which one can know nothing except that it necessarily 
exists. Kelsen argued that the ultimate grounds for a closed legal system was a consideration of 
meta-jurisprudence and belonged outside of the science of positive law. The epistemological 
hiatus
47
 obscures the normative substance underlying the law – but one must act as if some 
“Grundnorm” were underlying observable legal phenomena for them to have their normative 
authority and, ultimately, their systemic coherence. The task of legal science was, therefore, not 
to determine the content of the one morally right law (a task that cannot be scientific because it 
extends beyond the limits of human reason) but to understand whether a pure legal form hovered 
over the plurality of actual legal forms and to use this knowledge to refine them.
48
 And this focus 
on facticity went hand in hand with the neo-Kantians’ embrace of democracy. The 
epistemological limits of human reason, formulated as the hiatus, deny any definite 
determination of values and norms, which lead Kelsen to the sober conclusion of political 
relativism. In fact, Kelsen thought 20
th
 century metaphysical relativism was a positive advance 
for humanity, legitimating the spread of democracy and collective self-determination, freeing it 
from arbitrary authoritarian constraint.
49
  
Legal fictions play a larger role in Kelsen’s jurisprudence. He broadens it beyond the basic norm 
and assesses critical concepts of the state, such as sovereignty, ‘the legal person of the state’, 
legal will, and unity of the legal order, arguing that these too are simply legal fictions
50
 - 
recognizing, however, that they are just that: legal fictions. One of Kelsen’s strongest theoretical 
contributions to jurisprudence was his purification of law by eliminating disadvantageous and 
‘inutile’ fictions and replacing them either with scientific jurisprudence (which is to say, 
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jurisprudence based strictly on empirically observable phenomena) or with what he thought were 
useful fictions, such as the Grundnorm.
51
  
He criticizes the concept of sovereignty in particular for being merely a device for smuggling 
metajuristic phenomena into the practice of jurisprudence. Sovereignty – and the coercion 
attached to it – is undemocratic and provides an escape from the formal constraints of 
proceduralism by legitimating the arbitrariness of the state’s actions at its highest level. He felt 
20
th
 century law, corrected by his positive theory, could do away with the fiction of sovereignty 
because it is no longer a necessary or useful fiction. He argued the fiction of juridical sovereignty 
held humanity back just as the fiction of divine sovereignty had.
52
 Just as discarding the fiction 
of god’s sovereignty led to advances in human understanding of and power over the natural 
world, so too would eliminating the fiction of state sovereignty lead to advances in human 
understanding of and power over the social world.
53
 It was misleading to theorize the state as 
sovereign because this concept masked underlying a-juridical forces that manipulate public law, 
like economic and social powers.
54
 By replacing legal fictions like “sovereign” and “sovereign 
power” with the more scientific and formalized Grundnorm, Kelsen hoped to deprive meta-
jurisprudential powers of their ability to manipulate the law in an intransparent way. The 
Grundnorm was purely normative and everything else that followed in his science of law hinged 
upon its normative qualities, rather than opaque claims of sovereign power or other ‘impure’ 
legal phenomena and allow the state to be wielded in a more neutral manner – pushing human 
self-rule with the law in a more fair, which is to say more open and democratic, direction. 
To render jurisprudence scientific and to remain in accordance with neo-Kantian philosophical 
presuppositions, Kelsen sought to understand what universal qualities law has in its practice. 
That is, he seeks to understand the universal observable qualities of the behavior of and 
application of legal norms. To do this, Kelsen aimed to understand not transcendental principles 
or values underlying the law, which is to say its content, but instead its transcendental form. 
Kelsen pushed legal positivism to its limits and quarantined the study of law from any and all 
non-legal (or meta-jurisprudential) phenomena.
55
 By focusing on form, Kelsen concluded that as 
long as law was enacted in conformity with proper procedure and was generally enforced, it was 
legitimate law. But this, importantly, meant neo-Kantianism was wholly indifferent to the 
content of law – as noted already above, Kelsen, for example, was a democratic relativist with 
regard to jurisprudence; he was driven to this standpoint logically by his own epistemological 
assumptions, including the hiatus. In the end, neo-Kantianism’s epistemological assumptions, 
neutrality, and focus on proceduralism in jurisprudence caught up with it. Critics assailed it for 
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lacking any substantive basis to criticize the content of the law, opening the door to the 
destructive populist movements that undermined Weimar in the early 1930s.
56
 
Carl Schmitt’s relationship with neo-Kantianism is complicated, and has not received sufficient 
attention. Scholars usually focus on Schmitt’s polemics against the school (failing to distinguish 
neo-Kantian positivism from the broader philosophical movement), and minimize or simply 
ignore his debts to it.
57
 Schmitt completed his degree in jurisprudence at the University of 
Straßburg in 1912, while Wilhelm Windelband was its rector. Windelband was a leading 
member of the Baden School of Neo-Kantianism, whose other members included Heinrich 
Rickert, Emil Lask, Ernst Troeltsch, and Max Weber.
58
 Schmitt’s academic introduction to the 
movement came through Paul Laband, who taught him jurisprudence at Straßburg.
59
 Yet, 
sensitive to the importance of historical context in affecting legislation and jurisprudence, 
Schmitt incorporated historicism and the centrality of the state into his early jurisprudence.
60
 
This incorporation was not, importantly, incoherent with neo-Kantianism, central thinkers within 
the movement, notably Fischer and Lange, balanced Kant out with Hegelian insights.  
The greatest early influence on Schmitt came not from his teachers but from his studies. Hans 
Vaihinger’s 1911 Die Philosophie des Als Ob (The Philosophy of ‘As If’) was one of Schmitt’s 
main preoccupations until the First World War broke out. Many of his earliest works develop 
Vaihinger’s ideas further in the context of jurisprudence and the state.
61
 Schmitt was interested in 
Vaihinger’s influence and approval enough to self-review two of his earliest books, Gesetz und 
Urteil (1912) and Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen (1914) in Vaihinger’s 
Kant-Studien
62
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Four years of mechanized slaughter deeply affected German scholars’ perception of the world. 
Neo-Kantianism fell out of favor after the war. Europe believed less and less in the viability of 
the Kantian tradition. But not principally for whatever philosophical shortcomings it may have 
had. Instead, Kant and neo-Kantianism fell out of favor because they were believed to have 
simply been oriented by the wrong questions.
64
 Cultural pessimism that had been brewing since 
the turn of the century, and for the younger generations who had experienced the war, the 
formality and concern with neo-Kantian epistemology no longer made any sense. These “older” 
modes of thinking were simply illegitimate. By 1918, Schmitt had broken with neo-Kantian 
jurisprudence.
65
 In contrast to neo-Kantianism’s formalism, Schmitt sought outlets for “spirit.” 
The beginning of this turn was most identifiable with the embrace of irrationality in his writings 
on Däubler’s Nordlicht following Eisler’s death in 1915.
66
 
Schmitt became more concerned to show how “meta-juridical” factors affected legal decisions 
and were necessary to understand them.
67
 In other words, Schmitt rejected the idea that legal 
phenomena are “detached from processes of social formation.”
68
 Schmitt’s clearest criticism of 
the neo-Kantian school comes in the form of his attacks on Hans Kelsen in his 1922 Political 
Theology. There, despite agreeing with Kelsen about the existence of a divide between facts and 
values and the need for positing an abstract ‘Idea’ of Recht (that is, epistemologically), Schmitt 
argues that Kelsen is wrong to view something like the hiatus as a real barrier to norms’ 
regulation of reality.
69
 As long as there is the state, this logical barrier can be overcome. 
Agreeing with neo-Kantian jurisprudence, Schmitt thought there was no way to definitely 
contextualize a norm because its meaning depended on its context.
70
 Schmitt thought that neo-
Kantian formalism in legal theory undermines its practicality because it forces them to ignore 
concrete reality for the sake of logical rigor.
71
 He thought neo-Kantianism resulted in an aporetic 
formulation – the logical dilemma of the fact/value divide makes them impotent to assess the 
actual relationship between the two domains. And Schmitt thought he could overcome it by 
moving beyond neo-Kantian legal formalism and appealing to political notions like sovereignty 
and authority and incorporating sociological insights. He argued neo-Kantianism’s formalism led 
it to miss the defining question of jurisprudence: how the concepts and actual practice of 
jurisprudence are determined – how an Idea of Recht is realized concretely in a particular place 
and time.
72
 Neo-Kantianism formalism led it to be overly preoccupied with questions of formal 
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legality because, according to the Fact/Value divide, this was the only problem about which 
jurisprudence could really concern itself. Their juridical formalism, Schmitt would eventually 
argue, made them completely helpless to address the real problems of Weimar – because really 
any political party that adhered to the constraints of legality satisfied the neo-Kantian 
prerequisite of legitimacy, be it a Nazi party or the SPD. 
Schmitt’s criticisms of neo-Kantianism bring to mind Hegel’s critique of Kant in Philosophy of 
Right paragraph §135 for his ‘empty formalism’ in morality.
73
 Also reminiscent of Hegel are 
Schmitt’s concerns with meta-juridical factors reflects his belief in the necessity of 
contextualization of an abstract norm in its historical moment. This epistemological concern is, 
as I show in the next chapter, an aspect of neo-Kantian thought that Schmitt retains – albeit in an 
evolving form – throughout his career. Schmitt’s complicated relationship with neo-Kantianism, 
from the perspective of his entire body of work, could be summarized as the following: despite 
his clear rejection of neo-Kantian state and legal theory, Schmitt retains basic Baden neo-Kantian 
epistemological assumptions. And these assumptions will explain similarities between his 
constitutional and state theory and that of his contemporaries, including important foundational 
overlaps with Hans Kelsen.
74
 These assumptions are essential for making sense of his 
constitutional and state theory.  
 
2. Neo-Hegelian Jurisprudence: The Emergence of Recht out of Society 
Neo-Hegelianism jurisprudence developed out of neo-Kantianism, building upon similar 
scientific and epistemology foundations. Neo-Hegelianism too attempted to avoided metaphysics. 
In particular, neo-Hegelians strove to avoid linking Hegelian jurisprudence to Hegel’s 
discredited speculative metaphysics.
75
 Like neo-Kantianism, Neo-Hegelianism admitted 
epistemological challenges to metaphysical claims, such as the hiatus irrationalis, and 
recognized the problems positivism and modern scientific method posed for such investigations. 
Neo-Hegelians too believed they could provide scientific knowledge of the law.  
Neo-Hegelianism attempted to address criticism of neo-Kantianism, which argued that it had not 
overcome the substantive problem Hegel identified in Kant a century earlier: neo-Kantianism 
was overly formalistic and could not provide a substantive normative understanding of or guide 
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to jurisprudence.
76
 That exemplary neo-Kantians, such as Hans Kelsen, were openly relativistic 
only seemed to confirm this objection. In addition, critics argued neo-Kantianism lacked 
legitimacy because the movement merely supplanted metaphysics with methodological precepts. 
They criticized this, because they believed that neo-Kantianism had come no closer to actually 
scientifically accounting for the human phenomena that it purported to study. Even the Baden 
School of neo-Kantianism, the school most concerned with the role that culture played both in 
scientific knowledge and human life could make no claims about content – merely form – and 
therefore could offer no specific ethical prescriptions.  
To overcome these criticisms yet remain scientific, neo-Hegelianism looked to the ethical 
structures emerging out of a particular state and society. Neo-Hegelianism agrees with neo-
Kantianism that Recht does not originate from the state.
77
 Recht emerges out of society itself. 
Rather than seeking to derive the ideal form of law, the task of jurisprudence was to analyze the 
principles of right emanating from a particular society in order to best understand the ideal laws 
to which that same society ought to conform in its actual legislation. The movement instead 
focused on formal relations among legal phenomena, focusing strictly on their facticity – how 
legal phenomena emerge out of social and political questions.
78
 Insofar as neo-Kantianism 
sought to purify law by eliminating metajuristic phenomena and focusing on its transcendent 
formal characteristics, neo-Hegelianism sought to understand exactly how jurisprudence is 
merely a function of these meta-juridical phenomena, focusing on how a particular state and 
particular ethical society contributed to its system of legal practice. In accounting for this, they 
turned in particular to the nascent discipline of sociology. 
Neo-Hegelianism constructed its theoretical framework by turning to Hegel’s philosophy of 
history, ethics, and state theory. They conceived of law as a social tool. The end of jurisprudence 
was the promotion of the highest ethical community: the state. Neo-Hegelians thought, by tying 
power and coercion into social coordination, the highest ethical community and the most 
substantive form of human life and freedom could be realized. Objective right could be realized. 
Believing in the ethical superiority of both factical law and the community over the individual, 
neo-Hegelians were untroubled by the explicit subordination of individual wills to the state. And 
accordingly, for neo-Hegelians, neo-Kantianism was wrong: meta-juridical phenomena like 
sovereignty and the state were real. And rather than understanding meta-juridical phenomena as 
undermining the practice of law, as neo-Kantians did, they believed that these phenomena were 
indispensible for the law, grounding its practice.  
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Interestingly, despite clear differences between the two movements, both schools overlapped on 
one important point: any and every actually existing state was a Rechtsstaat.
79
 For neo-
Kantianism, every state was a Rechtsstaat because every state was merely the personification of 
its legal order and that, as long as the procedural constraints on the formation of law were 
maintained, that law was legitimate. Thus every state adhering to the formal constraints of 
legality was a Rechtsstaat. For neo-Hegelianism, every state was a Rechtsstaat because law was 
identified with the will of the state and thus, whatever the particular content, what the state 
‘willed’ was de facto law. While one understood law’s form without content, the other 
understood laws content without form – but both ended up without criteria by which to criticize 
existent legal systems. Their lack of a critical basis stemmed from their inability to clearly link 
facts and norms, which led them to marginalize or flat out reject transcendental norms’ relation 
to these facts. Regardless, both schools’ interests in accommodating natural science and 
positivism led to a problematic positivistic conclusion: whatever the state does is legally 
legitimate and there is no clear basis by which to criticize its meta-juridical legitimacy. In 
Germany, both schools’ focus on facticity and natural scientific method and both schools’ 
avoidance of transcendental normative standards at best deprived German legal theorists of a tool 
to criticize the Nazi movement’s legal revolution.
80
 
Schmitt’s state theory does have some overlaps with both Hegel’s state theory and neo-Hegelian 
jurisprudence.
81
 Schmitt argued the state is the highest ethical community and the only institution 
capable of overcoming the individualism of civil society and achieving a total normative 
community. As we shall see in later chapters, although he never uses the term, Schmitt seems to 
conceive of the state as the realm of “objective reason” and as the means to establish something 
like Hegel’s Sittlichkeit. The existential formation of identity his Friend-Enemy distinction 
implies was clearly influenced by Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. Schmitt’s critique of Kelsen 
follows the neo-Hegelian critique of neo-Kantian ‘formalism’ and, again like neo-Hegelianism, 
seeks to understand how meta-juridical phenomena, particularly sociological and political 
phenomena, affect juristic practice. The role that history and the uniqueness of historical events 
play in Schmitt’s jurisprudence and state theory is also clearly derivative of Hegel. Schmitt’s 
neo-Hegelian side was apparent enough to his contemporaries for the SS journal, Das Schwarze 
Korps, to accuse him of this publically in their attempt to discredit him his participation in the 
Nazi government and to undermine his character.
82
 
But Schmitt also incorporates traditions explicitly critical of Hegelian thought and Idealism in 
general. After the war, Schmitt was influenced strongly by the work of Soren Kierkegaard, who 
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was a strong critic of Hegel.
83
 Kierkegaard’s work became popular as a foil for both neo-
Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism because of his turn to the irrational and for his arguments about 
the role of faith.
84
 Schmitt used Kierkegaard’s writings to help make a case for committing to “a 
basic Weltanschauung emanating from one source.”
85
 Schmitt’s work hinges on his use of 
concepts, such as sovereign decision, the exception, and political theology, that clearly come 
from Kierkegaard. He even explicitly refers to Kierkegaard in Political Theology.
86
 In addition, 
against a sort of Hegelian reading, Schmitt does not base his theory on a teleological or 
rationalistic philosophy of history or any definitive idea of “objective reason” in the world – 




Schmitt also displays some of Nietzsche’s influence in his writing style and ideas – something he 
even later acknowledges.
88
 It’s unclear to what extent he was influenced by Nietzsche directly, 
because clearly some of that influence is mediated by Max Weber. But at least in one way, 
Nietzsche plays an important role in shaping Schmitt’s thought in an un-Hegelian direction: 
value fragmentation and irreconcilability of value spheres undermine any Hegelian aspirations to 
politically unify all under the ideal of “the Ethical.”
89
 Of course, “the political” may have some 
Hegelian influence – after all it constitutes some degree of unity within the state. But Schmitt 
does go beyond Hegel with his sphere differentiation.
90
 
In addition, aspects of Schmitt’s writings bear traces of his neo-Kantian roots, not to mention his 
later discovery of Kierkegaard. For both neo-Kantianism and Kierkegaard, phenomena are 
separated from values and rationality by a gap that cannot be logically crossed – thought inspired 
by Kierkegaard simply crosses this gap through a leap of faith while neo-Kantianism stays within 
the confines of logic. In an interesting Festschrift for Hans Freyer, Schmitt makes an important 
identification of a third movement to come out of Hegel besides the Right and Left Hegelians, 
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emanating from Wilhelm Dilthey.
91
 Dilthey is the scholar whose thought paved the way for 
Baden neo-Kantianism, particularly Weber and Rickert, through the distinction between 
Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft among other things. Dilthey’s appeal to Kantian 
epistemology is echoed within the concept of the hiatus irrationalis. Besides applauding Freyer’s 
work within this tradition, Schmitt also seems to see himself within this tradition.
92
 Schmitt’s 
own engagement with Dilthey shows the complexity both of what it meant to read Hegel in the 
early 20
th
 century and Schmitt’s own understanding of Hegel. Qualities like these make it 
difficult to characterize Schmitt as neatly Hegelian, despite the overlaps his thought has with 
core features of that tradition.  
 
3. Pluralism: A Challenge to the Legitimacy of the State and the Political 
Political pluralism popularized in the first quarter of the 20
th
 century, particularly in England and 
the United States through the work of Harold Laski.
93
 Pluralism criticized institutions like the 
sovereign state, positive law, and capitalism on normative grounds. Although pluralism agreed 
with syndicalism on the importance of granting representation to economic institutions and in the 
ideal of coordinating societal institutions to expand democratic legitimacy, it differed from other 
“third way” movements by seeking to do away with authoritative institutions altogether.
94
 
Although it had some similarities with anarchism in this regard, it did not aim to do away with 
societal order altogether. Instead, it sought to create a dense and overlapping normative oversight 
network spanning all institutions and spheres of human life, especially the state, for the sake of 
preserving and expanding individual freedom. Harold Laski was one of the most well-known 
pluralists and Schmitt believed his theory exemplified the movement. 
The basis of Laski’s pluralist criticism of the state is rooted in the normative desirability of 
individual freedom against arbitrary rule. In his eyes, the state was the greatest source of 
arbitrary domination and was the main target of his criticism.
95
 He argues one should consider it 
neither a permanent institution nor a normatively desirable one, at least in its present form.
96
 
From his historical critique, he directed the substance of his argument against traditional “monist” 
political philosophy, ubiquitous in modernity through the works of Bodin, Hobbes, Rousseau, 
Hegel, and Bentham. Monism, according to Laski, is the presence of a centralized and 
hierarchical political institution, possessing “sovereign” authority, at least in principle, over all 
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aspects of society.
97
 Against monism, Laski argued that individuals had natural rights a priori, 
most importantly a right to freedom, and that our political institutions should reflect this inherent 
quality.
98
 Accordingly, attributing sovereign power – the legally unqualified right to legislate, 
enforce, and judge – to the state was at odds with individuals’ natural rights.  
Although Laski never put it in these terms, the core aim of pluralism appears to have been non-
domination. He theorized a decentralized, plural network of associations and institutions across 
society – of which the state was merely one.
99
 The ideal was total: every association and even 
every individual ought to have the same democratic authority. The goal was to create a system of 
checks and balances across society, using these democratic associations and institutions to co-
regulate themselves in order to reduce the potential any one set of institutions or interests would 
have to dominate any other aspect of society, thus maximizing individual freedom.
100
 Pluralists 
believed that this system of checks and balances would force political and social acts by 
institutions to be morally legitimate: if an institution were judged by its ‘peer’ institutions, it 
would aim to behave as morally and legally legitimate as possible in order to avoid being 
sanctioned. They thus argued that by demoting the authority and status of the state, so to speak, 
and putting it on equal terms with other institutions, individual freedom would be best realized. 
The term “pluralism” thus comes from the ideal of having authority pluralized and democratized 
across society. Ideally, the only authority that would remain would be the moral authority of 
reason – whose “sovereignty” would result in a state devoid of arbitrary domination. 
While pluralism was a popular and influential theoretical movement, especially among the left in 
the Anglo-Saxon world, it had practical difficulties in realizing its goals. Namely, there was no 
clear practical plan for the implementation of the decentralized, non-hierarchical form of 
governance it idealized. Nonetheless, it was a significant critical movement, especially for Carl 
Schmitt. Schmitt saw pluralism as one of the most degenerate forms of secularization (as 
discussed in the next chapter). This trajectory of secularization undermined the unity and 
authority of the state. Pluralism completely relativized the state. By subjecting the state to moral 
appraisal by independent organizations, Schmitt thought that pluralism lost an essential aspect of 
political life; its opposition to authority, however well-intentioned, could not realize its 
normative goals. Political authority, however evil, was an essential aspect of the state. Pluralism 
was thus anathema to the state. Consistently in his Weimar era works, Schmitt criticizes Laski 
and other pluralists or pluralistic thinkers, like G.D.H. Cole and Otto von Gierke. Although 
pluralization was never successfully implemented, its theoretical presence was alarming enough 
– eminent political theorists were advocating curtailing state authority, seeking to replace it with 
‘decentralized’ authority and free, independent coordination among institutions.  
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Schmitt thought that the fact that pluralism appeared to be legitimate alone bore practical 
consequences for the state. Pluralistic theory laid the conceptual groundwork for the 
“quantitatively” total state and legitimated its pursuit.
101
 Pluralism reflected a general trend in the 
rise of political pluralistic legitimacy, an ideology that he argued was driving Weimar into a state 
of nature. Although this is discussed in depth in Chapter 3, briefly what Schmitt meant was a 
state in which the once distinct spheres of state and society were so interpenetrated (and there 
was no clear boundary between what was “political” and what was not) that all facets of life 
were subject to governmental regulation and intervention. The quantitatively total state created a 
strong incentive for factions within society to try to obtain power in order to ensure their 
particular interests were first not subject to regulation and second to impose their values across 
society. Schmitt saw this outcome as a consequence of a general anti-political trajectory in the 
west, of which pluralism was merely the latest and most severe symptom, and he was deeply 
opposed to it.  
 
4. Revolutionary Conservativism: Conservativism with Nothing to Conserve 
Few scholars have taken up the question of Schmitt’s relationship to the so-called conservative 
revolution. Those who do, such as Carlo Galli and Joseph Bendersky, strongly but briefly argue 
that Schmitt was no revolutionary conservative.
102
 While Schmitt may not best be identified as a 
revolutionary conservative, the movement may nevertheless be important for understanding 
Schmitt. Schmitt was an avid reader of Maurras’ Action française, the French source for 
revolutionary conservativism.
103
 He had a close relationship with principle figures from the 






 and Arthur Moeller van 
den Bruck.
107
 He attended their dinner parties, corresponded with them, and read and was read 
by the revolutionary conservatives. And he also published articles, such as “Weiterentwicklung 
des totalen Staats in Deutschland”, “Führertum als Grundbegriff des nationalsozialistischen 
Rechts”,“Die europäische Kultur im Zwischenstadium der Neutralisierung,” and “Die Wendung 
zum totalen Staat” in the flagship journal for German revolutionary conservativism, Europäische 
Revue. Besides these biographical intersections, Schmitt also shares some meaningful theoretical 
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overlaps with the movement. Spelling out the movement yields another important point of 
reference with which to approach Carl Schmitt. 
Revolutionary Conservativism was strongest around the turn of the century. The movement’s 
intellectual roots extend back to the French Revolution, when counterrevolutionaries, such as de 
Maistre, Cortes, and Bonald, opposed the advent of the Enlightenment by refitting values and 
institutions from the ancien régime.
108
 Like the counterrevolutionaries, revolutionary 
conservativism developed in response to the decline of traditional social and political structures, 




The social basis of revolutionary conservativism tended to be the middle classes, in Germany 
especially the educated middle-class, the Bildungsbürgertum.
110
 The German education system 
helps to explain the relationship between the middle classes and this movement and its core 
values. By the late 19
th
 century, late 18
th
 century movements like Sturm und Drang and 
Romanticism had become a central feature of education, and were complemented by Nietzschean 
radical aristocratism and agonal perfectionism.
111
 At their most impressionable, German students 
were taught to adore late 18
th
 century values, “authenticity,” and irrationality and to scorn 
technology, urbanity, “the people,” and Enlightenment rationalism. Paradoxically, as societal 
changes in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries threatened and undermined these core values 
more and more, their emphasis in education only increased. Major changes, such as the radio, 
mass media, the airplane and automobile, the technologically driven mechanized slaughter of the 
First World War, advanced industry and capitalism, urbanization, and the growth of modern 
institutions like the state and bureaucracy, were responded to by underscoring the value of the 
romantic ways of life lost.
112
 In Germany, moreover, the overthrow of the Second Reich and its 
replacement with a liberal, democratic, and socially progressive state exacerbated these other 
major changes. These turn of the century changes further catalyzed a process that had already 
been progressively building in society.  
As their name suggests, revolutionary conservatives were a chimera. Although their views 
overlapped with traditional conservativism, they also differed from it substantially, moving in 
radical, ‘un-conservative’ directions. Fritz Stern described them as “conservatives out of 
nostalgia and revolutionaries out of despair.”
113
 They were in a way ‘right Nietzscheans,’ and 
embraced his scathing critique of “last men,” the world of passionless bourgeois materialism, 
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and his indictment of the Enlightenment.
114
Although they rejected the changes occurring around 
them, especially the loss of traditional values and culture, revolutionary conservatives believed a 
simple restoration of the past was impossible. The events that had brought about those changes, 
particularly modern science, technology, and mass consciousness, could not simply be erased.
115
 
The only way out was to complete the revolution that had stalled at liberalism and capitalism.
116
 
They reacted against the recently established status quo in the name of what had been 
overthrown but in order to realize a new order, one capable of confronting and controlling the 
forces that had overthrown the old. 
Revolutionary conservatives share important values with traditional conservativism. They were 
deeply opposed to mass society for its irrationalism, its lack of culture, and from their general 
disdain for “plebian” society. They were “conservative” especially with regard to two prevailing 
worldviews of the time: socialism and liberalism. As conservatives, many saw both worldviews 
as equally materialistic, rootless, and driven by a slave morality.
117
 Both privileged the individual 
over the community. For conservatives, both liberalism and socialism’s materialism were 
woefully ignorant of the highest qualities of human nature, namely spiritual values and political 
community, thus undermining the possibility for meaning and human greatness.
118
 
Between liberalism and socialism, revolutionary conservatives tended to see the former as the 
lesser of two evils – especially after the bolshevist uprising in Russia.
119
 Moeller van den Bruck 
described socialism as a “stunted” Weltanschauung.
120
 They believed its fixation on material 
redistribution and the transfer of capital (or other resources) lacked any meaningful orientation; it 
was a modern, destructive form of panem et circenses. More than anything else, revolutionary 
conservatives feared socialism for its capacity to catalyze mass’ pathos, further spiritual 
emptiness, and undermine whatever virtues of the ancien régime remained.
121
  
An aversion to redistribution did not mean revolutionary conservatives were economically liberal, 
however. Revolutionary conservatives believed liberalism made a virtue out of egoism in general, 
most importantly in the spheres of politics and economics. By valorizing egoism and materialism, 
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the free market and basic individual rights seemed to turn society into a mere mass of individuals. 
They abhorred how liberalism undermined community by atomizing and exploiting individuals, 
offering no social safety nets in return.
122
 Like traditional conservatives, revolutionary 
conservatives believed that the community had an obligation to care for the least well off, 
remedy market excesses, and restrict the market’s independence for the common good. For these 
reasons, they were sympathetic to some of the more humanistic aspects of socialism. Some even 
sought a “German” socialism that would counteract the egoism of liberalism and excesses of 
capitalism by reincorporating individuals into the community – but without Marxism’s spiritual 
bankruptcy and mechanical redistribution.
123
  
Revolutionary conservatives were also deeply skeptical of liberal democratic political institutions, 
especially representative democracy, individual political rights, and the principle of ‘one man, 
one vote.’
124
 They saw basic rights as politically equivalent to the economic individualism of the 
free market. They believed basic rights similarly individuated communities and valorized self-
interest. Representative democracy, on the other hand, was not actually democratic at all. It 
failed to generate the people, which is to say political community. Instead, it merely aggregated 
individuated wills. The side with greatest number became ‘right’ through contingent, or 
accidental, factors – rather than the best interested of the community or what was objectively 
right. It mistook material democracy for substantive democracy, in a way. This form of 
democracy disgusted revolutionary conservatives for its arbitrary and nihilistic proceduralism. It 
reflected how the bourgeoisie lacked any substantive ties to a particular place, culture, and 
system of beliefs and values.
125
 This void left liberals with no transcendental purpose. Their lives 
could at best be devoted to the satisfaction of material needs. Liberal political freedoms were an 
extension of these shortcomings, which served to rationalize the pursuit of selfish motives 
against and above those of ends of the community. 
Revolutionary conservatives diagnosed the maladies of liberalism, and to a certain extent 
socialism, from the rise Zivilisation, which had supplanted Kultur. Kultur was defined as both 
the cultivation of individuals through a humanistic focus on ethics, art, and culture as well as 
humanity’s ‘civilized’ achievements – all necessary to fully develop one’s character.
126
 It is 
entwined with the concept Bildung. Zivilisation was a superficial type of learning and self-
development, lacking in Kultur’s prized humanism. Zivilisation was a product of the “West” 
(French and British). It allowed for great technological progress, but it seemed to lack a 
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complementary cultivation of culture and personality, what made humans human – and it 
symbolized the decline of every value the ancien régime embodied, if not value altogether.
127
 
Thus, although Zivilisation had generated enormous “technical” progress, this progress was 
substantively empty and inauthentic because it not only did it not have a corresponding progress 
in spirit and value, it even undermined them. Kultur, to the revolutionary conservatives, was 
“authentic,” whereas Zivilisation was superficial. 
Paralleling the technical progress of Zivilisation, advances in natural science were undermining 
Christian belief, which had stabilized society and buttressed the political community.
128
 
Frustrated by the spiritual emptiness they perceived in the race to the bottom and the 
rationalization of society, many revolutionary conservatives sought out secular forms of 
spirituality.
129
 All of these fears prompted them to search for ways to radically alter the trajectory 
of society in the hopes of revitalizing Kultur to preserve their status, way of life, and their 
material well-being as well as the spiritual value corresponding to those qualities. 
Revolutionary conservatives believed Zivilisation brought about the rapid, negative changes 
causing Germany’s decline. The ‘proletarization’ brought on by advanced capitalism, their defeat 
in the First World War, and the treaty of Versailles were all symptoms of that decline. Mere 
formal liberal freedoms, mere materialistic pursuits in the market place, and mere technical 
knowledge uprooted an entire way of life and drove them toward the lowest common 
denominator. But above all, proletarization meant the middle classes were not only losing their 
material well-being, they were losing their distinct status within society.
130
  
Revolutionary conservatives did not merely wax nostalgically for the past, however. They were 
revolutionary. Insofar as the religious, political, and moral beliefs had been called into question, 
the goal of the revolutionary conservatives shifted to the discovery and realization of new values 
worth conserving.
131
 Revolutionary conservatives “right” reading of Nietzsche, complemented 
with Sorel by some, oriented them in their search for values and institutions worth conserving 
and, for those who fought in the war, legitimated their sacrifices.
132
 They came to see agonistic 
conflict and struggle as the alternative to “liberal” nihilism and sterility. Paradoxically, they 
theorized, conflict, war, and even death did not enervate individuals and peoples but invigorated 
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them. They believed warfare ‘awoke’ a people from its bourgeois slumber.
133
 Conservative 
beliefs in aestheticization and militarism were a first step in the pursuit of new values.  
Revolutionary conservatives’ first goal was to treat the erosion of community.
134
 They conceived 
of community by modernizing and nationalizing Greek and Roman ideals. A healthy community 
was a Volk, united by a transcendental essence or spirit (Geist) that constituted its individual 
members. This Volk-identity was second nature; it was the source of individual’s creativity, 
power, and their individuality.
135
 The Volk was the “authentic” core of its individuals. It was a 
sort of panacea for all the ills of the Zivilisation. And through this ideal, revolutionary 
conservatives sought to identify a more meaningful form of democracy than representative 
democracy. So they neither disputed the value of democracy a priori nor saw themselves as 
cleverly smuggling in anti-democratic principles. They believed they were completing the 
democratic revolution. Although this form of democracy would be unrecognizable to most 
parliamentarians and liberal democrats today, it can be defended as a type of democracy. 
Their idea of an “authentic” people grew out of Rousseau’s idea of the volonté générale.
136
 
Revolutionary conservatives understand democracy in terms of what has been called “totalitarian 
democracy.” They believed democracy meant representing the people as a unity, rather than as a 
factionalized plurality. Representation cannot occur mechanically, by merely aggregating 
individual votes.
137
 Democracy can only be the will of the Volk, which must be produced 
organically. Yet, despite similarities with populist or plebiscitary accounts of democracy, there is 
one decisive difference. Revolutionary conservativism despised and feared the actual people and 
sought in totalitarian democracy a way to limit mass participation in democracy. The Volk was 
an ideal of authenticity, dictated by Kultur and aristocratic virtues, not the “cacophony” of 
individuals’ actual democratic voting. Revolutionary conservatives tended to perceive populist 
movements of their time, such as Nazism, with aristocratic disdain and saw them as plebian and 
suffering from the same spiritual emptiness as liberalism and socialism.
138
 
This authoritarian conception of the Volk found institutional expression in the state. Drawing on 
Hegel, revolutionary conservatives argued the state alone could counteract the atomizing effects 
of the market economy and liberalism and promote the community of the authentic Volk.
139
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Moreover, war and self-sacrifice, at the state’s bequest and on behalf of the Volk, could become 
meaningful again – la guerre pour la guerre.
140
 But the state was merely an institution. Some 
revolutionary conservatives believed it needed a driving force. They found that force in an elite 
individual or group who could exemplify and represent the values, ideals, and virtues of the Volk 
and realize them in the actual people by wielding the state.
141
 Once in power, the “leader” would 
constitute and represent the actual people and direct them toward the ends specified by the will 
of the authentic people. Thus, paradoxically, true democracy came to presuppose an exemplary 
leader or leadership body who could evoke the volonté générale in the masses. Organic 
democracy was thus linked to something like a Führerprinzip.
142
 By theorizing democracy as the 
people’s organic representation by their exemplary political leader, revolutionary conservatives 
were able to reconcile their conservative beliefs with democratic change. 
Schmitt’s state theory will be shown to have important overlaps with revolutionary 
conservativism. Schmitt was skeptical of “liberal” values, he despised materialism, and he 
frequently criticized atomizing individualism, which he blamed on liberalism, democracy, and 
capitalism. Even if he was unfamiliar with Nietzsche’s concept of the “last man” and his 
lamentations about a meaningless depoliticized world, Schmitt’s work resonates with that anti-
bourgeois sentiment. Schmitt also recognized that historical change prevented any serious 
turning back of the clock. As with many revolutionary conservatives, this recognition led him to 
search for a state strong enough to deal with 20
th
 century societal changes. Schmitt’s idea of the 
practice of democracy ends up appearing “totalitarian” in the above sense because he prioritizes 
the qualitative will of the “authentic” people over the simple aggregate of individual votes. But, 
as with other revolutionary conservatives, I will show the will of the people has little to do with 
plebiscitary expression in Schmitt’ account. Instead, despite concessions to the principles of 
“identity,” he argues that what is needed most for democracy is “representation” of “the 
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authentic people.” And like the revolutionary conservatives, Schmitt hoped to resurrect 
exemplary political leadership to overcome the deficits of mass democracy – theoretically 
justifying strong leadership to overcome individualistic democracy and parliamentarism.  
Before 1933, Schmitt recognized the danger of Nazism and sought to find ways to prevent their 
seizure of power.
143
 But then, like many revolutionary conservatives, Schmitt’s disenchantment 
with liberalism and democracy and his hopes for the restoration of the German state and political 
unity overlapped with those of the many Nazis (not to mention other parties), and his 
opportunism led him to embrace the Nazi party once they were in power. There has a fierce 
debate over whether he actually shared other Nazi “values,” such as anti-Semitism, or merely 
paid those values lip service in his efforts to endear himself to the regime. He did have a genuine 
hope they could be instrumental in realizing his goals and ideals for the revitalization of the 
German state.
144
 Like many revolutionary conservatives, Schmitt was so fixated on Weimar’s 
flaws that after the Nazis took power he did not even think about the practical consequences of 
his contributions to Nazism. So Schmitt wrote his most despicable work in 1934, a “legal” 
justification of Hitler’s political assassinations of the Night of Long Knives in his “Der Führer 
schützt das Recht.”
145
 Coupled with his open anti-Semitism, Schmitt’s early public collaboration 
went a long way in legitimating Nazism and its insane frenzy. 
But by 1936, like so many other revolutionary conservatives, Schmitt had distanced himself from 
the Nazi party and its practices (it did not hurt that prominent Nazis and Nazi publications were 
attacking Schmitt publically).
146
 It had become clear to many, including revolutionary 
conservatives and Schmitt, that Hitler was not going to deliver the stability or changes they had 
hoped for. Many believed the Nazis had usurped and perverted their ideal of a Third Reich.
147
 In 
the end, the Nazis represented a different form of the same hated materialistic, democratic and 
populist values for revolutionary conservatives. Schmitt’s relationship with Nazism might be 
explained in a similar way to how many revolutionary conservatives first embraced and then 
distanced themselves from the movement and state. 
Despite similarities, Schmitt also departed from core revolutionary conservative themes. He did 
not glorify war or service to the state in the unqualified sense others did. He thought of the First 
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World War not as a glorious moment of camaraderie and the chance for the generation of 
meaning, but as an event that exemplified the twentieth century’s loss of meaning.
148
 And 
although Schmitt struggled with 20
th
 century “instrumental rationality,” he was hardly an 
irrationalist or single-minded critic of the Enlightenment tradition. Moving in a different 
direction than his contemporaries, he sought to find ways to revive classical “occidental” 
rationalism, which included key figures from the Enlightenment – even British and French 
thinkers. As we shall see, his approach to political community and leadership are far closer to 
classical political theoretical ideals and themes such as natural law than his contemporaries were. 
Schmitt’s writings reflect his awareness of the limits of even revolutionary conservativism. 
Despite at times coming close to or even overlapping with that movement, Schmitt will be shown 
to have been a nevertheless independent thinker.  
 
Conclusion: The Priority of Order  
The world Schmitt had grown up in fractured after the war. His state theory was a response to 
how he understood the problems of his time and the inabilities of his contemporaries to deal with 
them. Weimar’s intellectual movements all contributed to the formation of his political theory 
and his own identity. Although Schmitt’s thought is irreducible to these movements, they do 
provide us with an important means to refine our understanding of him. Without this 
understanding of his background, how Schmitt responds to and grows out of neo-Kantianism, 
neo-Hegelianism, Pluralism, and Revolutionary Conservativism, it is very easy to misunderstand 
what is happening in the foreground of Schmitt’s state theory. 
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Quid est Veritas? Quis Judicabit? Political Theology, 
Disenchantment, and Political Crisis 
 
 
For it is evident to the meanest capacity that men’s actions are derived from the opinions they 
have of the good or evil which from those actions redound unto themselves. 
– Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 
 
Every movement is based, first of all, on a specific characteristic attitude toward the world; and 
second, on a specific idea, even if it not always conscious, of an ultimate authority, an absolute 
center…Metaphysics is something unavoidable, and we cannot escape it by relinquishing our 
awareness of it. What human beings regard as the ultimate, absolute authority, however, certainly 
can change, and God can be replaced by mundane and worldly factors. I call this process 
secularization. 
– Carl Schmitt Political Romanticism (1924) 
 
The question of the facts and structure of a system always boils down to the question of what 
conscious or unconscious theology rules over it. One has not understood a system, an epoch, until 
one has discovered the god or the idol in which it places its faith and trust. 





Carl Schmitt’s state and constitutional theory rests on his philosophical presuppositions, 
especially his philosophy of history and epistemology. He believes the legitimacy of political 
institutions is a function, in part, of the ideas and beliefs about the nature of reality those who see 
them as legitimate hold – consciously or unconsciously. Over time, Schmitt argues, changes in 
these ideas and beliefs lead to crises in static political institutions. He sees modern political 
history in particular as a process of change, crisis, and adaptation. The static nature of institutions 
in the face of change is a major source of their legitimation crises. In the case of Weimar, 
Schmitt argued that “its present-day constitutional situation is characterized first of all by the fact 
Leviathan Run Aground: Chapter 2 
Page | 45  
that numerous institutions and regulations of the 19
th
 century have continued unchanged, while 
the current state of things appears to have changed entirely.”
1
 The Weimar state was designed 
with 19
th
 century concepts and problems in mind. But 20
th
 century social and political changes 
were undermining its ability to perform its intended function.  
While the next chapter analyzes his diagnosis of those changes and the problems they caused in 
Weimar, this chapter lays the groundwork for this analysis by examining Schmitt’s philosophy of 
history and epistemology through his concept political theology. It draws and elaborates on Carlo 
Galli’s discussion of that concept, focusing especially on the dynamic between Idea and reality 
and the difficulties of realizing the Idea in reality.
2
 Galli is also careful to draw out the continuity 
of this theme throughout Schmitt’s career, beginning with his earliest writings. But it departs 
from Galli in reducing the role Catholicism, “ontology,” and myth play in Schmitt’s thought.
3
 
Above all, political theology is less of an irrationalist or mystical concept than Galli believes and 
more deeply entwined with Weber’s disenchantment than he allows.
4
 I argue political theology is 
above all a product of Schmitt’s continuation of Weber’s analysis (as Schmitt saw it, anyway) of 
how legitimacy and authority work politically, how roles that theology once played in shaping 
these concepts are now being performed by different institutions – albeit ones that still have very 
important affinities and overlaps with theology. Catholic influences are undoubtedly important 
for Schmitt’s development of political theology, but their role in his work declined over time. 
Moreover, Schmitt’s political theology reflects the depth of debts to neo-Kantianism.  
Political theology is often understood, as Andrew Arato argues, as “the secularization of 
monotheistic religious concepts for political theory and practice.”
5
 Karsten Fischer argues 
Schmitt was interested in merging politics and religion.
6
 He also argues Schmitt did not face 
interfaith conflicts. Yet these two approaches are related by what they miss about political 
theology. Schmitt himself even argues understanding political theology as merely the 
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secularization of religious concepts is superficial.
7
 When “theology” is expanded to include 
atheistic theologies like positivism, communism, and Nazism, it is clear that Weimar was the site 
of deep “interfaith” conflicts that had little to do with monotheism.
8
 Theology, for Schmitt, need 
not involve a god of revealed religion at all (nor “religion” as typically understood at all, for that 
matter). An error many thinkers make today is forgetting that zealotry and fanaticism are as 
compatible with secular beliefs as they are with “religion.” In fact, the fanatics of Schmitt’s time 
were Nazis and Communists; their theology was secular.
9
  
Other common misinterpretations include arguing against Schmitt that belief can somehow be 
“detheologized” (as John McCormick does)
10
 – as if “detheologization” were Schmitt’s Achilles 
Heel. Similarly, Schmitt did not understand political theology as “[the relation] of religious 
belief to larger societal issues while not confusing the proper autonomy of each,” which is how 
Scott and Cavanaugh define it in their 2006 Blackwell Companion to Political Theology.
11
 As I 
discuss below and alluded to in the last chapter, Schmitt argues all knowledge and any belief 
about the world necessarily rest on necessary presuppositions. To deny their necessity is naïve. 
And, Schmitt believed, positivism and other belief systems were myopic to believe it could get 
around this through processes like “detheologization” or neat compartmentalization. To argue 
that belief could be “detheologized” misses the point of Schmitt’s critique.  
Finally, political theology has been read in pseudo-religious terms that allow his readers – 
through esoteric concepts like katechon and the miracle – to portray Schmitt as a sort of mystical, 
Catholic thinker. Heinrich Meier ventures deep into this realm and attempts to turn concepts of 
katechon and miracle from analogies for explaining concepts of jurisprudence into mystical 
truths or revelations about Schmitt’s faith-based politics.
12
 Mehring has convincingly argued that 
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Schmitt’s worldview can hardly be characterized by Catholicism.
13
 Carl Schmitt’s juridical and 
political beliefs are instead best characterized by his interpretation of occidental rationalism – the 
tradition of thought that includes medieval philosophy but lies closer to Plato than Augustine. 
As long as thinkers continue to cling to these interpretations of Schmitt’s political theology, how 
very confusing it will be to read those passages in which Schmitt identifies the “political 
theology” of the Restaurationszeit
14
 with Weber’s critique of Stammler’s Rechtsphilosophie
15
 or 
Laski’s pluralism as the political theological expression of William James’ philosophy.
16
 Schmitt 
clearly understood political theology as – above all – an epistemological problem.
17
 From an 
epistemological perspective, the root of the problem is identical: the dilemma of the hiatus 
irrationalis, the indeterminate relationship of concrete reality to ideas and values. Pace Fischer,
18
 
Schmitt is well aware of Hobbes agnosticism and, despite committing to the Catholic faith, is a 
sober enough thinker to recognize what faith actually means. Scheuerman is right when he draws 
our attention to how the problem of epistemological indeterminacy underscores Schmitt’s work, 




A close reading of his work reveals Schmitt uses the terms “theology,” “metaphysics,” and “Idea” 
in a technical way. Theology, to Schmitt, is not merely religious conviction or faith.
20
 When 
Schmitt uses the term theology, he understands it in its classic sense: the study of being qua 
being, conceiving of “god” in the broadest possible sense as a first cause.
21
 While this 
understanding includes revealed religion, it is not limited to it. In this way, theology is not so 
different from metaphysics. And Schmitt in fact uses metaphysics and theology 
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interchangeably.
22
 He describes secularization in terms of metaphysics.
23
 Alternatively, Schmitt 
sometimes describes non-religious belief systems such as romanticism, Marxism, pluralism, and 
juridical positivism, as theologies – they just happen to be atheistic. Atheism is still theology for 
Schmitt. He alludes to Marxism as a sort of mystical religion.
24
 Following Schmitt, this chapter 
uses the terms “theology,” “metaphysics,” “Idea,” and weltanschauung interchangeably.
25
  
This chapter is divided into two broad sections. The first engages with Schmitt’s concept 
political theology, tracing how his understanding of it evolves. It ties political theology into his 
recurring question of quis judicabit? (who decides?), which has received scant attention even 
though it was a central axis in his work on both the state and political theology. The second 
section shows how Schmitt sees the problem of political theology playing out in history. Schmitt 
argued history is a process of changing epochs, each defined by its predominant metaphysical 
“Idea.” Epochs enter into crises of legitimacy, undergo paradigm shifts, and produce new Ideas. 
This process, he argues, helps to explain political change: because of the link between “theology” 
and politics, metaphysical change has corresponding effects in political institutions. Thus, 
political theology, for Schmitt, describes both a problem of indeterminacy of legitimate ideas and 
institutions and how this indeterminacy leads to change and crisis over time in political and legal 
institutions. This process of historical change is the basis for Schmitt’s analysis of Weimar’s 
crisis of authority, which the next chapter takes up. 
 
1. The Political and the Persistence of ‘Theology’ 
As discussed in the last chapter, neo-Kantian philosophy was the preeminent philosophy during 
Schmitt’s formative years. Although he is extremely critical of aspects of neo-Kantian legal and 
political thought, most notably that of Hans Kelsen, Schmitt had strong intellectual ties to neo-
Kantian philosophy. Early on, Schmitt was deeply interested in Vaihinger. And later he would 
study under and adopt many of the problems Max Weber did, including his analysis of the 
practical implications of epistemological constraints on human institutions, like law and politics. 
Although Schmitt was no neo-Kantian, his background in neo-Kantianism imprinted his beliefs 
and contributed to his “epistemological” theory of political theology.
26
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Scheuerman rightly observed how Schmitt’s early juridical writings addressing the problem of 
the indeterminacy of law have been “repeatedly ignored,” despite being among his pivotal 
contributions.
27
 Indeed, anyone seeking to understand Schmitt’s thought cannot ignore the 
relationship between his early neo-Kantianism and his subsequent thought in Weimar. But 
Scheuerman’s scope is too narrow. He does not discuss the genealogy of Schmitt’s early writings 
on legal indeterminacy and his arguments not so original when their context is kept in mind. As 
such, his work is not an aberration but rather an application of the predominant philosophical 
position of the time.  
To demonstrate political theology’s relationship to neo-Kantianism and how Schmitt develops it 
over time, I have chosen four periods of Schmitt’s life, organized around exemplary texts. 
Schmitt first develops this problem in recognizable neo-Kantian terms, with no reference to 
political theology at all, for example in his 1914 Der Wert des Staates and die Bedeutung des 
Einzelnen. Following the First World War, his writings crystallized into the familiar form of his 
1922 Political Theology. Although he is fairly consistent in using the terminology of Political 
Theology throughout the interwar period (such as in his 1929 “The Age of Neutralizations and 
Depoliticizations”), Schmitt sheds differently light on the same idea only one year after Political 
Theology came out. In his 1923 Roman Catholicism and Political Form, Schmitt discusses this 
concept in terms of the problematic relationship between ‘Ideas’ and concrete reality, which I 
analyze as the third period. The fourth and final period begins after the Second World War. 
While his engagement with political theology remains bounded by the language of Political 
Theology, Schmitt has broadened its meaning, in particular integrating Hobbes’ state theory into 
it through the question “quis judicabit?”
28
   
a. Schmitt’s Early Writings: The Hiatus of Neo-Kantian Epistemology  
To briefly recap, neo-Kantians aimed at revitalizing philosophy by insisting on the fact/value 
distinction and the hiatus irrationalis between phenomena and noumena in light of the successes 
of positivism and modern scientific method. But instead of metaphysically, they conceived of it 
epistemologically. For the neo-Kantians, the hiatus meant values and the thing-in-itself were 
limiting concepts or “regulatory Ideas,” which allowed for the evaluation of phenomena. 
Vaihinger, in particular, argued that, because of this epistemological barrier, regulative Ideas 
could not be validated. Instead, they were akin to faith. Individuals adopted one Idea or another 
and behaved ‘as if’ they existed and provided real normative guidance and structure to their lives. 
But, more importantly, individuals must behave ‘as if’ some Idea exists, as it is only through 
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filtering phenomena with regulative Ideas that the world can be perceived as both ethically and 
logically meaningful.  
Schmitt summarizes his 1912 Gesetz und Urteil as a work dealing with the juridical problem of 
“gaps” [Lücken] in the law.
29
 Reaching back to his earlier Über Schuld und Schuldarten, Schmitt 
argues that whether and how the law applies to a concrete case is indeterminate, that we cannot 
know the intent of the original legislator perfectly, and a judicial act bridges this gap despite the 
lack of guidelines on how exactly to do so.
30
 Norms (Recht) and empirical reality have no 
determinate relationship.
31
 He argues there is an unbridgeable hiatus between them and this 
creates a logical problem in the application of norms. 
Yet he does not believe this “bridge” is the product of an arbitrary judicial act. In applying the 
law, Schmitt believes judges do aim at creating a coherent, non-arbitrary, and functional system 
of law – just not because they merely execute the law but because of how they perceive 
themselves within a socialized practice. The legitimacy of a judgment comes about when judges 
induce an idealized judge from their peers’ behavior and conform their application of the law to 
their belief in how that idealization would apply it.
32
 In a world where norms and facts are 
severed by a hiatus, Schmitt sees juristic fictions induced from actual experience as playing a 
critical role in determining actual human behavior and institutions. Judicial practice is structured 
by regulative ideas that judges naturally conform to, behaving “as if” they were real “rails” 
guiding their decisions. In these cases, Schmitt argues, the regulative Idea imagined by the judge 
guides his or her actual determinations on how to bridge these gaps.
33
 His point is that, although 
there is a hiatus between juridical norms and empirical reality, it does not result in arbitrary 
decision-making and a chaotic juridical world.  
Schmitt continues to develop this idea in his 1914 Der Wert des Staates. This book seems to be 
Schmitt’s first deeply political work. Summarizing it in Vaihinger’s Kant-Studien, he describes 
its central thesis as, 
The state is the idea according to the function of law [Der Staat ist der Idee nach 
Funktion des Rechts]. It is the only legal subject, in a specific sense, the only thing that is 
through the law immediately authorized and responsible.  
The law [Recht] cannot be derived from power [Macht] or any other mere fact [Faktum], 
neither can it be derived from the state merely because it is a factical complex of power. 
Law [Recht] does not sit in the state, the state sits within the law. But the state is the sole 
                                                             
29 Carl Schmitt, "Selbstanzeige des Buches ‚Gesetz und Urteil‘," Kant-Studien 18(1913): 165. 
30 Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall  (München: C.H. Beck, 2009), 39. 
31 Galli, La Genealogia della Politica, 314. 
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 Schmitt, "Selbstanzeige des Buches ‚Gesetz und Urteil‘," 165; Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt, 22-23. 
33 Mehring, Carl Schmit, 44-45; Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt, 20. Schmitt  adopts this argument again – but with the 
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Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen [The Value of the State and the Meaning of the Individual] (Berlin: Dunker 
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executor of the law, it realizes the regnum juris [rule of law] in the world of reality. 
Therefore it is the highest (not merely the strongest) power, but in any case a power.  
The great opposition that moves all human history is not between the state and individual, 
but the state (-power) and right [Recht].
34  
This early book concerns political theology through its detailed treatment of the relationship 
between facts and norms. He summarizes his argument, writing, “between every concretion and 
every abstraction lies an insurmountable gap, which cannot be closed.”
35
 Throughout, he 
repeatedly argues there is a hiatus between facts and norms, Macht and Recht.
36
 Tellingly, at one 
point Schmitt invokes Kant’s antinomies of reason to ground his argument.
37
 As in Gesetz und 
Urteil, the juridical effect of this hiatus is a fundamental and insurmountable indeterminacy in 
how Recht relates to facts, in particular how Recht and Macht interact. Schmitt argues neither is 
reducible to the other and both are independent. But, he goes on, they do still interact. Recht can 
affect Macht. Macht can limit whether and how Recht is realized concretely. But they stand in a 
hierarchy: facts may be affected by values but values ‘themselves’ exist independently from facts. 
Recht thus has priority over any fact, including Macht. In a curious moment of Idealism, Schmitt 
even argues that only transcendent entities deserve to be conceived of as “being” (in the Platonic 
sense).
38
 He seems to argue that “accidental” qualities of the world are normatively irrelevant.
39
  
But Recht and other “true” beings are not without their own problems. He argues Recht is “an 
abstract idea, which is not derived from facts and cannot affect them, reality can only be subject 
of the will directed at the “realization” of right. The problem consists in relating the two realms 
to one another, determining the point from which – while maintaining the primacy of right 
[Recht] over power [Macht] – an influence in terms of legal norms is effected on being [Sein].”
40
 
Schmitt argues that Recht cannot realize itself. It requires actual a factical will to become real.  
And, taking up another argument from neo-Kantianism, Schmitt argues human psychology is 
deeply affected by Recht: humans are compelled to act on ideas of “right,” to realize that order of 
Recht in the world.
41
 Yet Individuals can neither be certain of the validity of a specific regulative 
Idea nor be certain of how to apply that particular Idea in reality. Through this uncertainty, 
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 Carl Schmitt, "Selbstanzeige des Buches ‚Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen‘," Kant-Studien 
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 Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates, 80. “Zwischen jedem Konkretum und jedem Abstraktum liegt eine 
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37 Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates, 27. 
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 Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates, 88. 
39 Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates, 89, 105. 
40 Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates, 42-43. 
41 Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates, 35ff., 107; cf. Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship: From the Origin of the Modern Concept 
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different interpretations over right arise.
42
 Differences and contradictions among them lead to 
conflict. Individual wills attempting to realizing different ideas of Recht, all indeterminate, has 
the potential to fragment society and lead to chaos and violence.
43
 Thus, Schmitt thinks that 
individuals without any definitive framework to determine what “right” actually means will 
eventually conflict violently precisely because the pull toward “good” and “evil” is so strong. 
To address conflicts arising out of this indeterminacy, Schmitt argues some institution above 
individuals can determine Recht in an authoritative way, thereby coordinating and directing their 
behavior and minimizing frictions. Ideally, this institution would be able to decide authoritatively 
on the nature of Recht but would not merely impose it and dominate individual behavior. Schmitt 
argues that this institution can only be the state.
44
 He unfortunately does not pursue any further 
this discussion of how the state can determine Recht without imposing it here. Schmitt writes the 
meaning of the state is “to realize right [Recht] in the world…the state is the midpoint in the 
series: right [Recht], state, individual.”
45
 Recht is pure normative valuation. The state exists in 
the world of facts, but occupies a unique position in that it has no physical existence. It is capable 
of enforcing the “conceptual world [Gedankenwelt]” of Recht on phenomena. Thus, Schmitt 
argues, the state mediates between values and facts. The state is a junction between one “world” 
and another, so to speak. Recht as pure concept turns into Recht as a phenomenon that causally 
affects the world. He goes on to argue that “the state is the legal entity [Rechtsgebilde], whose 
meaning consists solely in the task of realizing right [Recht], bringing about a condition 
[Zustand] in the external world, which as far as possible corresponds to the specifications that 
can be deduced from legal concepts [Rechtsgedanken] for the behavior of individuals and the 
institution [Einrichtung] of the outer world.
”46
 Invoking Hegel, Schmitt argues the sovereign will 
bridges the hiatus between facts and norms by actualizing one form of Recht juridically.
47
 
Implicitly criticizing contractarian arguments of modern political theory, Schmitt argues that the 
state, by providing the possibility for Recht in the world at all, constructs its constituents – rather 
than the other way around.
48
 Because the state stands at the junction of facts and norms, it can 
overcome normative indeterminacy and provide individuals with a clear political and juridical 
order.
49
 Without the state providing a regulative Idea of Recht, Schmitt believes individuals 
could not inhabit a meaningful and rationally ordered world.  
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But, Schmitt goes to great lengths to emphasize the state’s actualization of Recht is not mere 
positivistic domination – that is, the state does not use its power sophistically to turn its arbitrary 
rule into “Recht.”
50
 He argues power [Gewalt] cannot elevate itself into a legitimate authority 
[Berechtigung].
51
 He argues the essence of the state is defined by and created by Recht.
52
 The 
unity of the state derives from the unity of Recht, which is itself derivative of some regulative 
Idea.
53
 Similarly, legality, supplied by the state, can only arise out of the authority Recht 
provides.
54
 For Schmitt, the state is a concrete image of law, whose meaning consists exclusively 
in the realization of Recht – only through the state does Recht become positive, Gesetz.
55
 
Arguing against the Marburg neo-Kantians Stammler and Cohen, Schmitt declares the 
Rechtsstaat demands substantive legitimacy going beyond mere legality. He writes the 
legitimacy of the state hinges on the degree to which it actually approximates the idea of Recht.
56
 
He argues Recht constitutes the state and provides its end or telos. Citing Augustine’s Civitas Dei, 
he says “Recht is for the state… origo, informatio, beatitudo.”
57
 Clearly, Schmitt’s ultimate goal 
is to ground his state theory on some element of objective reason and to reject positivistic 
theories of the law. However, it is neither clear here how strong objective reason should be nor 
what its precise content is. Nor is it clear here how this relationship between Recht and Macht 
Schmitt describes can be guaranteed. Despite his insistence otherwise, it is not at all clear in this 
text how the state does not merely dominate its constituency with its particular interpretation of 
Recht. Nevertheless, while he does not satisfactorily explain his arguments here, Schmitt does go 
to great lengths to dispute views like positivism: “Recht creates the state; Recht precedes it.”
58
  
Der Wert des Staates thus appears to continue Schmitt’s arguments from Gesetz und Urteil: the 
judge’s role has been assumed by the state but its behavior is similar. The state, like the earlier 
judge, mediates facts and norms, solving legal indeterminacy by treating fictions “as if” they 
were facts – making them real and no longer fictitious in a way.
59
 Thus, this potential problem of 
indeterminacy is overcome by transcendent legal and political institutions that allow their 
constituents to go through their lives “as if” the world has been definitely ordered – even if we 
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really do not stand on any solid ground. Schmitt sees the relationship between the state’s efforts 
to realize an abstract normative order as the driving force of human history.
60
 
b. Political Theology: Recht and the Sovereign Auctoritatis Interpositio 
Reflecting on Political Theology toward the end of his career in 1970, Schmitt described his 
1922 book as being primarily concerned with epistemology and the history of ideas.
61
 The 
current problems of interreligious violence and of the tensions between liberalism and religion 
have wallpapered over Schmitt’s deeper philosophical concerns. Nevertheless, why he considers 
it primarily an epistemological work is an important question for understanding Political 
Theology. The beginning of the answer comes from its third chapter, also titled “Political 
Theology,” where Schmitt writes “the metaphysical image that a definite epoch forges of the 
world has the same structure as what the world immediately understands to be appropriate as a 
form of its political organization.”
62
  
The original three chapters of Political Theology
63
 raise Schmitt’s epistemological problem 
through the lens of the sociology of the concept of sovereignty. In this part of the book, Schmitt 
again raises questions regarding juridical indeterminacy. And although Schmitt explicitly uses 
Cortés only in the final fourth chapter, Political Theology as a whole resonates with his influence. 
A brief outline of Cortés’ thought thus provides crucial context to Schmitt’s arguments here.  
Cortés argues that how one understands the nature and meaning of the world is determined 
ultimately by what he calls “faith.” In other words, he believes one’s theological beliefs are the 
foundation for how one perceives and organizes facts. Cortés argues theology renders the cosmos 
intelligible and meaningful by providing its foundational presuppositions (by appealing to some 
non-human source, such as reason or god, to solve a problem of infinite regression).
64
 Moreover, 
he thinks that human knowledge rests on presuppositions ordering reality.
65
 Cortés believes that 
all worldviews (which he calls “civilizations”) ultimately rest on foundational theological 
presuppositions.
66
 And these foundational assumptions ground all other knowledge. This 
explains why he opens his masterpiece with a chapter entitled “In every great political question 
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is always involved a great question of theology.”
67
 Indeed, Cortés argues that theological belief 
determines political reality. One’s assumptions, or ‘faith’, about the world characterize how one 
acts within it. And faith, for Cortés, emerges ex nihilo; there can be no rational or demonstrable 
basis for faith – it is the bedrock one reaches as one searches for answers.
68
 Faith is dogma.  
Catholic dogma is, for Cortés, antithetical to “liberalism.” Catholicism’s authoritarianism 
diametrically opposes Enlightenment ideals of free thought. But Cortés argues that what is at 
stake is not a struggle of between freedom and dogma but two opposed dogmas. Enlightenment 
thinkers do not escape dogma, they just mask it. And because he thinks no worldview can escape 
making presuppositions: liberalism is a theology and has its dogma. So the opposition between 
liberalism and Catholicism is between an atheistic materialistic dogma and a theistic 
transcendental dogma.  
By appropriating from Cortés, Schmitt “catholicizes” his neo-Kantian roots. The concept of 
“political theology” is the outcome. Given the relationship between Schmitt and Cortés, a 
reasonable preliminary conclusion is that Schmitt’s “political theology” means political 
institutions are ultimately derivative of theological worldviews. Here too Schmitt focuses on the 
indeterminate relationship between an abstract normative system and its realization in a concrete 
juridical order.
69
 As before, Schmitt argues Recht cannot self-realize.
70
 And, although Schmitt 
argues there is a hiatus between facts and values,
71
 he believes neo-Kantians like Kelsen are 
wrong to halt at that division and focus only on treating law as a positive command. Although 
the hiatus cannot be bridged logically, he argues it can be bridged in practice. But instead of 
placing the onus of mediation on the state as he did before, he argues this time the bridge is 
someone or something that can decide authoritatively: the sovereign.
72
 Schmitt defines 
sovereignty through the exception, which is famously defined as when a concrete situation 
cannot be neatly subsumed under a law and requires an authority to decide on both whether it 
falls under some preexisting law and, if not, how to address it in line with the existing juridical 
order.
73
 The solution to moments of indeterminacy is the sovereign decision, which clarifies this 
indeterminate relationship through an act. Galli notes how decision literally means the ‘cutting 
off’ (de-cision) of alternative possibilities, in the same way a theological authority clarifies the 
meaning of dogma.
74
 Schmitt’s point, it seems, is that the only way to overcome the 
indeterminacy is when a singular, unitary agent capable of realizing that Idea authoritatively 
decides and commits to a decision. 
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Schmitt criticizes Kelsen for transferring the sovereign decision democratically to every 
individual, which is, for him, simply a return to the indeterminacy of the state of nature – exactly 
the insecurity we try to escape by creating the state. A democratically pluralized decision, for 
Schmitt, undermines legal order. Moreover, he believes no order can be normatively scrutinized 
until a sovereign has first implemented it.
75
 A sovereign decision creates an island of stability in 
a sea of indeterminacy and ethical irrationality.  
Yet, as before, Schmitt does not think sovereignty is merely the exercise of power. In attempting 
to navigate this hiatus, Schmitt looks to a third way: authority. Authority, rather than power or 
norms bridges concrete reality and order (or form
76
) according to some Idea.
77
 A legitimate 
sovereign must have the auctoritatis interpositio (authority to insert).
78
 The authority to insert 
this particular Idea comes from the sovereign’s accurate representation of that Idea. 
79
 Schmitt 
often quotes Hobbes’ maxim auctoritas non veritas facit legem. In doing so, he ties Hobbes’ 
nominalism
80
 into his analysis of the hiatus. An important early occurrence comes in Political 
Theology.
81
 In the context of auctoritatis interpositio, his repeated use of Hobbes’ maxim is 
meant to remind the reader that juridical order is determined most of all by the fixed meaning of 
language and concepts.
82
 Veritas alone, no matter how true, cannot produce political order. It is 
imperative to have the meaning of definitions fixed for activities and concepts like “social 
contracting” to have any practical effect. Schmitt, like Hobbes, concludes that “What matters 
most for the reality of legal life is who decides” – that is, who defines the terms of jurisprudence 
and realizes them concretely.
83
  
The important question of what authority is and where it comes from is not clearly addressed in 
Political Theology. Schmitt seems to distinguish between “exceptions” to an order and the total 
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absence of order – what Renato Cristi has called “hard” and “soft” decisions.
84
 The sovereign 
decision to realize a particular order comes ex nihilo. But it is in a way a function of the 
predominant metaphysical image of the world, most consistent with a political community’s 
existential identity.
85
 That is, something beyond the control of the sovereign and thus alluding to 
the fact, which Hobbes does not address, that sovereigns can lose their authority for reasons 
other than not providing protection and simply bridging the hiatus through its power. The “soft” 
decision on how to concretize an order is something that earlier Schmitt allotted to even regular 
judges. It is unclear here how Schmitt understands it. 
The erosion of authority bears on how Schmitt understands this epistemological hiatus. He 
argues that an epoch’s dominant metaphysical ‘image’ or Weltanschauung affects how 
phenomena are perceived: a particular Weltanschauung is a social product, reflecting a society’s 
conditions for metaphysical or theological belief and legitimacy.
86
 He begins by discussing the 
impact of the “deistic” Idea on juridical reality. The problem, Schmitt argues, is that deistic 
explanations of political form are misleading: the state actually makes exceptional interventions 
“everywhere” – except now they appear to be acts of a deus ex machina because they cannot be 
explained juridically.
87
 A sovereign act thus appears to be “exceptional” or “miraculous” only 
because one lacks a conceptual basis to explain it.
88
 That is, because a phenomenon does not fit 
one’s rational scheme of the world, it can only be classified as inexplicable and miraculous. But, 
Schmitt argues, this is a problem of idealization, not magic: the state is not actually miraculous 
when it intervenes in society, it merely appears to be so because it is now theorized to be a closed 
juridical order. This argument brings us full circle. It echoes neo-Kantian arguments about how 
the mind determines what aspects of ‘the manifold,’ which is actually infinite and incapable of 
being reproduced, are salient for the understanding and thus falsify the world to make it 
representable and understandable at all. Political Theology, then, is ultimately about how 
metaphysical belief structures understanding of reality and what is normal or legitimate. 
c. Political Theology Reformulated? Roman Catholicism and Political Form 
Published one year after Political Theology, Roman Catholicism and Political Form (1923) may 
be the high tide of Schmitt’s Catholicism. Yet, although its language differs from Political 
Theology, Schmitt’s goal remains largely the same. He focuses on the relationship between 
norms and concrete political order or form. Schmitt’s main concern is to contrast the Roman 
Catholic Church and its Weltanschauung with “economic-technical” thinking. Yet, despite its 
Catholic appearance, this contrast is more about the distinction between Wertrationalität and 
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Zweckrationalität. Ulmen, Galli, and McCormick have all pointed out that Schmitt’s title is 
meant to invoke Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.
89
 When one 
scratches Schmitt’s Catholicism, one finds Weber.  
In Roman Catholicism, Schmitt argues that Roman Catholicism, unlike economic-technical 
thinking, is formative; it uses political form to order the world in light of its specific “Idea.”
90
 For 
Schmitt, possessing a “true” regulative Idea allows Roman Catholicism to order the world and 
therefore be political. The absence of a determinate Idea makes economic-technical thinking 
‘formless’ and apolitical. It is merely mechanical. Thus, Schmitt’s use of “political” here already 
begins to take on the shape he would later define it as in The Concept of the Political, which I 
discuss in Chapter 4. 
The most significant point in Schmitt’s discussion of this relationship between Idea and form is 
the conclusion of the initial argument about Catholicism’s political nature: “To the political 
belongs the idea, because there is no politics without authority and no authority without an ethos 
of belief.”
91
 Politics, ordering the world through institutions, depends upon authority. Authority, 
the legitimacy of any hierarchical relationship of obedience, in turn, depends on this ‘ethos of 
belief.’ Ethos of belief relates an individual or group to an Idea; it is the faith in the validity of 
that particular Idea. Restated, Schmitt argues that an Idea held to be valid (by a community) can 
generate the authority necessary to provide political form. Without a legitimate Idea, there is no 
authority, and without authority there can be no political form, e.g., the “ethos” of Catholic belief 
generates Catholic authority, which in turn generates Catholic political form. 
Similarly to his earlier works, Schmitt conceives of an Idea as transcendental and necessary for 
making the world intelligible and a place in which meaningful action can occur.
92
 The 
compelling nature of a particular Idea relates to its ability to make the radical disorder of 
phenomena present to the sense comprehensible; the Idea is an essential part of experience.
93
 
And again, although an Idea underlies experience, it has no reality and cannot provide form by 
itself – abstract Ideas require mediation.
94
 And here Schmitt provides a clue about his claim in 
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Political Theology about the importance of ‘personality’ in the bridging of Idea and concrete 
reality. He writes only human agents can actually mediate Ideas.
95
 Machines cannot decide, they 
can only execute their programming.
96
 Humans concretize Ideas by judging particulars and 
acting on the basis of those judgments. Thus, politics for Schmitt is the product of the concrete 
representation of an Idea in the world. And political form overcomes the problem of pluralistic 
attempts to concretize Ideas.
97
 And language mediates an Idea.
98
 Language is public. Without it, 
the relationship between Ideas and reality simply cannot be expressed nor any consensus formed.  
And again, authority – not power – is central to determining the relationship between Idea and 
reality. The representative of the Idea receives his or her authorization from “above.”
99
 By which 
Schmitt seems to mean authorization comes from the legitimacy of the Idea itself. He writes 
“representation invests the representative person with a special dignity because the representative 
of a noble value cannot be without value.”
100
 This special dignity bestowed is the legitimacy the 
Idea itself has. As long as the representative appears to represent the Idea and the Idea is 
accepted as legitimate, the representative’s actions take on the transcendent character of that Idea. 
Thus, for Schmitt, the representative does not really act but merely mediates the Idea concretely.  
Here too, Schmitt articulates the problem of the relationship between an Idea and concrete reality 
through the constraint of the hiatus between the two. Schmitt wants to understand how to effect a 
particular Idea, to create “form,” in the world when there is no determinate relation between the 
two. Because of the central role Roman Catholicism plays, along with the vilification of 
“economic-technical thinking,” it is easy to forget Schmitt wrote this book on the heels of 
Political Theology. Yet by looking “behind” its Catholicism, one finds the same epistemological 
problem he has dealt with all along. And after this book, Schmitt returned to the terms he used in 
Political Theology in texts like “The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations” (1929) and 
The Concept of the Political (1927/1933). 
d. Quis Judicabit? Late Formulations of Political Theology 
Despite claiming to enter a “security of silence” after the Second World War, Schmitt continued 
to develop and write about his ideas. The high points of the development of “political theology” 
came in the 1963 edition of The Concept of the Political and in Political Theology II (1970). In 
these books, Schmitt integrates into political theology essential questions he attributed to Hobbes: 
quis judicabit? and quis interpretabitur? Yet, although Schmitt’s thought developed and he 
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became more Hobbesian, Schmitt’s neo-Kantian foundations never erode. In fact, his 
understanding of Hobbes maps onto his earlier ideas. 
Incorporated into the 1963 Edition of The Concept of the Political are notes from a 1960 seminar 
Schmitt gave at Ebrach on Hobbes.
101
 In these notes, Schmitt expands on his interwar writings 





This crystal describes the relationship of an Idea, an authority, and a constituency.
103
 The top 
level of the crystal is “open to transcendence,” obtaining some veritas from a transcendental 
source. As an example of some veritas, Schmitt takes the truth “Jesus is the Christ” from Hobbes’ 
reading of scripture in Leviathan. He says, however, that this truth claim could come in the form 
of any Idea, such as “Allah is great,” “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” “Man is good,” or “to each 
according to his ability.”
104
 Whatever one believes. From these examples, political theology 
clearly does not imply merely revealed religion or even religion at all. Schmitt not only classifies 
atheism as a theology but identifies multiple atheistic “theologies.” What all these “theologies” 
share is their status as the basic dogma of a Weltanschauung.
105
 What matters to Schmitt, again, 
is how the Idea comes to be concretized in reality, he recognizes that there are many potential 
Ideas and that a debate over which “faith” is truly right and true would be absurd.  
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Drawing on Hobbes, Schmitt argues that the concretization of a veritas is not unproblematic. 
Deciding abstractly on a veritas or Idea is a precondition for the first tier of the Crystal. But as 
important as this initial decision is, it does not say much about how it concretizes. The second 
axiom asks the natural question in the face of this second level of indeterminacy: whose 
interpretation of its concretization is correct? For Hobbes, this question came from a practical 
dilemma: in his time, although all Christians agreed on the abstract Idea of Christianity and 
agreed on the same Biblical text, violent conflict erupted because it was not clear how to 
interpret them concretely.
106
 Schmitt agrees with Hobbes, arguing the Reformation was a 
struggle over who could legitimately interpret the same abstract Christian Idea; it was a struggle 
over quis judicabit? and quis interpretabitur?
107
 The underdeterminacy of an Idea gives rise to 
mixed concrete interpretations. These interpretations may be irreconcilable and conflict. Conflict 




Dilemmas over how to answer these interpretational questions lead to the third “central” axiom: 
Hobbes’ maxim auctoritas non veritas facit legem. And Schmitt returns to the conclusion he 
drew 40 years earlier in Political Theology: the auctoritatis interpositio. He again argues that the 
only way to bridge the divide between Idea and concrete reality is through an authoritative 
decision that cannot be substantiated logically. This authority, Schmitt writes in agreement with 
Hobbes, must be the political sovereign. It must be a representative authority who can issue 
public laws and bring about political unity.  
The fourth axiom argues only a direct power (potestas directa), not an indirect power (potestas 
indirecta), can possess sovereign authority. Direct power governs through political institutions 
and possesses legitimacy because of its relationship to the transcendental Idea or veritas that 
constitutes the political order – the direct power has the auctoritatis interpositio because it 
purports to judge or particularize rightly. Only the state has the institutional apparatus to enforce 
an Idea and eliminate the conflict-producing ambiguity of the hiatus. It issues laws. And, perhaps 
most importantly, its acts are first concerned not with the truth claims themselves but with 
neutralizing dogmatic conflict to produce peace. This claim anticipates Schmitt’s ideas of 
neutrality and neutralization, which I take up in subsequent chapters. Indirect powers, in contrast, 
are subversive precisely because they are ethically irresponsible and will do whatever it takes to 
realize their dogma concretely. Schmitt thinks that direct power can legitimately and responsibly 
represent the political community whereas rule by an indirect power would simply mean rule by 
factional interest, which would plunge the community back into the state of nature.
109
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The fifth descending axiom argues that there is a basic material criterion that political authority 
fulfills (in addition to the basic transcendent criterion): direct power provides security, peace, 
and order (“protection”) to its constituents. Its legitimacy hinges in part on its ability to satisfy 
this material need. If the sovereign cannot guarantee protection against the insecurity and death 
of the state of nature, it is illegitimate as a political figure no matter how legitimately it 
represents the “truth.” Like in Hobbes, Schmitt finds, by providing protection against the state of 
nature, the sovereign is granted the total obedience of its constituents, which includes the 
unquestioning acceptance of the authority of sovereign decisions. The base of this crystal – what 
appears to be a direct reference to Hegel
110
 – is no longer “open” to transcendence because it is 
determined by material necessity. But, for Schmitt, the need trumping all other material needs is 
the need to escape the state of nature and establish some modicum of peace and security.
111
 No 
form of transcendence and veritas can affect this basic requirement, so Schmitt sees this basic 
relationship of protection and obedience as closed off and static, in a certain sense. Beyond these 
basic needs, Schmitt sees sovereignty as addressing the problem of the hiatus between Idea and 
juridical reality because of its political capacity. 
Political theology in Schmitt’s late period does not rely heavily on Catholicism. Instead, Hobbes 
is the central figure. Still, Schmitt’s argument is the same: no language or concept or Idea is self-
actualizing or self-determining. Even with a fixed truth, one must determine who has the 
authority to decide what it means concretely. He writes, “No machine yet is so perfect and 
‘cybernetic’ as to be able to pose the question quis judicabit?, in the sense of Hobbesian 
philosophia practica, outside of its own preconditions. In contrast to this machine, which by 
itself provides solutions and answers, the decisive question of quis judicabit? or quis 
interpretabitur? is specified as the question quis interrogabit? Which is the question of who 
poses questions and codes them into a machine in itself beyond the decision…It is the actual 
opacity and blurred borders that keeps conflicts from resolving peacefully.”
112
  
And Schmitt again raises Hobbes’ nominalism and the role that the determination of language 
plays in political and juridical life. He writes “Hobbes understood what words and names meant, 
he understood the mythical art of names through which words and names gain meaning. As a 
nominalist, the entire world of human representation and thought is not something merely given, 
but something created first by fiat of words and language.”
113
 Hobbes’ philosophy of language 
draws out the problem of pluralism and the breakdown of sovereign order: without one entity 
defining the meaning of concepts – insofar as they relate to political order – the state fragments 
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as words and concepts come to be determined individualistically, resulting naturally in pluralistic, 
conflictual interpretations of formally identical words and concepts.
114
 As soon as one of these 
conflicting interpretations becomes sufficiently politicized and without a recognized sovereign, 
neutral authority to fix meaning, peace dissolves.  
Political Theology II, coming almost a decade after Ebrach, raises the problem of the hiatus yet 
again. To “show what is at stake in political theology,” Schmitt cites Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences, paragraph §552.
115
 Paragraph §552 argues a political revolution cannot 
succeed without a religious revolution; law and justice cannot be separated from religion. Still 
quoting Hegel, Schmitt goes on to argue Plato got it right when he said a genuine constitution 
and a sound political life must have their deeper foundation on “the Idea” (the Idea must be 
“regent” of the political order). Schmitt concludes Political Theology II arguing, as long as man 
is in the world, Hobbes’ questions quis judicabit? and quis interpretabitur? will need to be 
answered in concreto.
116
 Politics could not be “closed off” from theology, metaphysics remained 
“unavoidable.” At the end of his academic career, albeit in different terms, Schmitt was still 
grappling with the problem at the beginning of his career: given epistemological indeterminacy, 
how could (normative) Ideas and political reality be related in a way that produced a legitimate 
order and meaningful life? No political order could this question and, according to Schmitt, the 
breakdown of authoritative “bridges” over the hiatus was part of the problem that Weimar faced. 
e. The Epistemological Problem of the Hiatus Irrationalis 
Both Political Theology and Political Theology II argue against the “closure” of politics and 
theology – by which, Schmitt means that the two spheres cannot be studied or understood 
independently.
 117
 However tempting it may be to separate them, belief and action, Ideas and 
reality, are intertwined. Every “theology” has practical, concrete consequences. Every intentional 
act is rooted in Ideas about the nature of the world. Thus, even though there is a hiatus between a 
particular theological dogma and concrete reality, we behave as if that dogma were determinate 
for reality and interpret its meaning concretely. But this hiatus leads to pluralistic, conflicting 
interpretations. Schmitt, invoking Hobbes, argues the only solution lies in sovereign authority.  
The hiatus thus presents the problem of insurmountable epistemological indeterminacy. This 
indeterminacy manifests in two ways juridically. He thinks Hobbes identified the first way, 
which the first section of this chapter addressed: the concrete indeterminacy of an accepted Idea. 
Even if, for example, Christianity is universally believed, what it means concretely is 
indeterminate. This indeterminacy caused the Thirty Years’ War. Hobbes’ auctoritatis 
interpositio, Schmitt thinks, solves this indeterminacy: an authoritative interpretation of 
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Christianity can neutralize an ideological point of political conflict. And Schmitt agrees with 
Hobbes that the duty of the sovereign is to protect individuals against the insecurity of the state 
of nature, which includes the chaos that results from the lack of consensus on the meaning of 
words and concepts.
118
 The authority of the sovereign is, at its core, derivative of the relationship 
between protection and obedience.  
Although Schmitt agreed with Hobbes on the importance of the sovereign decision and its 
interpretative monopoly over the foundations of thought, i.e. words, concepts and Ideas, Schmitt 
thought Hobbes had overlooked some important questions of political legitimacy. The second 
aspect of indeterminacy is a deeper problem: how can a stable political order break down. It 
deals with disagreement over different Ideas, rather than the concretization of a single Idea. In 
addressing this aspect of the hiatus, Schmitt moves beyond Hobbes.  
 
2. Political Theology and Disenchantment  
Addressing the concrete indeterminacy of one particular Idea was important. But states could still 
undergo legitimation crises, even when the order itself had not changed. How could this happen? 
How could a sovereign lose its auctoritatis interpositio despite continuing to guarantee 
“protection”? Schmitt answered this question by pointing to the pinnacle of his Hobbes Crystal – 
its openness to transcendence was the only point admitting change. He argued “metaphysical 
images” of the world change. Values and beliefs lose their traction over time and members of a 
social community come to question them.
119
 Using a pseudo-Hegelian idea of historical change, 
Schmitt charted these transformations in a sort of “political-theological” degenerative process. 
Changes in Ideas have a direct effect on the world and conceptions of legitimacy. For example, at 
the onset of the Confessional Civil Wars, religious leaders met at the Colloquy of Poissy to try to 
heal the rift between what they believed to be two branches of the same Christian root.
120
 They 
discovered, instead, that Catholicism and Protestantism were two distinct theologies rooted in 
irreconcilably opposed scriptural dogmas, sacerdotal authority and the Church, the sacraments, 
human will, and salvation. And these beliefs politicized because the disputed tenets seemed so 
existentially important their adherents would rather die than compromise.  
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Schmitt believes the Protestant Reformation was the beginning of a historical process of 
metaphysical degeneration. He provides two nuanced formulations of this process, first in 
Political Theology and then in “The Age of Depoliticization and Neutralizations.” In other works, 
he describes it simply as an antithesis of Catholicism and either Protestantism or Atheism. 
Despite his varied articulations, these formulations share an underlying coherence. They 
articulate a process of disenchantment, beginning with Protestantism, and examine how that 
disenchantment affects the state, political authority, and the constitution. Schmitt believed 
outlining these stages of metaphysical degeneration allowed a better understanding the 
underlying causes of Weimar’s situation. Weimar, he thought, was in crisis because it was 
modeled on 19
th
 century Ideas of legitimacy. But those 19
th
 century metaphysical assumptions 
were no longer valid. And Weimar’s unchanged institutions were behaving far differently than its 
architects had intended. This section outlines Schmitt’s philosophy of modern history as 
metaphysical degeneration. It is divided into three subsections. First, it discusses metaphysical 
degeneration in Political Theology. Then it discusses this process in “The Age of Neutralizations 
and Depoliticizations.” Finally, it discusses change more broadly as disenchantment.  
a. Political Theology: Schmitt’s First Formulation of the Disenchantment of the State  
As noted above, Schmitt refines his understanding of the neo-Kantian epistemological problem 
of the hiatus using Cortés’ political theology. But his debt to Cortés runs even deeper. The third 
chapter of Political Theology lifts – almost verbatim – Cortés’ philosophy of history and 
recontextualizes it to fit Weimar. Carlo Galli alone seems to have noticed this but Schmitt’s 
historical account plays a far greater role in his diagnosis of the crisis of the state than Galli 
acknowledges.
121
 When Political Theology was first published as a commemoration for Max 
Weber, this third chapter was the final chapter – so Schmitt had originally concluded his 
commemoration with an obscure Catholic’s philosophy of history. Why he does this reveals his 
relationship with Weber and the meaning of both figures to political theology. Schmitt believed 
both thinkers dealt with the same problem. Moreover, Cortés could help resolve some of the 
aporiae in Weber’s problematization of modernity. 
Political Theology’s third chapter builds on Weber’s The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, discussing different phases of disenchantment and pathological secularization, which 
degenerates both metaphysical Ideas and their corresponding political orders. Schmitt opens this 
chapter writing “All significant concepts of the modern theory of the states are secularized 
theological concepts.”
122
 He then immediately lays out a simple antithesis: deism versus theism – 
or early Protestantism versus Catholicism. He says the shift to a deistic metaphysics led to the 
triumph of the modern state and scientific legitimacy at once.
123
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Schmitt uses Kelsen to expand on this aspect of political theology. He credits Kelsen for noticing 
the relationship between theology and jurisprudence. Kelsen did so most famously with his 
remark “If I decide on democracy, it is done exclusively based on the relationship of form of the 
democratic state to a relativistic Weltanschauung.”
124
 Following Kelsen’s political-theological 
intuition, Schmitt probes more deeply into Kelsen’s metaphysical presuppositions. He notes that, 
as a neo-Kantian positivist, Kelsen presupposes epistemological legitimacy hinges on conformity 
of an object of knowledge to scientific method. Because scientific method seeks the necessary 
and inviolable laws of phenomena that can be explained causally, Schmitt argues Kelsen has an 
innate interest in scientific objectivity and an aversion to arbitrariness.
125
   
With his metaphysical presuppositions in hand, Schmitt turns to Kelsen’s “decision” for 
democracy. Kelsen’s “relativistic” democracy holds that whatever the outcome of democratic 
procedure, the aggregate of individual votes, is a legitimate political decision. For Schmitt, this 
reflects natural scientific methodology. In natural science, legitimate knowledge is limited to 
observable matter (what can be “quantified”) and it disregards classical conceptions like 
substance or essence (“qualities”) because they cannot be measured objectively.
126
 This means 
Kelsen’s theology cannot distinguish law’s substance from its accidental features. Kelsen 
reduces legitimacy to accidental, positive features because only what is accidental can be openly 
observed and quantified. But Schmitt is troubled by Kelsen’s approach, both politically and 
metaphysically – it appears arbitrary to him. Moreover, he thinks it may have something to do 
with Weimar’s legitimation crisis. Ultimately, he will argue it reintroduces the conditions that 
give birth to civil war in a political body: in an age of mass democracy and political pluralism: 
the unprincipled, value-neutral democracy exemplified by Kelsen’s quantitative proceduralism is 
the source of Weimar’s instability.
127
 He generalizes his conclusion: the predominant 
metaphysical presuppositions of an epoch affect and structure its other value-spheres; 
metaphysics is the most intense and clearest expression of an epoch’s legitimacy.
128
  
To make his case, Schmitt turns his gaze toward history, beginning with the 16
th
 century. Schmitt 
argues theistic metaphysics prevailed at the time. It was mirrored politically by understanding the 
theological sovereign as a personality who was simultaneously creator, legislator, and architect 
of the law.
129
 The Counterrevolutionaries rightly argued, Schmitt believes, that the 
Enlightenment put legitimacy on a track toward scientific materialism. The first shift in this 
direction was slight but of enormous significance. It was Protestant Reformation’s introduction 
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of deistic metaphysics. Deism presupposes the universe is mechanized and operates according to 
general inviolable laws. God exists and remains the architect of that universe, but no longer acts 
within it. Deism, Schmitt argues, then gave way to pantheism. Pantheism presupposes a 
depersonalized God, without architectural or decisionistic qualities.
130
 Instead, God is immanent, 
consisting in the universe itself. Finally, he argues, pantheism gives way to atheism. God is 
banished altogether. Only scientific method can establish legitimate knowledge.
131
 God no 
longer has any place. Each metaphysical stage sows the seeds for its successor. But all spring 
from the same origin: Protestantism. It decried the will and authority of the Church and the 
theistic God and undermined the basis for mystery by shifting the basis for belief from dogma to 
individual faith, which then gravitated toward material, phenomenal accounts of the world. 
Schmitt argues that these metaphysical “rejections” of God are mirrored by shifts in political 
legitimacy. The political sovereign of a theistic epoch was understood like its God: personal, 
decisive, creative, independent and above the law, and unitary – and these qualities were an 
extension of his legitimacy.
132
 Deism still admitted sovereignty, but only when bound to the 
law.
133
 Legal exceptions, however, had vanished. The sovereign of a pantheistic epoch was 
further impoverished. He was no longer even a personal, tangible figure. Legitimate sovereignty 
resided immanently in “the people,” an abstract, represented being. Finally, in an atheistic era, 
there is not even an immanent sovereign standing somehow ‘above’ real institutions. Sovereignty 
becomes the democratically aggregated will of actually individuals.
134
  
Schmitt’s sociology of the concept “sovereignty” can be depicted as follows: 
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THEOLOGY TIME PERIOD POLITICAL STRUCTURE THEORIST 
Theism 17th Century Monarchy: Sovereign is personal, decisive, and 
decides according to particulars 
Hobbes 
Deism 18th Century Constitutional Monarchy: Sovereign is personal and 
decisive, but decides only universals (there are no 
exceptions; sovereign subjected to law) 
Malebranche, 
Leibniz 
Pantheism 19th Century Republic: Sovereign is no longer personal, but 




Atheism 20th Century Anarchy: Sovereignty resides in individuals; there is 
no authority, order arises "accidentally" or naturally 
Proudhon, Bakunin 
Schmitt thus depicts political conceptions of legitimate sovereignty deriving from and running 
parallel to legitimate theological sovereignty.
135
 Schmitt, through his “sociological analysis of 
concepts,” argues attempts to “close” political theology will fail. Questions of politics and 
theology bear upon one another inextricably. So the metaphysical disenchantment Weber 
describes has a corresponding political disenchantment. 
Schmitt’s account of metaphysical degeneration is lifted almost unaltered from Cortés “Speech 
on the Situation in Europe.” Cortés similarly divides history into the same four theological 
periods and draws the same political-theological conclusions for political form.
136
 And Schmitt 
concludes Political Theology by explicitly discussing Cortés. He discusses how Cortés believed 
legitimacy could be saved with dictatorship, which would preserve the quality of personal 
decision. Cortés, like Hobbes, embraced auctoritas in political form. Although he would later 
change his mind about Hobbes, in 1922 Schmitt argued Cortés offered something Hobbes could 
not. He thought Hobbes was a victim of his own deistic metaphysics, which corrupted his state 
theory. Cortés, on the other hand, understood history. Schmitt praises Cortés theistic 
weltanschauung for rejecting “[Hobbes’] mathematical natural-scientific thinking,” which gave 
him greater clarity about how metaphysics affects juridical form.
137
 Schmitt departs from Cortés, 
however, over monarchy. He recognizes the steady march of democratization cannot be resisted. 
The burning question for Schmitt, discussed in later chapters, was whether a form of the 
democratic state existed that could overcome the factionalizing effects of democratic relativism.  
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of his fundamental concern for the question quis judicabit?. Schmitt, "Die vollendete Reformation," 64-65. 
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In Schmitt’s polemic with Kelsen, he argues Kelsen’s democratic relativism is an end stage in 
this process of degeneration. In Kelsen’s “decision” for relativism, the authority to interpret 
theology, norms, and political order is left to every individual – which for Schmitt, risks 
exposing the state’s institutions to the pluralistic conflict of the state of nature. Protestantism’s 
metaphysical regression also sparked crises in state authority. With every shift in theology, there 
comes a corresponding crisis in political authority, which forces a revision of the political 
institutions of an epoch. In 1933, it appears that Schmitt believed “atheistic” theology’s clash 
with pantheistically-designed institutions was the cause of the Weimar crisis.  
But even more problematically, Schmitt argues, an atheistic Weltanschauung inhibits the 
possibilities for meaningful human life. Political and theological “atheism” are driving the world 
into disenchantment – and this meant, politically, a world without any authority at all. Haunted 
by Weber’s account of the disenchantment and rationalization of the world – and the role that 
Protestantism played in placing humanity on that track toward secularization – Schmitt struggled 
to find a solution. He concludes Political Theology with Cortés because he offers a different 
perspective on the problem of disenchantment – one which, in Schmitt’s opinion, might offer 
insight into a way out of ‘the polar night of icy darkness and hardness’ that trapped Weber. 
b. Stages of Neutralization and Depoliticization: Schmitt’s Revised Formulation 
In the preface to the second edition of Political Theology (1934), Schmitt writes his article “The 
Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations” (1929) addresses “the major problem concerning 
the individuals stages of the process of secularization,”
138
 effectively amending the process 
described in Political Theology. This revised version dominates his later Weimar writings.
139
 But 
while Schmitt’s 1929 reformulation has affinities with Political Theology, it does not map neatly 
onto it. This time, he divides modern history into four stages: theological, metaphysical, 
humanitarian-moral, and economic, but suggests a fifth “technical” stage is on the horizon.
140
  
Schmitt writes “all essential concepts are not normative but existential.”
141
 The significance of a 
concept is existentially determined by an epoch’s predominant metaphysics. Sovereignty is 
legitimate when existential decisions and distinctions are made in line with the epoch’s 
metaphysics. Therefore, every epochal shift means that sovereignty enters into crisis as it adapts 
to this new Idea. Schmitt discusses the meaning of “progress” as an example. The concept of 
progress in an economic epoch means economic progress. The inhabitants of an economic epoch, 
particularly elites, understand the world primarily in economic terms. In that epoch, the state’s 
central task will be primarily economic distribution and regulation.  
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 Schmitt, Political Theology, 2. 
139 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 74-75; Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 13. 
140 Carl Schmitt, "The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations," [Das Zeitalter der Neutralisierungen und 
Entpolitisierungen.] Telos 96(1993): 131, 133. 
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Schmitt has little to say about the first two epochs or stages. He says that the existential questions 
of the 16
th
 century were defined theologically, to be solved by theologians.
142
 And political unity 
was defined in religious terms – the existential decision before a sovereign was cujus regio ejus 
religio.
143
 By the 17
th
 century, rationalism had eclipsed theology and replaced it with 
metaphysics. Essential questions were metaphysical, to be raised and solved by scholarly 
“systematizers.” In the 18
th
 century, Schmitt argues deistic metaphysics shifted to “humanitarian-
moralism.” The essential questions of that epoch were defined in terms of virtue and morality. 
Existential identities were nationalistic: political equality meant the nation.
144
 And, Schmitt 
argues, the epoch’s intellectual representatives were Enlightenment thinkers. 
In the 19
th
 century, humanitarian-moralism gave way to economic-technical thinking. But 
Schmitt these epochs were divided by the intermediary stage of romanticism. In a passage 
recalling his Political Romanticism, he writes romanticism was a pseudo-religious rejection of 
the world where every individual sought infinite possibility without responsibility. Romanticism 
was thus a depoliticization. It lacked any commitment to realizing values concretely. It embraced 
value-pluralism for the sake of infinite possibility. Schmitt saw its indecision as a mystical 
withdrawal from the world. Because romanticism has no existential commitments and is 
interested only in what is immediate, Schmitt argues it aestheticizes every value-sphere, 
dissolving everything into detheologized occasionalism and the possibility of infinite “play.” 
Paradoxically, romantic aestheticization leads to the economic-technical epoch: by reducing 
existence to aesthetic occasions, it gives birth to an epoch in which “the core categories of 
human existence are in terms of production and consumption.”
145
 Schmitt thinks romanticism’s 
rejection of values and responsibility leads its adherents to the basest materialism. Presumably, 
he thinks romantic aestheticism leads to the economic epoch because of the two epoch’s shared 
consumptive and immediate qualities.
146
 Romanticism differs from economic because it is 
spiritually consumptive while economics is materially consumptive.  
The economic-technical epoch is best defined by historical materialism: economics is the driving 
force of all history. Even the state is merely an extension of economic conflict. That epoch’s 
essential questions regard material distribution. Accordingly, its defining political-existential 
question was over the state’s economic order – which Schmitt formulates as cujus regio ejus 
oeconomia. Marx epitomized the epoch’s intellectual. Although the aesthetic occasionalism of 
Romanticism and economic materialism troubled him, Schmitt was preoccupied most by the 
dawn of the coming epoch, of technicity. In this epoch, essential questions and problems are 
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defined in terms of technology and innovation. It has no intellectual representative and it is 
characterized by the pure, thoughtless “technical” administration of bureaucracy.
147
  
This table depicts the process described in “The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations”: 
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Schmitt argues there is a meta-pattern driving this process of metaphysical change: neutralization. 
Historical change occurs when a neutralizing value-sphere politicizes and becomes the site of 
dogmatic conflict.
148
 The sovereign “neutralizes” this conflict with a new value-sphere that can 
absorb the site of conflict, reordering the state and constitution accordingly. For example, 
Hobbes’ “Jesus is the Christ” neutralized a dogmatic conflict between Protestantism and 
Catholicism by offering a “higher” veritas, on which both parties could agree. But each new 
neutralizing value-sphere will eventually politicize and thus become the scene of new dogmatic 
conflicts between irreconcilable Weltanschauung.
149
  
Like in Political Theology, the first shift was Protestantism’s individualization of theological 
authority. And it was decisive. It catalyzed the meta-pattern of neutralization, beginning a 
process of disenchantment and materialism.
150
 He believes the last, coming epoch of the 
“religion of technical progress,” will conclude this process with the thorough disenchantment of 
human life.
151
 Technicity is attractive, he argues, because it appears to be completely neutral. 
Problems raised and answered in terms of technology have two qualities that make them appear 
this way: technical problems are formed in terms of instrumental reasoning and they appear 
infinitely and objectively solvable. Ultimately, “technology appears as a sphere of peace, 
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understanding, and reconciliation”
152
 and seems as if it would avoid the politicization that earlier 
neutralizing spheres had eventually underwent.  
But Schmitt thinks technology is actually a monkey’s paw. And this is so precisely because it 
actually is totally neutral. Technology provides no answer to the essential existential questions 
necessary for meaningful human life. And its neutralizing quality misleads adherents about its 
actual practical consequences. Technology will not end metaphysics or politicization at all. First, 
technology engenders what Schmitt calls an “activistic metaphysics.” It presumes the unlimited 
power of humanity; the unlimited domination of man over nature; and unlimited change and 
possibility.
153
 Ultimately, technology does not represent the overcoming of metaphysics and 
theology per se, but merely the shift toward an utterly materialistic (or negative) metaphysics in 
which man has supplanted god and nature has supplanted the supernatural.
154
 But more 
problematically, because technology cannot provide regulatory Ideas or answers to existential 
questions, the wielders of technicity simply smuggle in values from other spheres. Technology 
cannot determine its ends. So individuals will tacitly draw on other Weltanschauungen. Whoever 
is in power can use technology to augment their beliefs and to impose them on others. 
Technology only intensifies the political values informing it because of its power and ostensive 
neutrality.
155
 Rather than contributing to any positive value like peace, common understanding, 
or liberation, Schmitt thinks that technology is “a means to the domination of the masses on a 
large scale.”
156
 It becomes a powerful instrument of indirect rule.  
Schmitt argues further that total neutralization is itself a false dream. It is either disingenuous or 
death. When it is disingenuous, proponents of neutrality are actually motivated by some value, of 
which they themselves may not even be aware. They have been ideologically blinded to their 
underlying beliefs and values. Moreover, the drive for total neutralization takes on a teleological 
quality: “the most terrible war is pursued only in the name of peace, the most terrible oppression 
only in the name of freedom, the most terrible inhumanity only in the name of humanity.”
157
 
When not disingenuous, Schmitt thinks total neutralization is “death.” It would be the total 
absence of value and meaning in life. The proponent of this sort of neutrality knows no enemy 
because he has no existential values that could be opposed. Perhaps, Schmitt suggests, his only 
motivation would be fear of death.
158
 But, he cautions, this motivation could only yield living 
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death. Life requires positive determination through decisions on Ideas if it is to be meaningful. 
Total neutrality is the negation of life. 
Again in “The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations,” Schmitt grapples with Weber’s 
problematization of modernity and the metaphysical and political degeneration he thinks it began. 
He is particularly concerned about its implications for political form: technicity undermines the 
basis for political authority altogether. It entails truly nihilistic state form through the 
mechanistic spirit of “administration.” Although Schmitt agrees with Weber that technicity may 
conclude in a world of congealed spirit, he is equally concerned that it may conclude in a world 
that is not neutral at all – that technicity, rather than being neutral, might actually paint over 
value-charged, non-neutral ends with a veneer of neutral legitimacy. In other words, value 
neutral technicity will allow existential decisions to be smuggled into an apparently neutral 
process – which, under the mask of technicity, leads to total domination. To anticipate a later 
chapter, relativized political institutions can be instrumentalized by highly politicized and 
factionalized powers to “legitimate” their views and impose them across the state. 
c. A World Robbed of Gods, Dominated by Impersonal Forces 
Schmitt’s philosophy of history sketches out the general problem he was getting at and allow us 
to look beyond the problems that any philosophy of history is bound to have. The systemic crises 
that arose out of the advent of Protestantism (described metaphysically as Calvinistic deism and 
cujus regio ejus religio) have a negative impact on human life.
159
 But more troubling is that they 
are the immediate cause of a process leading to the total disenchantment of the world. Above all, 
both accounts culminate in two forms of disenchantment: the metaphysical disenchantment of the 
world and the political disenchantment of the state. In other words, modernity is characterized by 
a progressively deepening crisis of authority.  
Political theology is entwined with the twin phenomena of disenchantment and rationalization: as 
the world is theologically rationalized (“robbed of gods”), the state is politically rat ionalized. 
Modernity undermines authority, increasingly subjectivizing value and belief. As rationalization 
progresses, sober reflection cannot escape that metaphysical values are foundationless. The 
world’s theological disenchantment is paralleled by its political disenchantment. Juridically, 
rationalization means the shift of law away from substantive principles like “justice” or reason to 
positivism.
160
 For the state, this means the triumph of administration or the complete dissolution 
of order altogether in political theories like anarchism and pluralism. 
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Disenchantment sits in the background of many of Schmitt’s writings. And allusions to a 
simplified philosophy of history, from enchantment to disenchantment, can be found in works as 
disparate as The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1926), Land and Sea (1942), The Nomos of 
the Earth (1950), and Political Theology II (1970). But Roman Catholicism and Political Form 
provides an exemplary account of this simplified formulation, where Protestantism exemplifies 
disenchantment and Catholicism its opposite. For this reason and for its proximity to Political 
Theology, this section uses it to outline Schmitt’s conceptual antithesis.  
Because Schmitt’s argument of political theology, especially here, is in direct dialogue with 
Weber, a brief recount of Weber’s main argument in his seminal work will better contextualize 
what Schmitt is arguing in his general philosophy of history.
161
 According to Weber, 
Protestantism’s doctrine of predestination was one of the most important theological innovations. 
It includes predestination for one’s specific worldly calling or vocation.
162
 It is important 
theologically because it denied even divine agency could alter fate. For Weber, its deism 
represented a giant leap forward in the rationalization of the world.
163
 Anxious about their 
salvation, early Protestants strove to find signs to comfort their doubts about whether they too 
shared in God’s grace.
164
 As a psychological coping mechanism to overcome their anxiety, they 
embraced a form of ‘inner-worldly’ asceticism. Their lives were purposively driven toward the 
glorification of god and the active abandonment of the world through their predestined vocation. 
Because of this abandon into their vocation and their asceticism, they amassed enormous capital 
and accidentally created their sought-after signs: they must have been saved if God had blessed 
them with such wealth! The birth of the spirit of modern capitalism was also the beginning of 
disenchantment.
165
 The theological doctrine of predestination was the catalyst for modernity.  
Weber describes how the advent of modern scientific method furthered the process of 
rationalization by redefining the terms of legitimate knowledge: dogma, mystery, etc. could not 
hold up to the scrutiny of scientific method.
166
 To continue to believe in them was irrational. The 
loss of these qualities, however, meant another step toward disenchantment. Disenchantment 
today means that, while people retain the culture of inner-worldly asceticism, it lacks the 
substantive transcendental orientation the early Protestants had that made it meaningful. Weber 
means today we maintain the Protestants’ ‘inner-worldly’ asceticism, working ourselves to death 
without regard to any substantive worldly ends, but we no longer believe some other-worldly 
salvation awaits our efforts. As modern scientific method became more pervasive, it culminated 
into the ‘iron-cage’ of domination. The world has no substantive meaning. Our lives are 
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regulated by supposedly objective administration, according to the only uncontroversial form of 
reason: instrumental-rationality. Rationalization, at this stage, means that every value-sphere – 
cut off from all substantive meaning – now operates according to its own logic without regard for 
human life as a whole. For the state, rationalization meant the increasing control of social and 
material life by subordinating political institutions to bureaucratization, governing impersonally 
according to formalized legal rules.
167
 For Weber, the Protestant spirit undermines the possibility 
for politics when it is understood to be oriented by decisions and substantive ends.  
Schmitt agrees with Weber. Rationalization and disenchantment originated in the inner-worldly 
ascetic of early Protestantism. And he agrees its outcome is the pervasive rationalization of 
human life, the reorientation of human action from transcendent values toward abstract formal 
rules; the change in the orientation of human life toward an impersonal, “objective” order is 
actually substantively meaningless.
168
 Schmitt focuses on the materialistic outcome of the 
Protestant spirit, furthered by modern science. He describes how the economic-rationalism of the 
era has become substantively irrational in its striving to satisfy whatever arbitrary material needs 
arise, “be it a silk blouse or poison gas.”
169
 Its only value is “soulless” exchange. Schmitt thinks 
these facets of the economic-technical age arise because there is no metaphysical Idea guiding it. 
Or better, its Idea is the absence of an authoritative Idea. Each individual has total authority over 
his or her “beliefs” – no matter how unreasonable or wrong it may be. 
And, Schmitt reasons, because a technical epoch purports to have no Idea, there is no place for an 
Idea’s authoritative mediation by political institutions. The administrative state purports to be 
apolitical: it rejects political authority believing the natural outcome of unregulated exchange is 
best and argues the state’s role should be merely neutral oversight. But if the free market and the 
night watch state were at all aligned with reality, if this ‘Idea’ were correct, then Schmitt claims 
there would not be problems of formlessness, nihilism, rationalization, and disenchantment. And, 
likewise, he argues the administrative night-watch state, the political form of an economic-
technical epoch, is a myth – the public and private realms are thoroughly interpenetrated and its 
form is not neutral or objective but left to whatever private or “indirect” powers are able to seize 
control of those “neutral” institutions. The myth of neutrality masks this phenomenon.  
Schmitt departs from Weber in suggesting that this increasingly rationalized world is not the only 
possibility. Schmitt believes Catholicism offers a model for authority and value that avoids 
disenchantment, which could be appropriated to repair Weimar’s political institutions.
170
 It is 
because of its relationship with a determinate Idea that Catholicism represents the antithesis of 
Protestantism. “Political Form” enters the picture when one reconsiders the relationship Schmitt 
describes between Idea and reality. Roman Catholicism is political because it works to concretize 
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the values of its Idea in the world.
171
 The Church appears to Schmitt as a complexio oppositorum 
because it is will instrumentalize whatever means allow it to realize its regulatory Idea: the 
Catholic political-theological order. The Church’s value does not lie specifically in Catholic 
theology, however. As I discuss in Chapter 4, Schmitt values Catholicism as an example of a 
solution to these problems. This model points to a way out of technicity that does not ignore the 
metaphysics of the 20
th
 century. 
For Schmitt, the conceptual antitheses of Catholicism and Protestantism culminate political-
theologically into one simple antithesis: the dogma of the natural goodness or natural evilness of 
humankind.
172
 Is authority – in any form – the source of evil and are individuals better off left 
alone, which is to say they will naturally arrive to reason and right? Or do individuals need some 
form of authority, no matter how limited, to educate or direct passions and drives and to lead 
them to reason and right? Catholicism is political because it answers the latter, subscribing to the 
dogma of natural evil. Protestantism in a narrow sense may be political, but its shift in emphasis 
opened the door to the apolitical dogmas of Schmitt’s time: anarchism and scientistic 
technocracy. This dogmatic antithesis will become especially important when as I discuss 
Schmitt’s state theory in depth in Chapter 5. Schmitt believes this challenge to authority and 
legitimacy is the cause of the crisis of the 20
th
 century. 
From this main antithesis between Catholicism’s “political” nature and Protestantism’s 
“economic-technical” nature, Schmitt teases out several further antitheses. Against the 
representative character of the Idea of Catholicism, there is the unmediated ‘presence’ of 
economic-technical thought.
173
 Against Catholic form, there is the formlessness of economic-
technical thought.
174
 Against the personality of Catholicism, with its juridical derivatives of 
equitability and its orientation toward substantive justice, there is the impersonality of economic-
technical thought, with its juridical derivative of mechanical legislation and judgment.
175
 Against 
the Catholic conception of metaphysical freedom, there is the economic-technical notion of 
scientific determination and causality.
176
 Against Catholicism’s harmonious relation with its land 
and “soil,” there is Protestant nomadism, living out of balance with and striving to dominate 
nature, attached only to the products of industry.
177
 Against Catholic soul, there is Protestant 
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economic-technical materialism.
178
 Finally, against the substantive value rationality of 
Catholicism, there is Protestant instrumental rationalization.
179
 
In Political Theology II (1970), one finds again Schmitt’s concerns about the impact of 
rationalization, especially of “technicity” and “technical thought” on theological form and 
political order in a way reminiscent of his 1929 article “The Age of Depoliticizations and 
Neutralizations.” And his discussion here expands again on the dialectic between Protestantism 
and Catholicism. Schmitt is particularly concerned with the conflation of rational-legal 
legitimacy with substantive legitimacy.
180
 By confusing legal procedure with substantive 
legitimacy, any end at all can become legitimate. But if legality is just that, then justice is merely 
something we give ourselves – having nothing to do with any metaphysical order independent of 
human will.
181
 It is self-empowerment. If legality is legitimacy, then justice is mere sophistry: 
whoever has the power to make law decides what justice is. The most rational-legal “legitimacy” 
can achieve in the modern world is democratic legitimation – but, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, “modern mass” democracy, construed in totally value-neutral terms, is a highly 
problematic form of legitimacy for Schmitt. He argues, echoing his earlier discussion in Political 
Theology of atheism’s political form, that worldly immanence is directed autistically against 
theological transcendence.
182
 Mere legality is the last stage of political degeneration; it reflects 
the attempt at complete separation from any sort of formative Idea about the world. With this 
degeneration, the world ceases to be a “politomorph,” a world with a political shape or form.
183
  
But Schmitt reaffirms that even a world completely deprived of traditional theology offers the 
possibility of enmity.
184
 Atheism is still metaphysics, even if it is a “negative” metaphysics. And 
there can be multiple atheistic images of the world – for Schmitt, liberalism, communism, 
anarchism, and bureaucratic technocracy are four types of atheism. Metaphysics, Schmitt argues, 
is something unavoidable.
185
 The rise of atheism simply means theology and humanity have been 
secularized.
186
 It does not mean politicization and theology have been overcome. 
 
                                                             
178
 Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political Form, 11-12. 
179
 Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political Form, 14-15. 
180
 Schmitt, Political Theology II, 119. 
181 Schmitt, Political Theology II, 120. 
182 Schmitt, Political Theology II, 120. Schmitt uses autism in the sense of the Greek αὐτός, meaning the withdrawal 
into the self, intolerance of external influence and interaction, the tendency to view life in terms of only one’s own 
needs and desires, and detachment from the world. 
183 Schmitt, Political Theology II, 124. 
184 Schmitt, Political Theology II, 126. 
185 See Appendix Note III 
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3. Political Theology in Weber’s Critique of Stammler 
In the introduction to this chapter, I noted Schmitt identifies the political theology of the 
Restoration [Restaurationszeit] as an exemplary illustration of Weber’s critique of Stammler. To 
be able to interpret this claim is a hard case for explaining his concept of political theology.  
According to Weber “Stammler’s whole argument depends on…the most colossal Scholasticism,” 
which is to say Stammler, like medieval scholastics, is so concerned with harmonizing facts by 
ironing out inconsistencies between value-spheres he commits major methodological fallacies, 
the most egregious of which is violating the hiatus between facts and values and causally 
reducing, ultimately, empirical phenomena to spiritual phenomena.
187
 Stammler ends up 
committing the same methodological fallacy Marxist materialism does – just inverted.
188
 The 
political theology of the Restoration, for that matter, seems to commit the same fallacy Stammler 
had – and both were intended to counter the materialistic outlook of Marxism.
189
 They reduce 
everything to “spirit.” Their political theology is the reduction of phenomena to noumena. It is 
mirrored politically by a Recht that objectively exists independent from and superior to any really 
existing facts. But this move is as guilty of breaching the hiatus as Marxism is.  
Weber’s critique of Stammler is, for Schmitt, especially relevant because Stammler was Kelsen’s 
teacher and, Schmitt believes, Kelsen committed the same methodological fallacy Stammler had. 
Kelsen follows Stammler methodologically, although he uses a different metaphysics: that of 
natural science and, accordingly, material causality.
190
 Kelsen transfers this conception of 
legitimacy to jurisprudence, arguing for democratic relativism as discussed above.
191
 Thus, 
Schmitt’s reference to Weber’s critique of Stammler may be a subtle reference to or even critique 
of Kelsen’s own political theology. Beyond that, for Schmitt, Kelsen’s jurisprudence bears the 
stamp of the disenchantment of their epoch: he thinks Kelsen’s rigid adherence to the hiatus ends 
up reducing all values to positivistic facticity, and he can offer no way to reenchant the world 
outside of an empty transcendental-logical presupposition. 
 
Conclusion: The Weimar Crisis and the Hiatus Irrationalis  
                                                             
187
 Max Weber, "R. Stammler's "Surmounting" of the Materialist Conception of History (Part 1)," British Journal of 
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188 Interestingly, Schmitt simultaneously argues that “political theologians” of the Restoration made this error, 
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 Schmitt, Political Theology, 43. “Both the spiritualist explanation of material processes and the materialist 
explanation of spiritual phenomena seek causal relations. At first they construct a contrast between two spheres, 
and then they dissolve this contrast into nothing by reducing one to the other.” 
190 Schmitt, Political Theology, 41, 42, 49. 
191 Schmitt, Political Theology; cf. Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, 84, 118. 
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At what seemed like the height of the Cold War in 1978, Schmitt wrote theological alternatives 
were out of the question. The defining issues of the epoch were industrial-economic and to 
continue to conceive of them in “religious-theological-confessional terms” would be an “obsolete” 
approach.
192
 Political theology, for Schmitt, meant finding “the political system of society 
adequate” to its level of development, by which he meant adequate to the existential questions 
that defined it most.
193
 During the Interwar Period and then the Cold War, Schmitt understood 
those existential questions to be fundamentally of an industrial-economic nature. Of course, 
today we face even different circumstances still. “Industrial-economic” questions persist, albeit 
changed by the end of the Cold War, but paired with theological and still other questions. 
Schmitt, undoubtedly, would have updated his ideas to reflect these changes.
194
 Nevertheless, to 
continue to conceive of political theology in strictly religious-theological-confessional terms is, 
to us Schmitt’s language, “obsolete.” It flattens Schmitt’s concept. 
Schmitt describes political theology in epistemological terms as the indeterminate relationship 
between metaphysics and concrete reality and the political problems this gives rise to, which he 
builds on a version of Weber’s theory of disenchantment. The first section of this chapter showed 
how Schmitt described the hiatus as an epistemological problem. It is the problem of the under-
determination of Ideas, both their abstract nature taken alone and how an Idea, however assumed, 
relates to reality. Schmitt eventually argues the hiatus begs Hobbes’ question of quis judicabit?, 
which is really a question of which regulative Idea is legitimate and whose interpretation of that 
Idea is legitimate. History affects political theology because Ideas change over time and these 
changes result in political crises.  
Schmitt thought 20
th
 century states were in crisis because the world was going through another 
stage of metaphysical change. Modern mass democracy was its political parallel. While this 
political crisis was itself a source of alarm, Schmitt was also concerned about what other effects 
it would have on political order and security. He thought humanity was moving toward total 
nihilism, chaos, and even greater unfreedom. He described the disenchanted, pluralist, and 
impersonal world of technicity as far worse than Hobbes’ bellum omnium contra omnes – in 
Hobbes’ time constituents could at least agree on Christianity.
195
 He believed Weimar could not 
even claim that much. Its political institutions were based on 19
th
 century conceptions of 
legitimacy. Its legitimation crisis reflected the failure of its architects to take into account 20
th
 
century change. In Schmitt’s view, his contemporaries, failing to grasp the significance of history, 
disenchantment, and indeterminacy, misconceptualized political crises, and presented solutions 
based on flawed premises. Failing to understand the source of political crises in authority, they 
only aggravated the crisis; their solutions only anticipated problems that no longer existed.  
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The Miserable Condition: Modern Mass Democracy and the 
Collapse of the State 
 
 
As far as national politics are concerned, the unorganized mass, the democracy of the street, is 
wholly irrational. It is at its most powerful in countries with a parliament that is either powerless 
or politically discredited, and that means above all where rationally organized parties are absent. 
– Max Weber, “Parliament and Democracy in a Reconstructed Germany” 
 
Absolute democracy annihilates freedom no less than absolute monarchy. This consequence is 
inevitable whenever monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic form is realized absolutely. 





In his attempt to restore the authority of the Weimar state, Carl Schmitt responded to what he 
believed to be the defining problem of 20
th
 century politics: modern mass democracy. He argued 
modern mass democracy – universal suffrage in an age of advanced communications, modern 
social-psychology, and broadening pluralism – factionalized society and overloaded 19
th
 century 
republican institutions. In the process, it undermined the authority of the Weimar state and 
brought it to near-civil war.  
This chapter analyzes Schmitt’s critique of democracy in the 20
th
 century. Indeed, Schmitt shows 
a remarkable hostility to democracy, which he defines, following Thoma, as a state founded on 
universal and equal suffrage and ruled by “the majority.”
1
 Schmitt is often interpreted to be the 
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paradigmatic 20
th
 century illiberal and, we are told, this is the defining feature of his thought.
2
 
But, in fact, whatever misgivings Schmitt had about “liberalism” (a topic I turn to in chapter 6), 
they were at best secondary to mass democracy simpliciter.  
Schmitt believed the unique problem of the 20
th
 century was that universal suffrage opened the 
state up to the irrationalism of the masses, which could be channeled and manipulated by total 
movements (“indirect powers”), who exploit that democratic legitimacy to make changes to the 
fundamental commitments and structure of the state and constitution and impose their factional 
beliefs across society. He believed that the triumph of positivism had blinded most 20
th
 century 
political thinkers to the possibility of a tyrannical majority. Too often, he complained, democracy 
had become a linguistically confused placeholder for “everything that is ideal, beautiful, and 
appealing” and attached to political movements with wholly irreconcilable understandings of 
what democracy meant concretely.
3
 And Schmitt thought what democracy meant concretely was 
far from clear anyway. He argued it could be attached to many different political practices and 
that “everything depended on how the will of the people is formed.”
4
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Yet political theorists have generally focused on Schmitt’s contributions to democratic theory, 
usually as a sort of plebiscitary or radical democracy, and/or his antiliberalism. Some interpret 
Schmitt as a plebiscitarian democrat. This view holds that he valorized the plebiscite as the 
authentic expression of democratic will – as opposed to its flawed expression through 
parliamentary democracy. Alternatively, some read Schmitt as a radical advocate for the right 
and power of the pouvoir constituant. Famously, Andreas Kalyvas reads out of Schmitt a theory 
of radical democracy, arguing Schmitt offers a way to salvage Weimar’s democracy against the 
constraints of its liberal structure through radical innovation.
5
  
But the idea that Schmitt endorsed any form of democracy at all has already been challenged. 
Jan-Werner Müller argues “a careful reading of Schmitt does not yield a theory of “radical 
democracy.””
6
 More strongly, Carlo Galli argues Schmitt diagnoses modern mass democracy as 
the cause of the crisis of the state.
7
 And Renato Cristi argues Schmitt actually was an 
“authoritarian liberal” and no democrat at all.
8
 And even Kalyvas admits that Schmitt’s vision of 
democracy is “mute and thus crippled.”
9
 Aside from whatever positive disposition Schmitt held 
toward the unconstituted democracy of extraordinary politics, Kalyvas seems to agree with Galli 
and Cristi that Schmitt deeply opposed all constituted forms of democracy.
10
  
For Schmitt, the crisis of the 20
th
 century state stemmed not from liberal parliamentary 
democracy but from liberal parliamentary democracy. Schmitt believed overheated modern mass 
democracy had corrupted Weimar’s parliament democracy, and that this corrupted state form 
was then being turned on its constitution. And, Schmitt went on, liberal democrats stood idly by 
while this happened, drunk on the “triumphal march” of democracy. Without sufficient 
precautions, any mass democratic state was vulnerable to the problems Weimar suffered.
11
 But 
determining which precautions to take meant first understanding the depth of the problems mass 
democracy posed. 
Political theology is never far from his analysis. The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 
originally written only one year after Political Theology, looks specifically at how Weimar’s 
institutions, the politicized form of “19
th
 century” liberal metaphysics, were unable to contain 
“20
th
 century” democracy. In 1924, he argued “with all due respect for the power and 
irresistibility of democratic ideas, one cannot leave the decision on conceptual determination 
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[such as “political value judgments”] to public opinion.”
12
 In 1925, drawing a parallel to the 
events of 1848, he wrote that Weimar’s crisis was ultimately a conflict over who should rule 
concretely: the bourgeois or the masses, liberalism or democracy.
13
 Even more pointedly, in his 
1926 preface to The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, he argues the crisis of the modern state 
ultimately stems from the fact that “no state can realize a mass democracy.”
14
  
This chapter discusses Schmitt’s critique of modern mass democracy, focusing in particular on 
his diagnosis of its effects on liberal parliamentarism. It is divided into three sections. The first 
section discusses Schmitt’s understanding of liberal metaphysics and shows how he sees it 
translating into “19
th
 century” ideas of political legitimacy and institutions. The second section 
discusses the effects of 20
th
 century democracy. It looks at the significant changes Schmitt points 
to in civil society that allowed for this advent and ties it into changing metaphysical beliefs. It 
also looks at how these changes in civil society impacted the “unchanged” institutions of Weimar. 
Finally, the third section draws conclusions linking the changes in civil society, and their impact 
on the state, to his ideas of historical change and legitimacy discussed in the previous chapter. 
This third section describes how Schmitt saw himself as the 20
th
 century Hobbes. Modern mass 
democracy undermined the ability of parliamentary democracy to represent a substantive status 
and decide political for its political constituency. This was the crisis of parliamentary democracy.  
 
1. Better Talk Had Gone: 19th Century Liberalism  
The legitimacy of parliamentary democracy as a method of determining the will of the people 
hinges on certain assumptions about political legitimacy itself, not to mention assumptions about 
whose will is legitimate. In The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Schmitt frames his 
discussion of the methodology of parliamentarism with the question “why has parliament been 
the ultimum sapientiae for many generations, and on what has the belief in this institution rested 
for over a century?”
15
 Following his argument that the “theological” beliefs of an epoch shape 
the legitimacy of its political institutions, we know already Schmitt wants to argue parliamentary 
democracy is the politicization of liberal metaphysics. That is, parliamentary democracy is 19
th
 
century “political theology.” Understanding what assumptions it rests on will also reveal how 
20
th
 century changes affected its capacity to realize political authority. 
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a. Liberal Metaphysics: The Theoretical Underpinnings of the 19th Century State 
Schmitt asks his readers to bear in mind that “liberalism be understood as a consistent, 
comprehensive metaphysical system.”
16
 Liberal metaphysics, he argues, rests on a peculiar 
relationship with knowledge. Whatever can be known is qualified by an epistemological 
reservation: although liberalism holds truth exists and is worth pursing, it is deeply skeptical of 
the possibility to definitively arrive to that truth. Accordingly, Schmitt characterizes liberalism as 
“renouncing a definite result” and “relative in a specific sense.”
17
 Although committed to 
discovering truth, it recognizes it can only be known in a qualified sense: truth may need to be 
revised in light of new evidence.
18
 Schmitt believes liberal metaphysics is still rational. But, 
unlike other earlier forms of rationalism, it commits to a truth-claim only conditionally. Its 
commitment to rationality itself trumps any substantive truth-claims, i.e. any definitive 
“dogma.”
19
 Schmitt’s depicts it more like a second-order commitment, regulating first-order 
commitments and, accordingly, liberal metaphysics comes across as more of an epistemological 
than a metaphysical form of rationalism.
 
It is a relative rationalism. 
From his remarks, Schmitt’s understanding of liberalism seems to draw on liberal theories such 
as Mill’s On Liberty.
20
 Mill’s liberalism hinges in part on what Akeel Bilgrami has identified as 
“the argument from meta-induction”
21
 – and it is from this part that Schmitt, not to mention 
many others, have drawn their understanding of liberalism. It begins with the observation that 
past convictions, no matter how deeply held, have been shown to be wrong. The meta-induction 
is that, so too might current convictions be wrong, no matter how convincing they may seem 
now. Mill concludes one could not rationally be certain of any “truth.” Accordingly, it would be 
irrational to close off routes to refine or revise “truth.” This means exposing oneself to new 
arguments ad infinitum, which will either strengthen one’s already-held beliefs or lead one to 
revise them in light of better arguments.
22
 Thus, basic liberal freedoms and a sort of agonistic 
competition between “truths” are justified as a basis for the continued pursuit and approximation 
of truth and the good.  
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In Schmitt’s discussion of political theology, liberal metaphysics corresponds to either pantheism 
or humanitarian-moralism, depending on which account one takes.
23
 Schmitt sees this faculty as 
pantheistic because of its immanence: it arises out of individuals as they engage in the process.
24
 
He sees it as humanitarian-moral because of reason’s inherent qualities and the value that derives 
from them.
25
 He believes liberal metaphysics rests on the idea that, by opening up the possibility 
for individuals to investigate truth through their own reasoning, two goods are served.
26
 First, 
individuals cannot be dominated by arbitrary drives or powers but are instead “ruled” by reason. 
Second, the greater good is served by providing an open forum for critique, in which the most 
reasonable beliefs will naturally come to light. Either way, he argues, liberal metaphysics 
presupposes some form of transcendent reason exists and that legitimacy is determined by the 
triumph of reason over arbitrary command or will – ratio over voluntas, νόμος over θεσμός.
27
 
From his account of 19
th
 century liberalism, one can see better why Schmitt thinks romanticism 
arises out of liberalism and how he ties his arguments about occasionalism into his analysis of 
liberalism. Because “truth” is at best viewed skeptically, it can lead to a lack of commitment and 
conviction – it entertains alternative beliefs and opinions because it cannot, logically, make any 
definite metaphysical commitment.
28
 And while liberalism recognizes the uncertainty of its own 
truth claims, romanticism goes one step further by instrumentalizing it: one does not even 
temporarily commit to anything but “samples freely,” that is, arbitrarily, from Weltanschauungen 
whenever it is “interesting.”
29
 Schmitt sometimes seems to want to go further and argue that 
liberalism is metaphysically no different than romanticism. But he is wrong to do so, since 
liberalism is hardly uncommitted to truth for reasons of aesthetic “play,” as he suggests.
30
 To the 
contrary, it is because of a deep-seated agnosticism about what truth is and the possibility to 
know any truth – a negative metaphysics that is more an epistemological commitment.  
Yet, despite his clear misgivings about liberal metaphysics, Schmitt does argue theories like 
Mill’s demonstrate a vestige of natural law has persisted. While clearly not robust, the role 
inherent reason played in 19
th
 century liberal metaphysics was enough for him to argue 
individual beliefs and actions could converge: humans were persuadable by rational arguments 
and this minimal basis could serve to provide a basis for legitimate political order. The 
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universality of reason, and the power of this faculty to move individuals beyond egoistic, private 
interests, allows a narrow form of natural law.
31
 It appears like a sort of natural order in which 
reason can, indirectly, be said to be sovereign, even if this natural order did not yield a definitive 
metaphysical, ethical, or political system. The method of reasoning itself could still produce 
arguments for truth and for political legitimacy. 
b. The 19th Century State: Liberté and the Legislative State  
Schmitt argues a liberal’s commitment to epistemic uncertainty leads to the recognition that 
others’ perspectives, reasons, and practices based on them may have some legitimacy. Thus 
liberal metaphysics leads to a substantive political decision for “Liberté,” a decision for the 
protection of individual citizens against abuses of state authority and power and for personal 
freedom, including a private sphere of belief and ownership.
32
 The relative rationalism of liberal 
metaphysical politicizes as relatively rationalism as well. Individuals should be left the 
possibility to investigate truth on their own, especially the most important truth, religious truth – 
the orientation and source of meaning in each individual’s life.
33
  
Schmitt argues the political decision for Liberté leads to two principles of state form. The first 
principle is “distributional” and the second “organizational.”
34
 The distributional principle 
establishes a sphere of freedom by constraining the state’s ability to interfere in individual life. It 
does so with basic rights, both for individuals in isolation (such as freedom of religion) and 
individuals in society (such as freedom of the press and freedom to assemble).
35
 Thus, rights 
guarantee an individual the freedom to pursue truth and right according to individual conviction. 
The only authority is what appears most reasonable from the perspective of that individual. 
An organizational principle complements the distributional principle. Schmitt argues this 
principle furthers Liberté by constraining the state internally. It checks the power of the state by 
creating different competencies (executive, legislative, and judiciary) that balance one another –
minimizing arbitrary domination, maximizing the sphere of individual freedom, and empowering 
that relative reason.
36
 Alongside balancing different branches, Schmitt argues there is a second 
facet of the distributional principle: an agonistic competition among ideas should be instituted to 
allow the cunning of reason to operate “behind the back” of the legislative.
37
 The relative 
rationalism of deliberation will separate out less reasonable laws and decisions like a 
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centrifuge.
38
 Because of this rationalism, Schmitt believes the bourgeois Rechtsstaat realizes 
natural law, at least in that narrow “relatived” form.
39
 Finally, the state, especially the legislative 
branch, should be transparent to allow its citizens to scrutinize it, thereby minimizing its arbitrary 
power.
40
 Publicity will generate accountability and produce a “public” opinion and popular 
consensus on the common good.
41
 The state, therefore, ends up representing the interests of the 
entire political community.
42
 Thus, this distributive principle of Liberté minimizes state power 
by balancing it against itself in three different ways: balancing among the state’s three branches, 
the rational agonism of political deliberation, and the public accountability of the state.  
In sum, both the organizational and distributional principles aim to concretize the decision for 
Liberté by guaranteeing individual freedom to form opinions and beliefs with minimal 
interference by the state. Schmitt goes on to argue that the decision for Liberté culminates in a 
theoretical distinction between state (a sphere of constraint) and society (a sphere of “private” 
individual freedom).
43
 The individual precedes the state.
44
 This decision produces a series of 
antitheses that he thinks are the crux of liberal politics: state/society; executive and 
administration/the people; executive/legislative; politics/society (as religion, culture, and 
economics); and domination and power/freedom and right.
45
 
But, although it is a proper political decision, Liberté yields only partial state form.
46
 The 
organizational and distributive principles do not yield a definite state form. They only limit it, 
producing a negative state form that Schmitt calls “the bourgeois Rechtsstaat.” And he argues 
the bourgeois Rechtsstaat can be paired with positive state forms as diverse as monarchy, 
aristocracy, parliamentarism, or democracy. But, regardless of whichever positive state form is 
actually constituted, Schmitt argues the political decision for Liberté takes precedence over any 
secondary decision on state form. In fact, state form tells very little about the substantive purpose 
of the state – it merely specifies the organization of the state’s constituted power. And Schmitt’s 
distinction between the end of the state and the organization of its constituted power is important. 
Historically, Schmitt argues, the decision for Liberté has been paired with parliamentary 
democracy. Parliament represented both “the people” as a whole and the “natural” process of the 
formation of the people’s legitimate political will, the extent to which it reflected the state’s 
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metaphysical origins.
47
 Parliamentary democracy is legitimate because it institutionalizes the 
distributional principle best. And Schmitt believes parliament worked politically in the 19
th
 
century – it was a legitimate reflection of the political goals of the state because it actually 
realized that goal of Liberté. And Renato Cristi writes that “when he stated the “early liberal 
Rechtsstaat…still subscribed to a Weltanschauung and was capable of a political confrontation,” 





 Schmitt made this argument in 1935, long after masking his “vehement illiberalism” 
would have lost all meaning.
49
 Not only did Schmitt believe liberal institutions worked, but 
parliament guarded it against state intervention and served as the legitimate guardian of the 
constitution on behalf of society.
50
 But the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy hinges on its 
instrumental value in realizing the political end of the state, here Liberté. Accordingly, if it failed 
to fulfill its role within the distributional principle, then either its structure or the institution itself 
would need to be revisited in light of that higher political commitment. 
Schmitt concludes that the “size” of the 19
th
 century state adjusted to match its political decision. 
The state’s role, beyond guaranteeing its constituents’ freedom through its two principles, was 
limited to enforcing law and it shrank accordingly,
51
 thereby maximizing individual freedom and 
fostering the rule of reason. For Schmitt, this neutral state adopted the maxim laissez-passer with 
regard to substate beliefs and values, no matter which sphere they fall under.
52
 Carlo Galli 
describes Schmitt’s conception of the state as passively neutral, meaning it merely executes 




2. The 19th Century State under the Strain of Modern Mass Democracy 
In 1928, Schmitt wrote “After half a century, all the demands of the German liberal bourgeoisie 
of 1848 and from the period of the conflict of 1862 to 1866 came to fruition…Now their 
demands were realized, but meanwhile the political and social situation was fully changed and 
their fulfillment acquired a different sense than it would have had fifty years before…the success 
that the German bourgeoisie had achieved with the introduction of parliamentary government in 
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Germany was in a certain sense enjoyed posthumously.”
54
 He believed that, by the time Germans 
achieved the liberal democratic state, it could no longer contain its content. Modern mass 
democracy had turned liberal democracy into Frankenstein’s monster, overpowering its creators 
and pursuing its own course.  
In writing this, Schmitt has in mind the revolutions of 1848 in which the middle and working 
classes united against the European monarchies. But, he stresses, this union was only a negative 
alliance. Once the monarchies they opposed were overthrown, their positive political goals 
collided and produced no stable political order. The revolution continued by restoring 
authoritarian rule across Europe. Schmitt thought this showed how unchecked (mass) democracy 
appeared to be too capricious and irrationally driven to ally with liberal values. And Schmitt 
believes tensions between liberalism and democracy only became more pronounced in the 20
th
 
century. In particular, the rise of philosophically justified “irrationalism,” politicized by Sorel 
and mobilized in movements like fascism and bolshevism particularly alarmed Schmitt.
55
 
Although the English translation is titled ‘The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy,’
56
 In his 
preface, Schmitt writes this crisis is actually threefold: of mass democracy, the state, and 
parliament.
57
 But its root was neither parliament nor the state. Mass democracy was consuming 
parliament, and turned its democratic legitimacy and positive law against the state. 20
th
 century 
mass pathos had supplanted 19
th
 century relative reason.
58
 Schmitt concludes his 1926 preface 
noting that, even if fascism and bolshevism were contained, the crisis of the modern state would 
remain until the problem of mass democracy was overcome. This section outlines how Schmitt 
saw “modern mass democracy” as the cause of Weimar’s crisis. 
a. The Interrupted Dream of Natural Law: Old Gods Ascend from Their Graves 
Fin-de-siècle Europe was characterized by a strong reaction against the “decadence” of the 
previous century. Toward the end of the 19
th
 century, movements fed up with Enlightenment 
rationalism, positivism, and “bourgeois” society trumpeted counter-virtues of nihilism, 
irrationalism, and emotionalism. They aimed to sweep the legs out from under classical liberal 
ideas and values. These movements and their goals deeply affected Schmitt, who described them 
as “polytheistic” and “irrationalist.”  
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Schmitt’s use of the adjective polytheistic to describe them is important. It most likely comes 
from Weber’s “Science as a Vocation.” Weber had argued that, as knowledge of ‘scientific’ facts, 
particularly causal laws, increased, human life was correspondingly robbed of substantive 
meaning. Faith was pushed further into the realm of irrationality. Simultaneously, increasing 
social and intellectual complexity resulted in greater specialization. Along with the annihilation 
of transcendent, objective meaning, deepening specialization resulted in plural irreconcilable 
value-spheres – “warring gods” – any of which an individual might serve.
59
 Thus, 
disenchantment did not annihilate belief altogether. It just forced it inwards in a process of 
romantic, subjective mystification. It undermined the foundations of external authority and 
crystallized the hiatus irrationalis, between knowledge of facts and knowledge of “unscientific” 
things, like values and metaphysics.
60
  
Weber had argued modern “polytheism” came about through the individualization of belief and 
values.
61
 As belief was forced inwards, it pluralized democratically.
62
 Seemingly paradoxically, 
disenchantment leads to this polytheism. Individuals were on their own to determine what 
meaning (if any) the world had. But Weber worries polytheism and the loss of objective values, 
coupled with modern scientific epistemology, undermined the possibility of meaningful life 
altogether. In Weber’s account, value pluralism and nihilism, or polytheism (‘warring gods’) and 
atheism (the death of god), appear to be two sides of the same coin.
63
 There is no longer any 
authoritative truth. All that matters is the degree to which a particular conviction affects an 
individual. And individuals are surrounded by a myriad of conflicting values, any of which they 
may serve. But, regardless of whichever “god” one ultimately serves, sober reflection reveals it 




As I argued earlier, the disenchantment of the world and the rise of modern “polytheism” 
disturbed Schmitt as much as it had Weber.
65
 And he believed Weber’s discussion of 
disenchantment (especially when framed by terms like polytheism) was really an argument about 
“political theology.”
66
 Building on Weber’s account, Schmitt argues reason itself went into a 
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crisis in the 20
th
 century: there was no longer any consensus on what was “rationally correct” or 
whether reason itself was legitimate.
67
 Schmitt even peppers his otherwise sober and systematic 
Constitutional Theory with lamentations about the loss of natural reason and natural law. He 
writes the crisis of Weimar’s constitution is rooted in the loss of the “metaphysical assumptions 
of the bourgeois belief in natural law,”
68
 and that “the old liberal belief” in the “sovereignty of 
reason” is lost.
69
 In other texts, he laments that the belief in “Cartesian idées générales,” i.e. 
transcendent truth, has evaporated.
70
 In all of these cases, he portrays a crisis in reason itself as 
the underlying cause of Weimar’s political crisis. Schmitt suggests 1848 was the turning point 
for reason. It was then, Schmitt argues, quoting Bernhard Windsheid’s aphorism, “the dream of 
natural law [was] over.”
71
 From then on, objective reason and truth, Platonic Forms, etc. etc. 
were in full retreat. Deliberative reasoning and substantive rationality, he believed, had been 
killed along with god.  
Schmitt was not unique in thinking this way. The triumph of irrationalism was discussed, and 
lamented, by many other important figures of that time. For example, Ernst Cassirer – a thinker 
about as far from Schmitt as possible – wrote in 1932, 
The eighteenth century is imbued with a belief in the unity and immutability of reason. 
Reason is the same for all thinking subjects, all nations, all epochs, and all cultures…For 
us, the word “reason” has long since lost its unequivocal simplicity, even if we are in 
essential agreement with the basic aims of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. We can 
scarcely use this word any longer without being conscious to its history; and time and 
again we see how great a change of meaning the term has undergone. This circumstance 
reminds us how little meaning the terms “reason” and “rationalism” still retain, even in 
the sense of purely historical characteristics.
72
 
Like Cassirer, Schmitt saw reason disintegrating in the 20
th
 century. And like Cassirer, he 
thought the political chaos of the early 20
th
 century was a product of that disintegration. 
Metaphysical disenchantment was driving political instability. Karsten Fischer draws attention to 
Schmitt’s relation of secularization and democracy.
73
 Indeed, they go hand in hand in Schmitt’s 
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account. But, pace Fischer, it was not democracy that led to disenchantment and secularism for 
Schmitt but disenchantment that led to democratization. The Protestant individuation of authority 
could not be limited to just theological belief – theological change could not be closed off from 
other spheres of life. This individuation of authority had a corresponding political effect. It also 
gave rise to democracy’s displacement of traditional forms of legitimacy.
74
 And thus 
concurrently with the erosion of authoritative metaphysical and moral truths, political self-
determination arose. 
And Schmitt believed both forms of disenchantment were state-destroying. At the end of The 
Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, he wrote “the theory of the myth is the most powerful 
symptom of the decline of the relative rationalism of parliamentary thought.”
 75
 The rise of 
irrationalistic philosophy, celebrating impulse and spontaneity over reason and thought (begun 
by Nietzsche and carried on, for example, in the work of Henri Bergson and his “philosophy of 
life”
76
) was the main “theological” source of the breakdown of older forms of political order.
77
 It 
had undermined whatever vestiges of natural law and objective reason remained. "It was  
politicized by Sorel, whose political ideals were in turn adopted by irrationalist movements – 
fascism and communism.
78
 Between the two, Schmitt argued fascism was stronger. But he 
argued the closest thing to genuine community either could generate was fanaticism – 
community based on pathos, rather than reason or value.
79
 He did not think either political 
community could provide lasting grounds for order and stability. Neither would withstand the 
centrifugal effects of its irrationalism. Thus, Schmitt thought, politicized “irrationalism” was 
dangerous because it undermined whatever solidarity and community the state provided. The 
pathos that irrationalist community thrived on and encouraged led to disintegrative pluralism, 
which, “for political theology, is polytheism.”
80
  
At the same time, Schmitt thinks Laski’s apolitical pluralism represents the flipside of this 
irrationalist political theological tendency.
81
 The state, according to Laski, has no priority over 
any other social group. There can only be “moral” authority, which appears politically as an 
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“unordered, series of equally valid, social relationships.”
82
 Schmitt thinks pluralism shares with 
fascism and bolshevism a tendency to undermine the rule of reason.
83
 He believes it empowers 
pathos individualistically in the same way fascism and bolshevism empower it communally. In 
fact, because of the metaphysical similarities he sees between the two movements, Schmitt later 
writes he was completely unsurprised that Laski “precisely in the critical period of 1931-1932 
converted from his original liberal individualism to Marxism.”
84
 But while Laski’s theory was 
genuinely pluralistic and individualistic, Schmitt thinks fascism and bolshevism smuggle in 
dictatorship, masking it by its ability to manipulate mass pathos.  
Parallel to these political manifestations of 20
th
 century disenchantment, Schmitt notes there is 
also the “a-rationalism,” so to speak, of technicity. Bureaucratic administration is another 
symptom of disenchantment. Bureaucracy appears to be a self-administering system, operating 
according to its own formal rules. It thus seems to be a form of “rule by nobody” and to lack the 
domination characteristic of politics.
85
 But, as discussed in the previous chapter, Schmitt believes 
technicity, which includes bureaucratic administration, is merely a mask for tyrannical 
domination – it provides that domination with the legitimating veneer of technical neutrality.
86
 
Schmitt is skeptical there could really be any self-administering order.
87
 What makes technicity 
“irrational” is both its inability to step outside its original programming and how its ostensive 
technical rationality ends up either twisting against its original ends as it becomes self-serving or 
being exploited by disingenuous powers standing above its operations. 
In general, Schmitt believed disenchantment’s full impact was felt in the 20
th
 century as reason 
would no longer converge on a single point. The 20
th
 century embraced irrationality and affect. 
Politically, disenchantment produced the individualization of authority, the rise of plural, 
politically irreconcilable worldviews, and could find no basis for legitimacy besides 
(democratized) pathos. Schmitt believed, insofar as liberal institutions are premised on 
reasonability or discursive rationality, this crisis in reason had deep repercussions. Communal 
and individualistic irrationalism and political pluralism along with technical a-rationalism 
seemed to be annihilating any basis for order and authority, even a minimal “relative rationalism.” 
Thus, pace Kalyvas, who argues Schmitt had “renounced the political significance of speech as a 
means of will formation,”
88
 Schmitt actually thought modern mass democracy had robbed speech 
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of political significance by undermining deliberative reasoning altogether. The legitimation crisis 
of the 20
th
 century state was a product of disenchantment. 19
th
 century institutions had not been 
adapted to meet 20
th
 century conditions, so instead of producing political unity and order, they 
were aggravating social tensions and political instability. 
Schmitt writes an institution can persist long after its “Idea” has lost legitimacy, however.
89
 The 
existence of an institution gives it temporal “momentum,” which keeps it alive even after its 
basis and legitimacy have decayed or changed. 19
th
 century political institutions could persist 
under a different context – but that changed context would bear strongly on how they functioned. 
b. Modern Mass Democracy: Warring Gods in the Arena of Parliament 
Schmitt believed Weimar demonstrated this temporal momentum: “[Weimar’s parliament] lost 
its moral and intellectual foundation and only remained standing through sheer mechanical 
perseverance as an empty apparatus.”
90
 But, quite differently than serving the liberal or 
democratic ends for which they had been designed, Schmitt argues Weimar’s 19
th
 century 
institutions had instead become tyrannical.
91
 Its parliament was twisted as illiberal and 
antidemocratic movements colonized it.
92
  
Schmitt laments how the nature of parliament has been perverted, writing “a modern election is 
no longer an election, but a technique to put the masses in motion, by virtue of which they are 
exposed to a committee.”
93
 He writes universal suffrage gave (the strongest) voice to the least 
intelligent and educated, the least capable of reason, the least likely to revise their beliefs in light 
of better arguments, and the most susceptible to emotional and psychological manipulation.
94
 It 
privileged the lowest classes (or whoever was manipulating them) simply because of their 
numerical superiority.  
But the deep problem of modern mass democracy was not mass participation in itself. He 
thought all these changes in democracy were simply dropped into parliament institutions that 
were no different than they were 80 years ago when suffrage was more restricted. Yet mass 
democracy affected the constitution of parliament. As reasonability and rationality entered into 
crisis, the parliamentarism that presupposed those ideals entered into crisis too. Pluralism led to 
irreconcilable Weltanschauungen among representatives. There was no longer a “relatively 
rational” point at which representatives’ deliberations could converge. Thus, parliament no 
longer collected “particles of reason.” There was no cunning of reason. Parliament instead 
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fostered unreason and disunity, its members obstinately opposed one another, struggling to gain 
enough votes to impose their particular Weltanschauung with positive law. There was not even 
agreement on the reasonability or legitimacy of the “rules of the game” itself.  
Schmitt thought the deeper problem was the interaction of positive law and democratic 
legitimacy with political pluralism. He argued concentrations of private power disingenuously 
manipulated the masses to legitimate their particular political interests, turning the public sphere 
into a “Schauplatz,” an arena or forum, for them to vie for the domination over the community. 
Thus, dogmatically opposed Weltanschauungen erupting out of society could exploit the 
bourgeois Rechtsstaat’s value-neutrality in parliament by manipulating mass democracy. The 
masses could be whipped into a frenzy, granting a democratic veneer of legitimacy to a 
movement no matter the content of its Weltanschauung, which that movement could then use to 
enact with positive law. Parliamentary elections were thus reduced to mass mobilization through 
emotional manipulation.  
c. Manipulating Mass Democracy 
As early as 1923, Schmitt discussed how an explosion of social-psychological work on crowds, 
parties, mass psychology, and other similar phenomena had changed the way the masses could 
be manipulated.
95
 While there was certainly voter manipulation before the 20
th
 century, Schmitt 
thought “modern” techniques were qualitatively different. The advent of sociological and 
psychological science had greatly expanded the possibilities for manipulation.
96
At the same time, 
communications innovations broadened the reach of that power. Schmitt wrote “today, everyone 
knows how routinely and safely a massive “psycho-technical” apparatus can be used to mold the 





 century scientific and technological advances yielded a powerful tool for 
private powers to shape “the people.” 
Schmitt often raised concerns about how the media could be used to exploit the masses. He is 
particularly alarmed by visual media – enough to remark in Constitutional Theory that, in 
contrast to other forms, freedom of speech in film should not be protected.
98
 Its emotional power 
was simply too great to be left unregulated. This concern would be reproduced regarding 
television in his 1970 “Von der TV-Demokratie.”
99
 And although less so than visual media, he is 
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similarly concerned about the radio’s potential for abuse.
100
 Moreover, he argues, because film, 
radio, and television were all monopolies or, at best, oligarchies, they would inevitably be used 
by those who control them to advance their private interests. Schmitt held printed media in a 
higher regard.
101
 He believes it was once an essential institution for spreading information and 
helping individuals to develop their opinions and beliefs. Yet, like with radio and film, he is 
concerned that printed media in the 20
th
 century has become a tool of private powers.  
In general, Schmitt argues mass media in the 20
th
 century hardly helps to further individual 
freedom or to foster the cunning of reason. He writes that it particularly privileges the (politically 
irresponsible) interests of private elites by giving their voice disproportionate power.
102
 Although 
once essential for individual freedom and the rational formation of public opinion, Schmitt writes 
concentrations of private powers, augmented by technology, controlled all media and used it to 





The end for which private powers used the mass media was the main problem for parliamentary 
democracy. They manipulated “the immediate interests and passions” of the masses to win as 
much “legitimacy” as possible for their particular interests.
104
 In an age of monopolies and the 
collapse of the rule of reason, classical liberal freedoms like freedom of the press were bent 
against their original purpose.
105
 Far from advancing human freedom, technological innovation 
merely increased the potential for domination. But because of the belief in the qualities of these 
freedoms as freedoms (anyone is free to start their own press or film company; freedom could 
not create unfreedom), their perverted, undemocratic and illiberal use was overlooked. 
Schmitt does not seem to think private monopolies controlling the most powerful means of the 
formation of public opinion would have been a political problem – except Germany was no 
longer politically homogeneous.
106
 The absence of political homogeneity led society to “self-
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organize” to fill that absence.
107
 Mass manipulation bore the imprint of politicized interests 
controlling the media. The media, not to mention the masses, had become objects to be struggled 
over for the sake of political domination of the state by one segment within it.  
In the case of Weimar, Schmitt thought five irreconcilable total movements had politicized 
parliament and turned it into that Schauplatz.
108
 He thought parliament had become an arena in 
which warring gods met but never produced any legitimate political decisions.
109
 Each 
movement, and its corresponding party, was inflexibly organized according to its particular 
Weltanschauung.
110
 Each had a massive organizational apparatus devoted to maintaining, 
reinforcing, and expanding its base and pursuing its factional interests, including newspapers, 
propaganda machines, bureaucracies and hierarchies, and, in most cases, even a private army.
111
 
Because of this apparatus, “[the movements] encompassed their members totally in respect to 
their worldview and their economic and other perspectives [and] transform all jurisdictions into 
points in their power constellations.”
112
 They enabled a “collusion of press, party, and capital” to 
undermine individual freedoms by subjecting them to psycho-technical manipulation and, when 
those private interests were opposed to the state, to undermine its authority as well. Schmitt 
argues these movements were total. And several of them, in particular the Communists and 
Nazis, were totally opposed to the Weimar state and constitution. 
To Schmitt, the emergence of total movements represented a qualitative shift in the relationship 
between state and society. They undermined the state’s authority and unity.
113
 No longer was the 
political community united by the protection of individual Liberté against infringement. The 
state instead was becoming a tool used precisely to infringe upon Liberté. It could no longer be 
the 19
th
 century laissez-passer state. And parliament was no longer the guardian of the decision. 
Comprised of irreconcilably opposed total movements, some openly hostile and impervious to 
reason even,
114
 parliament had become a threat to be guarded against. Schmitt believed there was 
no more “cunning of reason” because there was no willingness to listen or to compromise.
115
  
But Schmitt does admit qualitatively different sorts of compromise were occurring in parliament. 
Political compromise for the sake of the common good was replaced by private “business” 
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compromise.
116
 But quid pro quo bargaining to further private interests had nothing to do with 
the community as a whole.
117
 Parliament was at best an arena for the maximization of total 
movements’ self-interest. But, Schmitt cautions, while business compromises might yield 
temporary unity, it would fracture once there was nothing left to be gained.  
Schmitt also thinks parliament’s procedural attributes, namely rational-legal legitimacy and 
democratic procedures, were perverted by this crisis in reason.
118
 When rationality itself is in 
crisis, rational-legal legitimacy enters into crisis too. He argues when rational-legal legitimacy 
was linked to the rationality of natural law, even its “relatively rational” 19
th
 century form, the 
laws produced in parliament really were legitimate. Parliamentary acts reflected that cunning of 
reason. But the crisis in reason empties formal law of its rational content.
119
 He doubts laws 
passed merely procedurally by a broken and factionalized parliament will be seen as legitimate 
by the entire political community. It is merely positive law. But this sort of positive law can 
never move beyond its sophistic basis in power: no matter the quantity of votes backing it, laws 
opposing the basic Weltanschauung of a politicized movement will never appear legitimate to 
that movement. They are just the product of democratic domination. Schmitt argues parliament 
itself becomes a place where these movements seek to use merely positive law to impose one 
substantive worldview on the others. Liberalism on communists, communism on fascists, 
fascism on liberals – he doubts not a single one of these movements would consider the major 
political changes sought by another majority to be legitimate. Their visceral opposition would 
layer resentment upon resentment and tensions would build as movements sought to prevent the 
others from dominating them while simultaneously propagating their own Weltanschauungen 
through now disenchanted parliamentary procedures. 
In sum, Schmitt thinks 20
th
 century parliamentary legislation has become “the empty 
functionalism of momentary majority decisions.”
120
 Legal legitimacy has been replaced by mere 
“economic-technical” proceduralism.
121
 Because this “legitimacy” was merely the satisfaction of 
formal requirements, parliament produced popular decisions and laws – but not legitimate 
decisions and laws.
122
 And since he thought mass democracy was a question of who was best at 
manipulating mass emotionalism, parliament ultimately becomes a struggle amongst the greatest 
private powers. McCormick writes this “technical” attempt at neutralization merely papered over 
the tensions among the plural Weltanschauungen and failed to create any substantive points of 
agreement.
123
 Democratic equality to participate politically and neutrality with regard to political 
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goals provided total movements the opportunity to colonize the state and promulgate their very 
political values, all under the guise of democracy.
124 
Parliament thus undergoes a transformation: 
from the qualitative representation of a society’s underlying political homogeneity to the 
quantitative advocacy of the private but politicizing interests of its factions.
125
 Parliament 
became a political arena in which Weimar’s “disenchanted gods” competed.  
Schmitt thinks it was Sorel who buried the last vestiges of natural law. He did so when he 
declared irrationality and intuition virtues and urged his followers to avoid all deliberation, any 
reasoning, with the “bourgeoisie.”
126
 Victory could only come through reason’s antithesis: 
spontaneity and direct violence.
127
 Movements like bolshevism and fascism were concrete cases 
of this political shift toward irrationality.
128
 These total movements did not care about relative 
rationalism or Liberté. They had far different beliefs and agendas in parliament. Unable to deny 
the validity of extremists’ unconstitutional beliefs because of its agnostic value-neutrality, the 
liberal democratic state not only condoned extremists’ participation but also provided for its own 
political destruction: if extremists could obtain a majority in parliament, they could not only 
impede parliamentary action, they could positively legislate their values or even entirely 
abrogate the liberal Rechtsstaat. For a corrupted stato neutrale ed agnositco, antidemocratic and 
illiberal beliefs, no matter how insane, were “right” as long as they obtained a sufficient quantity 
of votes. Schmitt concludes Weimar’s relativized, value-neutral democracy had plunged the state 
into a dangerous form of political pluralism.
129
  
d. Structural Transformation: The Birth of the Quantitatively Total State  
Schmitt writes that the procedural value-neutrality of the 20
th
 century liberal democratic state 
made it actually just an extension of whichever particular social, economic, religious, or cultural 
belief dominated society most successfully at a given moment.
130
 As the state switched hands 
among these different total movements and as each sought to defend, entrench, and promulgate 
its own particular worldview, the degree of the state’s administration of society extended deeper 
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and wider.
131
 It grew to the point where everything was political and within the state’s domain. 
Societal conflicts intensified as the range of state intervention expanded. Each movement risked 
being dominated if it did not obtain control over the state. Schmitt writes the 19
th
 century 
antithesis of state and society had collapsed.
132
 They had fused and the nature of the state 
changed qualitatively. The state underwent a structural transformation [Strukturwandel].
133
 
Although it was still conceived of as the 19
th
 century laissez-passer state, it was instead total. 
Yet Schmitt argues that any true or authentic state is de facto total.
134
 It is a qualitatively totality. 
A state is total when it is “strong enough” to determine what is “political” and to extricate itself 
from non-political spheres.
135
 Besides refraining from intervening in non-political spheres, the 
qualitatively total state was also capable of depoliticizing substate conflicts. Because it divorces 
itself from non-political spheres, it could legitimately act as a disinterested arbiter of social 
conflicts. Thus, this state was an adamant enforcer and guardian of the community’s political 
status but was otherwise a neutral judge.  
Distorted by modern mass democracy, the 19
th
 century bourgeois Rechtsstaat’s non-intervention 
and value-neutrality actually become tools of “negative” interventions on behalf of the strongest 
movements in society.
136
 A “strong, well-organized plural party system interposes itself between 
the state and its government on the outside and the mass of citizens on the other, and manipulates 
the monopoly of politics – that most astounding of monopolies, the monopoly of political 
mediation, the monopoly of the transformation of interests, which of course must exist, into the 
will of the state.”
137
 As the relative power of movements wax and wane in parliament, shifting 
demands of ruling parties cause laws and regulations to expand wider and deeper.
138
 This 
expansion results in a corresponding delegitimation of the state’s political authority. Clarity is 
lost over what is political, i.e. what falls under the state’s authority, and what is non-political –
state and society fuse. As politicization progresses, the state determines large swaths of 
everyone’s life.
139
 In the end, Schmitt seems to argue, all feel the state dominating their lives and 
come to resent it. The competition among the total parties prevents the state from settling on any 
definite order and determining which spheres should be regulated and which left autonomous.
140
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Instead, it swells, first in one direction and then another, according to the will of whomever 
momentarily dominates parliament, consuming state and society like a cancer.
141
 
Schmitt describes this process as the structural transformation from a qualitatively total state to 
the quantitatively total state, which potentially politicizes all society. It is quantitatively total 
because it is unprincipled. Because of its disoriented and incoherent instrumentalization, the state 
ends up politicizing everything. Yet, Schmitt adds, the quantitatively total state is not a state 
proper; it is really just a plurality of total movements.
142
 The distinction of qualitative and 
quantitative reflects the same dynamic he draws between substantive democracy and empty 
arithmetic functionalism.  
Schmitt thought the sphere most interpenetrated with the state was the economy.
143
 And while 
each total party vied to use the state to shape its vision of “right” economic relations, the reverse 
was also true: state and economy have in fact become codetermining.
144
 Ostensibly private or 
social decisions in the economy had profound effects on the state, especially its military and 
defense, but also on core segments of industry, such as high finance and railroads.
145
 To explain 
the new relationship of state and economy, he appropriates Popitz’ concept of polycracy: a 
system of juridically autonomous and independent firms legally and formally operate outside the 
state’s discretion yet affect the state’s ability to function because they fulfill state responsibilities 
and affect the capacity of the state to support itself economically through taxation.
146
 Through 
powerful lobbying groups, these “polycratic” firms demand concessions from the state that 
further undermined its political autonomy.
147
 Schmitt advocated Popitz’ solution of instituting a 
non-state public sphere to rein in the economy but still keep it free from state intervention.
148
 He 
seemed to want to formalize the relationship between the non-state public (polycratic) sphere and 
the state itself in order to strengthen state authority and depoliticize those parts of society that fall 
outside its political scope. But this strand remains underdetermined in his work. 
Schmitt argues that the plurality of total movements transformed the qualitative totality of the 
19
th
 century bourgeois Rechtsstaat, in which its neutrality guaranteed maximum individual 
freedom, into the quantitative totality of the 20
th
 century Parteienstaat [party state], in which its 
neutrality merely masked those movements’ struggles to dominate. In conclusion, he argues two 
undesirable political outcomes unfold in parliament in a quantitatively total state. First, 
parliament becomes impotent, incapable of political action because parties too weak to impose 
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their will are nevertheless strong enough to create “negative majorities” and prevent parliament 
from accomplishing even the most minimal governmental functions, like passing budgets and 
emergency spending or addressing a crisis.
149
 More than mere harassment, these acts undermine 
the legitimacy of both parliament and the state as a whole as crises become aggravated by 
government inaction. Second, and far more problematic, parliament in a quantitatively total state 
commits apocryphal acts of sovereignty. This next section addresses this problem. 
e. potestas indirecta: Apocryphal Acts of Sovereignty in Parliament 
The total value-neutrality of the Weimar Constitution, institutionalized through the “equal 
chance to obtain office,” guaranteed even movements deeply opposed to the Weimar constitution 
the opportunity to participate politically.
150
 And although deliberative reason no longer played a 
role in parliament, as long as it adhered to the “empty functionalism” of legislative procedures, 
its products were accorded legitimacy – no matter the actual content. Schmitt argued 
parliamentary procedure appears to produce right; positive law appeared legitimate simply 
because it was positive.
151
  
Schmitt argues instead that the absence of substantive legitimacy was the source of Weimar’s 
crisis. He argued law does not automatically attain “rational-legal” legitimacy just because a 
majority pushed it through parliament. Instead, rational-legal legitimacy came from deliberative 
reasoning. So, when the state becomes quantitatively total, parliament ceases to produce rational-
legal legitimacy. And deprived of its relationship to natural reason, the procedure that ought to 
produce rational-legal legitimacy becomes an empty façade.
152
 Underneath this facade, Schmitt 
argues there is only the tyrannical principle sic volo sic jubeo [I want this, I command this], 
which becomes “lex est, quod populous jubet [law is what the people command] in mass 
democracy.”
153
 The bourgeois Rechtsstaat under the strain of 20
th
 century changes loses its 
relationship with republican virtues. Parliament, no longer the site of the rule of law or reason, 
now is an institution masking the arbitrary rule of men. Schmitt thus argues 20
th
 century absolute 




In practice, Schmitt argues, the presence of these total movements enable parliamentary 
“ruptures” of the constitution. They may pass unconstitutional but democratically “legitimate” 
law. Schmitt argued the most threatening source of these ruptures was Article 76, which 
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governed constitutional amendments.
155
 Because the only restriction on the exercise of Article 76 
was adherence to the procedures in effect at that moment, the entire constitution could in fact be 
amended out of existence if an antidemocratic and illiberal parliament had, paradoxically, 
sufficient democratic legitimation. But beyond explicit emendation, Schmitt cautioned that ad 
hoc parliamentary majorities were able to make individual “exceptions” to constitutional rules 
without changing the content of the constitution itself.
156
 Through these “exceptions,” the actual 
validity of the constitution was thus rather different from how it appeared in writing.  
Caldwell and Kalyvas have noted how, for Schmitt, these constitutional “ruptures” demonstrated 
parliament’s alarming capacity to assume sovereignty apocryphally, to make sovereign decisions 
without actually possessing sovereign authority.
157
 And total movements in parliament were not 
unaware of that power. They used whatever ephemeral majority they could cobble together to 
enact and expand their particular Weltanschauung – regardless of its coherence with the 
substantive core of the Weimar Constitution.
158
 And, as a temporary majority, they tried to limit 
the possibility for other movements to gain a majority, effectively kicking down the ladder to 
power that equal chance represents and solidifying their own power in the process. Thus, 
“ruptures” were not just a theoretical problem. Schmitt writes the authors of the constitution, 
Preuß and Triepel, rightly protested the increasing regularity of this practice.
159
  
Parliament also committed other apocryphal sovereign acts. Schmitt writes parliament began to 
tacitly breach the limits of the legislative branch, expanding into the executive. According to the 
distributional principle of the bourgeois Rechtsstaat, parliament should only be able to determine 
the content of general, formal statutes and the executive branch should execute the general 
statutes that parliament passed.
160
 But, in fact, Schmitt thinks it has managed to subordinate the 
executive to itself by formulating statutes that were no longer formal, undermining the 
executive’s power to determine when to apply those statutes.
161
 In addition, he argues, 
parliament’s authority to appoint both judges and bureaucrats undermined the independence of 
the other two branches.
162
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Parliament had become an arena for indirect powers, potestates indirectae, to struggle to seize 
the reins of power.
163
 Schmitt describes indirect power as appropriating for itself the decision of 
what is legitimate and without undertaking to provide for the basic needs of stability and security 
of the political community.
164
 It was far easier and more advantageous to remain an indirect 
power in a weak quantitatively total state and not risk taking political responsibility.
165
 Schmitt 
concluded that the “objective reason” of the rule of law had given way to the “subjective 
interests” of the majority’s shifting and contradictory motives under the direction of “egoistic 
parties and factions.”
166
 In other words, parliament’s representative character had eroded, 
publicity has given way to arcane committees, lobbying groups, and business interests, all 
indirect powers.
167
 Parliament had become dominated by its “an antechamber,” which exercised 
sovereign power indirectly.
168
 Nevertheless, parliament had crossed from being a pouvoir 
constitué to the front for a sovereign body because of the power it had to legislate and revise the 
constitution. The antechamber, he asserts, is comprised of those who service, assist, or even 
manipulate a legitimate sovereign. The state’s direct power, meanwhile, seemed to have 
vanished altogether.  
Thus, Schmitt argues mass democracy’s effects on parliament not only affected the rational-legal 
legitimacy of the laws it produced, but also the limits of the constitution on legislation and the 
separation of powers. Parliament in the quantitatively total state was rewriting, and effectively 
abandoning, the liberal metaphysical principles at the heart of the Weimar Constitution. Without 
ties to its underlying substance, the bourgeois Rechtsstaat’s value-neutral proceduralism allowed 
disingenuous parties to break it down from within. 
f. Mass Pathos and Plebiscitary Democracy  
But was Schmitt’s concern only with parliamentary democracy? Could his attack on 
parliamentary democracy been merely a means to introduce plebiscitary democratic legitimacy? 
An indirect indication of Schmitt’s concerns about unconstrained democracy writ large comes 
from reflecting on how little Schmitt has to say about voting and suffrage. This central issue of 
political theory only comes up a handful of times in Schmitt’s writings. And when it does, 
Schmitt absolutely trashes suffrage.
169
 Most of his discussion is a critique of the secret ballot, 
which Schmitt dismisses as a liberal depoliticization.
170
 He argues it reduces the democratic 
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process to merely a private, individual act in which a voter is publically unaccountable. Schmitt 
seems to adopt a classical republic stance. Without any requirement for public accountability and 
justification, voting becomes politically irresponsible. He argues the secret ballot shifts the 
popular will from being a volonté générale to an aggregated, apolitical volonté des tous, 
undermining democracy legitimacy in the process.
171
 
Because of these remarks, Schmitt could be read as a proponent of a different form of democratic 
legitimacy: plebiscitary democracy. Indeed, when one reads The Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy, Schmitt does appear to endorse it. He writes, that dictatorial and Caesaristic 
democratic methods, unlike liberal democratic ones, “not only can produce the acclamation of 
the people but can also be a direct expression of democratic substance and power.”
172
 And he 
argues further that “the will of the people can be expressed just as well and perhaps better 
through acclamation.”
173
 Read alongside his arguments that the people is a strictly “public” and 
“present” entity, Schmitt seems to argue for plebiscitary democracy.  
But Schmitt’s apparent endorsement of plebiscitary democracy is gone by 1928. In 1932, he even 
condemns it. One can speculate that his actual experience with the worst excesses of democracy 
and populism in late Weimar brought about this change. But even his arguments in The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy are not so unequivocally positive as they first appear. There, although 
Schmitt argues plebiscitary democracy is a better expression of the people’s will than the 
aggregate private wills expressed in parliamentary democracy, Schmitt also argue the dictatorial 
methods needed to produce this “more democratic,” more direct public will may well make it as 
illegitimate as parliamentary democracy methods of political will formation. Also in that text, he 
writes that while political power should ideally come from the people’s will, the experience with 
bolshevism shows how little dictators actually require the people to form a will in order to 
govern “legitimately.”
174
 He concludes that the people’s will is easily manufactured (and easily 
manipulated) – be it through either parliamentary or plebiscitary methods. Schmitt’s point in 
1923, then, is that although plebiscitary democracy is a more legitimate expression of the will of 
the people than parliamentary democracy, it is so only relatively.  
By 1928, Schmitt has distanced himself from plebiscitary democracy. In his Constitutional 
Theory and “Der bürgerliche Rechtsstaat,” he argues plebiscitary democracy is no less 
depoliticized than liberal democracy. “The people” make no actual decision in either form of 
democracy; political decisions are already fait accompli when presented to the people in a 
plebiscitary democracy.
175
 Moreover, in every instance of a plebiscite, “the people” has taken the 
path of least resistance – deciding on the matter not because it is consistent with the common 
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good but because it is the easier option.
176
 Thus, he concludes that “the people” is in general 
politically disinterested, besides being highly manipulable in a plebiscite.
177
 So, Schmitt argues, 
there is little reason to believe that a plebiscitary democracy would yield a political will any 
more legitimate than one produced by parliamentary democracy. In mass democracy, 
acclamation is as apolitical as the secret ballot. 
In Legality and Legitimacy (1932), Schmitt has turned against plebiscitary democracy even more. 
He contrasts Weimar’s provisions for plebiscitary democracy with those for parliamentary 
democracy, noting both are located in its First Principal Part. He writes there is “no compelling 
reason” why plebiscitary democracy should be accorded higher constitutional value than 
parliamentary democracy in determining Weimar’s core constitutional questions.
178
 He argues 
further that plebiscitary democracy only exacerbates the (already extremely problematic) 
“majoritarian functionalism” of Weimar democracy.
179
 He reprises his 1928 arguments, arguing 
“the people” cannot actually govern at all – at most, they can sanction decisions already made.
180
 
Moreover, he adds that plebiscitary democracy is problematic because it necessarily presupposes 
a higher authority posing it questions. And in doing so it presupposes a substantively legitimate 
authority (that is, that it presupposes an authority that actually attempts to represent the will of 
the people in the way it poses questions).
181
 In the end, Schmitt concludes plebiscitary 
democracy is an emotional, irrational, incommunicative, and therefore a dangerous method of 
political will formation.
182
 Whatever problems parliamentary democracy suffered were 
exacerbated by plebiscitary democracy - with one exception. The output of a plebiscite was a 
clear (simple) majority. Yet Schmitt does not seem to think much of unqualified majority rule, 
no matter how that will is formed. As we shall see in later chapters, his concern is more about the 
rational substance of that will than the way in which the will is formed. 
It is a mistake to argue Schmitt believes plebiscitary democracy is any more legitimate than 
parliamentary democracy. While he had some initial sympathy to it, his disenchantment with 
democracy and suffrage in general turned him decisively against both forms. The substantive 
problems modern mass democracy presented would not simply vanish with a plebiscite. 
Something more than mere will was necessary to obtain political legitimacy. Competitions 
among different wills were tearing the state apart. 
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3. Mere Anarchy is Loosed: Pacta Sunt Servanda and the State of War 
Schmitt writes that, without any foundation in reason, constitutional law becomes the site of 
interpretative battles between opposed worldviews, exhibiting the degree to which agreement on 
even the most basic political questions had broken down.
183
 As an example, Schmitt discusses 
the politicization of Basic Rights in the American, French, German, and Bolshevik 
constitutions.
184
 While there are similarities among the first three sets, Schmitt also notes 
important substantive differences. But most striking was the difference between the Bolshevik 
and the three “bourgeois” sets of Basic Rights. For the Bolsheviks, the “Basic Rights” enshrined 
in bourgeois constitutions were “only the instruments of the capitalist rule of private property” 
and therefore instruments of domination.
185
 They were not basic rights at all. In general, 
Schmitt’s point is that, although all constitutions agree on the importance of “basic rights” in the 
abstract, they disagree on what constitutes a legitimate basic right. These problems held for other 
core constitutional and political concepts. Schmitt also points to the concept Rechtsstaat, which 
“could mean as many different things as the word law itself.”
186
  
Nuances and alternative interpretations in these concepts, whose meaning was taken as self-
evident or left under-defined were written into the Weimar constitution, opened into chasms 
between total movements as each read its Weltanschauung into a concept. Each interpreted 
concepts such as “freedom,” “equality,” “justice,” “rights,” and even “democracy” in light of 
their particular metaphysical and political commitments. Each asserted, against the others, that 
any other understanding was wrong, that to enact laws based on those interpretations would be 
illegitimate. Each wrestled for control over the state in order to impose the right interpretation – 
raising, for Schmitt, again the question of quis judicabit?, the inescapable question of political 
theology: who had the right and authority to interpret the concrete meaning of a concept.
187
 As 
each total movement obtained power, it attempted to fill in those blank concepts, stirring 
objections from the other movements, who then decried determinations as threats to equal chance, 
and therefore at ends with Weimar’s value neutrality.
188
 While it prevented any one total 
movement from obtaining permanent domination, the balance of power their plurality created 




But these tensions did not prevent coalitions from forming in parliament. As argued above, 
Schmitt thinks the coalitions that did form were turning the state into a spoils system of 
“business” agreements and compromises and raised the question of the legitimacy of the 
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domination of the minority total movements by the majority. He writes, “a state dominated by 
these methods of the formation of political will is reduced to the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
and the defense of ‘established rights.’”
190
 The Weimar state was being reduced to this condition 
of pacta sunt servanda, Schmitt thought, wherein each faction jealously defended whatever 
‘rights’ it had acquired on the basis of the sanctity of positive statutes.  
Probing deeper, Schmitt looked at the history of the concept pacta sunt servanda. He writes it 
originated with the Roman Praetor, who could declare “certain contracts are to be treated as valid 
in the execution of his office…The Praetor presents the agreements, for which he secures 
protection and execution through the official power to decide.”
191
 The concept originally entailed 
the exercise of sovereign authority
192
: the Praetor decided by fiat the validity of contracts (that is, 
which contracts were valid) and guaranteed those contracts by the authority and power of his 
office. Pacta sunt servanda was originally tied to the concept of sovereignty and auctoritas.  
Schmitt argues that, without legitimate sovereignty backing it, pacta sunt servanda lacks the 
capacity or even the will to decide what constitutes a valid contract.
193
 Therefore, when there is 
no clear authority to decide and no consensus on the constitutional core of the state, the meaning 
of the concept becomes profoundly different in concreto from its formal definition. Schmitt says, 
indirect powers’ business compromises destabilize the community as a whole. Whatever 
legislation comes about, whatever “unity” there is, is merely the result of agreements and 
coalitions formed with “existential reservations [existentiellen Vorbehalten].” That is, Schmitt 
argues “then, the contract [based on principles of pacta sunt servanda] only has the sense of a 
peace treaty between the contracting groups, and a peace treaty, whether the parties want it or not, 
is always linked to the, though perhaps remote, possibility of war.”
194
 Such agreements are 
politically toxic and become the means to “stab another party in the back” as soon as conditions 
are right.
195
 The contractors, in this case, see one another as political enemies.  
Schmitt adds to his discussion of the degeneration of pacta sunt servanda that, “when the 
decisive Friend-Enemy groupings are determined in civil society instead of foreign relations, it is 
civil war.”
196
 When movements within a political community no longer agree on the existential 
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core of the constitution, each side will jealously compete for the power to impose their 
interpretation. These battles, precisely because they are so existentially important to the 
movements involved, bring the participants out of a state of peace and into a state of war – where 
war consists not in actual fighting but in the lack of assurance to the contrary. Thus, formal 
definitions aside, Schmitt thinks pacta sunt servanda, in the absence of sovereign authority, was 
practically no different from Hobbes’ bellum omnium contra omnes – and that it signaled the 
total breakdown of Weimar. For Schmitt, “radical subjectivity” fractures the state and returns its 
inhabitants to the miserable condition of the state of nature.
197
 
Schmitt thought the quantitatively total state simply could not contain or hold back the chaos 
erupting within.
198
 Without an authority to interpret and decide on the most basic and essential 
questions facing a political community, plural interpretations arose. Indirect powers, 
manipulating the masses, tried to instrumentalize the state’s monopoly of power to impose their 
particular values on the others. Fractures in society were reproduced in parliament. Law itself, 
now merely positive, became a victim of and a cause of this disorder.
199
 For the “warring 
factions,” even the most basic concepts were polarizing and polemically disputed. Appeals to 
quantity would not solve problems of illegitimacy in such cases.
200
 Each movement was 
dogmatically obsessed with its own rightness. The insecurity of the state of nature re-emerged.  
Although Hobbes’ epoch was different in that it dealt with the struggle between spiritual and 
secular authority, Schmitt saw parallels to the situation in Weimar.
201
 Because of that parallel, 
Schmitt thought he could become the 20
th
 century Hobbes. Yet, the causes of the breakdown, 
such as the nature of civil society, technology, and even belief itself, were different from Hobbes’ 
time, Hobbes’ solutions needed to be updated too. As Schmitt was fond of noting, the great 
problems of democracy in the 20th century could not be dealt with and answered using terms 
from the age of Talleyrand and Louis Philippe.
202
 Mass democratization was irreversible, so 
clinging to the model of the 19
th
 century state would fail to address its consequences – so he 
thought. If Weimar was to overcome its state of insecurity, Schmitt thought a legitimate 
sovereign authority was needed. The state needed to become total again. 
 
Conclusion: Behemoth against Leviathan 
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Beginning in 1848, legitimacy had come to be defined in terms of democracy. Yet Schmitt 
thought that unqualified democratic legitimacy offered no guarantee against tyranny. He argued 
Weimar’s crisis was caused by two simultaneous events: the advent of modern mass democracy 
and the crisis in reason along with its “political theological” parallel, irreconcilable value 
pluralism. These two events were related. Modern mass democracy turned out to be incompatible 
with Weimar’s 19
th
 century political institutions as it enabled a plurality of total movements in 
society to turn parliament into a forum for interpretative battles. Schmitt was troubled by how 
Weimar guaranteed and actively enabled the participation of parties committed to its destruction. 
Schmitt believed that, because of the disjunction between Weimar’s democratic institutions and 
mass society, the state – the institution charged with overcoming the state of nature – backfired 
in its role and instead exacerbated the very conflicts it was supposed to neutralize. He thought 
“19
th
 century” bourgeois Rechtsstaat under the strain of “20
th
 century” mass democracy had 
become self-neutralizing! Dissonance between Weimar’s 19
th
 century design and its 20
th
 century 
society was the underlying cause of its crisis. Political pluralism leads to the instrumentalization 
of the state. In the case of Weimar, apocryphal exercises of sovereignty emanating from 
parliament delegitimated the state. The state of nature reemerged. 
Yet discussing Schmitt’s critique of majority rule and the quantitatively total state begs the 
question: to Schmitt, what does it mean for a conflict to be “political,” as opposed to non-
political; what does it mean for society to be divided along the lines of friends and enemies. 
Answering this question correctly is an essential precondition for his state theory and what the 
state’s role is in relation to “the political.” Yet, this concept too has been misunderstood, leading 
to confusion about what Schmitt was getting at. The next chapter, Chapter 4, clarifies this 
concept by looking at what past interpretations of “the political” have missed and what this 
changes in Schmitt’s understanding of key concepts of the state, especially representation, before 
moving to his state theory in Chapter 5.  
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Status Par Excellence: The Concept of the Political 
 
 
Political unity is the highest unity – not because it is an omnipotent dictator, or because it levels 
out all other unities, but because it decides, and has the potential to prevent all other opposing 
groups from dissociating into a state of extreme enmity – that is, into civil war. Where a political 
unity exists, the social conflicts among individuals and social groups can be decided so that an 
order – that is, a normal situation – is maintained. 
– Carl Schmitt, “Ethic of State and Pluralistic State,” 203 
 
In reality, the state is never present; present is either the prince or the people; the state, as political 
unity, is represented….The essence of representation always stands in close relation to the 
development of the definition of the state. 





“The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political” begins Schmitt’s most famous 
work.
1
 This oft-quoted first sentence is pregnant with meaning. Schmitt argued it was state 
theory’s Copernican moment.
2
 In two overlooked passages, he emphasizes how important it is. 
In his 1963 “Foreword” to The Concept of the Political, Schmitt reflects back on it, writing, 
Who could understand such an abstractly formulated thesis? To me it is still unclear 
whether it made sense to begin this analysis with such a lack of clarity and abstraction, 
for often the first sentence decides the fate of a publication. Yet this almost esoteric 
conceptual assertion is not entirely out of place here. This provocative thesis encapsulates 
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what was intended to be understood by its audience in the first place, namely those 
familiar with the jus publicum Europaeum, its history, and its current problems.
3
  
In 1970, Schmitt discussed it again, writing, 
The Concept of the Political begins with a sentence that I once deleted because it seemed 
too difficult to use as the first sentence of a text. That sentence reads, “The concept of the 
state presupposes the concept of the political.” It sounds too abstract. But it is a summary 
of everything I have experienced; with this sentence, I can describe the entire 
constitutional-juridical history of my life. 
Until then, every textbook of international law, constitutional law and constitutional law 
or administrative law defined the concept of the political in terms of the state. Political is 
that which refers to the state. Then I upended this and said, the state has to be defined in 
terms of the political. This is an amazing twist [eine erstaunliche Wendung].
4
 
Evidently, Schmitt believed this sentence was being misunderstood already in the 60s and 70s 
and he needed to be more direct. He goes out of his way to raise several questions for readers of 
The Concept of the Political: what did he “upend”; what is so esoteric about that sentence; how 
does it summarize his entire juridical life; how exactly does it implicate the crisis of the state, 
and how would the answer to these questions bear on “the political”? Clearly, these eleven words 
warrant further discussion.  
This chapter analyzes Schmitt’s concept of the political from a new perspective. It begins with an 
in-depth exploration of this “amazing” first sentence, looking at its origins and exploring 
Schmitt’s motivation to upend state theory’s roots. It also answers a related but heretofore 
unasked question: why does Schmitt, a man deeply preoccupied with the state and the political, 
almost entirely avoid a seminal concept of state theory: raison d’état [Staatsräson]?  
The second section looks at the concept of the political in terms of the Friend-Enemy distinction. 
Critics of Schmitt, such as Richard Wolin and Jürgen Habermas, have attempted to reduce “the 
political” to something like Ernst Jünger’s aestheticization and “celebration” of violence.
5
 They 
understand the political solely in terms of the Enemy and violence. Yet, as Andrew Norris has 
convincingly argued, attempts to understand the political strictly in terms (violent) enmity or an 
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aestheticization of warfare fail to do justice to Schmitt’s explicit goals.
6
 That Schmitt saw 
himself as a theorist of concrete order (not disorder) and saw Hobbes as his “friend” in the 
struggle against the bellum omnium contra omnes should raise a red flag for these kinds of 
interpretations. Yet, these interpretations point to a somewhat confusing tension in Schmitt’s 
concept: the emphasis on enmity stands in sharp contrast with his concern for “concrete order” 
and stability. While this section does not deny that enmity is a cornerstone of Schmitt’s 
definition, it agrees with Norris that focusing on enmity alone is insufficient. It moves beyond 
enmity by examining the relationship of the political to “friendship” and “status” 
The third section links the political to Schmitt’s understanding of the state through the concepts 
status and representation. As Ellen Kennedy and Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde have pointed 
out,
7
 Schmitt wrote the first draft of The Concept of the Political concurrently with his 
Constitutional Theory and the ideas present in the former provide a key to understanding the 
latter. Duncan Kelly has challenged the centrality of “the political” for understanding Schmitt’s 
constitutional and state theory, arguing that instead representation is the crucial concept for 
unlocking them.
8
 While Kelly is correct to highlight the importance of representation, he is 
wrong to deny the centrality of the political. Kelly overlooks how the role of representation is 
precisely to “make present” the principle of unity, i.e. the friend-enemy grouping, that defines a 
political community. He thus mistakes how deeply representation is embedded already in the 
political.
9
 This section incorporates Schmitt’s concept of representation into his concepts of the 
political, the friend-enemy-grouping, as well as some concepts discussed in chapter 2, such as 
the Hobbes-Crystal and Ideas, to provide richer robust understanding of “the political.” 
To engage with Schmitt’s state theory, one must first understand his concept of the political. By 
focusing on some of the neglected aspects of the political, this chapter lays out a firmer 
foundation for his state theory. The discussion in this chapter, along with Schmitt’s negative 
account of the state through his critique of modern mass democracy developed in the last chapter, 
will serve as the foundation for extrapolating his ‘positive’ theory of the state in the next chapter. 
 
1. The Political and the State 
This section situates Schmitt’s state theory by looking at his critique of two seminal, early 20
th
 
century works in state theory. Schmitt criticized Jellinek’s Allgemeine Staatslehre and 
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Meinecke’s Machiavellianism as symptomatic of a general oversight in German state theory. 
Schmitt aims to show what exactly their state theory presupposes and why, given their masked 
presuppositions, state theory in Germany has failed to grasp Weimar’s problems. 
a. Schmitt and Jellinek on the Political 
In that first sentence, Schmitt claims to invert a well-established tradition. Whose (seminal) ideas 
had Schmitt inverted? The literature in English is silent on these questions. However, Christoph 
Schönberger and Carlo Galli both noticed how Schmitt’s first sentence inverts Georg Jellinek’s 
definition of the state.
10
 Several others have, however, gestured at Schmitt’s relationship to 
Jellinek, even if they stop short of making this connection. Duncan Kelly writes Jellinek 
anticipated Schmitt’s definition but goes little further.
11
 Peter C. Caldwell and Nehal Bhuta both 
describe the importance of Jellinek for understanding early 20
th
 century state theory, including 
Schmitt’s, but offers little specific insight into Schmitt’s intellectual debt to Jellinek.
12
 Finally, 
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde notes the inadequacy of Jellinek’s state theory when confronted by 
Schmitt’s concept of the political, but does not investigate this link.
13
 This section builds on 
Schönberger and Galli’s insight, discussing Jellinek’s place in Schmitt’s state theory. 
Building up to his definition of the state in his Allgemeine Staatslehre, Jellinek writes “‘Politisch’ 
heißt ‘staatlich’; im Begriff des Politischen hat man bereits den Begriff des Staates gedacht.”
14
 
Or “‘Political’ means ‘statal’; with the concept of politics, one has already thought the concept of 
the state.” By this, Jellinek meant the state has a monopoly over the political and, because of this 
monopoly, it is sufficient to simply discuss the state. Jellinek’s Allgemeine Staatslehre was 
written to confront a lingering question of the German state from at least 1848: how could 
individuals make claims on a supposedly sovereign entity? How could the state have a dual 
nature as a sovereign entity issuing positive law, yet still be constrained by subjective right? To 
answer these questions, Jellinek aimed to provide a comprehensive theory of the state. He 
analyzes the state in terms of two juridical structures: associational (Soziallehre) and “closed 
corporative” (Staatsrechtslehre).
15
 The former seeks to understand the state in terms of 
legitimacy and subjective right, the latter in terms of command and positive law. This division 
sort of reproduces the neo-Kantian hiatus, positive law’s facticity (sovereign power) confronts 
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the constraints of the state as an entity that its members voluntarily associate into and can make 
claims on. That is, the state is divided into its factical and normative facets. Jellinek is, however, 
more concerned with the sociological fact of legitimacy rather than its substantive basis and he 
reproduces the epistemological hiatus imperfectly. 
Jellinek builds to his definition of the state by noting several core aspects of this associational 
component: it is not natural, but a function of human community and human artifice; it consists 
of voluntary relationships; it is a principled unity; it is a unity of space, time, cause, and form; 
and it is a teleological unity.
16
 Jellinek defines the state sociologically as “an associational unity 
of a people settled in a location, who are equipped with sovereign power [Herrschermacht].”
17
 
The state was thus “a function of the social relations among men.”
18
 “The political” is so 
insubstantial it does not even find its way into Jellinek’s final definition of the state. The only 
thing they lacked was territory – which they aimed to solve through their insurrectionary activity. 
The sentence Schmitt inverts comes out of this associational (Soziallehre) component of 
Jellinek’s state theory; it stands to reason that Schmitt’s interest lies in the legitimacy of the state 
and not its sheer factical domination. In 1932, Schmitt believed his opening sentence would 
immediately bring to mind Jellinek’s definition in the context of Weimar crisis. Schmitt thus 
intentionally brought up those core qualities traditionally associated with the state: teleology; 
subjective legitimacy (in terms of voluntary relationships); human community as second nature; 
and principled unity in terms of space, time, cause, and form. By defining the political as prior to 
the state, he argues that conceiving of the political does not presuppose the state at all. The core 
qualities Jellinek held central to the state were actually independent of it. And this independence 
allowed those qualities to work at cross purposes to the state. And Weimar was one instance 
where they did. Any of Weimar’s total movements provided its members with those qualities
19
; 
namely, Weimar’s total movements – not the state – provided their members a principled telos; 
the appearance of legitimacy; and a unity of space, time, cause, and form.  
That Weber’s definition of the state was very similar to and in some ways derivative of Jellinek’s 
definition was probably not lost on Schmitt.
20
 Immediately after inverting Jellinek’s hierarchy of 
state and political, Schmitt goes on to note that Weber’s definition of the state is guilty, like 
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‘many others of that time,’ of putting the political and state in a circular relationship.
21
 Weber’s 
sociological definition, “that the state is a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,”
22
 shares with 
Jellinek’s its focus on human community, territory and location, and the idea of the legitimate 
use of force.
23
 Weber also seems to have picked up Jellinek’s concept of “the normative power 
of the factual,” which stemmed from the sociological horn of Jellinek’s division.
24
 Yet Weber 
emphasized more than Jellinek that the legitimacy, and thus efficacy, of a legal order hinged on 
the degree to which its subjects perceived it to be such, whether in terms of traditional, 
charismatic, or rational-legal authority.
25
 But both Jellinek’s and Weber’s definitions attempted 
to exclude discussion of substantive norms in order to stay within the bounds of the neo-Kantian 
hiatus and accordingly both tend to fall back upon the positivity of law in explaining the state.  
The underlying problem with such definitions, Schmitt argues, is that they presuppose a stable 
political community; they are correct only as long as the state is “a clear and unequivocally 
eminent being.”
26
 But, as argued in the last chapter, Weimar was no longer clearly, 
unequivocally eminent. It was neither total nor a unity. Definitions that describe the political in 
terms of the state thus were useless for addressing Weimar’s crisis because they failed when they 
were needed most: as the state entered into crisis. Schmitt calls into question the idea of 
legitimacy at work in their understandings of the state. He notes that, in the state of nature, the 
state no longer had a monopoly on the legitimate use of force or sovereign authority at all. 
Instead, because substate total movements were where the political resided, the state did not 
possess any independent legitimacy.  
Weimar, modeled on the 19
th
 century bourgeois Rechtsstaat ideal, was instrumentalized by one 
total movement after another in the 20
th
 century. Modern mass democracy had demonstrated the 
shortcomings of Jellinek’s state theory. But ideas have their own momentum. Schmitt’s peers 
continued to base their own concepts of the state and the political on ideas like Jellinek’s,
27
 
failing to see that the political could be the state’s competitor and not its product. Schmitt aimed 
to counteract this in the hope of restoring the state. Thus, as Böckenförde has argued, for Schmitt, 
it was not a question of the monopoly of power at all, no matter the terms of political legitimacy 
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behind it, but a question of the monopoly of the decision over what the terms of the unity are – 
the coincidence of the political with the domain of the state.
28
 
b. Raison d’État and Ratio Status: Schmitt’s Critique of Meinecke 
Another challenge Schmitt makes to his contemporaries’ state theories sheds additional light on 
how he understands the relationship of state and the political. Schmitt almost never discusses a 
core concept of state theory: raison d’état. In fact, he may only discuss the concept once, in a 
1926 review of Meinecke’s Machiavellianism [Idee der Staatsräson in der Moderne Geschichte]. 
Meinecke writes “raison d’état is the fundamental principle of national conduct, the State's first 
Law of Motion”
29
 By this, he understood that the preservation of the state had priority over any 
other consideration and could be pursued by any means, just or unjust. In doing so, he draws a 
strict divide between facts and norms, and places raison d’état strictly on the side of facts – and 
thus power and power politics are the relevant considerations to be made in calculating it.  





 centuries, when the will of the state was identical to that of the absolute monarch.
30
 
Like so many other concepts from the beginning of the era of the state (such as sovereign 
omnipotence), Schmitt thought raison d’état had become misleading.
31
 Old concepts continue to 
evoke their original meaning, even when that original meaning does not fit its new practice and 
context. Schmitt argues the concept raison d’état presupposes a ratio status.
32
 And he stresses 
these concepts are not the same.
33
 Both originated in the Venetian Republic’s phrase vita nostri 
status, which connoted a definite political entity, i.e. its public “sphere,” its particular res publica 
or civitas. He continues, “In [that] same sphere, concepts such as representation, person (which 
differs profoundly from personality or even individuality), dignitas, and honor belong. Status, 
according to Schmitt, originally meant “the fundamental and comprehensive unity of a 
substantial, ontological, essential public order. A public status has the inherent rationality of a 
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being and it will, therefore, “in suo esse perseverare.””
34
 Thus, ratio status implies a specific 
type of existence, of political life, which was far broader than mere material survival.
35
 It 
indicates a status civilis, i.e. that a specific political order has been normalized and there is no 
longer a bellum omnium contra omnes. Ratio status defined the essential order of a political 
community. Raison d’état, on the other hand, defined the rational actions the political 
community, as a state, undertakes to perpetuate that order. A state’s “rationality” and its “rational” 
status overlapped historically only when the state held a monopoly over the political.  
To speak of raison d’état becomes misleading once the state is quartered by total movements. 
Neither does it help when state theories like Laski’s deny its legitimacy and attempt to negate it. 
First, such a “state” has no specific ratio, no “inherent rationality.” As discussed in the last 
chapter, the dynamic of a quantitatively total state is that it moves in one direction and then 
another, it is irrational and incoherent under the shifting domination of various total movements. 
Second, and more importantly, it has no political status. Because it is no longer a total state, 
Schmitt does not think it can properly be said to have any res publica, any civitas, etc. etc. In 
other words, Schmitt believes that concepts like raison d’état presuppose a normal situation.
36
 
Normalcy and a definite political status are exactly what Weimar lacked. No state modeled on 
19
th
 century Rechtsstaat principles under the strain of modern mass democracy could claim to 
have a rational status.  
But beyond tensions between the political and the state, Schmitt thought raison d’état assumed 
too strict a hiatus between facts and norms, Sein and Sollen.
37
 Whether power or morality is in 
the state’s best interests is not the most important question of statecraft. To the contrary, he 
argues it is when rules in effect, such as the jus commune or general moral commands that the 
state itself has instituted, must be violated in order to preserve the state itself. That is, when the 
political order, or κόσμος, becomes self-undermining and requires a sovereign decision on 
whether there is an (internal) existential threat and what must be done in order to overcome that 
threat of disorder, or χάος – even if it means violating the norms of the established order.
38
 
Raison d’état was a marginal concern when ratio status was absent. For Schmitt, the most 
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important question of the state and sovereignty is quis judicabit?
39
 And quis judicabit? is far 
from being a question that divides power and morality. It is the question of the necessity to 
violate a normative-existential order in order to maintain or restore that order. Quis judicabit, 
then, means who decides on what the core of the ratio status is, whether it is in jeopardy from 
exceptions and abnormal situations, and what to do to save it and restore normality. It implicates 
the relationship of facts and norms.
40
 To hold that there is no relationship between the two 
realms, as Meinecke’s raison d’état theory had, was a mistake for Schmitt. The state is 
concerned with the realization of a specific type of order and this implies, political self-
preservation is deeply linked to a specific normative order.  
Thus, Schmitt argues raison d’état is problematic because the state itself has been “devoured” by 
a plurality of total movements, has lost its monopoly of the political. Without the state, without 
any ratio status, one could hardly even broach the question of raison d’état. Schmitt argued that 
the political had migrated to substate groups and thus a very different type of rationality was 
what needed to be discussed.   
 
2. The Political: Enmity, Friendship, Relativizing Status  
Schmitt defines the political in terms of the Friend-Enemy distinction.
41
 And while enmity is 
undoubtedly essential to the political, to discuss the political only in terms of enmity would leave 
out half the concept. This section provides a full account of Schmitt’s concept of the political by 
beginning with enmity and moving beyond it by incorporating also “friendship” and “status.” 
a. “Negated Otherness”: Schmitt’s Hegelian Point of Departure 
Even if it is not the end of the political, enmity is certainly the beginning. Schmitt analyzes the 
political first in Hegelian terms as “negated otherness.”
42
 Hegel begins his analysis of self-
consciousness through this idea of negation: to understand what one is, one must understand first 
what one is not. Identity and determination, for Hegel, originate through opposition. Schmitt 
seems to pick up Hegel’s understanding of the “negated other” and redefines it publically as “the 
enemy.” Thus, Schmitt transposes to the public domain what for Hegel occurred for the 
individual. The private other becomes the public enemy. In Schmitt’s idealized jus publicum 
Europaeum, this public enemy was to be the receptacle of only “public” hate: conflict was 
juridical and public, but not personal.
43
 That is, because the identity in question was communal, 
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Schmitt believes the enemy is abstractly conceived, according to wherever the fault line dividing 
Friendship and Enmity fell.  
To illustrate politically what “negated otherness” is, Schmitt offers the example of the 
proletariat.
44
 According to Marx, the proletariat has no positive identity. One cannot say exactly 
what it is. But it is possible to say what it is not: the proletariat is the antithesis of the bourgeoisie. 
By theorizing what the bourgeoisie and capitalism are, and thus constructing a positive identity 
to contrast with, Marx thought it would be possible to shed light on proletariat identity. By fully 
theorizing the bourgeoisie, the proletariat would be revealed – or so Marx’ argument goes.  
Schmitt continues arguing that, although the proletariat is the conceptual antithesis of the 
bourgeois, this political opposition did not mean individual proletariats would not find 
sympathetic qualities in individual bourgeoisie. Were it not for their very existential opposition, 
they might otherwise find much to like about one another. One could even share all other facets 
of the other’s identity. Yet, because of the opposition between their political identities, Schmitt 
believes a proletariat would recognize the bourgeoisie as a threat to his very existence – political 
identity trumps all other identity.  
Schmitt’s understanding of political identity may seem paradoxical at first: a political unity 
determines its identity through its “enemy” – but an enemy is such only because some facet of 
one’s identity is the antithesis of another’s. What becomes apparent is that this dialectic, when in 
context and in history, is more refining than defining.
45
 Catholics and Protestants originated from 
the same point, but it was only through their interaction that each denomination came to identify 
differences in dogma on which they would not compromise. Iterations of interaction led to the 
polarization and politicization of what had begun as very minor differences. Enmity does not 
come out of nowhere. It rests on a tradition of oppositions that has politicized to the point that 
death appears as a better solution than compromise. For the proletariat, the bourgeoisie denies 
the proletariat its specific existence through capital and property. The defense of property, which 
was not specifically bourgeois but became one of the important concessions they sought in their 
struggle against absolute rule, turned out to be the most contentious right of all for the proletariat.  
Schmitt argues political commitments are existential – and that therefore the political implies 
something more than mere material survival. It is a question of the foundational values necessary 
for meaningful life.
46
 As discussed in Chapter 2, foundational commitments, he believes, are the 
bedrock at which one’s spade is turned and justifications are exhausted. They are dogma. 
Politicized values are “existential” because to be deprived of them would render life not worth 
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living.
47
 And should an enemy threaten those commitments, violence and war may be the only 
conceivable response for that collectivity.
48
 Accordingly, Schmitt writes that “to the political 
belongs the ever present possibility of war.”
49
 But, Schmitt cautions, it is a mistake to think war 
is either the aim or the purpose of the political. It is merely the possibility that arises as the 
existential commitments of political communities collide with one another. Schmitt goes out of 
his way to note that the political and enmity are defined in defensive terms, as the drive to protect 
this existential core.
50
 Yet Schmitt’s attempt to differentiate these offensive and defensive senses 
falls flat since he argues an antithetical way of life is inherently threatening.
51
 
Enmity, then, offers a point of approach to Schmitt’s concept of the political. And his appeal to 
Hegel is appropriate, since it is Hegel who provides one of the richest accounts of identity. The 
real possibility of violence and war against this existential other acts as a heuristic device for his 
concept. Because existential-political identity is primarily affective, the most salient features of 
political identity become apparent first when one feels those features threatened by their dialectic 
opposite, an opposition that threatens to engulf them. The possibility of war and violence are 
always wrapped up in the concept of identity because existential distinction carries this risk. Pace 
Schmitt’s critics, the link to violence and warfare is best understood as the tragedy of the 
political, not its virtue. But enmity is not the end of the political. It is its beginning. Like in Hegel, 
negation is only the starting point of determinacy. It moves dialectically toward the affirmation 
of some positive quality. 
b. Friendship and Enmity: Ancient Political Community  
Friendship is as important for the concept of the political as enmity.
52
 Andrew Norris has written 
“it would be a mistake to think that what Schmitt means by an enemy can be grasped without 
understanding what he means by a friend.”
53
 And Strauss argues that, for Schmitt, “all political 
behavior is oriented toward [acquiring] friends and enemies” (his emphasis).
54
 Indeed, many 
thinkers make a serious mistake by tacitly throwing out this facet of the political.
55
 Admittedly, 
Schmitt barely uses the word friend and related terms without paring it with the enemy. While 
enmity may help to define what a community is, friendship is the basis for cooperation within it. 
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How else could the ideal of a political unity lacking enmity be described? Since Schmitt sets the 
goal of political stability based on the absence of enmity – the opposite of enmity is friendship. 
Thus, friendship must be the relationship among the constituents of a political unity. 
As Norris writes, Schmitt is not the first person to discuss “the political” in terms of friendship 
and enmity. He engages with political philosophy’s oldest tradition. Schmitt tips his hand, even, 
by defining the enemy and the political in terms of the “public” enemy from Plato’s Republic.
56
 
But, pace Norris’ assertion that Schmitt stands in stark contrast to the ancient tradition and 
despite Schmitt’s inversion of the ancients by approaching the political through enmity first, 
Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction resembles Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts in many important 
ways.
57
 For this reason, a synopsis of their analysis of political friendship (and enmity) 
contextualizes Schmitt’s own discussion. 
Besides the passage from Republic defining the “public” enemy and providing the distinction 
between war and civil war, Plato discusses friendship and enmity in terms of justice and injustice 
in the state. Factions occur when a state is not “one” with itself, that is, when there are enemies 
within the state and it is in a state of injustice.
58
 For justice and unity to occur within a state, 
Plato argues its inhabitants must be “friends.”
59
 For this condition to obtain, reason must rule, in 
particular it must rule over the passions so that all are united in their aims and the state is 
oriented toward “the good.” Only when it is ruled over by the complete guardian, a philosopher-
king who unites power and wisdom, can the city said to be ruled by reason.
60
 Plato emphasizes 
how the complete guardian has the insight to distinguish friends and enemies and that, aided by 
auxiliary guardians, he guards against those enemies while protecting friends.
61
  
Aristotle provides additional insight into friendship and the political. For Aristotle, a friend is 
someone similar and equal to oneself with regard to certain qualities (perfect friendship occurs 
when these qualities are virtue and the good).
62
 Friends have the same fundamental identity and 
the same end (τέλος). Aristotle thinks there are many different types of friendship and many 
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different types of association, but that each should be a part of and subordinated to the political 
community.
63
 While these subordinate communities may aim at immediate and partial ends, the 
friendship of the political community stands above all.  
Friendship is crucial to Aristotle’s understanding of a legitimate political community. He 
believes that the political community does not merely consist in a shared location (territory), for 
the exchange of goods (commerce), or for preventing wrongdoing (the night watch state). While 
these are necessary prerequisites, political community exists for the sake of the good, so that 
“friends” can realize it together.
64
 Aristotle argues legitimate political community is produced 
when friends who identify with the same values deliberately choose to associate politically in 
order to realize those values.
65
 And the extent of political community is identical with the extent 
of friendship.
66
 Friendship is achieved when all members are oriented by the well-being and telos 
of the political community and what affects their lives as a collective
 67
 Like Plato, he argues 
friendship is the greatest good: it safeguards against revolution and rebellion, guaranteeing the 
unity of the community; its absence produces factional conflict and destroys the community.
68
 
Also like Plato, Aristotle argues the supreme authorities must be “friends” of the constitution and 
the community.
69
 They must possess the insight to distinguish friends and enemies. Underlying 
each of Aristotle’s virtuous or “correct” regimes is their concern for the public good.
70
 Having 
this concern distinguishes just political rule from illegitimate or pathological domination. A 
political order is legitimate when its constituents perceive it to share in and actively realize their 
political interests, rather than merely its own particular interests. That is, a legitimate ruler – be it 
a single ruler, a few rulers, or the majority, acts on behalf of the public good. Tyranny occurs 
when a ruler instead acts on private self-interest. For example, politea, the non-pathological form 
of democracy in Aristotle’s typology, is when the majority of citizens rule but do so for the sake 
of the public good.
71
 It is legitimate because those ‘ruling’ share the identity – and are politically 
equal to – the ruled.
72
 When this occurs, the entire community is in a state of friendship, sharing 
                                                             
63
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), 
1160a1169.  
64
 Aristotle, The Politics, 1280b1238. 
65
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1156b1120, 1159b1153.  
66
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1159b1130.  
67
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1167b1162-1163.  
68
 Aristotle, The Politics, 1262b1267. 
69 Aristotle, The Politics, 1309a. 
70 Aristotle, The Politics, 1279a1217–1221; 1295b1219; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1155a1123; 1159b1125; 
1161a1133; 1167a1122. 
71
 Aristotle, The Politics, 1279a. 
72 Schmitt uses this in his ideal typical definition of democracy (which may be understood also as the non-
pathological form, in contrast to the tyrannical form described in the last chapter of the arbitrary rule of 51%). 
Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 249, 259; Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2004), 7-8. 
Leviathan Run Aground: Chapter 4 
Page | 124  
the same telos and the same conception of the good. By virtue of that identity, the ruled believe 
that, were they to rule, they would make similar decisions as their current rulers already have.
73
  
c. Friendship as Status Par Excellence  
Schmitt's Friend-Enemy Grouping overlaps significantly with Plato’s and Aristotle’s analyses of 
the importance of Friendship to political community. Like Aristotle, Schmitt believes members 
of a political community, Friends, identify with the same values (the political) and associate 
politically to guarantee those values. Political friendship is for the sake of the pursuit of shared 
goals.
74
 Schmitt also believes stability presupposes political solidarity.
75
 Citing Plato, Schmitt 
describes factionalism as the presence of enemies within what should be a community, upsetting 
its “στάσις.”
76
 Schmitt even goes as far in his integration of Platonic themes to argue that the 
study of political parties should be called “stasiology” because of their dynamic and destabilizing 
effect on political order. The extent of political community is thus identical to the extent of 
friendship. In his polemics against total movements, Schmitt seems to follow Aristotle in arguing 
that the political community is prior to all other associations – other non-political (i.e. social) 
associations may make legitimate claims on individuals, but they are subordinate to the political 
ends of the community.
77
  
Yet Schmitt departs from Plato and Aristotle in important ways. The Friend-Enemy distinction in 
Plato and Aristotle was subordinated to their main focus on ethical life and truth in politics. 
Schmitt totalizes this claim when he argues the high point of the political is the ability to 
distinguish friends and enemies in concrete clarity.
78
 Schmitt does not seem to believe there is 
any definite “good” but, closer to Hobbes, believes that, whatever the good is defined as, it 
always stands in need of interpretation. The basis for friendship, for Schmitt, can be anything 
sufficient to generate an intense feeling of association. “The good,” insofar as it can be said to 
exist at all, is relativized. Relative good or evil corresponds to affective intensity on a communal 
level: “[they] can be easily determined when one knows who one’s enemy is.”
79
  
Schmitt writes the political is “the authoritative [maßgebende] human grouping, the political 
entity” so existentially strong it “pushes aside” all non-political associations.
80
 Two things can be 
said of this relationship of subordination. First, although there will be non-political disputes and 
differences among individuals within a political community, their political association 
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“neutralizes” disagreements, preventing them from escalating into violent conflict. “Friends” see 
their differences as private, not political. To return to the above example of the proletariat, 
Schmitt would argue that other identities, such as race and gender, are secondary to class when 
economic identity is politicized. There may be racial or gender conflicts in a proletariat political 
community, but he argues these differences will not lead to civil war because their shared 
proletariat political identity depoliticizes them. As long as that proletariat identity remains 
politicized, other real differences will remain merely social. Second, the flip side of 
neutralization is politicization: despite overlaps in non-politicized identity, “enemies” will not 
find a basis for political association. Political identity, because it is so existentially compelling, 
necessarily leads to conflict.
81
 For example, if economic identity politicizes, other sources of 
identity, like race, will not generate friendship. The inverse holds too, the politicization of 
economic identity extends friendship beyond borders. Schmitt confronted this situation in 
Weimar, where the KPD was merely an extension of the Soviet-led Comintern.  
For these reasons, Schmitt defines the political as a relativizing or neutralizing status. Other 
identities are “relatived” because they are less affective than whatever the political is and thus 
they do not lead to violent conflict. Thus, when Schmitt discusses political homogeneity, he does 
not have in mind an impossibly monolithic identity that completely smothers difference.
82
 
Kalyvas rightly argues that “too much ink has been wasted over [Schmitt’s] alleged glorification 
of substance, homogeneity, and identity.”
83
 But Kalyvas is incorrect to argue Schmitt believes 
political homogeneity is not total. To the contrary, political homogeneity must be total to become 
a neutralizing status, which allows social heterogeneity, i.e. enables difference to coexist 
peacefully. That is, Schmitt distinguishes between political monism and social pluralism. Schmitt 
believes having a single “the political” shared state-wide will prevent other identities from 
politicizing and becoming violent.  
Drawing on Hobbes’ theory of civil war in Leviathan, Schmitt argues the Friend-Enemy 
distinction must be neutralized within a state. No state can tolerate political pluralism, in the 
sense of multiple friend-enemy distinctions or multiple (and thus potentially conflicting) value 
commitments. But one must bear in mind that Schmitt’s use of the term political is technical and 
not like what we understand as political pluralism today. The political, for Schmitt, entails 
commitments strong enough to lead to violent conflict.  
While Hobbes figured in the background of his earlier writings on status, Schmitt brought 
Hobbes explicitly into view it was in his 1963 “Remarks” to The Concept of the Political. He 
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argues that the transcendent veritas – whatever it may be – constituting a political community 
contains a neutralization.
84
 But Schmitt insists that Hobbes did not intend Leviathan to be a total 
neutralization. Political neutralization for Hobbes still included a substantive value commitment. 
The sovereign had a duty to neutralize the politicized differences between Christian 
denominations so they could peacefully coexist and legal order could be restored. This 
neutralizing truth was “Jesus is the Christ,” which Schmitt believes Hobbes intended as a 
genuine political-existential commitment. With the authority and power of the state behind it, the 
political dispels the state of nature. The political keeps “all domestic distinctions, antagonisms, 
and conflicts below the level of friend-enemy-groupings.”
85
  
After he inverts Jellinek’s definition at the beginning of The Concept of the Political, Schmitt 
describes the political as a relativizing or neutralizing status. He suggests the link between state 
and the political still is important for understanding what the state ought to be:  
in its linguistic and historical sense, “state” is a particular type of condition of a people, 
and that, in decisive cases, it is the authoritative condition and thus, opposed to the many 
conceivable individual and collective statuses, the status par excellence.
86
 
Schmitt believes historically that the state was the status or condition [Zustand] of its people. It is 
the authoritative status or condition [maßgebende Zustand]; the status par excellence [der Status 
schlechthin]. He argues that the word state derives from the concept status.
87
 It decided on the 
Friend-Enemy distinction and “relativized” other identities.
88
  
Jellinek’s reduction of status to state worked only because at that time the state was successful in 
maintaining its monopoly over “the political,” when there was already a ratio status. Schmitt’s 
inversion of Jellinek’s definition is intended to draw attention to the fact that the state no longer 
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provides this status par excellence. Under the strain of mass democracy and politicized total 
movements,
89
 Schmitt realized the political could exist wholly independently from the state – 
and that, when it was independent, the political became the cause of civil war. Schmitt’s concept 
of the political is thus a theory of civil war. Because it is “the political” and not the state that 
relativizes existential conflict, Schmitt wants to move away from concepts like raison d’état. He 
insists on separating out ratio status. Political crises arise when “status” frees itself from “state.” 
Schmitt considers political homogeneity and equality to be the conceptual equivalent of this 
relativizing status. In his discussion of equality in Constitutional Theory, he argues that the basis 
for democratic homogeneity depends on whatever qualities are politicized.
90
 He lists historical 
forms of this “neutralizing” political homogeneity.
91
 In ancient Greece, political homogeneity 
was physical or moral status – natural qualities determined ἀρετή. In medieval theory, it was 
ἀρετή, virtus, or vertu that constituted this basis. In post-medieval political communities, such as 
Puritan Massachusetts, religion served as this basis. In the late 18
th
 century, the basis for the 
Friend-Enemy distinction became the nation (anything from “common language, common 
historical destiny, traditions and remembrances, and common political goals and hopes”
92
). 
Finally, Schmitt argues economic class can serve as this basis. In the 1963 edition of The 
Concept of the Political, Schmitt provides a different set of neutralizing friend-enemy groupings: 
Christianity, monotheism, (French) nationalism, utilitarianism, and Marxism.
93
  
So Schmitt argues literally anything can be politicized.
94
 Anything is potentially a Friend-Enemy 
grouping; any identity can become the basis for political homogeneity. That is, Schmitt argues 
any of these values once it has politicized is sufficiently thick to generate Friendship. Interpreters 
have argued Schmitt thought only race could serve as the basis for homogeneity.
95
 Not only is 
there a lack of evidence for this view, as Kalyvas has argued, but it also fails to create a basis for 
a meaningful or coherent reading of his work on political identity.
96
 This does not mean Schmitt 
was unaware of race or ethnicity being politicized (in a well-cited example of the Turks and 
                                                             
89 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 30. See the discussion in the previous chapter. 
90
 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 263-264. 
91
 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 259-263. 
92
 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 262.  
93
 Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen: Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und Drei Corollarien, 122-123. 
94
 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 37.  
95
 Ulrich K. Preuss, "Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the Relations between 
Constituent Power and the Constitution," in Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical 
Perspectives, ed. Michel Rosenfeld (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 153-155; Richard Wolin, "Carl Schmitt, 
Political Existentialism, and the Total State," Theory and Society 19, no. 4 (1990): 390ff; Wolin, "Carl Schmitt: The 
Conservative Revolutionary Habitus and the Aesthetics of Horror," 425ff; William E. Scheuerman, "The Fascism of 
Carl Schmitt: A Reply to George Schwab," German Politics and Society 29(1993): 106ff; William E. Scheuerman, Carl 
Schmitt: The End of Law  (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 1999), 127; William E. Scheuerman, "Carl 
Schmitt and the Nazis (Book Review)," German Politics and Society 23(1991): 74-75.  
96 Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary, 120-121. Böckenförde outlines ways in which this is 
being done and draws attention to the idea of nationalism when Carl Schmitt’s more provocative writings came 
about. "Carl Schmitt Revisited," Telos 109: 83-84. 
Leviathan Run Aground: Chapter 4 
Page | 128  
Greeks, he argues it has
97
). But Schmitt’s claim is that, precisely because enmity leads to 
violence and civil war, an overarching political status that can neutralize potential conflict is 
essential. Schmitt argues the nation premised on shared values (such as Germany’s decision for a 
Rechtsstaat), and not race, is the most pervasive form of political homogeneity today.
98
 However, 
Schmitt did discuss the political core of the Nazi State in exactly those terms of race and 
ethnicity in his writings from 1933 to 1936.
99
 While Schmitt’s acts during this time and their 
implications for the dangers of his “political” have been rightly scrutinized, it would be a mistake 
to conclude his theory only implies volkish homogeneity. Insofar as he did succumb to the 
politicization of ethnicity, this does not mean we should discount his theory today. To do so 
would rob political theory today of the broader meaning of the political. 
 
3. The Political: Status, Sovereignty, and Representation 
It has been argued that “auctoritas non veritas facit legem,” translates as “not truth, but force 
makes the law” and that what Schmitt means by this maxim is “Nothing is true—everything is 
command.”
100
 “Everything is command” is not far from the sophist maxim “justice is nothing 
other than the advantage of the stronger.” Hyperbole aside (not to mention the obvious 
translation error), this reading is a caricature of a more common tendency to interpret Schmitt’s 
arguments about sovereignty and decisionism as reducible to power, that sovereignty is 
ultimately nothing more than a sophisticated justification for domestic power politics. Many 
scholars have argued for a reading of Schmitt along these lines. Some interpreters, such as 
Scheuerman and Dyzenhaus, argue Schmitt intended to produce a moment of pure sovereign 
discretion and that ultimately this moment is informed by nothing more than the exercise of 
power.
101
 Galli argues Schmitt espouses a form of nihilism and at times irrationalism.
102
 Others, 
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like Habermas and McCormick, go further and argue this moment is an aestheticization of 
violence or conflict, and, although they do not use the term, Schmitt comes across as a nihilist 
similar to Ernst Jünger.
103




Reading Schmitt as a sophist or a nihilist fails to grasp core elements of his thought. Kalyvas 
makes this point when he argues it is a mistake to read Schmitt as glorifying irrationalism in the 
decision and that, in order to understand sovereignty, “one has to go beyond personal empirical 
will.”
105
 Interpreting Schmitt as a type of sophist seems to be grounded in the similarly 
problematic ascription to him of volkisch communitarianism. What sophistry would do or gain 
for Schmitt’s legal theory is unclear. Regarding McCormick’s and Habermas’ more extreme 
reading, Schmitt was horrified by the aestheticization of violence.
106
 Moreover, as argued 
already, nihilism and disenchantment were Schmitt’s foremost concerns. He opposed legal 
positivism because he believed it reflected the nihilistic and arbitrary exercise of power. He 
actively sought theoretical ways to rein in and contain arbitrary political rule despite the 
pervasive disenchantment he saw around him. It is awfully strange to unproblematically read 
Schmitt as a thinker who simultaneously criticized and valorized the reduction of law to power. 
Even the less extreme reading of Scheuerman and Dyzenhaus is questionable. There are clear 
tensions in Schmitt’s writings that need to be answered if one wishes to argue Schmitt buried a 
moment of arbitrary power in sovereignty. It would be incredibly bizarre if, after spending so 
much effort decrying the arbitrary pathos of the masses, Schmitt then valorized the arbitrary 
pathos of an individual. It would be similarly bizarre if Schmitt – who book after book 
denounced the mere legality of positivism and argued law required legitimacy – ended up 
arguing law was nothing more than whatever came out of the exercise of power.  
It is just not clear what Schmitt had to gain from freeing law from normative restraints and why 
he would draw attention to the problem of indeterminacy only to later exploit it. Schmitt wanted 
to restore the state to overcome the state of nature. He thought the state of nature was, after all, 
where only the strongest rule and do so arbitrarily,
107
 where man became a wolf to man.
108
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Finally, Schmitt frequently makes arguments that sound an awful lot like natural law, especially 
concerning the dynamic of Recht and Macht and positivism’s failure to consider Recht as more 
than Gesetz backed by Macht. Schmitt explicitly criticized what he understood as sophistry: any 
attempt to legitimate something by appeal to sheer facticity – be it compulsion through sheer 
power
109
 or more subtle forms of power like an arbitrary democratic majority. Schmitt insisted 
Recht could not be derived from Macht or any other fact.
110
 Renato Cristi drew attention to the 
problems of ignoring natural law in discussing Schmitt’s jurisprudence – yet exactly this 
foundation in their interpretations of Schmitt.
111
 
Kalyvas has argued that, for a Hobbesian like Schmitt, chaos, exceptionality, and political 
disorder were states that needed to be overcome.
112
 He did not seek to eliminate the norm and 
create a permanent state of exception.
113
 To read Schmitt as somehow advocating permanent 
exceptionalism is incoherent. By distinguishing political status from neutralized or social statuses, 
it becomes clear Kalyvas is right to argue that Schmitt separates “sovereignty” from ordinary or 
normal politics.
114
 Analyzing states of indeterminacy or underdeterminacy and exception is not 
the same thing as endorsing those states. This section shows that, within a constituted state, 
Schmitt does provide a sharp critique of an unconstrained decision and instead attributes 
sovereignty to the “decisive,” “relativizing” status the political provides. Moreover, for Schmitt, 
the sovereign representative is hardly free. The sovereign is subject to the normative constraints 
of the meaning of that status as well as the degree to which the people will be able to identify 
with those decisions. 
a. The Authority of the Political: Relativizing Status as Sovereign 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Schmitt argues law is underdetermined; while this is not a new 
problem, it cannot be overcome or ignored.
115
 Positivistic jurisprudence like Kelsen’s, in 
theorizing the law “purely,” deprives law of a crucial buttress that narrows its range of 
indeterminacy and restricts its interpretability. Schmitt believes that positive law is not real law 
[Recht]. For Schmitt, law must be grounded in sovereign authority. And authority, although not 
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embodying moral “truth” per se, is not totally alienated from it either. The maxim auctoritas non 
veritas facit legem is not a sophistic assertion of power, it is a claim about how the hiatus 
destabilizes truth. Authority’s role in making the law does not mean the law is merely power or 
that “truth” plays no role. To be sure, power and authority are both important and “are, combined 
with one another, effective and vital in every state.” But to simply equate power and authority is 
to blind oneself to authority’s independent qualities.
116
  
Turning back to Schmitt’s Der Wert des Staates, power appears to be a necessary evil, needed to 
realize “pure” Recht in the concrete world.
117
 Recht, legal truth, stands outside the concrete 
world. A sovereign must have power to realize Recht. But Schmitt denies power alone creates 
either sovereignty or Recht. Schmitt, using Hobbes not Protagoras, argues justice is not merely 
whoever is strongest but comes about through ‘a spark of reason’ that allows humans to conceive 
of a legitimate state, outside of their natural state. In Legality and Legitimacy, Schmitt describes 
the legitimation deficit of the quantitative total state.
118
 As discussed in the last chapter, on core 
political issues, such as the meaning of a concept like social state or basic rights, who interprets 
that concept is decisive. Given the plurality of total movements, the interpretation of any concept 
dealing with political right will ultimately come down to whoever is in power interpreting it and 
how their beliefs shape their perspective on legitimacy. Other movements, because there is no 
neutralizing political status, will see this interpretative authority as an exercise of mere power. 
Schmitt thinks merely positive law in a politically plural state will lead to these interpretative 
conflicts domestically. And they will ultimately call the legitimacy of the state itself into 
question. He attacks the rhetorical use of concepts positive legality enables.
119
 He aims to 
undermine the possibility of ‘claiming the word for one’s own purposes in order to denounce 
one’s opponent as the enemy of an established political order.’
120
  
Schmitt’s writings are thus directed against the sort of legal sophistry he is often accused of 
today. For Schmitt, the meaning of a law or legal concept runs deeper than any subjective 
interpretation or exercise of power. There are non-legal factors that can help clarify whether an 
interpretation is legitimate or not. On core political issues, Schmitt believed it was not enough to 
simply ask the German people whether they thought the NSDAP, SPD, or KPD had the correct 
interpretation of democracy, for example. Schmitt believed there were more accurate 
interpretations, grounded in the normative principles a written constitution was based on. He 
believed the constitution was a higher normative basis than popular sovereignty.  
The previous section argued how Schmitt defined the political as the status par excellence, which 
neutralizes or relativizes other potentially existential conflicts, realizing a status civilis. He goes 
even further in his discussion of sovereignty, arguing that “the political unity or entity [die 
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politische Einheit]” itself is sovereign.
121
 He sets the sovereign in opposition to particular 
institutions and individuals – constituted powers – within the state. No concrete individual was 
sovereign. Schmitt has made an incredibly provocative yet very subtle move here. When Schmitt 
ascribes sovereignty to the political entity, he is literally ascribing sovereignty to the political 
status. Besides this claim, Schmitt’s work in general is rife with arguments about the role 
metaphysical entities, like Recht, Ideas, theologies, metaphysics, idées générales, and 
Weltanschauungen, play in authoritatively determining human life and actions and – more 
importantly, in legitimating political regimes. Even in early works like Gesetz und Urteil, 
Schmitt argues that the concrete determinations of abstract legal ideas can be done legitimately 
by representing an abstracted community of judges.
122
 
Obviously, however, a status cannot actually be sovereign because it lacks deliberative faculties. 
It does not even exist phenomenally, if it can be said to exist at all. Moreover, in a seemingly 
cynical manner, Schmitt argued already, citing Hobbes, that the sovereignty of law (or any other 
higher order) always presupposes the sovereignty of those who actually administer that law and 
that order. Otherwise, “the rule of law” is nothing but an empty phrase. Thus, the entire question 
of relativizing status, of the political, ultimately returns the discussion to Hobbes’ questions of 
quis judicabit? quis interpretabitur? – who decides? who interprets? Likewise, the question of 
goodness and evilness, of friends and enemies, presupposes already that the question of “who 
decides” has been answered.
123
 The solution to the epistemological problem of the hiatus has 
lexical priority in Schmitt’s account, and all political determinations follow from it. Thus, 
Schmitt’s claim about the sovereignty of the political unity – when taken at face value – seems to 
be incoherent: he attributes sovereignty to the meta-juridical neutralizing status after he denied it 
to “law” and insisted that interpretative authority can only rest with a real deciding person.  
Late in his life, Schmitt reopens his discussion of the political by giving three “hints” about 
Hobbes’ philosophical anthropology and its relation to state theory. His three hints offer a way to 
make sense of this incoherence. While the first two deal directly with the state, the third stresses 
the relationship between the political and transcendence. The third hint, discussed already in 
Chapter 2, is that Hobbes’ system leaves the door open to transcendence. Hobbes too, for 
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Hobbes did not think the state was merely a mechanical-technical institution to enforce the 
arbitrary will of the sovereign, according to Schmitt. To the contrary, its mechanical nature was 
but one facet of Hobbes’ Leviathan “myth” and it was the process of disenchantment, meaning 
the loss of a definite anchor in some substantive, objective reason, that led to the state being 
merely a mechanical, positive institution.
125
 Instead, what makes Hobbes’ system so admirable is 
its openness to transcendence, which takes the state beyond being merely positive. According to 
Schmitt, Hobbes’ state concretized a definite veritas, namely “Jesus is the Christ,” which was 
compelling enough to its constituents to neutralize politico-existential conflicts that had erupted 
out of irreconcilable, opposed interpretations of the Confessional Civil Wars. It did so as a higher 
third, which created a space for friendship among the denominations, depoliticizing their points 
of conflict but without annihilating them. Schmitt believes Hobbes argued the barest fact of 
Christianity could serve as an affectively motivating veritas that could simultaneously neutralize 
the politicization of Protestant and Catholic belief.  
Schmitt recognized “truth” in a disenchanted world was a tricky subject: “transcendence” could 
be any number of ‘neutralizing’ truths. Still, his goal – which he believes he shares with Hobbes 
– is to find a legitimate yet meaningful basis for political community.
126
 Whichever veritas was 
affectively motivating enough to unite a community and depoliticize its other statuses was “the 
political.” Typical of Schmitt’s work, “the political” turns out to rest upon a series of identities 
and antitheses. The political is the status par excellence, is the neutralizing status, is sovereign, is 
the Friend-Enemy distinction, is homogeneity, and is a real community’s existential commitment 
to concretize some transcendental regulative idea or veritas. The sovereignty of the political 
means the sovereignty of that ideal. It serves as the criterion of legitimacy for that community: 
when actions and decisions are made in accordance with the meta-juridical ideal of the political, 
whatever it may, they are legitimate.  
But the problem Hobbes sought to solve, however, was a conflict between truth claims – after all, 
Protestantism and Catholicism were opposed interpretations of the same truth claim. The dual 
                                                             
125 Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Hobbes, 42, Cf. 19, 42-43, 65. See Chapter 5 for a longer discussion 
of this point. 
126 Cf.Norris, "Carl Schmitt on Friends, Enemies and the Political," 78. 
Leviathan Run Aground: Chapter 4 
Page | 134  
problem of the hiatus is that there are plural Weltanschauungen but also plural ways to interpret 
a single Weltanschauung. In agreement with Hobbes, Schmitt argues that an abstract truth cannot 
actually “rule,” it has no agency and requires some agent in order to be realized and made 
effective. The fact that the “sovereign” lies on the wrong side of the hiatus is a source of political 
conflict. Thus, although norms are sovereign, they are absent and cannot perform their role: to 
provide concretely order. No “veritas” is self-effecting.
127
 In the chaos of the state of nature, 
claims about veritas have no foundation to stand upon and are the topic of polemical dispute.
128
 
Nevertheless, Schmitt places transcendence and veritas at the top of his Hobbes-Crystal. He 
places interpretative authority only at the third “center” axis, around which his Hobbes-Crystal 
turns. This emphasizes that interpretative authority is not arbitrary rule. It is subordinate to 
something else: either the system of needs or the transcendent truth orientation. The requirement 
of security or protection is clear enough. Authority aims to close the hiatus by reaching out to a 
substantive source of legitimacy.
129
 By deciding on something indefinite (and maintaining it 
through future decisions on the nature of cases in legal penumbra), Schmitt acknowledges that 
there is indeed an element of indeterminacy in the sovereign decision for a particular veritas. But 
that act of concretization is not wholly arbitrary and the authority to interpret is limited by what 
it aims at interpreting.  
b. Representation I: The Model of Suprapersonal Rule in the Church’s Office Charisma 
Political status is “sovereign” but it requires some interpretative authority to act and decide on its 
behalf. Schmitt argued in Der Wert des Staates (1914) that “Recht” cannot self-effect but 
requires an agent to realize it in the world.
130
 He argues further that this agent must be the state. 
In this early work, Schmitt argues the Catholic Church serves as a model for the state in terms of 
how to represent Recht in the world. He writes “[According to the doctrine of the Roman 
Catholic Church], the infallible Pope is nothing in himself, he is only an instrument, the vicar of 
Christ on earth, servorum servus Dei. Likewise, the will of the absolute ruler can desire nothing 
more than what is right [Recht].”
131
 Schmitt repeats this argument in Dictatorship.
132
 Hardly 
making a case for sophistry or arbitrary decisionism, Schmitt argues that the Pope is the Pope not 
because he has the power of his office but because “the Pope” represents the Church and is the 
Vicar of Christ: the Pope is bound to the Idea of Christ. The pope’s legitimacy is not something 
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obtained by fiat from the past, as traditional legitimacy. Nor is it a quality emanating from his 
personal charisma, as charismatic legitimacy. Finally, it is not inherent to the formal rationality 
of his rule, as rational-legal legitimacy is. Instead, the legitimacy of the Papacy consists in its 




Schmitt takes this argument up again in his Roman Catholicism in Political Form (1923). Again, 
he models political representation on the Papacy. Schmitt again emphasizes the subordination of 
the representative to what is represented: “representation invests the representative person with a 
special dignity” so that “an authoritative person or Idea becomes personified.”
134
 A 
representative must do justice to the Idea represented.
135
 Interestingly, Schmitt argues, citing 
Jellinek, that parliament was legitimate when it aimed at this type of representation because it too 
functioned as a complexio oppositorium, uniting a plurality of diverse interests and 
movements.
136
 That a political representative concretizes some Idea of Recht – some “authority 
from above” – to create a legitimate, non-tyrannical political regime underlies Schmitt’s early 
Weimar writings.
137
 One finds this argument also in The Concept of the Political, where Schmitt 
continues to use Catholicism as a model for political representation. He argues there the Pope 
ceases to be a representative of God when he fails to concretize the Idea of Catholicism and 
instead uses the office to further his (tyrannical) self-interests, impulses, and drives.
138
 Schmitt 
adds to this conception that the rule of law or ethical rule actually means that those who actually 
rule are oriented by those normative ideals and seek to concretize them, giving norms reality.
139
  
In On the Three Types of Juristic Thought, written two decades after Der Wert des Staates and 
one decade after Roman Catholicism and Political Form, Schmitt again discusses political 
representation using the Catholic Church as his model. There, however, Schmitt seems to have a 
better sense of how to separate “arbitrary,” tyrannical decisionism from the decision of a 
legitimate representative. He begins by discussing Tertullian, who weighed in on the dilemma in 
Plato’s Euthyphro arguing that ‘what God commands is good simply because God commanded 
it.’ But, Schmitt cautions, although God’s command appears to be “pure decisionism,” it is not. 
Tertullian’s argument presupposes both a Christian “order” and that “God” is a Christian God, 
which is to say Tertullian believes God’s explicit (political) commands are such only because 
they are grounded in a preexisting and defined theological order.
140
 Thus, the command realizes 
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an abstract order – but the legitimacy of the command, even God’s command, is determined by 
that order. He follows his discussion up with an argument that should sound familiar by now:  
The Roman Catholic Dogma of the infallibility of a Papal decision likewise contains 
strong juristic-decisionistic elements; but the infallibility of the decision of the Pope does 
not establish the order and institution of the church but presupposes them: the Pope is, as 




The pope cannot abruptly decide the only legitimate Gospel is that according to Richard 
Dawkins, regardless of his sovereign representative authority. The legitimacy of an authority 
hinges on his or her relationship to that order (Recht).  
Yet Schmitt had difficulty articulating exactly how sovereign representation would not end up 
being arbitrary nonetheless. The need for representation of an Idea and the validity of that Idea 
still were problematic. Because of the hiatus, there was still an interpretative deficit. But to allow 
totally individuated interpretation of the political risked reintroducing the very civil war the state 
was intended to solve. In 1934, he began to reformulate his ideas in terms of suprapersonal rule 
(a function of “concrete-order” thinking) in his efforts to delimit it from the arbitrary rule of a 
tyrant.
142
 Yet this account continues his earlier arguments about representation originally 
developed with reference to the Papacy. He affirms Pindar’s nomos basileus: law is king. The 
requisite for a legitimate human “king” is he become nomos incarnate.
143
  
Schmitt’s arguments about authority and legitimacy, especially in relation to representation, has 
been read by Dyzenhaus as endorsing a form of Weber’s charismatic authority against the 
rational-legal legitimacy of the legislative or bourgeois Rechtsstaat.
144
 But charismatic authority 
cannot capture Schmitt’s claims about legitimacy. Neither was Schmitt interested in the radical 
and revolutionary qualities of charismatic authority. In fact, charismatic authority seems to 
embody the opposite qualities of what Schmitt describes as the legitimate authority of a Pope or 
King. Carlo Galli argues that Schmitt models legitimate sovereign representation on Weber’s 
often overlooked second type of charismatic authority: office charisma.
145
 Thus, this form of 
charismatic authority, while still not “congealing” like rational-legal legitimacy, remains a 
conservative and non-revolutionary force. And it is not centered on an individual. Schmitt 
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advocates the “traditional” juridical authority of office charisma against the “modern” juridical 
authority of rational-legal legitimacy.
146
 Schmitt writes, echoing Weber, “the Pope is not the 
Prophet but the Vicar of Christ…The fact that the office is made independent of charisma 
signifies that the priest upholds a position which appears to be completely apart from his 
concrete personality.”
147
 In this model of representation, charisma separates from the person 
entirely and centers instead on the institution – thus an institution partakes of “personal” qualities 
normally attributed to real individuals.  
Thus, political authority is neither arbitrary nor the product of revolutionary charisma for Schmitt. 
It is bound to transcendent normative ideas, which individuals ideally represent in the world. 
Above all, sovereign representation is of an Idea underlying a political order.
148
 It is worth noting 
that this ideal develops after Schmitt’s fascination with neo-Kantianism, in particular Vaihinger: 
what is represented serves as a regulative idea (perhaps only as a necessary fiction) for both the 
representer and for the people governed by it. In formulating representation this way, Schmitt 
aimed at a means to avoid the congealed soul, the “iron-cage,” of positivism or rational-legal 
legitimation without enabling tyranny. His solution was to model representation on office 
charisma, which emanates from an institutional order rather than personal charm. 
c. Representation II: Hobbes and The Artificial Personhood of Political Status  
Duncan Kelly argues Schmitt turned to Hobbes to define representation as he moved away from 
Catholicism.
149
 Yet, although how Schmitt conceives of representation does evolve, its 
theoretical core remains the same. And, as before, his aim here is to provide a way to rein in 
arbitrary sovereign representative acts – not to find ways to legitimate them. 
A brief exposition of Hobbes’ theory lays the foundation for discussing the later developments of 
Schmitt’s understanding of representation.
150
 Hobbes describes representation by distinguishing 
between natural persons, who are concrete individuals with agency, and artificial or fictional 
persons, who lack agency and cannot take responsibility for their actions.
151
 He writes an 
artificial person could be biologically human but too young, irrational (insane), or incompetent to 
form intentions and act upon them. Or an artificial person could be a natural person who 
commissions another to act in her name because she is unable to. Finally, an artificial person 
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could be an inanimate object, such as a building, corporation, or concept – an object that may not 
exist but which we treat as if it were real.
152
 Only a natural person can actually deliberate, decide, 
and act. Yet, like natural persons, artificial persons still need to deliberate, act, and have their 
interests accounted for. They just lack the ability to do so themselves. With “authority,” Hobbes 
solves the juridical problem of how artificial persons can do so: to authorize is to enable another 
to act on one’s behalf.
153
 It is accompanied by the responsibility for whatever that authorized 
other does in one’s name, as if one actually were the author of those acts. An authority is the 
author of another’s acts. The authority represents that author.
154
 “Representation allows those 
who are incapable of acting otherwise to be capable of having words and actions truly attributed 
to them.”
155
 It makes artificial persons juridically real and their actions meaningful, even though 
they actually are not, thereby allowing even fictions to effect the world concretely. 
Schmitt understands representation in similar terms. He writes in his Constitutional Theory, 
“Representation is something existential. To represent is to make an invisible being visible and 
present through a publicly present one. The dialectic of the concept is that the invisible is 
presupposed as absent and nevertheless is simultaneously made present.”
156
 Schmitt believes the 
representative aims to embody the essence of what is represented and give it material reality. The 
most important quality of a political community, its decisive or neutralizing status, is exactly one 
such entity that has no presence or “visibility” and thus stands in need of representation. Political 
status cannot act or deliberate: it is “unorganized” and “unformed.”
157
 Representation overcomes 
this barrier.  
In his Constitutional Theory, Schmitt contrasts the concepts of Representation and Identity. Here, 
Identity has a narrower meaning than when Schmitt uses it to discuss “the political.” It seems to 
mean when individual or private identity and how that relates to political identity. Each 
individual is comprised of infinite qualities that constitute his or her particular private identity. 
Individuals identify with an order and with one another when they recognize its political status as 
their own. Rousseau’s contrast of the volonté générale (general will) and the volonté des tous 
(will of all) adds another layer to Schmitt’s antithesis of Representation and Identity.
158
 The 
volonté générale seems to be the equivalent of Representation, it is an abstract, public identity. 
When an individual represents it, she transcends the qualities that individuate her distinct and 
                                                             
152
 Cf. Hans Vaihinger, T   P  losop y of ‘as If’, trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1965), vii, 
33-54, 116-124. Vaihinger draws attention to this aspect of Hobbes’ thought in particular regarding “as if” 
formulations. For Schmitt’s relationship to Vaihinger, see Chapter 1. Cf. Mehring, Carl Schmit, 44ff. 
153
 Hobbes, Leviathan, 101-102; Skinner, "Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State," 8.  
154 Hobbes, Leviathan, 102; Skinner, "Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State," 7. There is a direct 
inverse relationship between these concepts: Author is to Authorized as Represented is to Representative. 
155 Skinner, "Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State," 16; Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, 104.  
156
 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 243; Cf. Böckenförde, "The Concept of the Political," 49-50; Schmitt, Roman 
Catholicism and Political Form, 19; Schmitt, Political Theology, 48.  
157 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 271. 
158 Schmitt seems to have this distinction in mind when he cites Rousseau’s ideal of the citoyen as representative 
and a necessary feature of representation – even in democracy. Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 240, 280ff. 
Leviathan Run Aground: Chapter 4 
Page | 139  
different from her political community and arrives to the core essence she shares the rest of her 
community. The volonté des tous, as the equivalent of Identity, is particular, private identity. 
Schmitt argues that Identity, unlike Representation, too is absolutely necessary for any political 
community to be non-tyrannical: if there were only representation, there would be a state without 
a people, a res populi without a populus.
159
 That is, one must actually recognize qualities in 
oneself that one shares with one’s fellow citizens – not to mention with the res publica itself.  
Kalyvas draws our attention to the fact that Schmitt does allow a moment of sovereignty in the 
pre-constitutional “people”
160
 – although this moment is more constrained than Kalyvas believes 
it to be. Schmitt does argue Identity, the actually existing pre-constitutional people’s recognition 
of political acts as their own, is crucial. To be representative, sovereign acts must appear to be in 
the public good. Schmitt says of a represented political status that “[it] is not a palpable reality, 
but rests on a recognition of identity. It is not a matter of something actually equal legally, 
politically, or sociologically, but rather of identifications…They can never reach an absolute, 
direct identity that is actually present at every moment.”
161
 But, he qualifies, outside of 
mathematics, identity can only be obtained through abstraction; homogeneity occurs only at the 
level of the Idea. Nevertheless, even though identity cannot be had with mathematical precision, 
a sovereign representative is still constrained by the need to have actual individuals identify with 
their community’s core existential values. Should the sovereign representative’s private interests, 
rather than the political status, dominate its actions, its representative legitimacy is overturned.
162
 
Without some degree of political Identity, there is no legitimate community. 
But Schmitt stresses that political community cannot consist in Identity alone. There cannot be a 
totally individuated community. The “community” would merely be an unprincipled society of 
individuals lacking in any basis for cooperation aside from personal gain. Schmitt believes, 
however, that in such a society all agreements and interactions would be conducted with the 
same existential reservations plaguing Weimar’s parliament. A political community requires a 
‘mixture’ of both principles.
163
 The state must somehow simultaneously represent a political 
status that its constituents already identify as their own status. Representation is necessary to 
mediate the real empirical differences among individuals and to shape their shared political 
identity.
164
 In Schmitt’s typology, representation subtracts all individuating qualities, all other 
statuses, from concrete individuals to produce their existential core.  
Drawing on the work of Rudolf Smend, Schmitt argues that representation is the “static” element 
of a political body, providing it with an important source of stability and coherence. It must be 
complemented by a dynamic, integrating aspect that aims to incorporate the distinct, plural 
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individuated identities into its political unity.
165
 Thus, Schmitt’s dynamic of Representation and 
Identity appears rather Hegelian: an individual comes to recognize himself in the collectivity 
through the integrative efforts of that collectivity and the “rationality” of the Idea it embodies. 
Civic education is important to community by teaching its constituents why its values matter.  
Thus, Schmitt argues the political status, rather than some individual, is authoritative and 
sovereign. Its sovereignty is nominal, however, because it is an artificial person and requires a 
sovereign representative person to represent it and act on its behalf. The task of this 
representative is, thus, to make present what “friends” recognize as their existential political 
identity – to make present what constitutes them as friends. While the representative clearly has 
some latitude in how to concretize this status, Schmitt does not think authority is license for 
tyranny. It is the political status, the political grouping oriented by some transcendental veritas, 
that is authoritative – not the arbitrary decisions of a “sovereign” that just happens to have the 
most power.
166
 Hobbes’ auctoritas, non veritas facet legem “is anything but a slogan of 
irrationalism despotism.”
167
 Representation, sovereignty, and the political are deeply grounded in 
questions of legitimacy in modern political form. Schmitt eventually dissociated his theory from 
“decisionism” precisely because decisionism implied the political arbitrariness that he criticized. 
But even when he described his theory as decisionistic, it is in this sense of concretizing the 
sovereign Idea. 
 
Conclusion: The Loss of the Monopoly of the Political 
Schmitt thought “political unity” was decisive for whether normality, order, and security could 
be attained – which is to say, political unity was the prerequisite for overcoming the state of 
nature. He also clearly did not believe political homogeneity extended beyond the political. 
Schmitt defined this relativizing status as “the political.”  
Schmitt’s concept of the political is linked to his critique of modern mass democracy and the 
quantitatively total state. Ideally and historically, the state monopolized the political, which led 
many to believe it the political was merely derivative of the state. Against this assumption, 
Schmitt argue the plurality of total movements arising from modern mass democracy 
undermined the state’s ability to create this decisive status. To return to the discussion from 
Chapter 3, Schmitt believes mass democracy led to the politicization of society: plural total 
Weltanschauungen sought to impose their total worldviews across all of society by exploiting the 
democratic representative nature of institutions like parliament and rewriting the constitution 
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according to those worldviews. Each total movement was constituted by a different political 
status, even to the point of constituting their identity negatively in contrast with one another. The 
partial interests of total movements wanted only to instrumentalize the state’s institutions for 
themselves and their particular concept of the political. Hardly the basis for stability.  
Schmitt’s “career-defining” sentence was intended to assert the independence of the political and 
argue for the importance of a definite political status for restoring authority to the state. The 
problem Schmitt aimed to solve was how the state could regain its monopoly over the political in 
order to become qualitatively total again and relative the factionalism and violence caused by 
political pluralism. This meant determining whether any decisive status could be decided on for 
Weimar and how the state could authoritatively assert it. To do so, required Schmitt to turn to 
state and constitutional theory. 
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Magnus Homo: Carl Schmitt’s State and Constitutional Theory  
 
 
The achievement of a normal state is to relativize its internal opposing factions and to prevent their 
ultimate consequence, war. 
– Carl Schmitt, Hugo Preuß 
 
The state is a kingdom of reason (this formula originates in Hobbes and is not first found in Hegel), 
an imperium rationis, which transforms civil war into the peaceful coexistence of citizens.  







 inversion of the relationship between state and political, it is clear Schmitt 
believed “the political” contained a significant part of his state theory already.
2
 But Schmitt’s 
state theory is not exhausted by the political. Schmitt believes a defining characteristic of the 20
th
 
century state is that the political has become independent from the state – and this is a massive 
problem both for the state and for peace. Through his polemics against “indirect powers,” 
lamentations about political pluralism and factionalism, and panegyrics of Hobbes’ Leviathan 
and the state’s direct power, Schmitt clearly thought the state’s monopoly over the political 
should be restored. This chapter extrapolates Schmitt’s state and constitutional theory.  
                                                             
1 Carl Schmitt, "Un Giurista davanti a se stesso," in Carl Schmitt: Un Giurista davanti a se stesso, ed. Giorgio 
Agamben (Vicenza: Neri Pozza Editore, 2012), 156. 
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Some contemporary interpreters, such as Carlo Galli, have argued Schmitt had abandoned the 
state.
3
 Christoph Schönberger argues instead that there is a tension in Schmitt’s thought. Some of 
his later works, such as The Partisan and his writings dealing with Großräume do suggest that he 
believed the state was dead.
4
 Yet Schmitt continued to return to the theme of the state and, 
although he acknowledges it is in crisis, he has difficulty completely turning his back on it.
5
 And 
while Schmitt never wrote anything resembling a traditional German Staatslehre, it would be a 
mistake to conclude he had no state theory. One can be extrapolated from his writings. Alongside 
his work on the political are fragments of his theory of the qualitatively total state. Schmitt uses 
Hobbes’ state theory extensively to develop his own understanding of the state and the status 
naturalis. Eric Voegelin argues Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory shows there is an intimate 
relationship between state and constitution.
6
 Schmitt’s constitutional theory provides an essential 
component of his state theory.
7
 Moreover, Schmitt began his Constitutional Theory as his 
attempt at an Allgemeine Staatslehre (in conjunction with his 1926 article “Absolutismus”).
8
 
Finally, commentators have noted that, “like Hobbes, Schmitt’s entire intellectual production 
was marked by a radical defense of the state.”
9
 This all suggests that Schmitt indeed provided 
ample material to extrapolate his state theory. 
However, few authors have approached Schmitt’s state theory head on. The most conspicuous 
absence lies in a thorough study of Schmitt’s relationship with Hobbes, whom he considered to 
                                                             
3 Carlo Galli, La Genealogia della Politica: Carl Schmitt E La Crisi Del Pensiero Politico Moderno  (Bologna: Il Mulino, 
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Loewenstein: From Public Law to Political Science," in German Scholars in Exile: New Studies in Intellectual History, 
ed. Axel Fair-Schulz and Mario Kessler (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 25. 
8
 Carl Schmitt and Ludwig Feuchtwanger, Briefwechsel 1918-1935  (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2007), 123. Schmitt 
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contribution was his article “Absolutismus” (1926); the Allgemeine Staatslehre became his Verfassungslehre (1928). 
9 Renato Cristi, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy  (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press, 1998), 4; cf. Helmut Rumpf, Carl Schmitt und Thomas Hobbes: Ideelle Beziehungen und aktuelle Bedeutung 
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be his 17
th
 century forerunner and his teacher, brother, and friend.
10
 While Schmitt considered 
this to be the case because both were concerned first and foremost with the problem of civil war 
and its relationship to the state and political order, scholars writing on Hobbes and Schmitt have 
tended to focus on peripheral questions and issues. Examples include: Does Hobbes’ 
individualism lead to the “fissure” Schmitt describes?
11
; Does Hobbes share Schmitt’s other 
concerns, such as the enemy?
12
; What is the role of potentia (a concept Schmitt never used) in 
Hobbes and Schmitt’s political theories?
13
; and finally, a rebottling of the well-known argument 
that his 1938 Leviathan was an esoteric critique of the Third Reich.
14
 In addition, there is also 
Springborg’s confused argument that Schmitt hoped to steer the Third Reich toward Catholicism 
but did not realize Hobbes’ goal was to contain religious sectarianism with his Leviathan.
15
 She 
seems to be totally unaware that Schmitt devoted so much of his time discussing the dangers of 
indirect powers, especially the Catholic Church, present to political order.  
Aside from these approaches, scholarship in English has largely overlooked the core of Schmitt’s 
interest in Hobbes and what he took away from Hobbes – with the exceptions of John 
McCormick and Duncan Kelly.
16
 They rightly describe how Schmitt was interested in Hobbes 
above all for how he dealt with civil war (and what Hobbes’ theory about Confessional Civil 
War’s meant for its “20
th
 century equivalent,” modern mass democracy) and his “pessimistic” 
philosophical anthropology.  
McCormick focuses on the relationship between Schmitt’s philosophical anthropology and his 
state theory. In particular, he look at how Schmitt follows Hobbes in characterizing “fear” as the 
central means to overcome humans’ inherent “evil” and change their relationship from homo 
homini lupus [man a wolf to man] to homo homini homo [man a man to man], i.e. from the state 
of nature to the civil state.
17
 McCormick rightly argues that Schmitt believes the state’s 
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overwhelming power “corrects” its constituents’ innate evil and this power, insofar as it is able to 
serve as their “protector,” entitling the state to their obedience.
18
 
But McCormick’s interpretation starts to unravel when he limits himself only to Schmitt’s 
reading of Hobbes’ state as a mechanical apparatus or a product of an “age of technology.” 
Based on this reading, McCormick goes on to argue that Schmitt “might have paid better 
attention” to the other facets of Hobbes’ myth of the state, particularly how it is more than 
machine – a great man and a mortal god.
19
 In McCormick’s reading, then, Schmitt’s state theory 
ends up looking exactly like what McCormick rightly argues Schmitt intended to criticize: a 
purely mechanical quid pro quo exchange of physical protection for obedience – obedience, he 
argues, to whatever (positive) law happens to be produced by the state.
20
 He goes on to argue 
that Schmitt’s oversight leads him to aestheticize violence. McCormick then argues that “if a 
state is purely mechanical, if no value inheres within it other than efficiency, then that state 
knows no boundaries or limits – not even that which is theoretically restrained in the Hobbesian 
state: the protection of individual life.”
21
 He believes that this is because Schmitt had no answer 
to the question of “what is to keep the [state] from being a force of indiscriminate domination 
instead of objective neutrality.”
22
 For McCormick, Schmitt’s state is purely mechanical and 
incapable of generating any meaning in the lives of its constituents. 
McCormick’s interpretation unravels because he does not incorporate all of Schmitt’s arguments, 
arguments that would address the objections he raises against Schmitt. For example, as will be 
shown, Schmitt does not believe Hobbes’ state was strictly mechanical. He writes Hobbes based 
his state on a richer “myth,” the same one McCormick wishes Schmitt had “paid better attention 
to.” Schmitt is alarmed that Hobbes’ myth has subsequently become impoverished and reduced 
to just its mechanical aspect by subsequent generations through the same process of 
disenchantment that looms in the background of all of Schmitt’s work. The loss of the “mortal 
god” and the “giant man” images of the state – those images that make it more than just an 
institution of positive law, of indiscriminate domination, and mere mechanical protection and 
obedience – are precisely what Schmitt laments having been disenchanted.
23
 McCormick’s 
criticism of Schmitt turns out to echo Schmitt’s own criticism of the 20
th
 century state! And 
Schmitt has far more to say about this richer “myth” than McCormick lets on.  
Duncan Kelly, although he does not really delve into the relationship between Schmitt and 
Hobbes, does engage with Schmitt’s state theory, in part through the lens of McCormick’s 
analysis. Kelly accuses Schmitt of constructing a tautological state theory: “the state is political 
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unity is the state.”
24
 As argued in the last chapter, this is actually the opposite of Schmitt’s theory: 
the crisis of the 20
th
 century state was that the political had been totally unhinged from the state. 
Its independence undermined the state’s authority and legitimacy and led to civil war. While 
Schmitt sought to reunite them, arguing the state should have a monopoly over the political, the 
state and the political were not identical.  
Kelly, like McCormick, correctly points to the role Schmitt’s philosophical anthropology plays 
in his state theory. The human propensity for “evil,” which “makes man dangerous,” is the 
source of instability and conflict within the state.
25
 It is also the reason why the state is necessary 
in the first place. But, like McCormick, the relationship of “evil” to the state of nature remains at 
best implicit in Kelly’s account.
26
 Kelly does not go beyond a “negative” critique of human 
anthropology and concludes that Schmitt’s response to evil lay in his interpretation of Hobbes’ 
state as a mechanical myth – a conclusion he inherits from McCormick.
27
  
The first section of this chapter shows Schmitt’s interpretation of Hobbes is richer than the above 
interpretations allow. After a brief discussion of Schmitt’s qualitatively total state and positive or 
active neutrality, it proceeds to develop his state theory in the context of his work on Hobbes. It 
looks at the meaning of anthropological “evil,” moving beyond Kelly and McCormick. Finally, it 
turns to Schmitt’s interpretation of Hobbes’ Leviathan and argues that it is far more complicated 
than a merely mechanical state. The second section looks at the relationship between constitution 
and state, discussing how the content of Schmitt’s state is filled by the values laid out in the 
Positive articulation of the Absolute Constitution – and how this link serves as the way point for 
the constitution of the relativizing status of a community. It also discusses how the 
“Relativization” of the Constitution, caused by disenchantment and positivism, are the 
constitutional reflection of the problem of mass democracy as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Finally, this chapter discusses how the concept representation plugs into Schmitt’s state theory. 
A big deal has been made of the relationship between Schmitt’s theory of dictatorship and his 
well-known arguments about the Reichspräsident and Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. 
Scholars have drawn attention to the fact that commissarial authority and sovereign power are 
not easily separated – and Schmitt was naïve to believe his approach could contain problems of 
instability and civil chaos like Weimar’s.
28
 Others go further and argue that Schmitt’s arguments 
are proof of his proto-fascism and he intended to seize legal possibilities to instate a plebiscitary 
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dictatorship.
29
 Those who do go further are right to draw attention to the problems in attempting 
to delimit commissarial from sovereign dictatorship. Nonetheless, there is a fine line between 
these two claims. This chapter argues that Schmitt did not aim at establishing a sovereign 
dictatorship. Instead, consistent with the last chapter’s discussion of representation, he sought a 
“defender” of the constitution. Schmitt sought a representative of the constitution in effect, of an 
imperium rationis over and against the irrationalism of modern mass democracy.  
 
1. Above and Below: The Great Man and Technical Perfection 
Schmitt’s most esoteric book analyzes the meaning of “Leviathan” in Hobbes’ state theory. 
While Schmitt’s interpretation may be important for Hobbes scholarship,
30
 this book is 
invaluable for interpreting Schmitt himself. He devoted a “lifetime” of study to Hobbes,
31
 and 
held a bizarre intellectual kinship with him. Schmitt concludes the book crying out in 
exasperation “non jam frustra doces, Thomas Hobbes,” suggesting that Schmitt, at least, has 
correctly received Hobbes’ wisdom.
32
 What did Schmitt think Hobbes’ state theory had to offer, 
were it only properly understood? In particular, what did he think Hobbes had to say about quis 
judicabit?, modern mass democracy’s tendency to produce plurality of total movements, and the 
requirement of a relativizing status?  
a. Qualitative Totality: Positive Neutralization and Depoliticization  
Chapter 3 discussed how Schmitt described the 20
th
 century state as “quantitatively” total. It was 
total “out of volume” and lacked any common end or values. Chapter 3 discussed it is clear that 
this absent end was a shared neutralizing status, which would lead to “friendship” among its 
citizens. Recognizing at least implicitly the weakness of the “passively neutral state,” movements 
jockeyed for control over it, especially parliament wherein they might legislate their particular 
values and dominate the other movements. But Schmitt’s point is that a movement obtaining 51% 
of parliamentary seats may nevertheless be illegitimate if its core existential status was inimical 
                                                             
29 William E. Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law  (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 1999), 30-
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to the other 49%.
33
 For this reason, Schmitt argued states modeled on 19
th
 century ideals could 





Schmitt writes a “genuine” state needed to be qualitatively total. But he was not entirely clear 
what qualitative totality meant. It is a negation of the problems associated with a quantitatively 
total state. So, in a qualitatively total state, state and society would be distinct.
35
 Society would 
be depoliticized. But the qualitatively total state would not merely be a state in which one total 
party or movement triumphed decisively in the struggle for control of the state.
36
 This would 
merely reproduce the legitimation deficit of the quantitative total state, only without the 
pluralism or compromises with existential reservations. Instead, the qualitatively total state is the 
continuity of “the political” with the state, loosely defined as an association cont iguous with 
some territory with sovereign power, so that state institutions would serve as a defender and 
actualizer of its relativizing “political” status. This much can be inferred from how Schmitt 
introduces The Concept of the Political: it was fine to equate state and political before the 
quantitatively total state emerged, before state and society fused, when the state had a monopoly 
over the political and neutralized important non-state domains.
37
 The qualitatively total state 
would, then, be an “active” neutralizer; by maintaining and dynamically integrating its political 
status, the state would prevent other statuses or identities in society from politicizing and 
reducing the civil state to a natural state.
38
  
With a clear determination of its political status, Schmitt believes the state would have a definite 
mandate of when it could legitimately intervene in society and when an intervention would be a 
violation of its authority.
 
Following this logic, Scheuerman summarizes Schmitt’s argument, 
saying a state is qualitative when “the scope of state authority is of secondary importance to the 
effectiveness and coherence of state activity.”
39
 Clarity in politicization is an essential aspect of 
Schmitt’s theory of the qualitatively total state.
40
 It allows for a corresponding clarity in 
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depoliticization.
41
 The state’s role would be limited to determining how to concretize its core 
political status. As the legitimate representative of that status, the state would have the auctoritas 
interpositio to determine the concrete meaning of that status – but nothing further. 
Schmitt envisaged a corresponding withdrawal of the state from those domains of society that 
fall outside that relativizing status.
42
 Non-politicized spheres would, in effect, be liberalized.
43
 
And the state’s political disinterest in those spheres would constitute it as a different sort of 
authority, categorically distinct from an auctoritas interpositio. Schmitt theorizes the state as a 
neutral authority in these cases. This authority would be valid for mediating relativized societal 
conflicts – like a judge in private law. Under the overarching political status, societal conflicts 
remain between friends; the state – embodying that relativizing status – mediates those conflicts 
authoritatively. As long as the state remains disinterested in depoliticized spheres, even those 
who “lose out” in its decisions will nonetheless accept them as legitimate.  
For its role in society, Schmitt conceptually distinguishes “active” neutrality, arising from the 
qualitatively total state with a monopoly over the political, from the “passive” neutrality of the 
current quantitatively total state. Schmitt breaks active neutrality down into four types44: 
1. Neutrality in the sense of objectivity and impartiality [Sachlichkeit] on the basis 
of a recognized norm. 
This is the neutrality of the judge insofar as he decides on the basis of a recognized 
law [Gesetzes] whose contents are determinable. The tie to the law allows the judge 
to have both objectivity and relative autonomy from other aspects of the will of the 
state (i.e. when it is expressed through means besides statutory regulation); this 
neutrality indeed comes to a decision, just not a political decision.  
2. Neutrality on the basis of unegoistic-uninterested expertise [Sachkunde]. 
This is the neutrality of the expert evaluator and counselor, the expert observer, 
insofar as it is an not an interested representative or exponent of the pluralistic system, 
this neutrality is based on the authority of the mediator and conciliator (unless it falls 
under the third type). 
3. Neutrality as an expression of the unity and totality that incorporates all 
opposed groups, and therefore the unity and totality that relativizes all 
oppositions within itself. 
This is the neutrality of the statal decision on domestic political oppositions, against 
the fragmentation and division of the state into political parties and particular 
interests, if the decision brings the interest of the state’s totality to bear. 
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4. Neutrality of the foreigner, standing completely outside an issue, who if 
necessary effects the decision and therefore unity from without as a third party. 
This is the objectivity of the protector opposed to its protectorate state and its 
domestic political oppositions, of the conqueror towards the various groups in a 
colony of the British towards Hindus and Muslims in India, of Pilate (quid est 
veritas?) toward the religious controversies of the Jews. 
Close examination reveals Schmitt really only distinguishes two types of neutrality here: 
“neutrality” as relativizing societal oppositions (3) and neutrality as impartiality toward societal 
oppositions (1, 2, and 4). (3) is when the state operates as a political entity, relativizing and 
depoliticizing all other oppositions. The other three types are when the state operates as 
disinterested mediator of those neutralized social conflicts. Most importantly, this type of 
neutrality satisfies the juridical constraint of nemo judex in causa sua. Schmitt’s apparent 
obfuscation of “neutrality” is not accidental. By establishing the political and focusing the state’s 
interest strictly in that, he believes the state will appear in non-political spheres as a legitimate 
“agnostic” authority because it will be disinterested in the outcome.
45
 
These two types of neutrality describe where the state’s disinterest toward the ends and values of 
its constituents begin and end. Schmitt argues the qualitatively total state lacks total disinterest as 
to which political parties and groups participate within it. It establishes the boundary between 
society and the political. Equal chance extends only to parties and movements whose ends 
cohere with the state’s political status.
46
 This state does not tolerate movements existentially 
opposed to its relativizing status because that political status defines the substantive rationality of 
the state itself. Schmitt thus denies that the state is a mere technical apparatus to be 
instrumentalized by whichever group happens to gain control over it at a given moment.  
b. Machina Machinarum: Protection and Obedience in Schmitt’s State Theory 
Schmitt saw himself as the 20
th
 century Hobbes. He believed they both confronted the same 
problem of the decay of state authority and the eruption of the state of nature due to ideologically 
driven internal domestic conflict. Unlike in the 17
th
 century, however, these problems were no 
longer religious conflicts. They were driven by a different sort of “theology.” Nevertheless, 
Schmitt believed the near state of nature modern mass democracy was creating in Weimar had 
important parallels to problem Hobbes tackled. Thus, to best overcome 20
th
 century cases of the 
breakdown of the state and the emergence of civil war, Schmitt looked back at how Hobbes dealt 
with the problem of factionalism and dogmatic conflict and to what extent his solutions could be 
updated to solve the crises of the 20
th
 century state. 
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Schmitt believes that, nearly four centuries after Hobbes first published Leviathan, we retain 
only half of his mythical “totality”: the ‘machine of machines’ and the ‘giant animal.’
47
 But the 
two more important facets of his Leviathan myth, giant man and mortal god, had entirely 
disappeared from state theory.
48
 The image of Leviathan as a giant animal applies only in 
international relations, where the state is conceived as an irrational elementary force.
49
 “Beyond 
the line,” across borders, one only encounters “werewolves.”
50
 Only within a state’s borders 
could “man” be civilized. Schmitt argued that domestically the state is conceived of only as a 
mechanical or technical instrument, by which he meant it merely executes whatever commands 
were fed into it. The state has been “positivized,” reduced to an instrument of positive law. And, 
pace thinkers like McCormick and Kelly who believe this was his ideal, Schmitt believed 
Hobbes’ myth “ran aground” when it became incapable of containing the state of nature, i.e. 
when it came to be understood only in technical, mechanical terms. Schmitt argues that Hobbes’ 
Leviathan ran aground because it had too been disenchanted. 
Although he objects to the totalization of this image of the mechanical state, Schmitt argues it is 
a vital aspect of Hobbes’ state theory. Schmitt writes Hobbes’ state theory is tied to his 
                                                             
47 Schmitt’s interpretation of Hobbes evolved over the course of his life. His early reading of Hobbes is that of a 
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reading [Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship: From the Origin of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class 
Struggle, trans. Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (London: Polity, 2013), 16-19, 79ff. 113.] on the core question of 
how Hobbes theorized scientific or “relativized” natural law [wissenchaftlichen Naturrecht], which was concerned 
not with the content of the decision but the fact of having one at all. Hobbes was not a positivist like Kelsen was. 
What remained consistent throughout Schmitt’s life was Hobbes’ philosophical anthropology: because man is “evil,” 
which means humans succumb to the force of drives, impulses, and passions instead of being guided by reason, we 
stand in need of a rational force to compel us to reason. In moments of clarity, so speak, this “spark of reason” 
flashes and we recognize the necessity of being subjected to the dictates of reason. But this spark of reason is 
insufficient in itself to overcome our passions and we cannot organize ourselves on our own. The state is necessary 
because it overcomes individual interpretation of good and evil – the root of all evil – providing a fixed reference 
point in an otherwise amorphous and flowing world. 
48 Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Hobbes, 19, 62. 
49 Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Hobbes, 49-50. 
50 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, trans. G.L. Ulmen 
(New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2003), 95-97. 
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appropriation of Cartesian metaphysics and anthropology: Hobbes conceived of the state’s 
institutions as a giant body and its “sovereign representative person” as its soul, which (invoking 
Campanella’s Platonic metaphor), intent on the body, “pilots” the state.
51
 As a mechanical entity, 
the state’s meaning resides in its technical, material perfection. This means the state neither 
offers nor defends any substantive right and becomes nothing more than an instrument in the 
hands of its pilot.
52
 This mechanical image was, according to Schmitt, indeed intended to depict 
the state as a thoughtless enforcement mechanism, which merely executed its legal commands. It 
conveyed formalized law’s qualities of predictability and calculability as well as the neutrality of 
the state itself. Aside from blindly executing commands, the essence of the mechanical state is 
the maxim protego ergo obligo. Schmitt calls this “I protect therefore I oblige” the cogito ergo 
sum of the state.
53
 The most elementary basis for legitimate any state action is that, at minimum, 
the state guarantees its constituents material security in exchange for their obedience.
54
 
Otherwise, its constituents would have no reason to contract into the state at all. Physical security 
is, then, the fundamental prerequisite of the state; without guaranteeing this most basic need, 
there could be “no form of order, no reasonable legitimacy or legality.”
55
  
By including the image of the state as a giant machine in his Leviathan myth, Schmitt argues, 
Hobbes provides a necessary condition for a legitimate state. But, Schmitt argues, mechanization 
was a necessary but insufficient condition. Total mechanization was never Hobbes’ intent.
56
 It 
came about because of an evolution in Ideas Hobbes did not foresee: the pervasiveness of the 
“mechanical” depiction of the world; the disenchantment of the world through our increasingly 
rationalized perception of it. Hobbes understood the state in far richer terms, Schmitt argued. His 
world was neither disenchanted nor rationalized. Schmitt believes that, precisely because of this 
process of disenchantment, because the “huge man” could not “prevail” in history, “the leviathan 
becomes nothing other than a huge machine, a gigantic mechanism in the service of ensuring the 
physical protection of those governed.”
57
 By the early 20
th
 century, the state had shifted to mere 
formal “legality.” For this reason, Schmitt draws on Cartesian anthropology again and describes 
the totally mechanized state as soulless.  
When the state becomes merely external, merely visible, and merely material, Schmitt argues its 
legitimacy erodes. This impoverished symbol “leaves nothing to remind people of a “huge man” 
and a god created by human reason. The leviathan assumes an inhuman or a subhuman 
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appearance…”
58
 And without a single authoritative “soul,” the mechanical state was “devoured” 
by a plurality of indirect powers.
59
 In fact, against what McCormick and Kelly argue, Schmitt 
underscores that a mere mechanism is incapable of any meaningful totality – that is, in the sense 
of the qualitatively total state – precisely because the state’s mechanical institutions must have 




 century, and not Hobbes at all, 
destroyed Leviathan “as magnus homo” by conceiving of it in increasingly rationalized terms.
61
 
This “philosophical connection” is the state’s transcendental tie to some metaphysical veritas. 
The loss of the state’s “personality” meant a loss of its representative qualities – which are 
crucial for the state’s role as the bridge spanning the chasm between facts and norms. Put in 
different terms, Schmitt argues that the disenchanted Rechtsstaat lost its orientation to relative 
truth and right.
62
 It became identical with positive law.
63
  
And without a link to some political status and value, the state became a substantively irrational, 
instrumentally rationalized instrument that served whatever and whoever happened to pilot it at a 
given moment.
64
 The divorce of substance and procedure meant its pilot could “legitimately” do 
whatever he or she desired with the state – there was no criterion by which to distinguish 
legitimate from tyrannical rule. This reduction is how parliament became an arena for indirect 
powers to rule arbitrarily and apocryphally. Schmitt theorized that, in the absence of the direct 
power of the state, indirect powers appear that all compete for the hearts and minds of 
constituents without any regard for the worldly consequences of their actions – they are ethically 
irresponsible for this world because they are unconcerned with basic needs like security but 
instead only focus on their ideals.  
Schmitt believes the mechanical image of Hobbes’ Leviathan was intended to provide one 
important facet of a very complicated allegory of political legitimacy (Leviathan was a 
complexio oppositorium).
65
 Its reduction to just its mechanical facet undermined Leviathan 
altogether. The politically neutralizing power of the state was turned on itself.
66
 The 
disenchantment and rationalization of Hobbes’ Leviathan, the loss of the myth of the state as 
giant man and mortal god, Schmitt argues, was decisive. The state’s loss of the monopoly of the 
political led to the politicization of society and produced its legitimation crisis. As the 
mechanical state is passively neutral or quantitatively total, the lost images of the mortal god and 
the giant man corresponded to the ideals of active neutrality and the qualitatively total state. Thus, 
in order to restore the state today, Schmitt sought to restore those lost images. 
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c. Human “Evil,” Imperium Rationis, and The Mythical Totality of Leviathan 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Schmitt ultimately believes all political theologies can be reduced to a 
single dogma of anthropology faith: whether human nature is naturally good or evil.
67
 If human 
nature is fundamentally good, we can and will order ourselves naturally; the state is not only 
unnecessary but unjust, as it interferes with that natural goodness and interferes with peace. He 
argues this dogma is the basis for worldviews that are ultimately anarchistic. If, on the other hand, 
human nature is somehow fundamentally evil, we cannot and will not order ourselves naturally; 
the state is not only just but necessary, as some authority – no matter how minimal – is necessary. 
Schmitt says this dogma is the basis for worldviews that are ultimately authoritarian. He argues 
this latter dogma is the basis of all “genuine” political theory. Because political theory is a 
question of legitimate orders and institutions in human life, it is a question of how much and 




Schmitt’s point is to force his readers to decide on a simple underlying political question: is at 
least some government and authority, no matter how minimal, necessary for justice, however 
justice is conceived? Put differently, is there any legitimate authority beyond an individual’s 
immediate will? Schmitt seems to believe there are very few who would answer “no” to these 
questions, whom he argues are true anarchists.
69
 And he is not worried about them. He aims to 
show that, for those who do admit some authority is necessary, the state presupposes some 
underlying political status that draws a hard limit to total individual freedom and justifies its 
authority. Without that status and authority, there is a state of nature. I suspect that, ultimately, 
Schmitt’s goal was to convince “liberals” or “democrats” that even a liberal democratic state 
such as Weimar presupposed some underlying political status, no matter how minimal.
70
 In other 
words, he wants to force liberals and democrats to admit there are cases where the state had 
legitimate authority to constrain both individual right and popular sovereignty, especially cases 
were those very values were in jeopardy. An underlying aim of political theology, then, is to 
distinguish liberals and democrats from anarchists, metaphysically and politically. That is, 
Schmitt argues liberals and democrats ultimately hold “political” attitudes and recognize some 
degree of human “evil” and, in admitting this, they recognize the necessity of some minimal 
degree of state. In doing so, he believed he would have made the case for the legitimacy of the 
(re)union of the political and the state. 
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Kelly rightly argues Schmitt believes anthropological evil makes man “dangerous” and suggests 
that an individualized understanding of the political is the source of danger.
71
 But Kelly does not 
pursue this insight much further and we are left without a clear sense of what exactly is evil 
about human nature for Hobbes and Schmitt or what links evil and this dangerous individuated 
understanding of the political. 
Schmitt writes man’s unchecked animality, drives, and passions give rise to evil and that this is 
the fundamental law of political life.
72
 Strauss comments that good and evil are not moral or 
ethical categories for Schmitt. Neither is it a religious concept like original sin.
73
 To the contrary, 
it is naturae potentia, “the power of nature,” or the human tendency to be most responsive to 
drives, irrationality, and instincts.
74
 Why Schmitt believes passions, drives, and irrationality 
produce “evil” becomes clearer only in his 1963 Remarks to precisely this section of The 
Concept of the Political. There, Schmitt gives us just enough of a “hint” to flush out what he 
meant. He writes,  
Good or evil, in the sense of normal or fallen, is contextual for Hobbes: the state of (or 
better, condition of) nature is an abnormal situation. This abnormal situation is 
normalized first in the state, i.e. first attained through political unity. The state is a 
kingdom of reason [Reich der Vernunft] (this formula originates in Hobbes and is not first 
found in Hegel), an imperium rationis (De Cive 10 §1), which transforms civil war into 
the peaceful coexistence of citizens. The abnormal is the “fallen situation,” civil war. In 
civil war, no one can conduct themselves normally.
75
 
Anthropological pessimism presupposes the state is necessary to check drives and passions. The 
difference between good and evil in Schmitt’s binary anthropology would then be the classical 
philosophical contrast of reason and the passions: anarchism argues reason naturally triumphs, 
whereas “genuine” political theories are at least skeptical about reason’s chances. 
But Schmitt does not think the precise danger of human passion lies in a proclivity to violence or 
jealousy. While these are important problems, the great danger of the state of nature comes from 
a very different passion. Schmitt writes “[Hobbes] recognized correctly that the conviction of 
each side that it possesses the truth, the good, and the just bring about the worst enmities, finally 
the war of all against all.”
76
 Schmitt elaborates that “the worst confusion arises when concepts 
such as justice and freedom are used to legitimize one’s own political ambitions and to disqualify 
or demoralize the enemy,”
77
 a claim he reiterates in his discussion of the mechanical state.
78
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Combined with what he says about passion and political theology, it is clear that Schmitt 
believes Hobbes’ problem is individuals naturally perceive the world differently and decide on 
different forms of what is right when left to themselves. This is the problem of perspectivism, 
due to the hiatus irrationalis. We are motivated by injustice to rectify what is wrong and 
irreconcilable views result in the worst enmity. Thus, the fundamental cause of the state of nature 
is human passion for justice, combined with individuated “conscience-based” valuations, leading 
to their attempts to realize that justice in the world.  
In an intense passage from 1959, Schmitt writes, 
The purely subjective freedom of [individual] value-determination [Wertsetzung] leads to 
an eternal struggle of values and Weltanschauungen, a war of all with all, an eternal 
bellum omnium contra omnes, to which the old bellum omnium contra omnes and even 
the murderous state of nature of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes is truly 
idyllic in comparison. The old gods rise from their graves and fight their old battles once 
again, but disenchanted and – it should not be added, with new means in the struggle 
which are no longer mere weapons but terrifying means of annihilation and extermination, 
atrocious products of value-free science and the industrialism and technology serving it. 
What is for one the devil is for the other god. “And so it goes throughout all the orders of 
life…and indeed for all time”…It is always values that precipitate the conflict and sustain 
enmity. That the old gods have become disenchanted and become merely accepted values 
makes the conflict spectral and the antagonists hopelessly polemical. That is the 
nightmare Max Weber’s depiction presents to us.
79
 
Schmitt believes a totally neutralized state is incapable of holding back the state of nature. By 
becoming merely a protector of material life, the state lost its ability to limit or neutralize 
individual value-determinations. And with this loss, the state has no basis to reign in human 
passion and create a space for reason to rule. Schmitt’s critique of the mechanical state is that, by 
merely aiming to protect its constituents, it will be delegitimated as it is instrumentalized first by 
one Weltanschauung and then another, each movement coming to see the state as a merely a tool 
for domination. Such a state, Schmitt argues, has lost sight of Hobbes’ original purpose; it has 
lost the mythical qualitative totality of Hobbes’ Leviathan.  
Anthropological evil leads Schmitt to conclude the state needs to simultaneously satisfy both the 
demand for protection from insecurity and the representation of a decision on the political status 
of the community by which constituents can identify their friends and enemies. By placing the 
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axiom auctoritas non veritas facet legim equidistant from the poles of “transcendence” (above) 
and “needs” (below) in his Hobbes-Crystal, Schmitt strives to highlight how legitimate authority 
mediates and satisfies these two demands of human nature. In other words, reason dictates, for 
there to be any peace, there must be convergence on core existential commitments of what is 
right, which would serve as a basis for cooperation and allow other disagreements to be 
relativized. The failure to fulfill either pole of the Crystal is anathema to stability. In orienting 
his Hobbes-Crystal by these two poles, Schmitt seems to have a rather Hegelian reading of 
Hobbes. He suggests Hobbes beat Hegel to the punch on core issues of state theory. 
Schmitt argues that when Hobbes described Leviathan in terms of Descartes’ anthropology, the 
two attributes of body and soul mapped onto it.
80
 By spelling out the “mythical totality” of 
Hobbes’ Leviathan, he hoped to restore this relationship between body and soul, “below” and 
“above.” The mechanical image of Leviathan, discussed above, the only facet of Leviathan left 
today constituted this below; the body dominated by physical causality and material 
considerations reflects the scientistic and technical Weltanschauung of the 20
th
 century. But it 
gives no answer to the most important question, “which of the various orders and values ought 
the state to realize?” The body cannot survive without a soul.  
Unfortunately, Schmitt does not say much about Leviathan’s soul. Schmitt says that the “gist” of 
Hobbes’ state theory is that as a totality it is an ensouled mechanism, an intellect intent on the 
machine.
81
 This combination, Schmitt says, is Hobbes’ artificial person: the giant man [magnus 
homo] constructed by human reason.
82
 Yet, like a natural person, a Leviathan judges and 
interprets reality in light of its transcendent Idea and attempts to follow its normative 
prescriptions. Schmitt consistently understands the image of the huge man as the integration of 
the mechanical body and transcendental “soul.” It is a moral, public person.
83
  
Yet, Hobbes’ Leviathan is also a mortal god. But Schmitt does not clearly define what it means 
for Leviathan to be a mortal god. Schmitt sometimes equates the images of man and god.
84
 Other 
times, he attempts to pry the two apart. He suggests that the soul animating the mechanism is the 
sovereign-representative person.
85
 That this “one sovereign person [is] brought about by 
representation” can only be understood in the sense of Hobbes’ artificial representation.
86
 This 
sovereign-representative person holds absolute power, in a politicized Calvinistic theological 
conception of God, to realize his order on earth.
87
 The sovereign-representative person holds all 
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authority to interpret, standing at the center axis of Schmitt’s Hobbes-Crystal.
88
 From this 
position, it animates the mechanical body.
89
 Besides its absolute power and authority, it is 
godlike because it has no material existence. And it is godlike because it embodies some 
transcendental philosophical conception.
90
 It is mortal because the propensity to make subjective 
valuations and act upon them, to act upon one’s conscience, is inherent to human nature.
91
 The 
state of nature is never overcome, it is just held back. 




Schmitt argues that, for Hobbes, the myth of the commonwealth as huge man begins with Plato
93
 
and that Hobbes uses Plato’s magnus homo and Job’s magnus Leviathan interchangeably.
94
 Plato 
too aimed at establishing the rule of reason. Of course, Plato, unlike Hobbes and unlike Schmitt, 
believed that this meant a definite Idea or Form of “the Good.” Schmitt takes a substantial and 
important departure from this conception in his relativized idea of the political – following what 
he calls Hobbes’ “scientific natural law.” Nonetheless, once the empty space of the political is 
filled, Schmitt’s construction of the commonwealth begins to seem like Plato’s.  
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d. Potestas Directas: Reason and Transcendence 
The Leviathan in the State Theory of Hobbes was not the first time, however, that Schmitt 
discussed the state in the context of Plato and the actualization of the rule of reason. Schmitt 
makes similar claims, with no reference to Hobbes, in his Der Wert des Staates. Like with his 
claims about how Hobbes’ imperium rationis overcomes individuation in the state of nature, 
Schmitt argues that individual egoism is what upsets peace and justice in the world.
95
 Citing 
Kant, Fichte, and Plato, Schmitt argues it is a mistake to believe that freedom consists in 
arbitrary willing. Instead, it consists in the exercise of reason over passion. Because individual 
egoism undermines what is reasonable, the state, through the exercise of power, must serve to 
harmonize individuals’ ends so that those individuals can become the rational beings they 
actually are.
96
 Like in his later discussions of Hobbes, Schmitt argues that passion undermines 
peace, the state is necessary to rein passion in and realize political harmony.  
Also similarly to his arguments about the disenchantment of Leviathan, Schmitt warns of the 
consequences of arbitrary individual wills for order and peace, so too does he deny the state aims 
at mere procedural Gesetz.
97
 It is not merely an instrument of positive law here either. Schmitt 
argues the state’s role is to realize Recht in the world. Recht itself is an abstract Idea and cannot 
directly affect the world. He goes on to write,  
[the state] is derived from Recht and its essence seen in a particular relation to 
Recht…From the opposition of the norm and the real empirical world follows the 
position of the state as a bridge point from one world to another. In it, as a construction 
point, Recht as pure concept [Gedanke] turns into right as material phenomenon. The 
state is thus the legal entity [Rechtsgebilde], whose meaning consists solely in the 
task of realizing Recht, bringing about a condition [Zustand] in the external world, 
which as far as possible corresponds to the standards that can be deduced from juridical 
concepts [Rechtsgedanken] for the behavior of individuals and the realization 
[Einrichtung] of the external world.
98
 
The state does what Recht cannot do on its own: it makes Recht efficacious.
99
 The state is the 
bridge between Recht and facts, which overcomes the problem of individual passions and egoism 
in order to overcome the state of nature.
100
 In other words, given this hiatus, the state’s role is to 
restrain individual passions so there can be public peace and order. Schmitt does not seem to care 
what the content of Recht is. He just makes the second-order claim that there must be some order.  
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And Schmitt continuously makes this argument that the state is the sole bridge between facts and 
norms, from Der Wert des Staates (1914), to “Absolutismus” (1926) to The Concept of the 
Political (1928), to On the Three Types of Juristic Thought (1934) and The Leviathan in the State 
Theory of Hobbes (1938), to the Hinweise to The Concept of the Political (1963) to Political 
Theology II (1970). In all these texts, Schmitt draws limits on the state’s arbitrary exercise of 
power, particularly power authorized by democratic legitimation.  
Renato Cristi also noticed Schmitt’s interest in developing the link between the state and its 
normative roots. He writes, 
There was a metaphysical core to Schmitt’s thought whose vestiges were to be found in 
all his works. A metaphysical community linked the distinction between the juridical 
(Recht) and its realization in Der Wert des Staates, the distinction between the substance 
and the exercise of sovereignty in Die Diktatur, the notions of absolute constitution and 
constituent power in the Verfassungslehre, the concept of the political in The Concept of 
the Political, the concept of movement in Staat, Bewegung und Volk, and the meta-legal 




The metaphysical core Cristi refers to is the idea that meta-juridical principles serve as the basis 
for political and legal legitimacy. They buttress state institutions and serve to distinguish 
legitimate rule from tyranny.
102
 The state’s duty is to enforce the law whenever possible but 
simultaneously to legislate within those bounds of substantive legitimacy.
103
 When the state does 
so, it creates public order and security – but also a political status.
104
  
To successfully overcome the state of nature, Schmitt believes the state must also provide for the 
material interests of its constituents but it must also Represent a basic political status with which 
they can all Identify, so disagreements between them occur as social disagreements remain 
among “friends.” A state that successfully satisfies the dual demands of material security and 
rational order becomes a direct power,
105
 and thus a legitimate authority.  
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2. Constitution as a Political and Existential Phenomenon 
Although Schmitt does not specify any definite content of the relativizing status, he does argue 
law must be grounded in some substantive idea of justice. His Constitutional Theory argues the 
constitution codifies the state’s “soul,” and he formally defines what the constitution is, even if 
he offers no specific defense for a particular constitutional type. Cristoph Schönberger 
summarizes his definition: “Constitution [is] a people’s fundamental political decision [politische 
Grundentscheidung] about the nature of its political existence.”
106
 This definition of the 
constitution sounds nearly identical to how Schmitt defines the political.  
In the first four chapters of his Constitutional Theory, Schmitt outlines a typology of the concept 
“constitution” divided into four categories: Absolute, Relative, Positive, and Ideal.
107
 This 
section focuses on the Absolute and Relative as they are the conceptual antitheses in Schmitt’s 
typology; Positive and Ideal, although they play an important conceptual role, are ultimately 
derivative of the Absolute Constitution and opposed to the Relative Constitution.
108
   
a. Constitution as Status: The Absolute Constitution (Constitutional Theory §1) 
The first chapter of Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory, “§1. Absolute Concept of the Constitution,” 
is the most important in the book, if not the most important chapter Schmitt wrote. It is one of his 
most explicit descriptions about the core status of a political community. He argues a 
constitution is “Absolute” when “it expresses a (real or reflective) whole.”
109
 Discussing 
Schmitt’s theory, Forsthoff writes “naturally, the constitution is primarily a political and 
existential phenomenon… Only during normal times does the application of the constitution 
reduce to the application of constitutional laws.”
110
 Its conceptual antithesis (discussed below), 
the “Relative” Constitution, takes an individuated series of statutes as an aggregated whole and is 
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antithetical because that whole is merely the sum of its parts. The “Absolute” Constitution is 
greater than these component parts.  
Schmitt divides Absolute Constitution into two broad types (I or II), both subdivided again into 
three subtypes (1, 2, or 3), producing six distinct, yet related concepts of Absolute Constitution:  
 
Absolute Constitution overlaps substantially with Schmitt’s concept of the political. Both the 
political and the Absolute Constitution define the status or “collective condition” of the political 
community. They define its core existential interests, its most fundamental basis for unity, the 
reason why a group of distinct individuals would commune politically at all, and, citing Aristotle, 
its τέλος (in I.1 and II.1). The difference between I.1 and II.1 is subtle. Schmitt argues in I.1 that 
“state is constitution,” meaning it is a concrete or factual condition (that the political community 
does correspond to it).
111
 In II.1, he argues “constitution is the state,” by which he means it is a 
normative ideal (i.e. that the political community should approximate it).
112
  
The Absolute Constitution is the political soul and existential core of the community (I.1, II.1, 
II.2).
113
 As the existential core, both the political and the Absolute Constitution define the values 
without which the political community would cease to exist and therefore that must be preserved 
and defended at all costs.
114
 It provides the meta-juridical principles – corresponding to the idea 
of transcendence and veritas in Schmitt’s Hobbes-Crystal – which serve as the basis for 
determining the derivative values and laws of the community (II.1, II.2).
115
 When it actually 
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corresponds to those principles, that regime may accurately be described as one in which reason 
is sovereign and thus free of domination.
116
  
He also defines the Absolute Constitution as a dynamic institution that integrates concrete 
individuals into the community, so that they come to see its will as their own (I.3).
117
 Finally, 
both the Absolute Constitution and the political are the product of existential willing – a decision 
by a “will” (even the will of an abstraction, like the German people) for a specific type and form 
of existence (II.2).
118
 Schmitt writes this will is capable of clarifying the penumbral instances of 
jurisprudence by deciding legitimacy according to the legal system’s meta-juridical values.
119
  
While the overlap is substantial, there are also important differences between the political and 
the Absolute Constitution. The political has no necessary relationship to the state. Politicization 
can occur in substate political movements. Absolute Constitution, according to Schmitt, is 
precisely the opposite: it is the idea of state form and political order (I.2).
120
 It codifies the state’s 
ratio status. It also defines the state’s form: e.g. as monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, or status 
mixtus, which describes how “normal” politics occurs.
121
 Schmitt’s concern about state form is 
primarily about whether or not a state form is capable of governing in accord with the common 
good. Regarding democracy, he even cites Aristotle’s distinction between politea and democracy 
– only when the citizens express the volonté générale is the state a politea.
122
 In addition to 
articulating the state form, in II.3 Schmitt also defines the Absolute Constitution as a written 
positive legal codification of the political status, in the sense of I.1, II.1, and II.2.
123
 In its 
normative sense, however, this legal codification is linked to and informed by that meta-juridical 
status and cannot be understood apart from it. Schmitt writes this relationship is expressed by the 
non-legal aspects of the constitution, such as the preamble.
124
  
It is worth dwelling on the relationship between the political and Absolute Constitution with 
regard to the constitution as a Hegelian (or Heraclitian
125
) process of becoming – which Schmitt 
argues must include a process by which constituents come to see themselves as members of an 
abstract community and see its decisions as in their interests too. Schmitt is emphasizing the 
importance of civic education for “constituting” citizens. In raising this point, Schmitt suggests 
how the dilemma of representation and identity, discussed in the last chapter, can be navigated. 
His extremely conservative and authoritarian remarks about the effects of the media (especially 
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film and radio) on the masses from Chapter 3 make more sense when taken in conjunction with 
this idea of constitution as dynamically incorporating and an institution of “becoming.” He 
believes that constituents need to be actively incorporated into the state through political 
education to understand why the state is legitimate
126
 – how the actions of the rulers are 
legitimate because a ruler’s political identity is the same as that of the ruled. 
Despite some clear differences between the Absolute Constitution and the political, the 
similarities are remarkable. Above all else, the definition of both the political and Absolute 
Constitution (especially definition I.1) as “decisive status” – in the sense of determining the 
existential core of the political community – indicates the center of Schmitt’s focus. The 
constitution, in its robust Absolute sense, describes the political status that forms the community. 
In this way, the constitution is both “the political” as well as a blueprint for its 
institutionalization by the state.  
b. Constitution as Decision: The Positive Constitution (Constitutional Theory §3) 
Although it is conceptually distinct, the concept of Positive Constitution has strong affinities 
with (and, in Schmitt’s terms, “adheres to”) the concept of Absolute Constitution.
127
 Schmitt also 
distinguishes the Positive Constitution from constitutional law, with an eye to his concept of the 
Relative Constitution. The distinction between Absolute and Positive Constitution seems to be 
that the Absolute Constitution is a strictly formal discussion about the constitution as a principle 
of unity. Positive Constitution focuses on the Absolute Constitution when it has received its 
content.
128
 In other words, Schmitt theorizes the Positive Constitution is the determination of 
what the Absolute Constitution only discusses in formal terms. It is the “conscious decision” by a 
political unity for itself, for a concrete unified existence, which is made by an authority.
129
  
Positive Constitution seems to be linked to the Absolute Constitution through definition II.2: 
constitution as an act of will. Citing Spinoza, Schmitt argues whichever affective qualities define 
the core of this particular political existence are those values that must be preserved and gain the 
right to self-preservation.
130
 Self-preservation is a curious way to describe the maintenance of 
values. But, as the existential core, they take on qualities that can elevate their own existence, so 
that a living individual may willingly sacrifice himself for the sake of perpetuating that ideal.  
What distinguishes the Positive Constitution is that it is determined. It fills in explicitly what the 
Absolute Constitution considers only formally. The Positive Constitution is a decision. Turning 
to Weimar, Schmitt argues there are several decisions in its Positive Constitution. Weimar is (a.) 
a democracy; (b.) a republic; (c.) a federated state, with distinct Länder comprising it; (d.) 
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parliamentary-representative form; (e.) the bourgeois Rechtsstaat.
131
 These are all distinct 
political decisions. And, importantly, while they are not mutually exclusive, the Idea expressed 
by each does fundamentally contradict the others, meaning that cases may arise where a decision  
contradicts another, even if they can coexist peacefully for the most part. For example, he argues 
the decision for Federation contradicts the decision for republic; the bourgeois Rechtsstaat 
contradicts democracy. In fact, both of these contradictions would require a decision within four 
years of Schmitt's first writing about this tension. Schmitt also suggests that any constitution will 
have multiple potential decisions and that, in moments of crisis, a sovereign authority would 
have to clarify the community’s true existential-political “decision” by deciding which has 
priority. Thus, there are clear links between the political and the Positive Constitution.  
c. Constitution Politicized: The Ideal Constitution (Constitutional Theory §4) 
The Ideal Constitution complements the Positive Constitution. Schmitt writes that “for political 
reasons, that which is designated as a “true” or “genuine” constitution often only corresponds to 
a particular ideal of the constitution.”
132
 This definition follows on Schmitt’s argument that the 
Positive Constitution, absent an existential decision, devolves into “linguistic manipulation.”
133
 
“Idealization” of a constitution is the politicization of its core concepts. For example, Schmitt 
contrasts the Marxist/Bolshevist Ideal Constitution with the bourgeois Rechtsstaat – in the 
degree to which both hinge on the place of property rights, neither will recognize the other’s 
constitution as legitimate precisely because it does not correspond to the (normatively) Ideal 
Constitution. He argues that the Marxist/Bolshevist Constitution holds any constitution 
enshrining property rights to be illegitimate because they are the antithesis of its existential 
commitments. Thus, here, normative valuation creeps into the concept of constitution and turn it 
into a means of discrimination and exclusion – a means of distinguishing Friends and Enemies. 
The Ideal Constitution is the politicized version of whichever Absolute Constitution.  
When there is a lack of a relativizing status, terms that would otherwise be a point of consensus 
like “freedom, justice, public order, and security” become divisive and fragmenting as politicized 
movements read their particular interpretation of those concepts and citizens begin to see one 
another as enemies.
134
 The polemical power of language left to indirect powers concerns Schmitt 
because not only does it deepen political rifts but it offers no grounds for mediation; politicized 
concepts polarize discussion. When there is no friendship within a community, the formal 
language in the constitution becomes a part of a total movement’s rhetorical arsenal as they 
attempt to read it in terms of their particular Ideals. Schmitt’s concept of the Ideal Constitution 
then seems to be a concretized political and constitutional decision. 
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d. Constitution as Written Statute: The Relative Constitution (Constitutional Theory §2) 
In Schmitt’s state theory, the intersection of Absolute, Positive, and Ideal Constitution with “the 
political” presupposes that the state is qualitatively total, i.e. that the state has a monopoly over 
the political and is not beset by a plurality of total movements. Disenchantment and 
rationalization also impoverish the constitution; it becomes Relatived. Relativization is the loss 
of the written constitution’s meta-juridical roots. Relativization leaves only the material 
component of the constitution: individual positive constitutional laws and statutes.
135
 When the 
constitution is fully relativized, it means that only the written constitution is the constitution.
 136
 
As the relativized state is mechanized, the relativized constitution is positive law. The 
relativization of the constitution means eliminating all but the sixth sense from the above theory.  
Constitutional Relativization changes the meaning of “constitution” by eroding its status as 
higher law in two ways. First, Relativization is a process of formalization and equalization of the 
distinct components of a constitution, in which the status of any individual law in the material 
constitution becomes equivalent to every other individual law in the material constitution.
137
 As 
an example of this equalization, Schmitt points to how the constitutional status of Basic Rights 
becomes equal to the status of the right of a civil servant to the privacy of personal papers.
138
 Yet, 
for Schmitt, it would be difficult to conceive of a state existentially oriented by the goal of 
preserving civil servants’ rights to their papers. Conversely, liberal basic rights are normally an 
end of states today. Relativization annihilates this distinction. All 181 Articles of the Weimar 
Constitution were conceived of as equal constraints. And were a situation somehow to arise 
which necessitated violating Weimar’s Article 129,3 for the sake of preserving its Basic Rights, a 
Relativized Constitution could offer no legal justification to do so. The second way relativization 
alters the meaning and significance of constitution is by eroding what makes a constitution 
distinct from other law. The constitution ceases to have qualities that make it distinct from 
normal law, except for the fact that it is more difficult to change because of a super- or qualified 
majority procedure (if it is more difficult to change) and that, often times, constitutional law is 
written in a document called “constitution.”
139
 The Relative Constitution, according to Schmitt, 
is a disenchanted form of the historical and normatively meaningful (Absolute) Constitution. 
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Regarding whether super-majority protections of the constitution offer any meaningful difference 
to the constitution, both in terms of its status and in terms of defending it from illegit imate 
change, Schmitt writes that super-majority protections are constitutionally more stable than 
simple majority amendment procedures. But he thinks they are only marginally so. Both are 
ultimately “legitimate” only through mathematically arbitrariness. Neither has any relationship to 
substantive reason. He writes that, by confusing the “quality” of the status of the political 
community with the arbitrary “quantity” of whatever affect happens to inspire the greatest 
number of individuals at any given moment, this “half-measure” fails to achieve what it aims to: 
a definite principle that would stabilize the community and bring it out of the state of nature.
140
 
He argues that so-called qualified alterability fails to provide the stability, durability, and 
security to the constitution and political status that the constitution, by definition, should 
provide.
141
 Should a party deeply hostile to the liberal-democratic constitution manage to obtain 
a supermajority, so much for the constitution. Super-majority procedures cannot serve as the core 
principles of a constitution any more than a simple majority can.  
The immediate target of Schmitt’s critique of the Relative Constitution is juridical positivism. 
But his deeper concern is that, in divorcing the law from substance, Relativization paves the way 
for tyranny (of the majority, in modern mass democracies). He worries the Relative Constitution 
cannot serve as a source of unity because the document itself offers no clear hierarchy among the 
statutes it has.
142
 As all the individual statutes have equivalent value, the constitution defines no 
relativizing status but instead, at best, a plurality of statuses. As already discussed, a constitution 
can contain multiple decisions and, absent some hierarchical ranking, these decisions can 
become polemically opposed or even, in the case of a value-neutral democracy, abused. A 
Relative Constitution offers no guidance on the political status of a community and which values, 
while still existentially important, are subordinate to that status.  
Among other things, value-neutrality and equal chance as the basic decision of a community thus 
enable disingenuous parties, which is to say illiberal and antidemocratic parties hostile to that 
basic constitutional decision, to affect not only the quotidian operations of the state, but also its 
constitutional core. Should they obtain power, they can take advantage of the political premiums 
of the legal possession of state power.
143
 Beyond the capacity to create for itself a political 
surplus value through obéissance préalable for all laws and acts of state; management of the 
military, police and finance, administration and justice; distribution of national wealth, offices, 
employment and subsidies; and interpretation of the numerous new situations which arise 
constantly from rapid progress in science, technology and industry,
144
 this premium allowed 
those parties to stall and thwart effective governance in a crisis (such as the emergencies facing 
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Weimar) as well as to prevent other parties and movements from gaining a majority in 
parliament, kicking down the ladder to power that equal chance represents.
145
  
Schmitt does concede, though, that there is a sort of basic principle ordering the Relative 
Constitution. It is Equal Chance. As the fundamental decision of the constitution, equal chance 
institutionalizes democratic value-neutrality, or completely unqualified toleration. The state is 
neutral with regard to the content of the beliefs of any political party seeking office, “there are no 
unconstitutional goals” no matter how “revolutionary or reactionary, disruptive, hostile to the 
state.”
146
 The only basis for disqualification is when a party or movement obtains power through 
illegal means.
147
 To that end, all must have the opportunity to compete for the right to 
institutionalize their ideals. And, in fact, Schmitt argues precisely this: Article 76 – the 
possibility for infinite democratic qualified emendation of the constitution – has been accepted as 
the principled basis for the Weimar Constitution.
148
 According to this interpretation, the First 
Principle Part of the Weimar Constitution, which institutionalized democratic value-neutrality 
and the principle of equal chance, was the formal constitutional core of the entire Weimar 
Constitution. Thus, constitutional amendment procedures, like Article 76, institutionalize the 
principle of equal chance – the Relative Constitution – by guaranteeing the state and 
constitution's democratic openness to any revision. Yet, amendment principles can hardly 
constitute a political status – they merely organize the state’s constituted powers. 
Equal chance purports to serve as the democratic basis for the constitution but in practice, 
Schmitt argues, it ends up being unable to provide a basis for unity for two related reasons. The 
first is that it is actually contentless and merely procedural, tacitly legitimating whatever other 
set of values provides it with content at a given moment, and more importantly, because it 
ultimately capitulates to the numerically greatest will, it is suicidal, containing the basis for its 
self-annihilation in favor of very undemocratic principles. The Relativized Constitution in 
Schmitt’s depiction ends up as an extension of capriciousness legitimated by “democracy,” or 
whatever state form happens to prevail at that moment. Denouncing the legitimacy of a merely 
written constitution with an associated amendment procedure (itself open to emendation), 
Schmitt argues that “the idea of a written constitution must consistently adhere to the broader 
idea of a closed constitutional codification and to an absolute concept of the constitution.”
149
 In 
other words, a constitution must be based on some substantive reason and political status.  
Thus, in the 20
th
 century, Schmitt believes the Relativization of the constitution introduces two 
novel threats to the state: the tyranny of the majority and the state of nature. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, Schmitt argued that shifting majorities use their power to procedurally pass laws 
                                                             
145 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 155-156. 
146
 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 48-49. 
147 Otto Kirchheimer, "Legality and Legitimacy," in The Rule of Law under Siege, ed. William E. Scheuerman 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 52ff. 
148 Schmitt, Dictatorship, xxxiv(ff.). 
149 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 70. 
Leviathan Run Aground: Chapter 5 
Page | 169  
against one another and to guarantee the extension of their interests long after they have ceased 
to be a majority. He even writes a majority in parliament that lost power in recent elections might 
enact laws requiring a supermajority procedure to be changed to make them extremely difficult 
to annul, thereby crystallizing their rule even after they have been democratically ousted.
150
 
Supermajority procedures, he writes, only make this process more difficult – but have no 
relationship to reason or legitimacy.
151
 And Schmitt argues that, just because a supermajority 
buys into some constitutional revision, does not mean it is right or legitimate. And in an age of 
"psycho-technical" manipulation, the Relativized Constitution is particularly vulnerable to 
disingenuous manipulation by elite, indirect powers. Schmitt believes Relativization enables the 
constitution to become a tool for indirect powers to pursue their particular interests and to 
dominate the state. 
e. Nomos Basileus 
As argued in the last chapter, in 1934 Schmitt began to describe his ideas in terms of the 
suprapersonal rule of “concrete-order” in order to distance his concepts from the arbitrariness 
decisionism could imply. There, I showed how Schmitt argued nomos was Recht, by which he 
meant it “encompassed” a juridical order and political community by serving as its transcendent 
normative ideal.
152
 He argued legitimate political rule occurred to the degree to which a ruler 
represented the community’s “nomos.” Thus, in this work, Schmitt’s concept of nomos ends up 
sounding much like the political – it also sounds a lot like Hegel’s Sittlichkeit. Nomos provides 
the juridical ideal on which a political community is based and defines the terms of political and 
legal legitimacy. It is the normative standard against which both the state and individuals lives 
are measured and the end which they aim. Schmitt appears to use nomos as a device to repackage 
and reinvent his concept of the political and status. 
In that text, Schmitt introduced a concept that would become the defining concept of his 
international legal theory. While his 1950 The Nomos of the Earth is focused on international 
law, and thus somewhat peripheral to his state theory, one still finds within his concept nomos 
further iterations of his theories of the state, constitution, and the political. And it is worth 
drawing attention to the degree to which this overlap exists. 
Circling around the concept, Schmitt defines nomos in many distinct but overlapping ways. 
Nomos is constitutive of a political community.
153
 It is the relation of order and orientation.
154
 It 
is the original act from which law and the political, social, and religious order spring.
155
 It is the 
higher objective or “soul of the whole.”
156
 It is the foundation or foundational act.
157
 It is the 
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bracketing of the state of war or chaos, within which a state of peace or cosmos can exist.
158
 It is 
the antithesis of mere legality or mere compulsion through power – it is the source of the 
legitimacy of all law.
159
 It is impersonal in the sense that when a king rules according to the 
dictates of nomos, his decisions become more than merely acts of power or domination.
160
 It is 
the counter-concept to democracy.
161
 It is the origination of the commonwealth or Leviathan.
162
 
It determines the concrete nature of the relationship of protection and obedience.
163
 It is 
communal and public.
164
 It is the guarantee of an existential minimum for all.
165
 It is important to 
take away from this both how Schmitt sees nomos as uniting these different qualities and how 
nomos is a lost yet essential concept for modern jurisprudence.  
In so defining nomos, Schmitt begins to sound a bit like a broken record. He repeats arguments 
we already know, modified and repackaged under this new concept. Perhaps he does so in order 
to approach them differently. Perhaps it is in response to adapt to problems or failures the old 
ideas had suffered. Perhaps it was just a bid for new attention to his work. Or perhaps he 
believed a stronger basis to link his work on political and legal legitimacy into international law 
was by linking it to the authority of an older concept. 
Regardless of his motivations, the definitions of nomos he provides all point to what I have 
already been describing in this and the previous chapter. Constitution too is “soul.” Similarly, it 
is both the order and orientation (or telos) of the state and community. Constitution is 
“constitutive,” both of juridical order but also the community of friends. It, along with the 
political, is the existential basis for a community. The state achieved the bracketing of the state 
of nature, ceasing the bellum omnium contra omnes, and realized the civil status through its 
neutralization of all other authorities and truths. The political, too, seems to be all of these things. 
Above all, it is clear yet again that Schmitt’s foremost juridical goal is to define some terms of 
natural law or objective reason that can serve to rein in what he thought was the arbitrary, 
positivistic government of his day. Of particular importance here is again how Schmitt 
juxtaposes nomos with forms of government that ultimately rely on will (forms of both “–cracy” 
and “–archy”). For example, he argues both democracy and monarchy are problematic insofar as 
they are depart from the quasi-objective reason nomos provides. Nomos lacks the subjective, 
pathological element that especially democracy, through its plebiscites, has.  
Schmitt wanted to restore authority to the state, authority that would provide a basis to deny what 
he thought was the arbitrary rule of democratic majorities. Rule divorced from some form of 
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objective reason was dangerous and tended to cause politicized divisions that collapsed the state. 
Schmitt wanted to carve out a space for a form of reason that could preserve authority despite 
disenchantment. His use of concepts like Recht, the political, Absolute Constitution, nomos, or 
concrete order, all appear to be related facets of this one underlying theme, which bursts through 
Schmitt’s political and legal writings. Schmitt’s state theory is above all an attempt to restore the 
state as an authoritative sphere of objective reason that, despite the disenchantment of the world, 
can hold back the chaos of the state of nature and allow for meaningful peace and stability. 
 
3. Dictatorship: The Constitution and the Exception 
The concept of dictatorship is important for Schmitt’s state theory for three reasons. First, it is an 
essential aspect of the presidency. Second, it is a continuation of Schmitt’s analysis about the 
state, state of nature, and maintaining political community. And third, Schmitt conceives of 
dictatorship in the same rationalistic terms he does the rest of the state. In fact, he understands 
the dictator in essentially Platonic terms, as a (virtuous) agent capable of rationally guiding the 
state through exceptional circumstances. Dictatorship is a continuation of Schmitt’s theory of the 
state as the rule of reason. 
Yet Schmitt's theory of dictatorship is often regarded to be his most problematic contribution. 
Scheuerman argues Schmitt’s concepts of dictatorship and legal indeterminacy are closely 
linked.
166
 Scheuerman believes that, because of a tension in Schmitt’s thought, dictatorship can 
be read one of two ways. Either Schmitt makes a genuine attempt to analyze an institution that is 
necessary for the preservation and defense of republican states. Or, because indeterminacy 
actually pervades every legal syllogism, Schmitt instead abuses indeterminacy to mask a total 
deformalization of the law and arbitrary decisionism. That is, Schmitt subtly makes dictatorship 
into a permanent institution. Scheuerman argues Schmitt does the latter, writing that Schmitt’s 
1918 theory of dictatorship contained the seeds for his later embrace of fascism. Scheuerman 
adds that, despite Schmitt’s express assertions that dictatorship is not a despotic or tyrannical 
institution but one oriented toward restoring the legal order even if not by the formal rule of law, 
this too is a façade masking the dictator’s arbitrary rule.
167
 
McCormick seems to follow and build on Scheuerman’s conclusions to some extent. Like 
Scheuerman, he notes there is a tension in Schmitt’s concept of the dictator. But McCormick 
believes this tension results from a shift in Schmitt’s thought. In his 1921 Dictatorship, Schmitt 
analyzed dictatorship genuinely in the comparatively benign sense described above – as an 
institution necessary for the preservation and defense of republican states. But by 1923, when 
Political Theology was published, McCormick argues that Schmitt’s aims had shifted and he 
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now understood dictatorship very much in the pathological terms Scheuerman describes.
168
 And, 
also like Scheuerman, McCormick concludes that (setting aside his early stance in Dictatorship), 
Schmitt laid the groundwork for fascism with his arguments for dictatorship by 1923.
169
 
This section reexamines Schmitt’s concept of dictatorship. Schmitt’s discussion of dictatorship 
hinges on how parliament, the defense of the constitution, and democracy all changed in the 
transition from the 19
th
 to the 20
th
 century. Schmitt’s dictatorship hinges on, even as it anticipates, 
his theories of the Absolute Constitution and the political. This section argues against claims, 
like those by Scheuerman and McCormick, that Schmitt intended to use dictatorship to create a 
state of permanent exception or that his dictatorship contains the seeds of a fascist “leader” 
driven state. To the contrary, as discussed earlier, Schmitt was concerned not with instituting 
disorder and chaos but with normality. Dictatorship, he believed, was a necessary republican 
institution – not the means to drive the state into a permanent state of exception (i.e., lawless 
civil war). Dictatorship appears to positive legal theory to be irrational and illegitimate. But, 
when framed in terms of the Absolute Constitution dictatorship becomes normatively limited 
even as an emergency institution. 
a. Exceptional Order: Dictatorship as Defensor Pacis 
The original meaning of dictatorship, Schmitt writes, was being supplanted by concepts such as 
tyranny, despotism, Caesarism, Bonapartism, etc. – all of which connoted the illegitimacy and 
arbitrariness of the institution.
170
 To restore its original sense, he reconstructs the concept. 
i. 19th Century Metaphysics and the Rationalization of the Exception  
Originally, he argues, dictatorship was distinct from tyranny. It was an essential institution of 
classical republics (i.e. Rome and the Italian City-State Republics): they were normally governed 
according to the rule of law but its formal qualities at times required exceptions for the sake of 
either emergencies or equity.
171
 Dictatorship, while given wide latitude to act and freed from the 
constraints of law, was not an institution of arbitrary rule for its first 2000 years. By the 19
th
 
century, however, Schmitt thought it had become synonymous with despotism. Nevertheless, its 
original purpose – under different names – continued to be provided for in constitutions. 
Similarly to classical republican institutions, the nature of the liberal democratic Rechtsstaat 
presupposed the rule of law as the center of political order. And, again similarly, constitutional 
legislators foresaw the need for an institution capable of reacting to exceptions and maintaining a 
state beyond legality. In particular, Schmitt argues that in the 19
th
 century dictatorship evolved 
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into the (more rationalized) concept of “State of Siege” [Belagerungszustand], which assumed 
dictatorship’s purpose but (then) without its negative connotation.
172
 
Schmitt argues this conceptual shift came about when 19
th
 century state theorists attempted to 
rationalize or legally regulate all order, including what a dictator could do in emergencies.
173
 
Although the dictator may have fused the different branches of the state in emergencies, his 
ability to interfere in that state’s civil society was as constrained as it was for the executive 
branch in normal times. Here, as discussed already, Schmitt argues the Relative Constitution did 
successfully prevail and the restriction of the latitude of dictatorial authority was based on that 
success.
174
 He further concludes that the (relative) rationalization of the state of exception 
succeeded in the 19
th
 century because a decisive status had been realized by the state. He argues 
that the legal-rational formalization of the concept dictatorship succeeded because of the absence 
of an internal enemy opposed to the relativizing political status.  
Because of how the Relativize Constitution equates all laws in the (written) constitution, it 
renders dictatorship unconstitutional because the violation of any constitutional law is 
unconstitutional – there is no basis to determine whether the violation of a particular 
constitutional law for the sake of the whole is legitimate or not.
175
 A Relativized Constitution 
cannot tolerate dictatorship in its classical republican sense because there is no (positive) legal 
basis to distinguish the essential core of the constitution, in need of protection, from other 
constitutional laws. The original meaning and purpose of dictatorship is lost when every single 
constitutional law ends up having a greater value than the constitution as a whole. To complicate 
matters, Schmitt argues that, under a Relative Constitution, institutions with the extra-legal 
authority to act will become tyrannical – after a society has pluralized politically. Because there 
is no basis to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate violations of constitutional laws, 
disingenuous movements can rhetorically justify dictatorial acts at odds with the deeper 
substance but not the language of the written constitution as a series of individual laws.  
When approached through the Absolute Constitution, the institution of dictatorship appears 
differently, Schmitt argues. A violation of particular written laws in the constitution for the sake 
of its underlying meta-juridical principles can be legitimated, given a situation in which a 
decision between the two must be made. In other words, breaches of the Relative Constitution 
for the end [Zweck] of preserving the Absolute Constitution are justified – they just cannot be 
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done so according to positive law.
176
 The Absolute Constitution serves to order the written laws 
of the constitution, showing which have priority; which are violable or inviolable.  
Schmitt wants to revise our understanding of dictatorship:  
The constitution determines the fundamental organization of the state and decides what 
order is…it would be a dangerous misuse of the constitution to write into it every 
possible pet project as a basic right and quasi-basic right…The constitution says what the 
normal order in the state is. Its task and its value consist in deciding fundamentally what 
the public interest, public safety, and order are…It would be politically naïve and 
juristically false to employ an idyllic and vor-März concept of calm and security here 
through administrative legal notion developed for the legal limitation of political law and 
try to master dictatorship as something encompassing the state as a whole.
177
 
The rationalization of dictatorship works only as long as “powerful associations,” i.e. indirect 
powers, do not reemerge and seek to subvert the political status.
178
 Just as a Relatived 
Constitution becomes a subversive tool in the hands of irrational and factional movements 
erupting out of 20
th
 century society, rational-legal limitations on dictatorship render it too passive 
to respond adequately to these threats. Because of the broadened legal latitude for exploitation, a 
dictator needed correspondingly broader power to respond to potential threats.   
ii. The Ends of Dictatorship 
Schmitt understands dictatorship as legitimate when it suspends individual constitutional laws 
for the sake of the Absolute Constitution.
179
 He defined dictatorship as “the exercise of state 
power freed from legal constraints for the purpose [Zweck] of overcoming an abnormal state 
[abnormen Zustands], especially war and insurrection. Thus, decisive for the concept of 
dictatorship is first the idea of a normal state [normalen Zustands], which should be restored or 
brought about by the dictatorship, and furthermore the idea of certain legal constraints, which are 
abolished (suspended) in the interest of eliminating the abnormal state [abnormen Zustands].”
180
 
He describes it as a reactive concept responding to the “compellingness” of concrete 
circumstances.
181
 Concrete changes necessitate a concrete reaction.
182
 Dictatorship is a reaction 
to an emergency threatening the existential core of the constitutional order.
183
 
Most of Schmitt’s interpreters, including Scheuerman and McCormick, have drawn attention to 
how Schmitt juxtaposes abnormal and normal states, which serves to conceptually define the 
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ends or purpose of dictatorship.
184
 McCormick goes further and notes dictatorship’s “functional” 
or “technical” nature.
185
 But they stop short of drawing out the full implications of Schmitt’s 
claim: he conceives of dictatorship in terms of instrumental rationality, i.e. Weber’s 
Zweckrationalität. Instrumental rationality can be defined as purposive, useful, and calculating 
reasoning, which takes for granted (or does not question) whatever purpose or end it is given.
186
 
Over and over, Schmitt describes dictatorship in terms derivative of this concept.
187
  
As an instrumentally rational institution, Schmitt argues dictatorship is bound by the constraints 
of its predetermined ends [Zwecke]. In fact, the dictator too is an authority bound to its source – 
and it is not by accident that Schmitt describes the Papal origins of the modern concept of 
commissarial dictatorship in terms identical to how he describes the concept of representation in 
texts published before and after Dictatorship.
188
 The dictator is a representative institution, just 
one not bound by positive law.
189
 Its specific end is the restoration of “normal” order in which 
positive law can fulfill its function.
190
  
Schmitt argues that the commissar, out of which modern dictatorship emerged, was a precursor 
to the modern state, namely its rationalization of the political and legal administration. In other 
words, before bureaucracy could “congeal” into its modern rationalized form, a monarch relied 
on the relatively deformalized administration of commissars.
191
 The extra-juridical authority of 
the commissar was necessary because a formal or legal-rational system of law could not be 
maintained. The commissar’s fusion of powers was necessary to overcome the competing 
powers and antithetical goals of the feudal Stände. Once commissioners had sufficiently 
normalized order by creating a hierarchical administration and had weakened powers competing 
with the state, the state could rationalize further and assume something much closer to today’s 
bureaucratic division of labor.
192
 Schmitt argues the function and end of dictatorship must be 
understood in this historical development of the modern state: dictatorship and the system of 
commissars filled a legal void in which a more rationalized legal order could not exist.  
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Schmitt thus argues that the rationality of modern dictatorship is the implementation of legal 
order. Dictatorship creates the conditions in which Recht can exist at all.
193
 Another way Schmitt 
conceives of dictatorship is through the distinction of Recht and Rechtsverwirklichung [the 
implementation of law].
194
 For Schmitt, dictatorship is Rechtsverwirklichung.
195
 It is accordingly 
subject to Rechtsverwirklichungsnormen [the norms of the implementation of law], not 
Rechtsnormen.
196
 Here too, the legitimacy of dictatorship lies in its end of creating a space for 
Recht.
197
 But, anticipating his discussion of the Absolute Constitution, Schmitt argues even the 
law [Recht] is not an end in itself, “[it] is a means to an end, to the existence [Bestehen] of 
society.”
198
 Should the law be incapable of saving society, other means become legitimate, 
including the use of force. He writes there is a tacit reservation in law that allows its suspension 
for the sake of the public interest.
199
 Spinoza’s in suo esse perseverare sits in the background of 
Schmitt’s concept of dictatorship. Finally, Schmitt’s concept implies dictatorship is not so much 
a suspension of a legal order as a recognition that concrete affairs are already so abnormal that to 
continue attempting to enforce the normal order no longer makes sense.
200
 
iii. The Means of Dictatorship 
Although legal order and dictatorship have the same end, Schmitt argues they have different 
means and occur in different contexts. That context determines which is appropriate. Since 
dictatorship is an institution that reacts to the abnormality of legal order, its specific means must 
be appropriate to abnormality. Schmitt notes (following Machiavelli) that both the deliberative 
nature of the Rechtsstaat as well as the separation of powers create debilitating hurdles in 
abnormal states, when timing matters.
201
 Fusing powers into a non-deliberative institution is 
legitimated by the pending collapse of the constituted order itself. To that end, dictatorship is an 




1. Constitutional constraint and guarantees of basic liberties; dictatorship circumvents 
individual constitutional laws, including basic liberties, when they stand between the 
institution and its specific end (the preservation of the status). 
2. Parliamentary discussion and relative rationalism; dictatorship circumvents deliberation 
and relative rationalism in order 
3. Democracy and equal chance. 
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A dictator is free to choose the means appropriate to the restoration of the normal order but the 
dictator’s authority comes from the constitution. 
b. The Absence of Order: Dictatorship as Creator Pacis  
Schmitt theorized “commissarial” dictatorship as an institution essential for republics. He also 
theorized another type of dictatorship: “sovereign” dictatorship. The concerns about Schmitt’s 
dictatorship – that it is inherently expansive and ends up allowing for even an ostensibly 
commissarial dictator (such as the Reichspräsident) to exercise sovereign authority, including the 
power and, in a sense, the authority to substantially amend or abrogate a legally constituted order 
– stem from sovereign dictatorship.  
McCormick explicitly writes that “[sovereign dictatorship] becomes the power to perpetually 
suspend and change political order in the name of an inaccessible people and an eschatological 
notion of history.”
203
 Peter Caldwell argues that, in the democratic age, the sovereign dictator is 
the people freely and consciously constituting itself.
204
 Caldwell, McCormick, and Dyzenhaus 
interpret Schmitt’s sovereign dictator as being identical to the sovereign he theorized in Political 
Theology.
205
 While there is good reason to be concerned about the expansive potential of 
dictatorship, on closer examination Schmitt’s concept of sovereign dictatorship appears different 
from how it has been understood until now.  
i. The Persistence of Representation: Sovereign Dictatorship and the Commission 
Like its sister concept, Schmitt defines sovereign dictatorship as “the exercise of state power 
freed from legal constraints for the purpose [Zweck] of overcoming an abnormal state [abnormen 
Zustands], especially war and insurrection. Thus, decisive for the concept of dictatorship is first 
the idea of a normal state [normalen Zustands], which should be restored or brought about by the 
dictatorship, and furthermore the idea of certain legal constraints, which are abolished 
(suspended) in the interest of eliminating the abnormal state [abnormen Zustands].”
206
 Sovereign 
dictatorship is authorized when “the entire legal order [Rechtsordnung] is suspended 
[aufgehoben] and the dictator serves the purpose [Zweck] of bringing about an entirely new order 
[neue Ordnung].”
207
 Sovereign and Commissarial dictatorship share much. Both are 
instrumentally rational institutions oriented toward realizing legal order in its absence through 
the legally unconstrained use of power. But the initial definition offers the simple distinction 
between the two types of dictatorship: the commissarial dictator restores [wiederherstellt] the 
normal state whereas the sovereign dictator brings about [herbeiführt] a normal state in the first 
place. In both case, the dictator’s end of the creation of legal order hinges on the distinction of 
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Rechtverwirklichung from Recht.
208
 Sovereign dictatorship, too, is a reactive institution in 
Schmitt’s theory. 
Schmitt adds that sovereign dictatorship may be further subdivided. It can either follow a 
revolution or it can be revolutionary itself.
209
 In other words, either sovereign dictatorship only 
fills a void in order, which it did not itself generate. Or it first creates that void and then fills it. 
Of this latter type, Schmitt writes, “[it] can, however, also consist in when a revolutionary party 
– referring to the true will of the people – seizes state power for itself and exercises it, albeit 
provisionally, i.e. until the realization of the condition [Zustand] in which the people can freely 
exercise their will, but it admittedly decides itself on when this condition has arrived.”
210 Schmitt 
offers a historical example of both types of sovereign dictatorship.
211
 Non-revolutionary 
sovereign dictatorship is “the common case of the modern democratic state,” exemplified by the 
French National Assembly of 1848 and the Weimar National Assembly from 1919.
212
 The 
Bolshevik dictatorship of the proletariat exemplifies revolutionary sovereign dictatorship.
213
  
As noted, concerns like McCormick’s hinge on the role the “ex nihilo decision” plays in 
sovereign dictatorship and the propensity for commissarial dictatorship to take on this power.
214
 
From the identity of sovereignty and the sovereign dictator, plus the fuzzy line between 
sovereign and commissarial dictatorship, interpreters conclude Schmitt smuggled sovereign 
authority into his concept of dictatorship.  
But the sovereign dictator is not a sovereign in Schmitt’s theory. According to Schmitt, all 
dictatorships are commissioned. He theorizes the sovereign dictator too is a commissioned 
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institution – it is just not commissioned by the existing constitution. It is instead constituted by 
the sovereign. In a long passage worth quoting at length, Schmitt clarifies what this means: 
“In both cases [sovereign dictatorship, occurring either only after a revolution or before 
as a cause of that revolution], there exists [vorliegen] a commission of action 
[Aktionskommission] as in the commissarial dictatorship, and in both cases the concept 
remains functionally dependent on the idea of a rightful constitution – because even in 
the revolutionary dictatorship the constitution to be realized by that dictatorship is itself 
suspended, as is the ever present pouvoir constituant. But, while commissarial 
dictatorship is authorized by a constituted organ and is entitled by the existing 
constitution, sovereign dictatorship exists only quoad exercitium [in relation to what it 
does] and it is derived [abgeleitet] immediately [unmittelbar] from the formless pouvoir 
constituant. It is truly a commission…But because the external conditions have yet to be 
created in order for the constituent power of this same people to come into effect…the 
content of the constituting will, in itself problematic, is not actually available. 
Consequently this dictatorial power is sovereign, but only as a ‘transition [Übergang]’; 
and, because of its dependence on the task to be accomplished, this power is sovereign in 
a completely different sense from that in which the absolute monarch or a sovereign 
aristocracy can be said to be ‘sovereign.’ The commissary dictator is the unconditional 
commissar of action of a pouvoir constitué, and the sovereign dictator is the 
unconditional commission of action of a pouvoir constituant.”
215
 
According to Schmitt, whatever sovereignty a sovereign dictatorship can be said to have is 
completely different from that of a self-constituting “people.” Like commissarial dictatorship, 
sovereign dictatorship is subordinated to a definite idea of Recht. Sovereign dictatorship is, also 
similarly, an Aktionskommissar constrained by an end not set by itself in Schmitt’s theory. Both 
types of dictatorship are constituted powers. As an example of sovereign dictatorship, Schmitt 
provides the National Convention of 1792, which was merely an “extraordinary organ of the 
pouvoir constituant,” not the pouvoir constituant itself.  
The difference between commissarial dictatorship and sovereign dictatorship is not, then, that 
one is sovereign and the other is merely constituted. The difference is one of whether there is 
mediation between the dictator and the pouvoir constituant. For the sovereign dictator, the 
authorization chain proceeds “immediately”: pouvoir constituant  sovereign dictator; whereas 
for the commissarial dictator, authorization is mediated: pouvoir constituant  constitution  
commissarial dictator.
216
 Its authority emanates directly from the pouvoir constituant. For 
Schmitt, “the concept [dictatorship] always remains in a state of functional dependence on an 
existing or imagined constitution.”
217
 That imagined constitution is a legitimate status that 
simply has not yet been actualized. It is not, however, an arbitrary decision. And both the ends of 
both forms of dictatorship are determined by it. 
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Schmitt appeals to Sieyès definition of the pouvoir constituant as the “nation.” I have argued 
Schmitt understood the pouvoir constituant not as the nation per se, but whatever affective status 
serves as the existential basis for the political community (“the political”). Sieyès too 
emphasized that all organs of the state, including the representative of the will of the pouvoir 
constituant, are ultimately commissarial and bound to its will.
218
 And that the pouvoir 
constituant can manifest itself at any time because its power and its legitimacy are unlimited.
219
 
On the other hand, the power of the sovereign dictator (such as the 1919 Weimar National 
Assembly), is actually comparatively weak and rests entirely on whether “the people” accept its 
proposed decision. Put differently, the sovereign dictator qua dictator has legally unconstrained 
Macht, but qua sovereign it fuses it with the Recht it represents; it is sovereign for its authority to 
legislate, but a dictator because it is commissioned.
220
 But, Schmitt argues, not even sovereign 
dictatorship can be understood apart from the normative constraints of representation. 
ii. A Moment of Pure Decisionism? The Generative Paradox in the Decision 
But an open question in Schmitt’s account is whether the dependency of the sovereign dictator 
on the pouvoir constituant makes any difference. For example, Scheuerman worries that the 
sovereign dictator’s ex nihilo decision could be wrestled from the pouvoir constituant –the 
Reichspräsident, for example, could exercise true sovereignty and obliterate the constitution.
221
 
The problem, even for Sieyès, is that a pouvoir constituant is inherently unorganizable and 
cannot self-constitute.
222
 Could the sovereign dictator not simply impose a status? And, in that 
case, would not the sovereign dictator actually be the pouvoir constituant, supplanting the people? 
Chapter 4 discussed how Schmitt defines legitimate representation. He believes constituted 
power is bound to representation and may not simply decide ex nihilo. The problem of the 
sovereign decision and sovereign dictatorship is that now this decision does appear to be ex 
nihilo – and it is one made on behalf of the so-called pouvoir constituant. Kalyvas notes how the 
sovereign dictator is a delegated power and also that it is a constituting power
 223
 There thus 
appears to be a paradox in Schmitt’s account of sovereign dictatorship: how does power remain 
with the pouvoir constituant, despite its inability to self-organize? How can the sovereign 
dictator be both a delegated authority but also a constituting power? This seeming incoherence is 
Schmitt’s generative paradox of sovereign dictatorship. 
The sovereign power of the pouvoir constituant is merely negative power: it is the power to 
affirm or reject potential decisions presented to it. But Schmitt believes it generates a dialectic 
with the sovereign dictator, nonetheless. He argues that “even if the will of the people does not 
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exist in terms of content but is shaped primarily through representation, the representative’s 
dependence on this will – a dependence that is unconditional and, put succinctly, commissarial – 
persists. The will can be unclear. In fact, it is even the case that it must be unclear, if the pouvoir 
constituant is to be truly unconstitutable [unkonstituierbar].”
224
 Schmitt believes the pouvoir 
constituant, despite being unformed, still determines what legitimate representation is. The 
dialectic of pouvoir constituant and sovereign dictator is peculiar, then, in his account. The only 
way to make sense of this relationship is that “the people” does not exist politically, it lacks its 
decisive status, until the sovereign dictator first represents it. But “the people” holds all right of 
the determination of the legitimacy of any representation. Its omnipotence consists in its power 
to negate or reject a representation of itself. The representative represents some status of a people 
but that people may not embrace this representation. It may refuse it because there is no Identity 
between what is Represented and what individuals actually are. In this act of quasi-plebiscitary 
legitimation, the representative (as well as the people) is exposed to the possibility of failure. A 
people may be stillborn, so to speak.  
This process can be demystified with an example. The Weimar National Assembly did not 
succeed in creating the Weimar state because it was sovereign. It presented a constitution to the 
pouvoir constituant, which it believed best represented the status of the German people – the 
German people then acclaimed that representation.
225
 The 1919 Weimar National Assembly 
could have failed, however (and, actually, it almost did). Had it failed to present an acceptable 
decision to the German people, one could then conclude that the sovereign dictatorship of the 
1919 Weimar National Assembly had failed to represent the political status if the German people. 
“The generative paradox” of the commissioned sovereign dictator lies in the work that dictator 
undergoes to represent something that does not actually exist but a non-existent entity that still 
holds power over its acts. The people must authority the dictator’s representation to exist in the 
first place, but it does so “co-originally” with its birth. 
As he developed and refined his Constitutional Theory and became more interested in Hobbes, 
this generative paradox recurs through the dialectic of Identity and Representation. Schmitt 
writes, “The “contract” that produced the state is, however, only possible through a sovereign 
guarantee of the order thereby established and only through the state whose power just arose 
from this general consent. The sovereign is omnipotent through the consent he himself produced 
and made possible through the omnipotence and decision of the state.”
226
 Without some 
antecedent sovereign guarantee, the original contract would have to be founded on mutual trust 
and understanding, which are exactly the qualities individuals lack in the state of nature. Hobbes’ 
state is founded around the sovereign authority, but does not seem capable of overcoming the 
presuppositions of its generation – its logic undermines itself.
227
 In other words, a people must be 
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presupposed as existent already by the process through which it would be generated.
228
 Yet the 
people cannot be compelled by a Representation; they must Identify with it.
229
  
Here too, Schmitt suggests that “the people” always retains the status as the highest, legally 
independent, underived power and can deny or withdraw the authority of the representative 
through mob demonstration, action, and even violence.
230
 The sovereign-representative faces a 
high hurdle. The people is not yet determined. Even when it is determined, it remains intangible, 
an “as if” Ideal. The sovereign, pouvoir constituant itself resists rationalization and this is why it 
always remains invisible – sovereignty is inherently unrationalizable.
231
 The sovereign remains 
“invisible” until it actually exercises its capacity to decide through some definite act, acclaiming 
its existence and producing a pouvoir constitué.
232
 Yet the pouvoir constituant lurks in the 
background and can explode onto the scene whenever it feels compelled to.
233
 That is, political 
identity ultimately remains up to actual individuals who affectively feel or do not feel a real 
Identity with the Represented people, i.e. individuals are motivated by the sense of the “decisive 
status” of the unity.
234
 In this regard, Schmitt might appear to stand in the tradition of Locke, 
Paine, and other thinkers seeking to embed sovereignty and the constituent power within the 
people. But when one combines Schmitt’s discussion of the pouvoir constituant with his ideas of 
the political, regulative ideas, and his Platonic and Hegelian roots, Schmitt clearly stands in a 
different tradition.
235
 The people are not irrelevant in his account but they are hardly the most 
important matter in the construction of the commonwealth. The role of Schmitt’s sovereign 
dictator is to give voice to this formless and unorganized entity so that it may have a concrete, 
constituted, political existence. But the end of constitution, the end of the decision, is not the will 
of any people but the will of the “the people,” an invisible ideal. 
The last section had argued, following Kalyvas, that Schmitt separated sovereign decisions on 
the concretization of the political status from “ordinary,” institutionalized politics. But Kalyvas is 
mistaken to argue that in extraordinary states Schmitt somehow allows for a moment of radical 
democracy.
236
 Schmitt limits even extraordinary democracy to mere acclamation in order to 
deprive actually existing individuals of what he believes is an arbitrary power to decide. This 
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limitation is intentional in order to control public will formation and tame it as much as possible. 
Even in extraordinary states, Schmitt’s authoritarianism is present. The unformed constituting 
power must be represented by the sovereign representative person.
237
 But the people as the 
pouvoir constituant still retains this negative trump power to reject a sovereign dictator’s 
representation. The resolution to the generative paradox lies in this complicated relationship 
between representation and acclamation. 
iii. Who Decides on What? Hard and Soft Decisions 
Schmitt’s typology of dictatorship parallels his approach to the decision and indeterminacy itself. 
Two types of indeterminacy were raised earlier in Chapter 2 in the discussion of quis judicabit? 
First, there is the generative question: which Idea ought to be represented? This type of 
indeterminacy, requiring a decision, occurs in the state of nature, only in the absence of a state. 
Second, however, is how exactly a legitimate Idea ought to be concretized in cases where its 
concretization is indeterminate. It is a question of the representation of the political status in such 
a way so as to maintain the political order legitimately.  
Renato Cristi offers a way to think about indeterminacy and the decision, which Kalyvas picks 
up, arguing Schmitt has an implicit distinction between “hard” and “soft” decisions.
238
 A hard 
decision occurs in the state of nature in which no order at all can be said to exist.
239
 It decides on 
what Idea of order there ought to be and makes it efficacious. It represents the absolute 
beginning of a specific constitution.
240
 It is a decision for the Absolute Constitution or the 
relativizing status. Cristi notes how Hobbes was the first hard decisionist: he recognized that 
there was no longer a single Idea structuring European political order.
241
 The hard decision came 
about “because of the collapse of classical and Christian concepts of order.”
242
 The sovereign 
dictator is authorized by the pouvoir constituant to make hard decisions. It is the creator pacis 
for Schmitt – but only as representing the existential constitution that allows for real individuals 
within that state to identify with it and live together with one another in peace. The sovereign 
dictator’s acts bring about the decisive status and end political factionalism.
243
  
Cristi says less about the soft decision: it is “limited and encompassed by the idea of [an] 
order.”
244
 It can be assumed to lack the qualities of a hard decision because it does not mark a 
new beginning and does not occur in normative chaos. He adds that a soft decision occurs only 
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during a “temporary” return to the exceptionalism underlying a valid system of norms.
245
 Cristi 
is correct, although this last remark is misleading. The exception of the soft decision does not 
occur in the state of exception before a valid system of norms exists, but one that occurs within a 
still valid system of norms now requiring exceptional measures to persist. An emergency may 
demand an extra-legal response but it is not a question of constituting a new order. 
A soft decision occurs within a legitimate constituted order. Its indeterminacy is not existential 
but practical. Decision on how to concretize that order can be made by a specific constituted 
branch of government’s normal acts. But they may also be made through the emergency acts of a 
commissarial dictator. Both forms of concretization occur through constitutional authorization. 
Even when that constituted order experiences an emergency or an exception, it still continues to 
rest on and presuppose precisely that same meta-juridical Idea. Schmitt conceives of the 
commissarial sovereign in terms of this soft decision and, as such, it is merely a defensor pacis. 
Its decisions do occur in a state of exception. But this state is not identical to the state of nature 
in which there is no order whatsoever.   
c. Commissarial Dictatorship in Liberal Democracy 
Schmitt’s guardian (Hüter) of the constitution acts as a neutralizing agent as described in Section 
I.1. It attempts to remain impartial with regard to societal oppositions, operating as a pouvoir 
neutre. Should those societal oppositions politicize, the guardian’s duty is to take on a more 
active role and act to depoliticize them, for the sake of maintaining the state itself.
246
 The 
guardian of the constitution falls under this second type of decision: it is commissarial 
dictatorship. As Kalyvas has argued already, Schmitt did not theorize the Reichspräsident to be a 
permanent executive dictator – he intended it to preserve and guard the constitution.
247
  
i. Dual Forms of Representation 
Schmitt argues either parliament or the Reichspräsident could – theoretically – serve as 
Weimar’s guardian.
248
 Both were democratically legitimated, representative institutions.
249
 The 
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design of Weimar (but not its practice) exemplified this dual defense. Weimar’s parliament was 
designed to serve as the “definitive political leadership through [a parliamentary] majority” 
based on the Articles 50, 54, and 59 of its Constitution.
250
 This structure stemmed, in part, from 
the structure of the Chancellorship, which was designed to guide and lead parliament through 
Articles 53, 55, 56, and from the Cabinet, which was designed as a sort of an extension of the 
Chancellor through Articles 53, 54, 57, and 58. Together, the Chancellor and the Cabinet 
constituted the Reichsregierung. Schmitt argues that Weimar was designed so that its parliament 
would be the center of leadership and governance. That is, he thinks Weimar was designed 
according to 19
th
 century ideals, with parliament at the center of the state.  
In the 20
th
 century, the advance of democratic ideals led to other forms of democratic 
representation.
251
 Schmitt describes the president as another democratically legitimated branch of 
government. To continue to realize the Rechtsstaat ideal of the balance of power, the president 
was designed to counterbalance the power of parliament.
252
 And, Schmitt argued, Preuß applied 
this theory in constructing the Weimar Constitution. Through Article 41, the Reichspräsident 
was a democratically legitimated and accountable elected official. The Reichspräsident’s powers 
consisted in appointing the chancellor (and thus to affect normal legislation positively), 
dissolving the Reichstag (to affect normal legislation negatively), and initiating popular 
referendums (to legislate positively if indirectly) through Articles 25, 73, and 53.
253
 Besides 
these measures, the Reichspräsident had one other constitutional mechanism at his disposal: 
Article 48. Importantly, Schmitt stressed the presidential counter-representative would function 
autonomously only when parliament was dysfunctional – a stable, majority-controlled parliament 
would be able to effectively counterbalance the Reichspräsident’s checks on its power. 
But, given the actual concrete situation in Weimar, especially toward its end, where total 
movements had largely undermined parliament’s capacity to govern, it ceased making sense to 
speak of parliament as the guardian of the constitution. As argued in Chapter 3, Schmitt 
diagnosed Weimar’s core political problems as stemming from the eruption of politicized 
factionalism within civil society, which then infected parliamentary politics. Parliament reflected 
the various organized social powers and became a disharmonious plurality. And this was a 
problem because of the central role parliament was supposed to play. With the politicization of 
society infecting parliament, parliament was no longer capable of representing the political status, 
let alone acting as its guardian. To the contrary, not only was parliament not Weimar’s guardian, 
it was the main threat to its political and constitutional status.  
Parliament was first dominated by negative majorities and then by a positive majority inimical to 
the core principles of the constitution. In the first case, which happened throughout the later 
years of Weimar – resulting either in the collapse of the parliament entirely or the dismissal of 
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parliament through Article 25 in order to allow something to be done by the Chancellor and the 
President, the Chancellorship would be held by a minority party but would be incapable of 
passing legislation through parliament and subject to votes of no-confidence by that negative 
majority. In the second case, the Chancellorship would be held by a party existentially opposed 
to the values of the Weimar Constitution (in the case of the NSDAP and the KPD, opposed to the 
core values of both the First and Second Principal Parts of the Constitution). Constitutional 
alternatives needed to be found that would allow it to continue functioning until its parliamentary 
crisis could be resolved. As Ellen Kennedy has noted, Schmitt’s discussion of dictatorship and 
the powers of the Reichspräsident emerge out of the context of a dysfunctional, potentially state-
destroying parliament and the need for effective governance.
254
 
ii. The Reichspräsident as the Guardian of the Constitution 
Schmitt argued that, because the Reichspräsident was similarly democratically legitimated, it too 
could act as guardian in emergencies – especially when internal factionalism prevented 
parliament from doing so. The Weimar system provides for one democratically legitimated 
institution to counterbalance another; plebiscitary democracy counterbalanced parliamentary 
democracy and vice versa.
255 That is, the balance of plebiscitary democracy and parliamentary 
democracy fulfilled the organizational principle of the bourgeois Rechtsstaat. Because of the 
balanced forms of democracy legitimation in its executive and legislative branches, the 
breakdown of parliament need not incapacitate the state or become a power that could 
overwhelm the legitimate constitutional order by overwhelming the other branches of the state. 
Independent of political parties but not apolitical, Schmitt argued the Reichspräsident 
represented the collectivity and the unity defined by the German people. Yet the sort of 
representation here was not what physical individuals happened to want at that moment: “the 
German People,” as a unity, was what was construed in the terms set forth by the Absolute 
Constitution. That is, although the Reichspräsident was elected by plebiscite, so to speak – 
especially through his oath to defend the constitution – the democratic basis he is obliged to 
represent was the status of the German people. The Reichspräsident is bound to the Absolute 
Constitution as its commissarial dictator and guardian of last instance.
256
 
Schmitt outlines the Reichspräsident’s role as neutral power and guardian of the constitution 
confronting progressive parliamentary breakdown according to the following scheme
257
: 
a. State as Honest Mediator among Social “Interest-Complexes”  
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b. Majority-Forming Objective Third 
c. State/President as a Third Party (as an Independent Social Power) 
d. Statal Mediator/President as assuming the Open Decision 
Each escalation in this scale seems to correspond to a greater degree of factionalism within 
society, reflected in its parliament. And each escalation requires a corresponding escalation in 
the Reichspräsident’s interventionist role. In the first instance, the state, represented by the 
Reichspräsident, merely mediates between different social interest groups to help arrive to a 
definite decision.
258
 In the second instance, the “interest complexes” are divided enough where 
they effectively neutralize one another.
259
 The Reichspräsident’s role, then, is effectively to cast 
a tie-breaking vote – to participate in legislation – based on whichever he believes best 
represents the public interest. In the third instance, the Reichspräsident not only casts a decisive 
vote but contributes to deliberation about what constitutes the public interest, to “guarantee the 
view of the majority represents a fair balance among interests” and that they remain committed 
to the constitutional ideal of justice.
260
 At this point, the Reichspräsident becomes the guardian 
and becomes representative – his neutrality changes qualitatively.
261
 This third stage is triggered 
when political factionalism is sufficient for the state itself to be ruptured. Yet Schmitt believes 
parliamentary action is still possible at this point and the Reichspräsident’s power, even if it is an 
independent power now, is merely one among the many other powers within parliament. 
Should parliament become nothing more than an arena of political pluralism and the constitution 
become merely an instrument employed by one group in power to dominate the others, Schmitt 
believes the Reichspräsident, the only legitimate representative of the political status, is 
compelled to make (soft) political decisions alone.
262
 Either the state ceases to be a state (that is, 
it passively allows politicized factionalism). Or the state brings about unity through a decision on 
its political status and ensures the perpetuation of that order. Given that the president has no 
actual legislative powers – and that, given the failure of parliament, there will be no forthcoming 
legislation at all – this final capacity of the president would have to come through the exercise of 
the powers granted by Article 48,2 – to pass measures to deal with an emergency. 
Schmitt’s discussion of the use Article 48 is consistent with this account. The end of Article 48 is 
to enlarge the area of the state’s initiative to cope with some external situation undermining the 
status quo.
263
 That is, to protect the safety and order of the public, as defined by Weimar’s 
Absolute Constitution (I turn to Schmitt discussion of Weimar’s Absolute Constitution in the 
next chapter).
264
 In opposition to the legislative acts of parliament, the Reichspräsident could 
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only issue measures through Article 48 and measures have no power to change the 
constitution.
265
 That the president can determine when the status quo is being undermined by 
internal enemies is categorically different from having any legitimate authority to abrogate the 
status quo itself.
266
 The constitution itself could only be changed through Article 76.
267
 The 
Reichspräsident’s role – rather than seeking to expand the use of or appropriate Article 76 for his 
own ends – was to constrain and reduce constitutional change through parliamentary exercise of 
Article 76. As noted above, the apparent incorporation of sovereign and commissarial 
dictatorship into the Reichspräsident’s authority is a product of 19
th
 century efforts to rationalize 
the state of exception entirely – in which any extra-legal actions (that is, actions violating any 
individual constitutional laws) by the dictator would appear to be an illegitimate exercise of 
sovereignty.
268
 In fact, however, the irrationalism of mass democracy necessitates the return to 
the guardian’s extra-legal authority, constrained by the Absolute Constitution.  
Schmitt’s ideal of the Reichspräsident as guardian of the constitution seems to have been 
modeled on Friedrich Ebert, who invoked Article 48 fairly regularly.
269
 Schmitt catalogued 
Ebert’s every use of Article 25.
270
 And he approved of Ebert’s use of Article 48 to defend the 
basic idea of order in Weimar’s Absolute Constitution.
271
 Schmitt approved of actions devoted to 
the defense of Weimar’s order. Ebert was a liberal democrat who could decide on his friends and 
was committed to a political principle – he had decided for a form of liberal order that had 
positive content and recognized its enemy. He was not so committed to value-neutrality that he 
was willing to stand by and allow Weimar to dissolve in conflicts between the Freikorps and the 
Spartikusbund. Schmitt thought Ebert understood what his oath to the constitution meant. He 
could act as the guardian of the constitution precisely because he recognized the substantive 
decisions contained in Weimar’s Absolute Constitution.
272
 Hindenburg, on the other hand, 
suffered his “oath trauma” because he could not distinguish an amendment procedure from an 
existential commitment. 
At the same time, Schmitt warned that this power was contingent on the personal qualities of the 
man elected and that, were a disingenuous guardian elected Reichspräsident, too much power 
would be in the hands of an enemy: “with a new president, the Weimar Constitution could 
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appear entirely differently without a word of the text of the constitution having been changed.”
273
 
That is, this office, too, was subject to contingency and the survival of the constitution hinged on 
the degree to which it had real, concrete defenders. Better to keep enemies out altogether. 
As parliament broke down, Schmitt envisaged the role of the Reichspräsident as including the 
authority to constrain irrationalist movements and preserve the constitution against centrifugal 
movements like Nazism and Communism – to derail populism, not to represent it. This guardian 
was to serve as a commissarial dictator, the final bulwark against the total breakdown of order 
and the eruption of the state of nature. It maintained the Absolute Constitution – the core of the 
state’s normality – in the face of the disruptive indirect powers. The context in which he 
advocated the emergency powers of the Reichspräsident was one in which parliament really was 
divided between plural total movements, some of whom were devoted to the annihilation of the 
Weimar Constitution. While Schmitt argued for an interpretation of the Reichspräsident’s 
powers to make decisions, he envisioned them as decisions representing the Absolute 
Constitution of Weimar and whose legitimacy was so constrained. 
Writing in 1914, Schmitt argued, characteristically, “no law can self enforce; there are only men, 
who can be installed as guardians of the laws and who are wary of guardians themselves, who do 
not benefit from being installed as guardians.”
274
 There, Schmitt likens the guardian to Plato’s 
Philosopher-King or Fichte’s Ephorat, who ensure the state as a whole adhere to Recht.
275
 He 
sees this Guardian as a direct power, a vis coactiva, capable of not merely giving moral advice 
but ensuring the law actually has concrete efficacy. Plato’s hand in the construction of Schmitt’s 
guardian, and by extension, his understanding of dictatorship, casts this institution in a different 
light than it normally receives. Dictatorship reflects the rationalistic bent of Schmitt’s state 
theory: the state and its branches ought to bear substantive rationality and realize the rule of 
reason concretely. Ready to act in those exceptional circumstances when normal institutions 
faltered, Schmitt envisaged an ultimate guardian prepared to swoop in from above. It appears as 
an extension of Schmitt’s theory of the state as an imperium rationis.  
Read in the context of his state theory, Schmitt’s theory of dictatorship does not appear to be a 
(poorly veiled) attempt to smuggle in deformalized law. While clearly still open to abuse, it 
seems highly unlikely that dictatorship was proto-fascist. Instead, Schmitt's theory is a rather 
romantic approach to the exercise of power. Yet the consequences of Schmitt’s romantic theory 
of dictatorship, when anyone who lacks the ideological and rational purity required to fully 
execute it, are the same as those readings that attribute tyrannical motives to Schmitt. A highly 
idealized dictatorship is highly vulnerable to abuse. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to attribute 
corrupt motives to Schmitt for his construction – for the same reason it is a mistake to attribute 
corrupt motives to Plato for his Republic. Hans Kelsen had it right when he depicted Schmitt’s 
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theory of the Guardian – of the dictator – as naïve in the power it placed in a virtuous individual 





This chapter investigated three core components of Schmitt’s state theory: state, constitution, and 
dictator. It showed how Schmitt interpreted these components in light of his concept of decisive 
status. Schmitt seeks to restore the state’s monopoly over that decisive status because he believes 
if the state does not do it, factions in society will struggle to assume it. And the outcome of the 
politicization of society will be civil war. But the positivistic mechanization of the state and 
relativization of the constitution have led to the very problems of the absence of a decisive 
political status – of internal factionalism that leads a political community toward the state of 
nature. This positivistic approach had further negative consequences for the institution of 
dictatorship. Schmitt opposes this trajectory with his historically rooted counter-interpretation: 
the state as giant man and mortal god (as well as mechanism), the constitution as Absolute (as 
well as Relative). The dictator, understood in light of these reinterpretations, had a different 
constitutional value and purpose than its positivistic interpretation allowed for. This substantive 
reinterpretation of state and constitution serves as the basis for Schmitt’s reinterpretation of the 
meaning of the Weimar Constitution itself, discussed in the next chapter.  
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The Absolute Constitution of 20
th
 Century Liberal Democracy:  
Carl Schmitt and Militant Democracy 
 
 
In the old Aristotelian three-part classification – monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy –, modern 
democracy would be unrecognizable.  
– Carl Schmitt Der Begriff der modernen Demokratie 
 
Political liberalism also supposes that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine does not reject the 
essentials of a democratic regime. Of course, a society may also contain unreasonable and 
irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines. In their case the problem is to contain them so 
that they do not undermine the unity and justice of society. 





Schmitt thought the 20
th
 century state’s legitimation crisis was caused in part by an 
overestimation of the range and meaning of popular sovereignty – democracy’s “triumphal 
march.” His contemporaries, including Hans Kelsen, Richard Thoma, and Gerhard Anschütz, 
had argued limitations on democratic amendment procedures, such as those outlined in Article 
76 of the Weimar Constitution, were illegitimate. They argued that as long as a democratic 
majority adhered to procedural constraints, it had the right to do whatever it desired – including 
revolutionizing and reconstituting the state. Kelsen, in particular, had explicitly defended the 
unrestricted will of the majority as long as it adhered to established legal procedures. Kelsen 
defended this type of democratic legitimacy because he believed there was no political basis to 
determine right beyond majority will. This interpretation led him, along with other Weimar 
constitutionalists, to conceive of its constitution as nothing more than a collection of individual 
laws open to infinite amendment. 
Leviathan Run Aground: Chapter 6 
Page | 192  
Schmitt believed his contemporaries’ fetishization of democracy, understood in the above 
terms, had blinded them to over two millennia of political science canon. He thought it was 
absurd to believe 20
th
 century democracy had somehow vanquished tyrannical government.
1
 
Their interpretation of the Weimar Constitution was out of touch with Weimar’s political reality, 
especially the destabilizing effects of modern mass democracy. And he thought their theoretical 
interpretation of the constitution had the practical consequence of limiting the state’s ability to 
respond to radical revolutionary movements, such as the NSDAP and KPD. 
But Schmitt was confident it was possible to restore Weimar’s Absolute Constitution. Doing so 
would empower the state to deal with its insurrectionary parties. And, like Neurath’s ship, he 
thought Weimar’s constitution could be rebuilt “at sea,” without a revolution, by clarifying the 
relationship between Weimar's written laws and its deeper political legitimacy. So Schmitt broke 
it down into its core components to identify its “Absolute” core. Despite his later embrace of 
Nazism, Schmitt’s late Weimar work opens a window into his constitutional and state theory in 
which he attempts a robust defense of Weimar’s bourgeois Rechtsstaat in order to deny 
Weimar’s extremists the means to subvert the state and constitution. In doing so, Schmitt offers a 
different defense of the liberal democratic state than we are accustomed to think about today. 
The last chapter has shown Schmitt’s state theory owes large debts to Hobbes and Hegel. This 
chapter builds on this account further, showing how Schmitt’s state theory includes individual 
rights, but theorizes and defends them in a way liberals may not recognize. In doing so, he 
provides an alternative theory of rights in modern states. 
Beyond this alternative account of rights in the state, this window shows an alternative way to 
understand the legitimacy of liberal democratic states today. It provides insight into a 
constitutional institution today known as “militant” or “streitbar” [constrained] democracy. 
Militant democracy is a type of liberal democratic constitution that guards against certain forms 
of popular sovereignty and prevents constitutional suicide. Jan-Werner Müller defines it as a 
“democratic regime which is willing to adopt pre-emptive, prima facie illiberal measures to 
prevent those aiming at subverting democracy with democratic means from destroying the 
democratic regime.”
2
 Its most well-known mechanisms are the absolute (“eternal”) entrenchment 
of core constitutional principles, such as basic rights and democracy, against amendment and the 
use of political bans against certain illiberal and antidemocratic (extremist) parties. Schmitt’s 
state theory highlights how militant democracy is militant, above all, against unconstrained 
democratic will-formation, thereby giving political theorists today a different way to approach it. 
This chapter outlines Schmitt’s defense of Weimar through his concept of the Absolute 
Constitution and links it to militant democracy. To do so, it is divided into four sections. The first 
section situates the discussion by challenging the prevailing interpretation of Schmitt as an 
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overwhelmingly illiberal thinker. The second looks at how Schmitt applied his theory of the 
Absolute and Relative Constitution to Weimar. It examines Schmitt’s critique of the prevailing 
interpretation of the Weimar Constitution as above all “democratic” and how he theorized 
Weimar’s counter-constitution in its liberal basic rights. It argues that, despite the predominance 
of depictions of him as an illiberal thinker, Schmitt devoted his late Weimar texts to a defense of 
Weimar’s basic rights and attempted to entrench those rights against democratic revision. The 
third section looks at additional institutions Schmitt theorized for the sake of defending 
Weimar’s Absolute Constitution against extremists and relativization, which eventually took 
effect in Bonn. The final section concludes by looking at how Schmitt offered an early theory of 
militant democracy with his theory of Weimar’s counter-constitution. It also outlines a normative 
theory of militant democracy based on Schmitt’s state theory.   
 
1. Carl Schmitt’s “Relentless” Illiberalism 
As I argued in Chapter 3, Schmitt was not a democrat but instead was preoccupied above all with 
the effects of mass democracy on the stability and authority of states. But what of Schmitt’s 
attitude toward liberalism? As discussed, the reigning interpretation of Schmitt today is that he 
was the paradigmatic 20
th
 century illiberal – that illiberalism is the defining feature of his thought. 
He is most often accused of being “relentlessly” illiberal; others dismiss him as, at best, 
opportunistically or “ironically” liberal.
3
 His emphasis on the decision and the qualitatively total 
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state is believed to totally preclude liberalism. The (incorrect) understanding of him as some sort 
of democrat has led some to conclude he opposed democratic legitimacy to a morally and 
politically bankrupt liberalism. 
Yet both Nadia Urbinati and Renato Cristi have argued Schmitt was actually deeply ambivalent 
about liberalism.
4
 Renato Cristi has argued Schmitt was actually a theorist of “authoritarian 
liberalism.”
5
 And, in a claim that seems to agree with the substance of what Urbinati and Cristi 
argued, Andreas Kalyvas has argued that Schmitt sought to deny constituted powers the ability to 
amend the “constitution,” which Kalyvas recognizes Schmitt had essentially theorized as 
inviolable.
6
 I show how in Weimar’s most desperate moment Schmitt theorized a way to defend 
“basic liberty rights” from the NSDAP’s and the KPD’s intentions to amend them out of 
existence. Contemporary discussions of Schmitt largely overlook this defense, perhaps because it 
fits so poorly with the prevailing interpretation. But if Schmitt did seek to defend the Weimar 
state because of the legitimacy of basic rights, then interpretations arguing Schmitt was 
“relentlessly” illiberal will need to be revisited.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, Schmitt theorizes liberalism as stemming from a decision for Liberté, 
a decision for the protection of the private freedom of individual citizens against abuses of state 
authority and power. Schmitt argues that Liberté leads to two principles of the state: a 
distributional principle and an organizational principle. Parliamentary democracy is a significant 
part of how that organizational principle has been translated into state form – historically. But 
Schmitt emphasizes that the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy, or any state form a 
“bourgeois Rechtsstaat” takes, is second to its political decision to guarantee a sphere of 
individual freedom and right against interference from either the state or other individuals. Thus, 
although parliamentary democracy has succeeded as a state form to concretize this political 
decision historically, it is neither necessary to guarantee it nor the only way to do so.  
Put differently, Schmitt theorizes “liberalism” as two distinct political forms. On the one hand, it 
describes a positive decision for state form. On the other, it describes the political decision for 
the state’s content and telos. The former, parliamentary democracy, is merely a means to the 
latter’s individual protections and freedoms. This distinction is apparent in his 1926 
“Introduction” to The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy but only becomes theoretically 
explicit in his 1928 Constitutional Theory. There, Schmitt first identifies liberalism as a negative 
political decision “against” state form, absolutely constraining it with basic rights and the system 
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of checks in balances in §§12-16 of Constitutional Theory.
7
 Any state form is distinct from this 
“bourgeois Rechtsstaat” component of the constitution.
8
 And it is only when he turns to state 
form that parliamentarism comes up, in §§24-28 of Constitutional Theory. Parliamentarism is 
theorized there as a “public” form of liberalism, concretized through value-neutrality and a 
constitution’s amendment procedures.
9
 Because it is merely a procedure, parliamentarism is 
“indecisive” insofar as that procedure can realize any content. Schmitt described Liberté, on the 
other hand, as a political-existential decision: a commitment, not a procedure. 
The problem of overlooking this distinction (and thus depicting Schmitt as “relentlessly” illiberal 
because of his criticism of Weimar parliamentarism) becomes apparent when otherwise careful 
interpretations of Schmitt become incoherent. Peter Caldwell, who provides a fantastic 
exposition of Schmitt’s Weimar thought, first argues that Schmitt in fact supported basic liberal 
rights in his writings, but then argues Schmitt opposed parliament and thus liberalism as a 
whole.
10
 Similarly, Dyzenhaus notes Schmitt thought liberalism made a substantive political 
decision when it committed to the protection of basic liberty and private property.
11
 But he then 
argues that, in the end, Schmitt thought liberalism was a decision to avoid decisions.
12
 Kelly, on 
the other hand, recognizes Schmitt believed parliament could be legitimately representative and 
produce political unity, but then later argues (citing McCormick) that, as an extension of his 
illiberalism, Schmitt thought parliament, was “the very violation of [representation and 
legitimate state form].”
13
 These thinkers do recognize Schmitt accorded some degree of 
legitimacy to liberalism, in particular basic liberal rights, but cannot reconcile that recognition 
with their interpretation of him as fundamentally illiberal. As a result, some of Schmitt's most 
interesting arguments end up getting throw out. 
Schmitt’s open criticism of liberalism as parliamentary democracy has been addressed and 
questioned by many thinkers, including Caldwell, Dyzenhaus, and Kelly. Indeed, Schmitt had 
argued that parliament and parliamentary ideals had become unworkable. But, returning to the 
argument from Chapter 3, Schmitt’s problem was not what we understand to be liberalism, or 
even parliamentarism per se, but how these institutions had been compromised by modern mass 
democracy. He believed the crisis of the modern state sprung from the fact that no state could 
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realize a mass democracy. Because his interpreters have for the most part not recognized the 
nuances of Schmitt’s theorization of liberalism, they have read his critique of Weimar’s 
dysfunctional parliament as a blanket rejection of all principles associated with liberalism today, 
including Basic Rights. But this is a mistake. In fact, Schmitt explicitly insisted that Second 
Principal Part of the Weimar Constitution (The Basic Rights and Duties of Germans) be treated 
as the existential decision of Weimar and thus serve as the basis for the substantive 
constitutional order of the Weimar State. In other words, Schmitt argued the liberal, “bourgeois” 
Rechtsstaat principles outlined in the second section of his Constitutional Theory, i.e. individual 
basic rights, were first a legitimate existential, political decision and second the means to 
legitimately overcome the crisis of the modern state. In making this argument, Schmitt turns out 
to have provided a novel defense of basic individual rights against the state – and against the 
tyranny of modern mass democracy.  
 
2. Weimar’s Constitution and Counter-Constitution 
Reflecting back on his late Weimar writings in 1958, Schmitt argued he sought to resolve the 
constitution from its internal contradictions. The contradiction between its First and Second 
Principal Parts was by far the most significant.
14
 He described how the Second Principal Part of 
the Weimar Constitution was actually a counter-constitution opposed to the First Principal Part. 
This tension was between the design of Weimar’s constituted powers and its ‘basic rights and 
duties,’ between Weimar’s “functionalist value-neutrality,” with its “fiction of indiscriminate 
equal chance,” and its “substantive system of meaning.”
15
 The contradiction amounted to a 
question of which part of the constitution was superior to, and therefore trumped, the other when 
they conflicted. Could popular sovereignty do away with the bourgeois Rechtsstaat? Or do the 
principles of the bourgeois Rechtsstaat absolutely limit popular sovereignty? While these two 
parts could and did unproblematically coexist with one another in normal times, they were 
logical opposed and could clash during the constitution’s existentially most important moments. 
That is, there are exceptional moments in which democracy and Rechtsstaat principles clash. 
                                                             
14
 The other two contradictions were each limited to one part of the constitution. The contradiction in the Second 
Principal Part was that it contained a myriad of rights so far ranging that there was no clear core. I discuss this 
further below. In the first part, however, he points to the contradiction between parliamentary and plebiscitary 
democracy. His argument here, which I touch upon in Chapter 3 indirectly, is that in plebiscitary democratic 
referenda of any type only lead to a more immediate, more irrational, more emotional democratic expression than 
the already deeply problematic expressions in parliament. Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, trans. Jeffrey 
Seitzer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 60-64. Plebiscitary democracy, in other words, was not Schmitt’s 
ideal – it was merely a more problematic version of everything already wrong with 20
th
 century mass democracy. 
He goes on to argue that, for these reasons, it is extremely dangerous as an extraordinary lawmaker. Schmitt, 
Legality and Legitimacy, 91. Moreover, as I discuss below, Schmitt seems relieved that the Bonn Grundgesetz does 
away with popular referendum. 
15 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 93-94. 
Leviathan Run Aground: Chapter 6 
Page | 197  
And such clashes demanded a decision on which part ought to have lexical priority over the 
other.
16
 In other words, a decision on which principle “trumped” the other.  
For Schmitt’s discussion of liberalism, the question of parliamentary democracy, or even 
plebiscitary democracy, versus the bourgeois Rechtsstaat amounted to a dilemma over the two 
forms of liberalism he conceptualized. The priority of democracy over basic rights meant 
Weimar’s liberalism would be a seemingly paradoxical decision for liberalism as formalized 
indecision, concretized through procedures. It was a decision for a formal procedure, but one 
without any definite existential content. The priority of the principles of the bourgeois 
Rechtsstaat, on the other hand, would be a decision for a specific (liberal) form of existence. 
Schmitt thought the former was relativistic, its legitimacy rested on positive democratic 
proceduralism. He thought the latter was substantive, its legitimacy rested on the basic 
commitment to individual liberty. This dilemma between democracy and the Rechtsstaat, 
between an indecisive liberalism and a political liberalism, will turn out to map onto Schmitt’s 
discussion of Constitutional Relativization. 
a. The Prevailing Interpretation: Democratic Value-Neutrality and the Relativized Constitution 
Schmitt argued the prevailing interpretation of the Weimar Constitution, exemplified in the work 
of constitutional theorists, such as Kelsen, Thoma, and Anschütz, seized the first horn of that 
dilemma.
17
 Because the decision-making procedures of parliamentary democracy trumped all 
other articles of the constitution, these thinkers had interpreted the Weimar Constitution above 
all as a decision for democratic value-neutrality and legal change.
18
 Their interpretation was for a 
second-order decision against deciding; in other words, it was a decision for a form of 
democracy where the seat of power was left empty and undefined. Schmitt argued, then, that 
Weimar’s leading constitutional lawyers were ultimately committed above all to democracy, 
which in constitutional terms meant its formal democratic amendment procedures.  
Schmitt describes the prevailing interpretation as “functionalist value-neutrality,” by which he 
means it interprets the constitution and legislation as open to any political goal or aspiration that 
adheres to the legal procedures in effect.
19
 He writes, “in the dominant “traditional” theory, no 
parties, aspirations, organizations, and associations can be illegal because of their goals or the 
content of their goals.”
20
 The assertion that political legitimacy boils down to legality –
democratic legitimation – is a by-product of a positivist Weltanschauung. He argues that, for the 
prevailing interpretation, value-neutral legislation produces legitimate law, whatever its content, 
just as value-neutral elections produce a legitimate governing body, whatever its content.
21
 The 
                                                             
16 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 46-47, 50. 
17 Dyzenhaus, ""Now the Machine Runs Itself"," 8. 
18
 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 47-48; cf. Otto Kirchheimer, "Remarks on Legality and Legitimacy," in The Rule 
of Law under Siege, ed. William E. Scheuerman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 77, 94-95. 
19 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 10, 48-49. 
20 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 49. 
21 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 20, 21. 
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ideal of value-neutrality is institutionalized by the principle of equal chance. It presupposes any 
group within a political community that wishes to obtain political power should have the 
possibility to do so as long as they adhere to whatever legal procedures for doing so are in effect. 




Chapter 5 argued that functionalist value-neutrality, institutionalized by equal chance, served as 
the core of Schmitt’s theory of the Relatived Constitution. And the legitimacy of the Relative 
Constitution comes from the same principles that make positive law legitimate: adhering to 
proper procedures to enact law (in this case, constitutional law) yields legitimate law. In the case 
of Weimar, the prevailing (Relative Constitutional) interpretation centered on Article 76.1, which 
came out of the First Principle Part of the Weimar Constitution, its organizational component. 
Article 76.1 reads:  
The Constitution can be amended via legislation. However, a decision of the Reichstag 
regarding the amendment of the Constitution only takes effect when two-thirds of those 
present consent. Decisions of the Reichsrat regarding amendment of the Constitution also 
require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast. If a constitutional amendment is concluded 




For Schmitt, especially the first sentence of 76.1, which lacks any qualification regarding limits 
to amending the constitution, shows how the Relative Constitution, democratic value-neutrality, 
equal chance, and openness to all procedurally-valid constitutional amendments are interrelated. 
For value-neutrality to have any meaning, no ideology can be prevented from having the 
opportunity to compete for political office. An extension of this equal chance is that any and all 
beliefs must have the possibility to be enacted constitutionally. Because no aspects of the 
constitution can be beyond the reach of the amendment process, the constitution must be 
theoretically treated as a collection of individual laws – at most more difficult to amend than 
other non-constitutional laws. 
Schmitt argues that, although the prevailing interpretation understands the constitution as 
decisionless, this is not exactly the case.
24
 Although they do not expressly acknowledge it, they 
believe that this type of constitution is more than mere domination and is legitimate on some 
“lower level.”
25
 It goes beyond being a modus vivendi to an overlapping consensus. Accordingly, 
even a positivistic and value-neutral constitution moves beyond being merely a collection of 
laws. Schmitt argues the Relative Constitution actually does make a political decision, just a 
weak one: its status is defined by its amendment procedure. As long as a party adheres to 
whatever constraints of legality are in effect when it seeks to obtain and exercise political power, 
                                                             
22 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 28. 
23 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 421. 
24 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 29. 
25 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 41-42. 
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then it can be understood to be a “Friend” of the constitution. Tyranny and enmity in a system of 
“functionalist value-neutrality” is the violation of whatever positive law there is, especially the 
second-order legislation governing the legislative process itself. It is a weak decision because it 
admits revolution of that decision to be legitimate as long as the revolutionaries abide by the 
enacted procedures. Yet, because there is this basis to determine political legitimacy, Schmitt 
argues even the Relative Constitution contains a political decision.
26
  
So although the Relative Constitution’s decision is a passive one, Schmitt believes it still decides 
on a status. And, Schmitt believes, appearances aside, no constitution, not even a Relativized 
Constitution, can be totally neutral toward itself.
27
 It does not intend for its substantive 
elimination. So Schmitt argues that even proponents of value-neutrality implicitly make this 
argument: they believe democratic elections and amendment procedures are themselves values 
worth perpetuating and should continue to define a community’s legitimate political 
relationships – this constitution was not instituted to be an ephemeral constitution that merely 
stands in until a prevailing majority replaces it with a radically different constitution.
28
 
Proponents of the prevailing interpretation intend for democratic procedures to persist over time. 
It was on this basis that Kelsen, for example, argued commitment to value-neutrality and 
democratic principles means one must allow committed antidemocrats, such as Nazis, to have 
the possibility to revolutionize the state and constitution – to do otherwise, for him, meant 
abandoning his substantive commitments.
29
  
Was Schmitt’s characterization of Weimar’s leading constitutional theorists accurate? Were they 
actually committed to functionalist value-neutrality above all else, i.e. the legitimacy of 
unlimited democratic emendation of the constitution according to the terms laid out in Article 76? 
Were they actually committed to something like the Relative Constitution?  
Kelsen certainly held this view. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, Kelsen himself acknowledge 
that he was above all committed to a positive weltanschauung and that this meant the legitimacy 
of democratic relativism, the politicized theology of atheism. But Schmitt is primarily in 
dialogue with Thoma and Anschütz in his discussion of Article 76, even if Kelsen looms in the 
background. He had public engagements with both, especially Thoma, and was on good enough 
terms with both to be offered the opportunity to contribute to their then seminal volume 
Handbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts.
30
 So circumstantial evidence suggests Schmitt fairly 
represented their positions.  
                                                             
26 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 74ff. 
27 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 27; Cf. Cristi, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism, 2. 
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 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 58. 
29 Kelsen, Hans. Die Verteidigung der Demokratie (1932), Cited in Arthur J. Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink, eds., 
Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 74. 
30 Schmitt contributed an article on his interpretation of the Second Principal Part of the Weimar Constitution. 
“Inhalts und Bedeutung des zweiten Haupteils der Reichsverfassung.”  
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And, in turning to the substance of what they wrote, Schmitt’s representation of Thoma and 
Anschütz holds. Like Kelsen, both Thoma and Anschütz were leading representatives of legal 
positivism. So, already implied in their legal theory is a commitment to that value-relativism. 
Anschütz was explicitly critical of Schmitt’s argument to restrict the range of constitutional 
amendment through Article 76. “Democracy” ought to prevail, he argued, no matter the content 
of the people’s beliefs.
31
 He argued that, now that Germany has participated in democracy’s 
“triumphal march,” it meant the supremacy of democracy above all other facets of the state.
32
 In 
other words, Weimar democracy meant the supremacy of the will and wish of the people, 
expressed through positive legislation.
33
 
Similarly to Anschütz and Kelsen, Thoma believed “the right of the Reichstag to amend the 
Constitution through a two-thirds vote was in theory unlimited. This idea of free, democratic 
self-determination, he argued, was “daring, perhaps, but sublime in its logical consistency.””
34
 
There was no authority beyond popular will. Thoma’s position was adopted in explicit 
opposition to Schmitt and Bilfinger’s argument for limits on the range of Article 76 democratic 
amendment powers. He wrote, “from the standpoint of democracy and liberalism, from which 
interpretation must begin, it would be impossible to evaluate what the resolute and undoubted 
majority of the people wills and decides in a legal way as a coup d’état or rebellion, even if it 
subverts the basic pillars of the present Constitution!” Here too one sees the belief that any 
constitutional change is legitimate as long as it abides by the procedures in effect – even if it 
appears to be something illegitimate like a “coup d’état.” Thoma seemed to understand rule as 
either democratic, in which a majority might occasionally “offend some interest and quash some 




Schmitt was not manufacturing straw men in describing Weimar liberal democrats as he did.
36
 
Weimar’s leading constitutional theorists believed in the supremacy of the democratic 
procedures of the First Principal Part of the Weimar Constitution, including the possibility for 
total legal democratic constitutional abrogation through Article 76. They believed that, no matter 
the substantive content sought through democratic procedures, the procedures themselves made 
them legitimate. And the (bourgeois Rechtsstaat) ideal of basic rights was no barrier to such 
changes. Schmitt describes this position as functionalist value-neutrality. It is value-neutral 
because it makes no attempt to evaluate the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a popular, democratic 
will. Thus, it implicitly but clearly denies that there can be a tyrannical majority: the will of the 
                                                             
31 Walter Pauly, "Introduction to Gerhard Anschütz," in Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis, ed. Arthur J. Jacobson 
and Bernhard Schlink (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 129. 
32 Gerhard Anschütz, "Three Guiding Principles of the Weimar Constitution (1922)," ibid., 144. 
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 Anschütz, "Three Guiding Principles of the Weimar Constitution (1922)," 147. 
34 Peter C. Caldwell, "Introduction to Richard Thoma," ibid., 153; Cf.Richard Thoma, "The Reich as Democracy," 
ibid., 159, 164. 
35 Thoma, "The Reich as Democracy," 170. 
36 Cf.Müller, "Militant Democracy," 3-4. 
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people is always legitimate. It is functionalist because of its commitment to procedure. 
Legitimacy is evaluated not by normative standards per se but adherence to procedure – but a 
procedure that is, in the end, as plastic as democratic will.  
b. Schmitt’s Critique of Weimar’s “Functionalist Value-Neutrality”  
Whatever reasonable intentions it may have had, Schmitt thought the theoretical aspiration to 
seize the first horn of the dilemma and treat liberalism democracy as institutionalizing permanent 
indecision was impractical and even foolish. Functionalist value-neutrality and equal chance 
could not realize political stability nor could they generate an overlapping consensus in mass 
democracy. In Legality and Legitimacy, Schmitt “uncharacteristically” quotes a large passage 
from his Der Hüter der Verfassung to emphasize how serious a problem he believes this 
interpretation is.
37
 There he argues the dominant interpretation of Article 76 makes it into an 
amendment procedure indifferent toward every content, which deprives the constitution of all 
political substance. He warns it can be used to bring about any constitutional order oriented by 
any values – ranging from a Soviet Republic to a National Socialist Reich to a revived German 
monarchy. He is alarmed that any attempt to defend the state as a bourgeois Rechtsstaat from 
this sort of constitutional revolution is dismissed as “crude and enraging” by both proponents of 
the prevailing interpretation as well as by those antidemocratic parties and movements that stand 
to gain from it. And no matter the intention of its proponents, their uncompromising commitment 
to functionalist value-neutrality actually empowered movements and parties who would abuse it 
to enact a constitution hostile to democracy.  
But, Schmitt argues, those who defend the legitimacy of the prevailing interpretation are not 
always truly committed to it. He thinks many of its defenders would concede that, should 75% 
(or a higher percentage, even) of a population elect an antidemocratic, illiberal, racist party, that 
party would nevertheless not be a legitimate ruler and neither would its subsequent abrogation of 
democracy and liberalism – even if it adhered to the functionalist constrains of Weimar’s 
amendment procedures.
38
 When they insist, for example, that functionalist value-neutrality does 
not include value-neutrality itself, he thinks their constitutional theory becomes disingenuous. 
They have only superficially disagreed with him. For example, Schmitt writes that Thoma 
eventually admits Schmitt’s arguments to limit Article 76 were legitimate when an illiberal and 
antidemocratic party reaches the democratic threshold necessary to pass constitutional 
amendments.
39
 But he does not reconcile this with his insistence on the unlimited legitimacy of 
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 Cf. Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 95. 
38 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 48. 
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democratic revisions through Article 76 (thus, arguing democratic constitutional change is 
always legitimate – as long as it produces a democratic constitution). In such cases, Schmitt 
believes the commitment to democratic value-neutrality of the Weimar Constitution is only a 
superficial decision that stands on a more fundamental decision for an Absolute Constitution. In 
the end, Schmitt argues that, even though they do not admit it, many ostensive proponents of the 
prevailing interpretation actually share his interpretation: that Article 76 ought to be limited for 
the sake of preserving the actual core of Weimar’s “Absolute” constitution. 
But Schmitt recognizes there are defenders of the prevailing interpretation who do fully commit 
to the ideal of value-neutrality. These defenders hold that amendments to any articles or aspects 
of the constitution, including to democratic amendment procedures themselves, are legitimate no 
matter how illegitimate they may appear. Thus, they would argue for example that, as long as a 
party legally adheres to the procedures necessary to amend all democracy and rights out of a 
constitution and replace them with a fascist state, it is politically legitimate. But in this case, he 
argues, the theoretical commitments of the prevailing interpretation clearly undermine the 
constitution itself; this constitution does not even try to preserve itself.
40
 And if Weimar’s Article 
76 amendment procedure can be turned on itself, then not even Article 76 can be said to be 
constitutive of the Weimar Constitution. Its problem is that this is a self-undermining value 
commitment. Committing to it means one cannot commit to it as an Absolute Constitution – it is 
merely a placeholder. In the end, it too is theorized as nothing more than an accidental principle 
of the constitution. But, Schmitt questions, if the amendment principles (Article 76) too are 
merely accidental, why do defenders of the prevailing interpretation care if it is limited? The 
answer lies in the defenders’ positivistic worldview. And Schmitt thinks it is too dangerous to 
treat positivism as the basic existential decision of the constitution because its internal 
inconsistencies have such clear and problematic practical outcomes for its own admitted goals 
and values.
41
 A Relative Constitution must admit that “any goal, however revolutionary or 
reactionary, disruptive, hostile to the state or to Germany or even godless, is permitted and may 
not be robbed of the chance to be obtained via legal means.”
42
 He believes defending this 
interpretation of the Weimar Constitution is the pinnacle of political irresponsibility when private, 
indirect powers utilize powerful psycho-technical means to manipulate the masses and 
“democratically” legitimate their interests. Positivism and functionalist value-neutrality cannot 
serve as a stable political basis for the state. Positivistic “technicity” merely masks the 
illegitimate political domination those private powers exercise over the state as a whole. 
Like Kierkegaard’s aesthete, Schmitt thinks the positivist’s refusal to decide – the adoption of a 
Relativized Constitution premised on indecision – does not actually suspend the decision. It 
instead relegates agency to external factors, in effect granting it to those willing to decide and act. 
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Indecision is still a decision. It is in a way a second-order decision against deciding. A decision 
to be passive. Although committing to an amendment procedure may appear to be different from 
a refusal to decide at all, its lack of commitment to any definite content or values (what Schmitt 
would call its aestheticism) has the same result. As a Relativized Constitution, it can offer no 
political status; proceduralism relativizes itself.
43
 By constituting the state around functionalist 
value-neutrality, the prevailing interpretation contributes to the mechanization of the state, 
casting aside its authority and opening it up to violent factionalism. A mechanized state is a state 
only for accidental, contingent reasons. 
Schmitt argues the prevailing interpretation, by denying it any clear and fixed content, 
mechanized the Weimar state and relativized its constitution. He thinks it mistakes the 
organization of the state for its purpose or telos. Democracy and functionalist value-neutrality 
were merely means to realize that value. And no matter how ideal those means were for realizing 
it, the legitimacy of democracy should hinge on that end. Schmitt thus believed the prevailing 
interpretation of the Weimar Constitution embodied the rationalization and disenchantment of 
his time. But, he argued, no matter what his opponents argued, legitimacy and right could not 
rest on whichever positive laws a majority happened to have passed or declined to amend at a 
particular moment in time.
44
 But Schmitt thought a democratic bourgeois Rechtsstaat could still 
commit to a definite political status.
45
 His theory of Weimar’s Absolute Counter-Constitution 
aimed to show this by “struggling against a destructive use of the state and the Constitution, 
against a functionalism that was neutral with respect to truth and values.”
46
  
c. The Counter-Constitution: Basic Rights and Politically Decisive Liberalism 
Schmitt described his 1932 Legality and Legitimacy as a despairing attempt to defend the 
Weimar Constitution “from a form of jurisprudence that refused to pose the question of the 
friend and enemy of the constitution.”
47
 At the time, his critics vehemently rejected his attempt, 
criticizing his main argument, “that the legality of a party can only be denied when the authority 
to make constitutional amendments is limited,” as “fantasy law.”
48
 Specifically, it was his efforts 
to find a way to limit the range of the application of Article 76 that they found to be fantastic. 
And Schmitt provided reasons to limit Article 76; dismissing his argument as fantasy law avoids 
engaging with the tensions between democracy and basic rights. 
The question of party legality followed from Schmitt’s discussion of the nature and limits of the 
use of Article 76. It was on the basis of the constitution’s inviolable core that a party’s legality 
could be assessed and the Weimar state could be defended against insurrectionary movements. 
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Schmitt believed the basis for limiting the use of Article 76 came out of his theory of the 
Absolute Constitution. If Weimar could be shown to have an Absolute Constitution, this would 
restrict the range of Article 76 and certain acts would no longer be constitutional amendments 
but illegal revolutionary acts.  
Schmitt argued one did not need to go far to find a basis for Weimar’s Absolute Constitution. He 
believed it already existed as the Second Principal Part of the Weimar Constitution: “The Basic 
Rights and Duties of Germans.”
49
 In a way that reproduces key components of his definition of 
the Absolute Constitution, he writes “the declaration of basic rights means the establishment of 
principles on which the political unity of the people rests and whose validity is recognized as the 
most important presupposition of the fact that this unity always produces and forms itself anew. 
It also means that the integration of the state unity occurs.”
50
 He goes on to argue that the articles 
of the Second Principle Part of the Weimar Constitution “contain a comprehensive political 
decision of the German people concerning the type of their existence and they provide the 
German Reich in its present form the character of a constitutional democracy. In other words, it 
is a constitutional state [Rechtsstaat] resting on democratic principles, yet one that is modified by 
the principles of the bourgeois Rechtsstaat.”
51
 So Schmitt explicitly argues liberal basic rights 
can be a political decision.
52
 Were they taken to be the political status of Weimar, he believes no 
legislation to alter Weimar’s Absolute Constitution in any way – no matter how procedurally 
correct or democratically “legitimated” – could be substantively legitimate.
53
  
Thus, Schmitt thought basic rights could be interpreted to be the existential core of the Weimar 
Constitution and used to define the identity and status of the Weimar state and the German 
people.
54
 And his arguments for the priority of basic rights did not just apply to the Weimar 
Constitution; they could defend basic rights as the Absolute Constitution of any liberal 
democratic state, which would set limits to the range of amendment procedures.  
So, as Weimar stood on the brink of collapse in 1932, Schmitt argued the basic rights of the 
Second Principal Part of the constitution were “undoubtedly” “reasonable and justified” 
guarantees to oppose to the “empty value-neutrality” of the First Principal Part, to positive, 
functionalist democracy.
55
 Schmitt argues his interpretation would provide clarity about when 
parties were a political threat to Weimar, determined by whether their political goals were 
inimical to basic rights.
56
 And in a very disarming passage,
57
 Schmitt argues, were they 
interpreted as the Absolute Constitution, basic rights would be dictator-proof.
58
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Yet, Schmitt wrote that, although the bourgeois Rechtsstaat was a substantive basis for political 
unity, it was still only a negative decision. It did not define Weimar’s state form (whether the 
state is, for example, a monarchy or democracy). A political decision for the basic rights of the 
bourgeois Rechtsstaat did not preclude parliamentary democracy. Advocating for the priority of 
the basic rights in the Second Principal Part of the Weimar Constitution did not mean jettisoning 
democracy.
59
 It meant that when democracy and basic rights conflict with one another, basic 
rights have lexical priority over democracy.
60
 This is, after all, what it means to have rights. It is 
only when positive law proceduralism and democratic value-neutrality become instruments of 
revolutionary change that Schmitt thinks they become illegitimate. The shift to revolutionary acts 
is defined by the content of the Absolute Constitution. In the case of Weimar, revolutionary acts 
included Article 76 amendments that would seek to alter or suspend its political status by 
amending its “sacred” value commitment to basic rights – even if such acts have the requisite 
majority to be legally enacted.
61
  
In sum, Schmitt thought basic rights should trump democratic procedures in a bourgeois 
Rechtsstaat Constitution. And it should be emphasized that Schmitt opposes plebiscitary as well 
as parliamentary democracy when he elevates the core principles of the Second Principal Part of 
the Weimar Constitution above its Article 76 amendment procedures. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
Schmitt believes plebiscitary democracy only exacerbates the functionalist value-neutrality of 
Weimar’s parliamentary democracy. He believes the will expressed by a plebiscite is as irrational, 
unstable, and manipulable as that expressed by parliament. And he objects to the lower threshold 
Article 76 accorded plebiscitary democracy, which allowed popular referendums to pass 
constitutional amendments by a simple majority, bypassing the 67% parliamentary threshold. 
Schmitt seems flabbergasted by this discrepancy: why on earth would one settle for a 51% 
threshold from “a people who bursts onto the scene in its complete, though incommunicative, 
directness, and emotionality” when one requires a higher threshold from parliament, an 
institution with no less constitutional legitimacy?
62
 He answers there is “no compelling reason” 
why plebiscitary democracy should have any greater latitude in amending the constitution than 
parliamentary democracy. He concludes “the constitution undoubtedly did not intend this.” 
Weimar’s Absolute Constitution, located in its Second Principal Part, represented the fountain of 
the state’s political legitimacy and was the source of its authority and stood above its democratic 
state form, both plebiscitary and parliamentary. 
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d. Schmitt’s Rights Typology  
But Weimar’s Second Principal Part contained a vast array of rights, ranging from basic 
individual liberties to economic rights to religious and educational freedoms to rights of the civil 
service and it is not immediately clear which rights should serve as Weimar’s Absolute 
Constitution.
63
 Schmitt was not unaware that the Second Principal Part of the Weimar 
Constitution was overflowing with rights. In fact, he argued that because Preuß’ constitution had 
been diluted by subsequent additions of rights, the bourgeois Rechtsstaat core of the Weimar 
Constitution was not immediately apparent.
64
  
Schmitt distinguished Weimar’s Absolute Constitution by looking at Preuß’ original draft. He 
argued Weimar’s Absolute Constitution should be the “Basic Liberty Rights of the bourgeois 
Rechtsstaat” along with guarantees of private property.
65
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Schmitt believes for a right to be classified as a basic liberty right, it must be conceived of as an 
individual right against the state.
67
 It must be something that defends an individual’s private life 
against public interference. This definition excludes “political status rights,” such as the right to 
vote and equal chance (the third column). It also excludes “rights to state services,” such as the 
right to work (the fourth column). Schmitt argues that both these set of rights are rights to the 
state. Schmitt is emphatic that rights like that of civil servants to their papers (Article 129) are 
qualitatively different from basic rights like freedom of the person (Article 114).
68
 This 
distinction does not deny the legal validity of these rights. Like with democratic amendments and 
positive legality, Schmitt’s distinction only denies that they are part of Weimar’s existential core, 
its political status. Schmitt thus argues they are distinct from basic rights, they are subordinate to 
basic rights, and they are not protected like those basic rights are. They not a part of Weimar’s 
Absolute Constitution. 
Basic rights are those rights described in the first two columns in the Schmitt’s chart. He argued 
that the “rights of the isolated individual” from the first column, which included freedom of 
conscience and rights to private property, were unambiguously guaranteed as basic rights. Those 
rights in the second column, “rights of individuals in connection with other individuals,” are a 
grey area in his typology. Schmitt believes they “must be considered genuine basic rights as long 
as the individual does not leave the nonpolitical condition of mere social relations and so long as 
only the free competition and the free discussion of the individual is recognized.”
69
 Because 
these rights can be the means for society to politicize, i.e. they could be exploited by 
disingenuous groups to act violently against the status or other social groups, Schmitt believes 
they must be guaranteed but their use must be guarded over.
70
 Ambiguity over what he means 
exactly is obviously problematic – but Schmitt leaves us little to go off. The state’s duty, it seems, 
is to monitor when these individual associative rights make two leaps: from social to political 
and from an individual right to a group right. If both leaps occur, then Schmitt believes the state 
must take steps to depoliticize their use.  
Because the state has the authority to decide what constitutes politicization and how to respond, 
Schmitt’s guarantee of social rights does directly empower the state with alarming discretionary 
powers. Schmitt’s focus seems to be on the logical coherence of the constitution itself and not 
the potential abuse of the constitution by its representatives. Most problematically, Schmitt 
trashes the right to equality before the law (Article 109). He categorizes it as a political right, 
rather than a right of the individual. It is difficult to make sense of this decision, since it is 
obviously the right of an individual against the state – moreover, equality before the law need not 
apply to citizens at all. A charitable reading could argue he did so because Article 109 includes 
other rights related to citizenship – but even so, his argument is obviously wrong. It is difficult to 
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see how equality before the law either can be used to undermine the Absolute Constitution. 
Moreover, it is no clear how it is a right “to” the state rather than against the state’s interference. 
Equality before the law protects isolated individuals against the power of the state and, under 
Schmitt’s own rubric, clearly should have been classified as a basic right. 
 
3. Defending the Absolute Constitution of the bourgeois Rechtsstaat 
Besides the threat posed by democratic value-neutrality, Schmitt discusses several other threats 
to the state and constitution and offers institutional solutions to them stemming from his theory 
of Weimar’s Absolute Constitution. Aside from the absolute entrenchment of basic liberty rights 
and the empowerment of a “guardian” to take action in cases of parliamentary failure and 
emergencies (as discussed in Chapter 5), his solutions included bans against unconstitutional 
parties, legal constraints on “negative” majorities, and a stronger federation of the Weimar state. 
a. Limitations on Negative Majorities 
Parties too weak to enact laws still had power. By always opposing the majority and coordinating 
their actions with other minority parties, weak parties could undermine parliament’s functionality 
even in normal times. In his Constitutional Theory, Schmitt warned about the potential of 
“negative” majorities of unconstitutional parties to sow the seeds for revolution by rendering 
parliament impotent and making it look incompetent. Recognizing their potential there, Schmitt 
theorized a way to prevent them from undermining the state. Schmitt calls cases like this merely 
an “accidental” majority and writes it is “in most cases useless logically, juristically, and 
politically” because it only aimed at debilitating the state. Specifically, when a majority of 
Reichstag members aimed not to govern but to demonstrate how the Reichstag and the 
democratic state were political failures (which the communists and Nazis actually did later 
cooperate in doing in Weimar), value-neutrality and political rights like equal chance empowered 
them to do so. 
Schmitt realized that Article 54’s no-confidence vote to dissolve the Reichsregierung was a 
powerful tool in the hands of unconstitutional parties when they were strong enough to act as 
negative majorities. He warned that Article 54 could be used to empower a (negative) majority in 
the Reichstag to oppose the Reichsregierung on political grounds and make legislation 
impossible and even topple the government.
71
 For example, the KPD and NSDAP opposed every 
Reichsregierung because they rejected the constitution itself. When they dominated the 
Reichstag, they forced the Reichspräsident to decide between two equally undesirable and 
destabilizing options: to dissolve the Reichstag using Article 25 (and hope reelections would 
produce a majority actually interested in governing) or allow the Reichsregierung to be dissolved. 
Neither option would yield a working legislative body in Weimar.  
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Schmitt wrote the problem was there was nothing in the use of Article 54 to guarantee a majority 
was “positive” and would actually govern.
72
 A majority of the Reichstag might be able to take 
down the Reichsregierung and stall the Reichstag but, because they were substantively 
heterogeneous, offer up no functional alternative. For Schmitt, negative majorities were another 
symptom of the quantitatively total state: too weak to govern by themselves but strong or 
reckless enough to impede others.
73
 Without seeking a positive majority to replace the 
government the Reichstag had just expressed its lack of confidence in, Article 54 becomes “an 
act of pure obstruction.”
74
 In those cases, Schmitt argues, there is no duty to resign, even; the 
government need not recognize a vote of no confidence by a majority unable to organize a stable 
new government.
75
 His point is that Article 54 like Article 76 could be (and later was) 
instrumentalized by democratically legitimated parties in their goal of thwarting and 
overthrowing democracy itself. 
b. Bans on Unconstitutional Parties 
Stemming from his arguments that political rights are distinct from basic rights and therefore do 
not hold absolutely, Schmitt argues that the very presence of parties deeply opposed to the core 
commitments of the Weimar Constitution in the Reichstag could be a threat to the Weimar state. 
They could use the power of public office to further their revolutionary goals by actually 
thwarting effective governance. But beyond blocking parliament, they could also use the veneer 
of holding public office and their privileged access to public opinion to shroud and “legitimate” 
their ideals, thereby broadening their base. As described in the above table, Schmitt argued 
political rights, such as equal access to public office, are qualitatively different from and 
subordinate to basic liberty rights. Political rights, while important, are not a part of the Absolute 
Constitution. By conceiving of political rights in these terms, Schmitt believed Weimar had a 
means to weaken the power of potential revolutionary parties: if individuals or groups exploited 
political rights to undermine basic liberty rights, their political rights can be legitimately 
limited.
76
 As an example, Schmitt discusses the opposition of both the KPD and NSDAP to 
Weimar’s basic rights and its bourgeois Rechtsstaat.
77
 Because of the incoherence between their 
political goals and Weimar’s Absolute Constitution, Schmitt argues they ought to be denied 
political rights to participate. 
The theoretical basis for Schmitt’s differentiation between the right of a political party to 
participate and the right of an individual to believe seems to come from Hobbes’ distinction 
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between confessio and fides.
78
 Private belief (fides) cannot translate into acts eroding the 
foundations of the public sphere (confessio). Private beliefs, even those opposed to the political 
status, are tolerable as long as they remain depoliticized. But when individuals and associations 
become indirect powers threatening the nature of the peace the relativizing status achieves, a 
qualitative shift, they cross the threshold of tolerability because it risks reintroducing the state of 
nature. The state cannot tolerate such private beliefs. Just as Hobbes excepted private individual 
belief from the public “cujus regio, ejus religio,” so Schmitt theorized Weimar could tolerate 
radical individual beliefs but not politicized illiberal antidemocratic movements that attempted to 
revolutionize the constitution. There was no way to stop a private Nazi, but the state had to 
prevent the Nazi party from using government to undermine the legitimacy of Weimar by  
obstructing or subverting it. Thus, by adapting Hobbes’ concepts to the 20
th
 century, Schmitt 
justified bans on those political parties existentially opposed to Weimar. 
c. The Federated State [Bundesstaat] 
Finally, Schmitt cautioned that tensions between Weimar’s Länder (individual states, such as 
Prussia, Bavaria, and Nord Rhine-Westphalia) and the Reich itself could be another means for 
revolutionaries to exploit democracy to further their goals of undermining the state and 
constitution. He wrote that the Länder were the walls behind which extremist parties could hide 
and consolidate their power.
79
 For example, the NSDAP used Bavaria as its safe haven and grew 
within its relative safety. Another example of the problematic dynamic of Reich and Länder 
came from Prussia. Prussia was two-thirds of the entire Reich. And because the Prussian capital 
was also located in Berlin, Berlin housed two centers of government and two parliamentary 
bodies: the Prussian Landstag and the Reichstag. And the Prussian police were large and strong 
enough to potentially constitute a military power strong enough to balance the Germany army 
itself. Were the Prussian Landstag seized by extremists, it may not even matter if the Reich itself 
was still constitutionally secure. For Schmitt, Prussia had the potential to become a political and 
military counter-power to Weimar and to turn the Reich into a “colossus with feet of clay.”
80
 
Schmitt argued Prussia could not be permitted to become a counter-power within Weimar’s 
federated structure. Were the NSDAP or KPD to take Prussia, they would be in a position to 
directly threaten the Reich. By staging a revolution in Prussia, they could trigger civil war within 
the Reich itself. And this problem would actually come to a head in the Preußenschlag.
81
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 Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol, trans. 
George Schwab and Erna Hilfstein (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 54-56. 
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81 The political pluralism in Weimar’s Reichstag was paralleled in its Länder. And although the Prussian 
Government had been dominated by the SPD until 1932, Prussia too had become a microcosm for the party 
political-situation of the entire Reich. There, powerful and well organized political movements with affiliated 
paramilitary organizations confronted one another as political “enemies” committed to using any and all means to 
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In the Preußenschlag, Schmitt drafted ordinances to thwart the NSDAP’s attempts to hold a legal 
revolution in the Prussian Landstag and weaken the power Prussia could use through Weimar’s 
federated structure. He also advised Hindenburg, via von Schleicher, to use Article 48 to unify 
the Reich and overcome opposition from both the SPD and the NSDAP to collapsing Prussian 
power. Schmitt described his participation in the Preußenschlag as an attempt to prevent the 
NSDAP from finding any subsequent handholds in its ascent to power without giving it rallying 
point to further contest democratic legitimacy. He believed the Reich had to bypass the factional 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
acquire the state and wield its machinery to impose their Weltanschauung across it. And as the SPD’s base of 
support eroded in Prussia, extremist parties expanded. Schmitt’s concerns about the dynamic between Prussia and 
the Reich, between two extremism and the state, played out in reality in the events leading up to the 
“Preußenschlag” of July 20, 1932. And – in a rare moment for political and constitutional theorists – Schmitt had 
the opportunity to put his theory into direct practice when he represented the Reich in Prussia vs. Reich, the 
constitutional trial over the legitimacy of the Preußenschlag. 
The Preußenschlag installed von Papen as “Commissioner” of Prussia – effectively ending Prussia’s 
independent status as a Land. Dyzenhaus, who offers the best analysis in English, argues this decree removed the 
last pillar of legitimate democracy in Weimar when it removed the SPD from power in Prussia (David Dyzenhaus, 
"The Concept of the Rule-of-Law State in Schmitt's Verfassungslehre," in The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt, ed. 
Oliver Simons and Jens Meierhenrich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 16-22; Dyzenhaus, Legality and 
Legitimacy, 30-37; David Dyzenhaus, "Legal Theory in the Collapse of Weimar: Contemporary Lessons?," The 
American Political Science Review 91, no. 1 (1997): 122-127.). Yet, although Prussia had been controlled by the SPD 
until April 24, 1932, it was not the Preußenschlag that upset the balance of power. After the April elections, the 
SPD no longer commanded a plurality of the vote. Instead, the NSDAP had triumphed in the elections and won a 
plurality. Moreover, after April it was the NSDAP and the KPD who commanded a majority in the Prussian Landstag. 
It was with the April elections that Prussia ceased to be the pillar of Weimar democracy.  
Sensing its loss of power, the Prussian SPD led by Braun passed an eleventh hour revision to election law 
that allowed it to remain in office as a “permanente Geschäftsregierung” [permanent caretaker government] to 
govern until a legitimate alternative coalition formed (Seiberth, Anwalt des Reiches, 43ff, 93ff; Dyzenhaus, "The 
Concept of the Rule-of-Law State in Schmitt's Verfassungslehre," 17.). This revision prompted a legitimation crisis: 
the NSDAP argued the SPD changed the rules of the game to keep itself in power, violating democratic neutrality 
and its right to the cabinet as Prussia’s largest party. The SPD counter-argued that the NSDAP could not form a 
legitimate majority coalition. Although our sympathies naturally fall with the SPD, its decision to alter the electoral 
law did effectively kick down the ladder of democracy, changing the nature of democratic equal chance altogether 
(Cf. Caldwell, "Controversies over Carl Schmitt: A Review of Recent Literature," 369-371.). On the other hand, 
Braun and the SPD were right to try to find ways to keep the NSDAP out of office, recognizing the unconstitutional 
nature of the party. In effect, their actions were consistent with Schmitt’s own concerns about unconstitutional 
parties even if they did not resolve the problematic dynamic of Prussia and Weimar. As noted above, Schmitt 
argued that there is no duty to resign in the case of negative majorities in his discussion of Article 54. Caldwell 
notes that Schmitt’s participation in the Preußenschlag raises doubts about his theory. But with all the other 
problems of the Prussian state, especially the counterpower it posed to the Reich, however, Schmitt believed the 
situation was too grave to attempt an SPD-led minority coalition there. (Caldwell, "Controversies over Carl Schmitt: 
A Review of Recent Literature," 372-373; Cf. Dyzenhaus, "The Concept of the Rule-of-Law State in Schmitt's 
Verfassungslehre," 19-20; Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy, 82.)  
Neither the SPD nor the NSDAP would tolerate the other’s control over the Prussian Landstag because 
both saw the other’s actions as illegitimate and unconstitutional. Rather than risk the situation escalating into civil 
war, von Schleicher asked Schmitt to constitutionally prevent Prussia from becoming a political counterpower to 
the Reich, should it fall into the hands of the NSDAP (Seiberth, Anwalt Des Reiches, 144.). Schmitt drafted an 
ordinance [Verordnung] to keep the police out of the hands of the NSDAP and an attempt to ban paramilitary 
organizations and unconstitutional parties like the NSDAP. He also advised von Schleicher to exercise Article 48 to 
unify the Reich and circumvent any potential violent confrontations between the SPD and NSDAP and between 
Prussia and the Reich.  
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conflicts occurring in its Länder if Weimar’s Absolute Constitution was to be maintained.
82
 This 
meant reinforcing the legal unity of the Reich against Prussia – the state within the Weimar state. 
d. Reflections from Bonn 
In his 1958 remarks to Legality and Legitimacy, Schmitt notes that his arguments against the 
unlimited use of Article 76, rejected in Weimar, found express recognition in Article 79 of the 
1949 Bonn Grundgesetz.
83
 Schmitt argues the Grundgesetz realized the very principles upon 
which he had insisted 18 years earlier in his struggle against a relentless “value-neutral, 
positivistic” opposition. Schmitt believed the principles underlying the Article 79 eternity clause 
of the Grundgesetz can be construed in terms of the distinction between Absolute and Relative 
Constitution, between legitimacy and legality.  
Even before he explicitly endorsed Article 79 in 1958, Schmitt wrote a lengthy analysis of the 
Bonn Grundgesetz in 1949 under a pseudonym.
84
 This analysis has been almost entirely 
overlooked in English,
85
 yet it reveals how he thinks the Weimar Constitution should have 
looked if it were to successfully uphold the Absolute Constitution. Schmitt summarizes the Bonn 
Grundgesetz by writing “the Federal Republic of Germany is not only a democratic and federal 
                                                             
82 Looking at how other theorists, such as Kelsen ( Hans Kelsen, "Das Urteil des Staatsgerichtshofs Vom 25. Oktober 
1932," Die Justiz 9, no. 2/3 (1932). ), Kirchheimer (Otto Kirchheimer, "Verfassungsreform und Sozialdemokratie," 
die Gesellschaft 10(1933): 32. Cited in Seiberth, Anwalt des Reiches, 131. ), and Fraenkel (Ernst Fraenkel, 
"Verfassungsreform und Sozialdemokratie (1932)," in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Hubertus Buchstein and Rainer 
Kühn (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), 518ff, 525-529. ), reacted, one finds a consensus that the 
premises of the Preußenschlag, preventing the NSDAP seizure of Prussia for the security of Weimar itself, were 
well grounded, legitimate and necessary.  
Kelsen’s account in is particularly revealing. He argues “The policy and goals of Prussia and the Reich ought to be 
unified. If a Landsregierung could impede public security and order were it held by certain movements (i.e. the 
NSDAP), it was legitimate for the Reich to assume power. The Weimar Constitution had created this problem by 
providing insufficient effective guarantees for its maintenance. Therefore, it fell to the president to do so through 
Article 48.” To that effect, he writes Hindenburg’s measure [Maßnahme] was constitutional; the constitution 
provided the possibility for ensuring coordination of the different tiers of institutional power in line with the 
Grundnorm implicit in the Constitution. cf. Seiberth, Anwalt des Reiches, 195-198. 
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 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 95-96. 
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 Carl Schmitt, "Das Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1949-1950)," in Carl Schmitt und die 
Liberalismuskritik, ed. Klaus Hansen and Hans Lietzmann (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1988); Cf. Hans Lietzmann, 
"Carl Schmitt Alias Dr. Haustein: editorische Anmerkungen zu einem politischen Konzept zwischen ,,Occasionalität" 
und Opportunismus.," ibid.  
85
 Jan-Werner Müller seems to be the only thinker to have taken it up. But he summarily argues Schmitt wrote it 
merely in a desperate attempt to earn some money. Müller, A Dangerous Mind, 62. But when one looks at the 
substance of what Schmitt writes in the context of his earlier analysis of the flaws in the Weimar Constitution and 
the solutions he proposes, this fails to explain the substance of what Schmitt wrote. The similarities between this 
anonymous argument and his other writings are remarkable. Schmitt actually restates, in “un-Schmittian” terms, 
many of the same constitutional arguments he made in Weimar. Most importantly, he approves that the architects 
of the Bonn Grundgesetz decided on an Absolute Constitution in the terms outlined in his Constitutional Theory 
through Article 79. Although he Schmitt (deliberately) avoids using many of his characteristic concepts, the 
meaning remains the same. One finds Schmitt when one knows how to look for him. 
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structure. It is above all a Rechtsstaat…”
86
 He writes “if [the basic rights outlined in Articles 1-
19] really dominate the entire public life of the federation and the states, one can say that 
Germany is a Rechtsstaat in which the life, liberty, and property of every human being is 
protected and it is moreover not misleading to speak of the basic rights of the Germans.”
87
 He 
argues the Grundgesetz is a major advance because it structures its constitution logically. Rather 
than putting the “organizational” component first, as Weimar had, it opens with its basic decision 
to be a Rechtsstaat.
88
 This positioning eliminates the ambiguity about its political status that had 
led to the prevailing interpretation in Weimar. 
Besides simply expressing its basic decision, Schmitt argues that the Bonn Grundgesetz also 
commits to it. Its status as a bourgeois Rechtsstaat takes precedence because it argues the basic 
rights of Articles 1-19 are asserted as existing prior to the state, they are the telos for which the 
state exists.
89
 Positive Law, he argues, has been reconnected to idées générales because Bonn’s 
basic rights link law to its meta-juridical foundations.
90 
He also anticipates his 1954 claim, 
writing with approval that Bonn’s Article 79 “Eternity Clause” legally entrenches the 
constitution’s political decision from any attempts at revision whatsoever. Bonn is thus not 
merely a mechanical state, it committed existentially to its Absolute Constitution. Furthermore, 
Schmitt notes that popular referendums are not included in the Grundgesetz, which will further 
buttress its constitution against radical democratic revision.
91
  
Schmitt writes the Grundgesetz also provides for a definite guardian (Hüter). However, it is not 
the Reichspräsident, but the courts, culminating in the Federal Constitution Court, who are its 
guardian.
92
 It seems likely that he would be satisfied that there is an explicit guardian, especially 
that the guardian had the power to overrule democratically “legitimated” decisions against the 
Absolute Constitution.
93
 The most important power of the courts is to declare explicit Enemies of 
the constitution. The interpretation of core political concepts like “democratic” or “just” is not 
left open in a way where they could be interpreted against the basic decision of the 
Grundgesetz.
94
 Schmitt’s also finds his typology of basic rights in the Grundgesetz: according to 
Article 21, parties can have their political rights restricted or they can even be banned for 
violating Bonn’s constitutional principles and, according to Article 18, individual liberty rights in 
connection with other individuals may also be forfeited when they are abused in the struggle 
against the basic democratic order. Schmitt notes, in contrast to Weimar’s weak federalism, there 
Articles 31 and 37 assure the legal superiority of Federal law over Land law and authorize the 
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Federal government to use coercion in extreme cases against the Länder for the sake of 
preserving political and legal unity. Finally, Schmitt notes with approval how the Bonn 
Grundgesetz has a mechanism to prevent the recurrence of negative majorities’ abuse of the vote 
of no confidence, the “so-called constructive or positives votes of no confidence” of Article 67.
95
  
Schmitt's remarks on the Bonn Grundgesetz show that he believed it was an improvement over 
the Weimar constitution. Bonn had learned from the errors that had crippled Weimar. Most 
importantly, it decides for itself and provides mechanisms to prevent democratic legitimacy from 
being abused to destroy the constitution and revolutionize the state.  
 
4. Carl Schmitt, Karl Loewenstein, and Militant Democracy 
Schmitt argued the Weimar Constitution – any liberal democratic constitution, for that matter – 
faced a choice when its two constitutive principles conflicted: between democratic legal change 
and basic rights, value-neutrality and Liberté, Relative Constitution and Absolute Counter-
Constitution.
96
 Under normal circumstances, these two principles coexist unproblematically. Yet 
in exceptional circumstances, like a political and economic crisis, the existential opposition 
between them can erupt and demand a decision on which ought to have priority.  
But it was only a choice in theory, Schmitt thought, because the decision for total value-
neutrality only led to “system suicide.”
97
 Unconstrained democracy and value-neutrality lead to 
chaos and tyrannical government.
98
 Schmitt vehemently opposed this constitution – but he did so 
with another.
99
 He argued basic rights could be the foundation of legal order in the substantive 
sense he proposes; they could serve as Weimar’s “superlégalité constitutionnelle.”
100
 Were 
liberalism to restrict its value-neutrality to matters beyond its own liberal order and existentially 
commit to liberalism and elevate basic rights beyond the reach of revision, it would establish 
itself as a qualitatively total state and become political liberalism.  
Renato Cristi describes Schmitt’s theory as “authoritarian liberalism,”
101
 i.e. “a form of 
liberalism that stands opposed to purely normative liberalism.”
102
 This definition makes sense 
especially when one considers Schmitt’s discussion of philosophical anthropology: the dogma of 
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political liberalism holds human nature to be naturally “evil” and required some measure of 
authority to prevent a state of chaos from erupting – what Cristi calls “normative” liberalism, 
which produces value-neutral proceduralism, does not. Schmitt had theorized a state that could 
defend and enforce basic liberal rights unconditionally. Its legitimacy lays in realizing a rational 
political status rather than a will, which provided it with a basis to overrule popular sovereignty 
in those cases where its will conflicted with basic rights. Schmitt’s theory indeed straddles 
authoritarianism and liberalism. 
But there is another way to characterize Schmitt’s theory of the Absolute Constitution when 
applied to liberal democratic states. When one considers the institutions Schmitt theorized – the 
concept of the Absolute Constitution (the absolute entrenchment of the core principles of the 
constitution), bans on “unconstitutional” parties, and a guardian who can authoritatively 
determine the Friends and Enemies of the constitution and the limits of legitimate constitutional 
change – his theory ends up looking a lot like Karl Loewenstein’s theory of “militant 
democracy.”
103
 And, as I have argued, Schmitt argued his constitutional theory has a lot in 
common with the main institutions outlined in the Bonn Grundgesetz, which is arguably the 
paradigmatic militant democracy constitution. These overlaps may reveal something about the 
nature of militant democracy itself. 
                                                             
103 I suspect that Loewenstein’s militant democracy might have been substantially influenced by Schmitt and a 
welcome contribution to the literature would be a scholarly analysis of Loewenstein’s pre- and post-Weimar state 
and constitutional theory. Loewenstein’s militant democracy is a substantial departure from his earlier 
constitutional writings. In 1931, before the fall of Weimar, Loewenstein, like Kelsen, Thoma, and Anschütz, argued 
against limiting democratic constitutional change (through Article 76), arguing explicitly against Carl Schmitt. Yet, 
as I describe below, Loewenstein’s theory of militant democracy overlaps substantially with Schmitt’s theory. Thus, 
in the span of 5 years or less, Loewenstein’s theory about the relationship of constitutionalism and democracy 
seems to have undergone an almost total reversal. When taken in conjunction with Loewenstein’s familiarity with 
Schmitt and his work and Loewenstein’s post-war remarks about how Schmitt’s “constructive criticism” of the 
Weimar Constitution, particular in his Dictatorship and Constitutional Theory, diagnosed its defects and offered a 
potential remedy to it, there is a good deal of circumstantial evidence pointing to Schmitt’s influence on 
Loewenstein. What remains, then, is to see whether there is any substantial evidence to confirm or deny Schmitt’s 
influence. 
The most explicit contrast with Loewenstein’s militant democracy comes from his 1931 Habilitation, 
Erscheinungsformen der Verfassungsänderung, in which he was highly critical of key features of Schmitt’s state and 
constitutional theory – especially Schmitt’s attempts to limit the exercise of Article 76. In his Habilitation, 
Loewenstein argued the Weimar Constitution was infinitely amendable as long as Weimar’s Reichstag adhered to 
the procedures outlined by Article 76. Speaking of the Reichstag, he writes “The legislative [Gesetzgeber] 
organized as a constitutional legislator [Verfassungsgesetzgeber] faces no substantive limits to constitutional 
change, even to the point of the total abrogation [Totalaufhebung] of the constitution, as long as they adhere to 
the essential forms shown to be absolutely necessary in this study; therefore, Carl Schmitt’s theory of the material 
limits to constitutional amendment has to be rejected.” Karl Loewenstein, Erscheinungsformen der 
Verfassungsänderung: Verfassungsrechtsdogmatische Untersuchungen zu Artikel 76 der Reichsverfassung  (Aalen: 
Scientia Verlag, 1968), vii (my emphasis).  
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a. Karl Loewenstein’s Militant Democracy 
Karl Loewenstein first coined the term “militant democracy” in 1937. He argued democratic 
principles had, across Europe, enabled antidemocratic and illiberal parties to exploit democracy 
for legal revolution. In response, he wrote, “democracy must become militant” – by which he 
meant democracy should set measures to limit how democratic procedures could be used against 
a liberal democratic state’s constitutional core. His argument is in some ways an affirmation of 
constitutionalism over democracy. But he pushes militant democracy beyond constitutionalism: 
Loewenstein argues democracies ought to defend themselves proactively against its enemies, 
including potential or latent threats. The most important features of Loewenstein’s theory are the 
absolute entrenchment of constitutional principles beyond the reach of democratic 
emendation;
104
 restrictions on the political rights, like equal chance, of antidemocratic or illiberal 
parties and movements
105
 (and the distinction of political rights from basic rights
106
); the 
appointment of a clear “guardian” of the constitution and the legitimacy of the use of exceptional 
acts against enemies of the constitution;
107
 controls on “political” uses of the media and other 
demonstrations against the heart of the democratic state;
108
 and the federation of states to prevent 
the formation of extremist safe havens.
109
 
Like Schmitt’s theory of the Absolute Constitution, Loewenstein’s militant democracy is above 
all concerned with preventing the subversion of a constitutional democracy by an emotionally-
driven “ochlocracy.”
110
 Also like Schmitt’s theory, Loewenstein argues that the core principles 
of the democratic state must stand beyond the reach of popular revision.
111
 Finally, he argues like 
Schmitt that even democratic government requires consensus on the “fundamentals” of the state; 
that total plurality can undermine the state. In a passage worth quoting at length, he writes,  
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Evidently parliamentary government is workable only where unanimity about the 
fundamentals of national values is unbroken. In the absence of such unanimity, the strain 
of how to harmonize conflicting conceptions on the therapeutics to be administered to the 
ailing body politic resulted in most states in destruction of the policy-forming process 
through parliament, and, in consequence thereof, in economic disintegration and even 
chaos. More and more the legislative body torn by internal dissensions, became incapable 
of expeditious action or any action at all.
112
 
Like Schmitt, Loewenstein sees factionalism – caused by the disagreement over the fundamental 
political “decision” of the state and constitution – as the defining threat to the 20
th
 century 
democracy. The democratic state cannot tolerate those who reject the rules of the game. And, 
like Schmitt, Loewenstein argues these “fundamental” decisions are the basis to distinguish total 
from partial constitutional revisions.
113
 He conceives these fundamentals as the inviolable core of 
the constitution. And movements substantively opposed to “democratic” constitutional 
fundamentals and who would seek to alter them if they had sufficient popular support can be 
legitimately denied political participatory rights.
114
 Loewenstein’s militant democracy thus holds 
a substantive conception of what the constitution and democracy look like and it uses them to 
guard against pathological forms of democratic behavior. 
Although “militant democracy” is for the sake of defending the “democratic order,” it employs 
mechanisms remarkably similar to Schmitt’s Absolute Constitution. Despite its name, 
Loewenstein’s militant democracy does not seem to be primarily concerned with preserving 
“democracy.” It is about preserving the deeper core of the constitution, which Loewenstein calls 
“fundamental rights,” against democratic subversion. It is also about denying “unconstitutional” 
parties access to those legal democratic procedures and using state authority to overcome 
constitutional emergencies and its enemies. Insofar as the spirit and logic of democracy includes 
an openness to democratic revision of even core constitutional features and a toleration of the 
political goals of its constituents,
115
 Loewenstein’s militant democracy is undemocratic. That is, 
although democracy still plays a role in militant democracy, it is in a contained form and an at 
best secondary consideration. In this regard, Loewenstein’s theory seems to have a substantial 
overlap with Schmitt’s constitutional and political theory – as he himself suggests in his 1945 
remarks on Carl Schmitt.
116
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b. An Alternative Rights-Based State Theory 
Jan Werner Müller recently wrote that militant democracy appears to lack “a proper normative 
theory.”
117
 This may be due in part to the way Loewenstein theorized it. He was more concerned 
with establishing practical institutions to deal with the immediate threat of fascism than with 
providing a substantive legitimation for those institutions. Many thinkers confronting it today are 
less comfortable with Loewenstein’s theory, worrying for example that militant democracy 
betrays democracy’s legacy of self-determination and self-legislation.
118
 Militant democracy may 
not sit well with these thinkers because, aside from its name, it is not so much a theory of 
democracy as a peculiar, and extreme, theory of constitutional commitment. But it does not sit 
well with traditional liberal theory either, because it draws hard limits on toleration and gives 
state authority substantial latitude in defending itself. For these reasons, “militant democracy” 
may not sit well with the core ideals of liberal democracy at all. Yet, for lack of alternative ways 
to conceive of it, theorists have struggled to define and defend it as an institution. But conceiving 
of militant democracy as an extension of the liberal democratic tradition may be the wrong 
approach. Its similarities with Schmitt’s state theory provide an opportunity to approach militant 
democracy differently than it has been so far.  
Although Schmitt saw his state theory as embracing a facet of liberalism, it does not sit well 
within the liberal tradition. Peter Caldwell, Duncan Kelly, and Nehal Bhuta have shown that 
Schmitt inherits and stands in the 19
th
 century tradition of German state theory that understands, 
Bhuta writes, the state as “a comprehensive unity of social life and an order of domination 





 century “Hegelian” approach to the state may overlap with the liberal democratic 
tradition on certain issues, there are reasons to be reluctant to classify it as emerging from that 
tradition. In particular, it collides against the ideals underlying the social contract tradition. It 
theorizes the state’s existence, before that of the individual and subordinates individual status to 
that of the state – even as the state guarantees individual rights against it. Through this genealogy, 
Schmitt may be better understood as taking up a theory of rights based on a far older tradition 
than liberalism. While Schmitt’s immediate relationship to this tradition comes through his early 
study of Jellinek and Sohm, it began with the ancients and runs through seminal thinkers like 
Hobbes (in Schmitt’s interpretation) and – most importantly – Hegel.  
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Hegel aimed to reconcile Greek and Roman ideals of political life as the realm of reason and the 
highest form of individual existence with modern ideals of individualism. He argues freedom 
consists in the possession of rights and the absence of domination. But it departs substantially 
from the liberal tradition. He understood rights along the lines of the Roman concept of libertas 
– as opposed to licentia.
120
 Licentia was the freedom to will arbitrarily, a power to do whatever 
one likes without constraint or qualification. But the absence of constraints only leads to anarchy. 
Arbitrariness is not actually meaningful freedom: in a condition where anyone can do anything, 
Hobbes’ bellum omnium contra omnes reemerges.
121
 Thus, were everyone guaranteed subjective 
freedom (licentia), the outcome would be arbitrariness and eventually political chaos. The 
freedom of Libertas, on the other hand, begins with the renunciation of the arbitrary willing of 
licentia. If everyone is to enjoy freedom, there must be constraints on every individual’s will 
through law and guaranteed basic rights. This ideal also holds that meaningful freedom can exist 
only in a rational, law-bound order. Because libertas is not naturally occurring but must in a 




But beyond the effects of purely subjective freedom like licentia, Hegel argued that living in a 
community in which the state and political institutions were merely an instrument for the 
satisfaction of individual self-interests or living in a community unguided by “reason” would be 
to live in a state of incomplete freedom.
123
 The state alone was capable of realizing a rational, 
normative order in the world.
124
 So, not just rights but Right [Recht] itself was not possible 
outside of the state. Meaningful individual freedom therefore depended on the state’s authority to 
impose a rational order. It was thus normatively desirable to live in a rational state. But, 
conversely, Hegel argued that a Platonic-like state that did not provide for some degree of 
subjective freedom was not human at all – and therefore could not provide for meaningful 
individual freedom either.
125
 Full ethical life, Sittlichkeit, can come about only when both 
conditions are realized. The trouble was how to properly balance the two types of freedom. 
In this Hegelian tradition, a condition of state’s legitimacy and its end, therefore, was to realize 
Sittlichkeit.
126
 A further condition of Sittlichkeit was that it could not be a condition simply 
imposed on individuals by the state – as it would be if the state ruled merely using positive 
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law.
127
 Individuals must identify with the moral community and recognize the rational ends of 
their state as representing a higher (and worthier) goal than the satisfaction of their immediate 
material needs.
128
 That is, the constituents of the state must identify with the normative order the 
state realizes, which is simultaneously the state’s attempt to represent the realm of objective 
spirit and reason.
129
 And because a meaningful individual life and Right itself could not exist 
outside of the state, Hegel argued no state could be justified that was neutral toward its own 
order.
130
 Thus, a part of legitimacy meant the absolute authority of the state with regard to the 
realm of objective reason and the preservation of that order. The state was necessary for realizing 
complete freedom, a condition of Sittlichkeit. 
The rule of law was the state’s tool for realizing Sittlichkeit. It does so through both objective 
reason and subjective freedom. In terms of objective reason, individuals within the state will 
ideally recognize that, even if the law contravenes their immediate self-interests and needs, it is 
nonetheless legitimate because it is for the sake of a higher good and guarantees the 
commonwealth, both of which they share in and see as a part of their rational self-interest. 
Beside the politicized order of “objective reason” imposed by the state, this Hegelian state 
guaranteed a sphere beyond the reach of the political and legal interference through individual 
rights.
131
 It institutes a system of legal rights to guarantee a sphere of individual discretion. He 
called this depolicitized sphere civil society. Within the sphere of civil society, individuals could 
freely and arbitrarily live their lives however they desired. The depoliticized and “arbitrary” 
nature of civil society in Hegel’s state theory has been identified as Hegelian pluralism.
132
  
In his earlier writings, Schmitt discusses this Hegelian approach but attributes these ideas to 
Hobbes. He juxtaposes two types of natural law: scientific and justice-oriented 
(wissentschaftliches Naturrecht and Gerechtigkeitsnaturrecht).
133
 Gerechtigkeitsnaturrecht is 
defined by the rational and God-given qualities of the individual which exist prior to and 
independent of any political and social institutions that it produces.
134
 The state is constrained 
while the individual is unconstrained. Schmitt argues that this Grotian-Lockean tradition of 
natural law presupposes a certain order is already in effect. But without the determinacy of 
(individual) rights decided upon and effected by the state, there can be no Right at all.
135
 There is 
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no freedom or right in a state of nature. In fact, a state of nature destroys it. Freedom is a human 
product, something that has to be realized through deliberate actions. Instead, either the rights 
within this system actually rest on an actual concrete order, which the justification of the system 
is blind to, or it rests on nothing and will degenerate into a state of nature as individual 
interpretations conflict and politicize. 
Schmitt associates “scientific natural law” with Hobbes. For this theory, although contracting is 
theorized as an individual act, the individual falls out of the picture in the transition to the state. 
This tradition theorizes the individual as an atom, whose energy goes into producing the state, 
which in turn engulfs those atoms into its unified self. In the process, the state attains “unlimited 
and irrevocable” authority.
136
 Individuals are, in terms of justification, fully “irrelevant.” And, 
most importantly, the only moral worth an individual has comes about through the state (until 
there is a state, no individual can be said to have moral worth because in the state of nature there 
is no morality). Outside the state, there exists no right and therein lies its value. In Hobbes’ 
theory, according to Schmitt, the fact of the decision has more importance than the quality of that 
decision – because the imperative is to create an order in which morality, right, and justice can 
exist at all.
137
 Accordingly, the state has priority over the individual and is unconstrained, while, 
since individuality in a normative sense can only exist within the state, individual status is 
wholly subordinate to it. 
Schmitt offers a rather Hegelian reading of Hobbes. He reads out of Hobbes the role Hegel 
accords the state in realizing objective reason and Sittlichkeit (which Schmitt too accords the 
state). This, in turn, suggests the depth of Schmitt’s debts to this Hegelian “lineage.”
138
 One 
important overlap is their treatment of individual rights. Although Hegel’s state theory does 
provide for basic rights and a depoliticized sphere of subjective freedom, it is clearly no liberal 
theory of rights. Instead it stands in an alternative tradition in which individuals cannot be 
conceived of outside the state and the order it guarantees. Schmitt, far more so than Hegel, is no 
liberal. And Schmitt’s account of individual rights and depolicitization ends up sounding a lot 
like Hegelian “pluralism.” Individual life is “depoliticized,” i.e. left to individuals’ discretion for 
them to develop themselves however they saw fit. And, like Hegel, Schmitt theorized the rights 
the state guaranteed were property and basic individual liberties.  
Another important similarity is how Schmitt also conceives of the state as fulfilling the opposed 
values of subjective “need” and objective reason. Hegel’s state appears to be similar to Schmitt’s 
images of Hobbes’ Leviathan: both see the state as a complexio oppositorium of soul and body – 
god and machine.
139
 The state simultaneously satisfies individual “need” through the freedoms of 
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civil society, reinforced through guarantees of individual security, property, and liberty rights. 
But the realm of objective reason the state imposes is far too important to allow individual 
discretion – even if a democratic will expresses a desire to alter it. The state for Schmitt alone 
produces the “higher value (peace, order, the good, the constitution, etc.), a jus of lex, to which 
individuals must align themselves (their “duty towards the state”) if a concrete order is to be 
maintained or created” – i.e. a condition of Sittlichkeit.
140
 But Schmitt does not endorse anything 
like Hegel’s progressive cunning of reason. Instead, although the state produces “the good,” this 
good was the struggle against a historical process of disenchantment that came to threaten even 
the state itself. For this reason, the state could not afford to be neutral toward itself or the rational 
order it provided. And it was conceived in a way that subordinated the individual to the political 
order the state constituted. The state, as actualizer of all legal norms in reality, was a necessary 
authority to hold back or restrain the state of nature.
141
  
Schmitt thought the Hobbesian-Hegelian tradition, which recognized the state as the realizer of a 
space in which justice, right, law, and even individuality can exist and have meaning, was the 
only way to legitimate a state that did not leave the door open to its eventual subversion. That is, 
granting individuals “right” before the state – as the Grotian Gerechtigkeitsnaturrecht tradition 
did – opened the door to the state’s subversion by individuation. The state, whatever status it 
realized, had to come prior. Approaching state theory in this way, Schmitt is indeed, as Bhuta has 
argued, an inheritor of the 19
th
 century German tradition of theorizing (and justifying) the state’s 
order-generating and -maintaining capacity.
142
  
For Schmitt, understanding the state as prior to the individual does not mean abandoning some of 
the most important ideals of modernity, however. While one must recognize the priority of the 
state over the individual – for, without the state, there can be no individual –, Schmitt seems to 
believe this can be reconciled with the core values of the bourgeois Rechtsstaat as he conceives it: 
basic rights and checks on state power. Even democracy can be reconciled with this conception 
of the state. What changes is that these values are conceived of as the core end, or constitutive 
principle of the state rather than as something individuals have simply by existing – as natural 
right ex nihilo. Conceived in this way, basic liberal rights depend on the perpetuation of the 
political order guaranteeing them. And it is the same with democracy. And if democracy 
becomes a weapon against itself or against basic rights, then no matter how “right” popular 
sovereignty may be, the political order guaranteeing it takes precedence over its practice as well 
as for the sake of preventing the far worse evil – the re-eruption of the violence of the state of 
nature that a democratic “revolution” entails. Without the guaranteed practice of the most 
important ideals of modernity, i.e. liberal freedoms and democracy, their a priori reasonability 
can end up being irrelevant for human life. Recht is nothing if it is not also real. 
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Conceiving of Schmitt’s state theory as an intermediary between Hegel’s state theory and 
militant democracy suggests that militant democracy may be a misleading term. It seems to have 
more in common with “authoritarian” liberalism – or perhaps militant constitutionalism
143
 –, and 
the 19
th
 century tradition of German state theory, than any contemporary theories of democratic 
legitimacy rooted in the Western liberal tradition. Certainly, it comes across as a misleading 
attempt to repackage classical state-centered thought in terms “friendly” to the discourse of 
liberal democracy.  
I have emphasized how Schmitt denies that law can be mere command, i.e. mere positive law, 
even if it is a popular command. Recht must be rational as well as real. Militant democracy 
seems to follow this in arguing that the unqualified freedom of democracy in certain spheres of 
legislation, such as to eliminate itself, is no longer an act of democratic liberty but an act of 
democratic license. Because such an act is no exercise of freedom it is not something that the 
state must guarantee. Yet Schmitt also argued that even if Recht is rational, it must also be real. 
Thus, whatever rights individuals have exist only within the state and the state need not tolerate 
this particular type of abuse, even if the state’s end is the actualization of those rights in the case 
of the bourgeois Rechtsstaat. Toleration and freedom, according to this conception, does not 
mean respecting the legitimacy of democracy to the point of allowing democratic suicide to 
undermine the reality of law and the political order. 
Militant democracy, in a way similar to what Schmitt has argued, holds that the authority of the 
state was not reducible to the aggregated will of individuals on certain fundamental issues, i.e. 
that legitimacy has nothing to do with arbitrary wills of individuals, mechanically assembled. 
Indeed, militant democracy seems to be compatible with a more “authoritarian” state form 
whenever democracy encounters a “state of siege.” That is, as long as the core of the constitution 
is preserved, undemocratic decision-making become legitimate under these emergency 
circumstances and especially when democracy itself becomes a threat to the constitutional core 
and the state.  
The persistence of “authoritarian” institutions like militant democracy in real constitutions today 
shows that this 19
th
 century statist tradition is alive and well. Dressed in terminology from a 
different tradition, discussions about the legitimacy of militant democracy have been 
complicated because it appear as if it militant democracy should satisfy the terms of democratic 
legitimacy set forth by thinkers like Kelsen. And even if one objects to militant democracy, by 
approaching it in terms of Schmitt’s theory of the Absolute Constitution, rather than as standing 
within the traditional liberal theory, would enrich the discussion of the legitimacy and limits of 
militant democracy because Schmitt’s state theory provides a normative basis to militant 
democracy. Militant democracy does not aim at guaranteeing “democracy” per se but is far more 
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concerned with guaranteeing “liberalism.” It is on this basis, and through its origins in 19
th
 
century thought, that militant democracy can legitimize limiting the range of democratic will. 
Here, again, Schmitt aims to push liberals out of their comfort zone by exposing a core 
existential decision – one we hope we will never have to act on. Which takes precedence: a 
commitment to basic rights or a commitment to democratic procedure? Schmitt argues that, those 
who believe democratic procedure has greater legitimacy must confront one of their underlying 
presuppositions: that democracy cannot be tyrannical, that the will of the people is all there is. 
Schmitt argues that not only can democracy be tyrannical but far more important to 
contemporary political practice than democratic procedure are the rights guaranteeing protections 
against tyrannical majorities. But he grounds this conception not on metaphysical conceptions of 
human dignity but on the facticity of the state and its constitution. 
 
Conclusion: Shifting the Debate about Militant Democracy  
While Schmitt is certainly not best understood as a liberal, it is a gross simplification to 
characterize him as relentlessly or vehemently illiberal. His defense of basic rights in his 
reinterpretation of the Weimar Constitution in Absolute terms, while unorthodox, shows he 
defends some core features of the liberal tradition. Schmitt’s attitude toward liberalism is best 
described as ambiguous.  
The similarities between Schmitt’s theory of Weimar’s Absolute Counter-Constitution, which he 
thought had been practically produced in the Bonn Grundgesetz, and “militant democracy” 
provide us with a new starting point to approach a theory of militant democracy today. Schmitt’s 
theory shows how militant democracy actually answers a basic dilemma between two antitheses 
in liberal democracy: commitment to democratic malleability or commitment to individual basic 
rights. These principles can and do peacefully coexist with one another in regular times. But, 
Schmitt argues, exceptional circumstances do arise in which the tension between liberalism and 
democracy causes constitutional fissures. In these circumstances a decision between the two is 
required. Some decide for democracy and argue that absolute limitations on popular sovereignty 
are not legitimate. Schmitt argues that a stable political order cannot be produced through 
democratic procedures alone but instead requires a decision for a more fundamental commitment 
to basic rights. Only basic rights could be the basis for a qualitatively total state, i.e. for a state 
grounded in a political decision. The then prevailing interpretation for infinite democratic 
revision relativized the constitution – effectively mechanizing the state and setting the conditions 
for the loss of its legitimacy and authority. Militant democracy too makes this argument when it 
denies democratic change to core areas of the constitution – which it understands to be basic 
rights and the democratic process itself. 
These similarities suggest that it may be a mistake to conceive of militant democracy as standing 
within traditional liberal democratic theories of rights and the state. Schmitt’s theory of the 
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political and the Absolute Constitution shares core features of Loewenstein’s militant democracy. 
I have shown that one can extrapolate a rich state theory from Schmitt’s writings and that his 
theory of the Absolute Constitution of a “bourgeois Rechtsstaat” stands upon that theory. Those 
seeking a proper normative theory of militant democracy could find it in Schmitt’s state theory. 
While militant democrats may rightly be hesitant to uncritically use Schmitt to construct a 
normative theory of militant democracy, his state theory is a useful starting point in militant 
democracy’s path to self-understanding and situation within this tradition of state theory.  
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Conclusion: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? 
 
 
If democracy really has nothing to do with Weltanschauung, it can in no sense realize the “full 
truth” of a state personality and can never be more than one state form among others in political 
and constitutional technique. 
– Schmitt, “Der Begriff der modernen Demokratie” 
 
States governed by these bodies of people apparently have no choice then: their only chance of 
being true imitations of the authentic political system, government by a single person with 
expertise, lies in never allowing the slightest infringement of their written laws and their time-
honored traditions once they have been established.  




Carl Schmitt theorized the state in response to the rise of modern mass democracy. He believed 
the din of democracy’s “triumphal march” had drowned out defining questions of political 
science. Could democracy be tyrannical? Can a constitution commit suicide? Was there any 
relationship between popular sovereignty and the rule of reason? Were there objective limits to 
what “the people” can legitimately will, besides numerical thresholds? Schmitt believed that 
questions like these were no longer asked as Europe celebrated its democratic revolutions. Yet 
they remained key questions of political theory. Overlooking them imperiled the state’s 
constitutional order and its political stability. 
In fact, the Weimar state and constitution had exhibited signs of how important these questions 
still were from its birth. “The state of nature” repeatedly burst through its constitutional order. 
Whatever semblance of stability the state seemed to take on after 1924 only masked the deep 
tensions within its constitution and society. Above all, Schmitt argued that Weimar had no 
defense against revolutionaries exploiting democratic legitimacy. The possibility was there from 
the beginning for an illiberal, antidemocratic party to obtain political power through democratic 
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elections and then kick the ladder down by legally amending democracy and liberalism out of the 
constitution entirely. Schmitt argued mass democracy provided a “legal” means for 
democratically disingenuous movements to advance their illegitimate goals, presenting those 
goals as if they were coherent with the values of the Weimar constitution itself. These 
movements whipped up an emotionally charged base, obtaining for themselves a veneer of 
democratic legitimacy and the means to parliament. Once in parliament, they exacerbated 
Weimar’s crises and struggled against one another to advance their particular goals. By 1930, 
extremists were strong enough to cooperate in parliament to obstruct vital legislation and 
debilitate the state. So, even before the Nazi’s “legal revolution” occurred, the NSDAP and the 
KPD had made Weimar’s parliament appear both impotent and incompetent, which “legitimated” 
their radical alternatives to liberal democracy in the eyes of many German voters.  
Schmitt argued Weimar’s would-be defenders showed little capacity to deal with, let alone an 
awareness of the nature of looming threat. They had argued there was no basis to declare any 
values or goals politically illegitimate. What mattered to them was democratic procedure: 
“functionalist value-neutrality” had become the 20
th
 century’s criterion of legitimacy. As long as 
it was democratically elected, there was apparently no basis to declare a Nazi or Bolshevist state 
illegitimate. Schmitt argued Weimar’s defenders had consciously or unconsciously mechanized 
the state, completing a centuries-long process of political neutralization. But a totally neutralized 
state, Schmitt continued, was the least desirable state: politicization would leap from state to 
society and reintroduce the insecurity of civil war.  
Schmitt saw the situation in Weimar as the 20
th
 century equivalent of the Confessional Civil 
Wars and he saw himself as the 20
th
 century Hobbes. He modeled his solutions on Hobbes’ 
Leviathan. Like Hobbes, he theorized how to neutralize substate conflicts and restore the state’s 
sovereign authority over the political. Schmitt believed that Hobbes’ state had failed due to 
circumstances Hobbes could not have anticipated: the unique problems of the 20
th
 century, 
especially modern mass democracy. Accordingly, Schmitt updated Hobbes’ state theory to 
address those problems. Schmitt argued that, especially in an age of total movements, mass 
“irrationalism,” and universal suffrage, the constitution must impose hard limits on what popular 
sovereignty could accomplish, on constitutional amendments, and even on which parties could 
participate in democratic institutions. These limits, he argued, had been defined by the 
constitution itself, which he described with his theory of “the political” and Absolute 
Constitution. A state constructed on his theory could become more than a merely mechanical 
state, even amidst the disenchantment of the 20
th
 century. It could continue to fulfill its purpose: 
to hold back the state of nature and provide a space for a meaningful political existence.  
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1. The Significance of Carl Schmitt’s State Theory 
This dissertation’s analysis and reconstruction of Schmitt’s state theory matters both for our 
understanding of Schmitt and for our contemporary constitutional and political practices. In 
terms of our understanding Schmitt, I have attempted to provide an interpretation of Schmitt’s 
state theory that is more coherent with his writings than other interpretations and which shows 
how Schmitt is not a radical aberration in political theory but instead builds (admittedly in a very 
conservative way) on its canonical texts. Above all, I have shown how Schmitt builds on the 
work of Hobbes and Hegel. But beyond setting the record on Schmitt straight through a critical 
reinterpretation, Schmitt’s state theory offers insights into our constitutions today that defenders 
and critics alike can benefit from engaging with. I have focused on how Schmitt’s state theory 
can contribute to our understanding of militant democracy. 
a. Reinterpreting Schmitt 
History has not been kind to Carl Schmitt. This unkindness has been deserved to a certain extent. 
In deciding not to disappear from politics in 1933, Schmitt played an important early role in 
legitimating the Third Reich and propagating its totalitarian regime and its absurd anti-Semitic, 
völkisch ethos. And Schmitt wrote despicable things while he participated in and sought the 
approval of that regime. Opportunistically or otherwise, Schmitt’s decision to act in this way 
brought grave moral consequences. His irresponsible and unrepentant attitude shows he had a 
wretched character complemented by a razor sharp intellect. 
But Schmitt’s early collaboration with Nazism has blurred the borders between his personal 
failures and his political theory. Schmitt’s shifting commitments exacerbated this lack of clarity. 
He first argued there was a constitutional basis to bar Weimar’s extremists from political 
participation but then, after it had triumphed democratically and legally revolutionized the state, 
he embraced the Nazi movement. All the while, he argued for the priority of the state and Recht 
over their constituents. As a “complexio oppositorium,” Schmitt provided ways for defenders 
and critics to bisect him and approach him as Friend or Enemy.  
I have argued that, contrary to what some interpreters have maintained, there is a coherent core 
that extends throughout Schmitt’s writings and that, despite appearances to the contrary, an 
original state theory can be extrapolated from Schmitt’s writings. I have made the best attempt to 
interpret his published writings, correspondence, and diaries to understand him as he understood 
himself.
1
 I began my analysis by situating Schmitt among the 20
th
 century legal and political 
theories and events most formative for his intellectual development. 
                                                             
1 Accounting for these opposed interpretations of Schmitt’s political and legal theory means explaining how he 
could go from (however reluctantly) defending Weimar to embracing Nazism. There are two dominant 
explanations. Schmitt was an opportunist out for his own survival and personal gain. Or Schmitt simply always was 
a Nazi, he just needed Hitler to be elected to catalyze his fascism. Both sides attempt to reduce Schmitt’s 
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Building off of his intellectual context, the first step of this reinterpretation was to argue that 
Schmitt’s political theology was formulated as a critique of the (then prevalent) theory of 
juridical positivism. He argued that even positivism had a metaphysics. But positivism was a 
“disadvantageous” weltanschauung not only because it reflected and exacerbated 
disenchantment but also because it hid real political decisions when it presented them as if they 
were natural facts of the world. Schmitt argued there is no neutral ideology – all political theory 
is polemical, even liberalism or functionalist value-neutrality. To the contrary, he thought the 
effects of masking their polemical roots opened them up to abuse by private powers who were 
best equipped to exploit their purported neutrality. 
I next argued that, far from being a recognizable democrat (even a plebiscitary democrat, as 
some believe), Schmitt was like many other well-educated conservative Germans of the early 
20
th
 century: disturbed by and distrustful of mass democracy in all its forms. Democracy, 
Schmitt argued, was becoming tyrannical in the 20
th
 century because it had been freed of 
normative constraints: no procedure, divorced of its relation to normative legitimacy, could 
provide a stable basis for political governance. Schmitt thought modern mass democracy 
reflected the prevalence of an atheistic, positivistic worldview politically and, despite attempts to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
psychological motivation for this transition or revelation (depending on the interpretation) to a single underlying 
factor. And this may be the problem with both interpretations.  
There are several important factors to consider in attempting to explain Schmitt’s behavior. First, as a 
conservative, Schmitt’s loyalties rested with the constitution in effect. Second, Schmitt was a reluctant defender of 
Weimar only – he was not dogmatically attached to its survival. He was happy to see Nazism correct some of the 
most problematic aspects of it (from his perspective), such as mass suffrage and liberalism’s inability to distinguish 
its enemies and inability to commit politically. Third, Schmitt had much to fear from the Nazis, especially after the 
Night of Long Knives. They assassinated his former political mentor and there were good reasons to believe he 
might be assassinated too. Fourth, one simply had to pay Hitler and the party lip service (although Schmitt went 
beyond this) – even thinkers whose liberal democratic credentials were otherwise in good order affirmed Hitler 
and his policies: e.g. Richard Thoma praised the “insight” and “saving deeds” of “our Führer, Adolf Hitler” Peter C. 
Caldwell, "Introduction to Richard Thoma," in Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis, ed. Arthur J. Jacobson and 
Bernhard Schlink (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 154. But, fifth, Schmitt was genuinely 
opportunistic. Schmitt, like other conservatives, hoped to manipulate Hitler into realizing his own policies and 
goals. Sixth, many Germans, across the political spectrum, hoped for a revitalization of Germany. Schmitt was no 
exception. After Hitler was elected, this hope actually seemed to be a possibility. Seventh, Schmitt like many other 
Germans was attracted to authoritarian thought. Hitler – setting aside his departure from Schmitt’s ideals – was 
charismatic and an authoritarian leader who seemed capable of bringing order to a German state that had been in 
near total chaos since 1929. Yet, once they were elected, he seems to have genuinely bought into it – and even 
Hitler – as a possible solution to the mire of Weimar’s government. In late interviews, Schmitt admits that in 
meeting Hitler, “calm as a Buddha,” he was swept up in his personality. Germany itself seems to have been swept 
up in the sense of hope that Hitler inspired – and became willing to turn a blind eye to otherwise obviously 
alarming acts and promises. 
As I wrote in Chapter 1, Schmitt’s psychology and disposition to Nazism has relevant overlaps with what 
many revolutionary conservatives experienced from 1928 to about 1938. Although obviously initially (vehemently) 
opposed to Nazism – for its methods and for its ideology –, Schmitt lowered his guard soon after Hitler’s election 
and appointment and even became enthusiastic and hopeful about Nazism’s possibilities. But this initial euphoria 
wore off in a few years and Schmitt realized that whatever Hitler’s Reich was and could become, it was not his idea 
of the Third Way or of an ideal state. And from that point on, he sought to distance himself from it.  
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institutionalize some atheistic order, would only lead to a state of nature. Modern mass 
democracy was the political reflection of a positivistic weltanschauung. 
I then reinterpreted Schmitt’s concept of the political. I argued it is not, as it is often understood 
to be, exclusively about Enmity. It is a theory of the basis for political cooperation. Schmitt 
argued that without some shared values that “neutralized” real differences and oppositions within 
a political community, those differences would politicize and undermine the state. He defined 
“the political” as the neutralizing status of a political community. And he theorized that the aim 
of representation was to actualize the political status.  
I next argued that Schmitt believed the state must regain a monopoly over the political if there is 
to be peace, order, and security within a political community. The state should represent and 
institutionalize that political status, asserting it as a higher value to depoliticize other statuses and 
create a space for plurality within the state. His theory of the Absolute Constitution complements 
his state theory and through it he attempted to counteract the Relativization of the constitution, 
which he thought had led to the state’s instrumentalization and the repoliticization of society. 
Schmitt’s theory of dictatorship ties into his state theory as an extension of his theory of the 
political and the Absolute Constitution. He theorized the dictator as the const itution’s 
representative and guardian of last resort in emergencies. 
I conclude by arguing that when Schmitt applied his theory of the Absolute Constitution to the 
Weimar state, he located the political core of its constitution in basic liberal rights – which he 
raised above Weimar’s democratic state form. Schmitt argued that the Absolute Constitution of a 
liberal democratic state could only be found in the basic rights of individuals which defend 
isolated individuals against interference from both other individuals and the state, no matter how 
democratically “legitimated” interference might be. He theorized the constitution in this way to 
counterbalance Weimar’s overheated democracy and overcome what he thought was its deeper 
problem: the disenchanted functionalist-instrumentalist weltanschauung driving the early 20
th
 
century. In the case of Weimar, its democratic “Relative” constitution was being manipulated 
against itself by disingenuous movements seeking to revolutionize the state. The apparent 
“neutrality” of democracy was subtly legitimizing indirect powers’ struggles for political 
domination. By counterbalancing the “functionalist value-neutrality” of Weimar’s Relative 
Constitution with the basic rights of its Absolute Constitution, Schmitt thought even a 
disenchanted epoch could develop terms of political legitimacy. I argued that Schmitt’s state 
theory is not a defense of any type of democracy. Instead, Schmitt constructed an original rights-
based state theory to defend the state against the tyrannical potential of 20
th
 century democracy.  
It is no surprise that Schmitt insisted democracy and liberalism were deeply at odds with one 
another. But it may surprise many that Schmitt distinguished parliamentarism from basic rights 
and endorsed many of the rights we understand today to be essential to the practice of liberalism. 
Until states understood the rights-based parts of their constitutions as their (Absolute) 
constitutional core and as values that trumped democratic proceduralism, they would potentially 
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consume themselves. Although his argument that “no state can realize a mass democracy” is 
clearly an exaggeration, Schmitt did diagnose real problems mass democracy presents to political 
order, including indirect powers, tyranny, domination, “legal” revolution, and how Hobbes’ 
Behemoth sits on the periphery of all political order, even democracy. 
Schmitt argued that democratic states in the 20
th
 century were driven to anarchy because they did 
not understand democracy’s potential for tyranny. Schmitt, instead, understood tyranny as the 
absence of legitimate authority and rule. Authority and authoritarianism tend to be dirty words 
today. But a sober assessment shows that Schmitt’s critique of “functionalist value-neutrality,” of 
unqualified democratic change, and of the tensions between liberalism and democracy yields a 
constitutional type that is not so far from many of the constitutional forms many today accept as 
legitimate or at least take seriously – such as militant democracy or even Rawls’ political 
liberalism. The core of Schmitt’s political theological argument is that few people are actually 
anarchists; few believe in a naturally occurring order and harmony somehow ingrained in human 
nature. Schmitt believed most recognize the need for some limits of every individual’s will in 
order to achieve some modicum of peace, stability, and even meaning in human life. He argued 
those who admit this much must acknowledge that some form of authority is indeed necessary. 
The question is then not whether there should be authority at all but where is authority legitimate? 
And who decides what the proper domain of authority is?  
b. Redefining Militant Democracy 
Militant democracy’s origins seem to be echoed in contemporary debates about its meaning and 
legitimacy.
2
 Jan-Werner Müller has defined it as the adoption of illiberal measures to prevent the 
democratic subversion of democracy. Müller describes four measures that today’s exemplary 
militant democratic constitution, the Bonn Grundgesetz, incorporates.
3
 The first is an eternity 
clause, preventing any democratic amendments to core constitutional principles (usually changes 
to articles outlining basic rights, the value of “human dignity,” and democracy itself). The 
second is the possibility to ban the political participation of unconstitutional parties. The third is 
the restriction of individual rights when those rights become a danger to the order itself. The 
final is civic education. The second and third are, respectively, institutional and individual 
limitations of rights when those become a threat to the liberal democratic political order itself. 
The institution with the power to determine when to restrict rights is the courts, the branch most 
removed from the democratic political process itself (and thus the one most likely to be neutral 
with regard to their application). 
                                                             
2
 Bendersky recently gave a talk in which he discussed Horkheimer’s positive disposition toward something like 
militant democracy and its compatibility with Loewenstein’s theory (and, following my claims above, Schmitt’s Ur-
theory of militant democracy). Joseph W. Bendersky, "Horkheimer, “Militant Democracy,” and War,"  Telos(2009). 
3 Jan-Werner Müller, "Militant Democracy," in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, ed. Michel 
Rosenfeld and András Sajó (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1258-1263. 
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Are these best conceived as illiberal measures though? The first, the restriction on democratic 
will, does not seem to be. It is what has elsewhere been called mast-binding, a form of 
constitutional precommitment, admittedly an extreme one. The third is clearly illiberal. But 
Müller points out that it is strictly a symbolic warning that has never yet had any efficacy in 
practice.
4
 Insofar as the restrictions on individual freedoms go no further than the symbolic level 
(which is where they must remain, if they should exist at all), than individual basic liberties are 
left untouched by militant democracy. Thus, although they would be illiberal if enacted, this 
third measure of militant democracy is a paper tiger. The fourth measure, civic education, is a 
relatively uncontroversial aspect of most if not all states today.  
It is only the second measure, because it is efficacious, that is ambiguous.
5
 But when one looks at 
the rationale for banning parties, it becomes less so. Banning political parties is aimed at 
preventing illiberal and antidemocratic beliefs from translating into illiberal and antidemocratic 
political acts. It does not bear on individuals’ privately held beliefs in themselves. An extremist 
party’s attempt to democratically realize a genocidal anti-Semitic Christian theocracy (either 
through its seeking to legalize them or simply through extra-legal violence
6
) could legitimately 
be barred from politics. But denying the political legitimacy of those values does not entail a 
corresponding denial of their private, depoliticized practice – no matter how disagreeable they 
are to the rest of society. The distinction between public right and private right can be 
conceptualized best, perhaps, through Hobbes’ (Schmitt’s) distinction of fides and confessio. 
Because of the distinction drawn between the private and political beliefs, the practice of 
banning parties is best conceived as a democratic constraint rather than an illiberal one. 
Thus, pace Müller’s argument, the same characteristics of his definition of militant democracy 
can interpreted differently to produce a different definition. An idealized militant democracy 
consists in three features: first, an extreme, exceptional form of constitutional precommitment to 
the core values of the constitution defined by basic rights; second, the political 
disenfranchisement of parties existentially at odds with those core values; finally, civic education 
in liberal and democratic values. The possibility to deny individual basic rights, the existential 
core of a liberal state, should not be a mechanism open to states because it is incoherent with the 
end of the state itself. If militant democracy were merely the eternal entrenchment of core values 
of the constitution, it could be considered to be a form of constitutionalism precommitment, even 
if this precommitment is very rigid. But because it moves beyond that with party bans, it 
becomes something different entirely. So militant democracy is distinct from constitutionalism 
because of its use of ex ante discrimination. And militant democracy is characterized by its pre-
emptive antidemocratic measures to prevent those aiming at subverting democracy with 
democratic means from destroying the democratic regime. Militant democracy denies the 
                                                             
4
 Nor should it. I doubt it should even remain a component of militant democracy. 
5 It is worth noting that the practice of party prohibition is a common feature of democracies today. Gregory H. Fox 
and Georg Nolte, "Intolerant Democracies," Harvard International Law Journal 36, no. 1 (1995): 37. 
6 These are the same thing practically when one does not subscribe to militant democracy – except one is the 
result of legal legitimation through democratic procedures while the other is not yet. 
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legitimacy of certain forms of popular sovereignty. Militant democracy is not best characterized 
as an illiberal but an antidemocratic political institution in those narrow instances it kicks in. 
c. Schmitt and Militant Democracy Today 
Schmitt adds something to contemporary debates about the legitimacy of constraining 
democracy through institutions like militant democracy. His arguments against the Relative 
Constitution have been almost entirely overlooked by contemporary debates. This oversight is 
unfortunate because his theory reveals weaknesses and gaps in contemporary proceduralist 
arguments that should either be developed further as a means of critiquing them or used by 
defenders of democratic proceduralism to strengthen their arguments. 
Melissa Schwartzberg recently criticized precommitment, in particular entrenchment, for 
betraying “one of democracy’s most attractive legacies: the ability to modify the law.”
7
 While 
Schwartzberg and Kelsen differ on many key aspects of democratic theory, Schwartzberg does 
share Kelsen’s concern with the validity of legal entrenchment and opposes Schmitt’s theory of 
constitutionalism.
8
 She adapts Kelsen’s arguments about democratic legitimacy to today’s 
discussions about precommitment and entrenchment. In doing so, she demonstrates both the 
contemporary relevance of the debates Schmitt engaged in as well as provides an updated 
argument for unconstrained constitutional revision and popular sovereignty. 
Schwartzberg argues that any law, even a state’s constitution, should be open to democratic 
revision as long as legal procedures in effect for revision are adhered to. Schwartzberg seems to 
agree with Kelsen
9
 in conceiving of democracy in relativist-proceduralist terms. She writes “no 
set of beliefs, and no law, can ever attain the level of absolute and immutable truth.”
10
 Because 
there can be no absolute truth, she argues the only measure of political legitimacy one can have 
is democratic self-rule – no matter where it takes a state. 
For these reasons, Schwartzberg argues democracy embodies our deepest political commitment. 
She writes that democracy, as a political activity, must be an innovative, deliberate legislative 
activity, recognize human fallibility, and ensure democratic engagement and deliberative 
legitimacy.
11
 It must also signal to minorities the potential for the reversibility of laws and 
decisions – that minorities may persuade the majority of the rightness of their views.  
She believes forms of constitutional precommitment and entrenchment, including militant 
democracy, deny states the only legitimate political commitments or values possible to have in a 
                                                             
7 Melissa Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 2. 
8 Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change, 154-157. 
9
 As discussed earlier, Kelsen had openly admitted that his arguments about positivism stemmed from his 
relativism: once one admits there is no definitive truth, one can only conclude in the legitimacy of positive law and 
the necessity of admitting any democratically legitimated revisions. 
10 Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change, 28,178. 
11 Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change, 194. 
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world without absolute and immutable truths. Precommitment entrenches particular values, 
presupposes the infallibility (and inherent reasonability) of those values, and denies the 
legitimacy of revisions to them – no matter how deliberatively reasonable or popular proposed 
revisions might be. That is, the extreme form of precommitment of militant democracy 
contradicts the spirit and logic of democracy because it presupposes the infallibility of the 
framer’s decision to entrench those core principles.
12
 Constitutional law is presumed to embody 
reason, this is the basis for its legitimacy. But Schwartzberg argues this is a problematic 
presumption. First, no matter how reasonable the founders may be, it is a mistake to presume that 
they could have perfectly anticipated the future and the circumstances under which the 
constitution would be applied. A second, deeper objection holds it is a mistake to presume the 
framers’ reasonability to begin with. Constitutions are written in turbulent circumstances by 
“highly charged assemblies.”
13
 Therefore, there is little reason to presume that the laws “locked 
in” are reasonable at all. But even granting that the laws were formulated reasonably and can 
anticipate the future, Schwartzberg argues that core constitutional laws should not be confused 
with the moral concepts they aim to guarantee. That is, the positive instantiation of the moral 
principles underlying (liberal) constitutionalism are not the same as those moral principles 
themselves and their positive instantiation may introduce real world imperfections into them. 
Schwartzberg argues framing debates about precommitment in terms of constitutionalism versus 
democracy or reason versus passion is a misleading practice: the (democratic) revision of basic 
constitutional law is a “critical activity” and is therefore inherently reasonable.
14
  
Although Schmitt does not offer any direct response to Schwartzberg’s criticism of the 
assumption of an inherent reasonability of constitutional entrenchment, there are some implicit 
responses. First, militant democracy only defends an extremely narrow core of the constitution 
against democratic change. It does not undermine a democracy’s ability to grapple with changed 
circumstances. It is misleading to describe militant democracy as profoundly undemocratic 
simply because draws a few fundamental limits to democratic will, simply because it denies 
amending democracy or the freedom of speech out of existence. Some have even argued that 
providing for a minimal constitutional core is enabling, not disenfranchising. Thus, the range of 
democracy is still very rich in militant democracy. It is a mistake to conflate the entire 
constitution with the narrow scope of the changes militant democracy and precommitment 
prevent against. 
Moreover, the precommitment to that narrow core is not the product of a rash decision from a 
highly charged, polemically opposed assembly seeking compromise in a turbulent time. Neither 
is it a recent political experiment or innovation. The realization that democracy can be tyrannical 
and that tyranny should be guarded against is as old as political theory. And guarantees of legal 
                                                             
12 Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change, 200ff. I thank Nadia Urbinati for pressing me to respond to this 
point. 
13 Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change, 201. 
14 Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change, 193. 
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protections against the state and against a politicized majority are nearly as old. Schwartzberg’s 
arguments do not seem to apply to the narrow constitutional entrenchment militant democracy 
seeks – they are neither the product of hasty constitutional assemblies nor the irrational 
experiments of constitutional framers. They are the product of the slow accumulation of human 
political wisdom over the course of millennia. Liberal democracies are not going to reverse on 
the legitimacy of basic individual freedoms like religion and speech and the value of democracy 
itself, when it is not turned on those basic individual freedoms. 
Schmitt’s does respond to the objection that the constitution merely locks in a positive 
instantiation of a moral principle, not the moral principle itself. Schwartzberg formulates the 
objection by arguing that the constitution does not “protect these moral concepts themselves but 
the positive instantiation of them, which is the product of a constituent assembly.” This 
(positivistic) separation of law and morality may make sense in the abstract, but when one looks 
at the actual constitutional provisions that are guaranteed by militant democracy, it falls apart. 
Schmitt’s argument, that the core of the constitution, the Absolute Constitution, and the preamble 
to a constitution stand at a bridge between law and politics, rings true. Consider for example 
Article 1.1 and 1.2 of the Bonn Grundgesetz: “(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect 
and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority. (2) The German people therefore 
acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace 
and of justice in the world.” Although it is a concrete constitutional law, it is also clearly a 
(abstract) moral principle. And it clearly aims at human dignity in terms of the liberal democratic 
ideals, laid out by subsequent articles in the Grundgesetz. And while Schwartzberg is correct to 
argue that the further legislations or judicial interpretations based on the constitution may be 
imperfect or undesirable, these further concretizations are not closed to legal change (or judicial 
revision) like the Absolute Constitution is. It serves to guarantee human rights and demand an 
articulation of what human dignity means. While there is latitude in the substance of that 
articulation, it does prevent legal interpretation of a constitution opposed to human dignity. A 
constitution is more than the positive instantiation of moral principles. The aim of theorizing the 
Absolute Constitution is to prevent the sort of Relativization that conceives of its core values as 
merely positive law open to infinite revision and interpretation. 
Militant democracy “locks in” the qualities of democracy that are essential to the spirit and logic 
of democracy – democratic procedures and individual rights that guarantee individuals the 
possibility to freely formulate political values and practices. Thus, the objection against militant 
democracy for presupposing the rationality of the founders can be reversed: the rights guaranteed 
by its extreme precommitment are guarantees of a meaningful democratic process, and best 
realize the spirit and logic of democracy by ensuring it not become its pathological form while 
minimally constraining its ability to create and revise its laws.  
Schmitt shows framing discussion of entrenchment in terms of precommitment versus non-
precommitment, authority versus freedom and neutrality, creates a false polarity. Schmitt argues 
it is actually a question of which political principles ought to be committed to not whether there 
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should be precommitment in the first place. That is, he shows us that this debate is actually about 
a basic decision between two antithetical commitments: basic rights or democratic malleability. 
These two commitments can and will peacefully coexist with one another under normal 
circumstances. But their logical tension can explode into actual conflict, which happened in 
Weimar. When this happens, a decision between the two becomes necessary. Schmitt’s theory 
identifies the argument that democratic states ought to decide on a precommitment to democratic 
revision as actually a commitment to functionalist value-neutrality and therefore a commitment 
to a Relative Constitution.  
As discussed in the last chapter, Schmitt thinks the committing to functionalist value-neutrality is 
not actually a defensible form of precommitment for two reasons. On the one hand, many 
proponents of democratic neutrality – despite what they argue – actually stop short of 
compromising the core of democracy, understood to include basic rights and democratic revision 
itself. Insofar as this is the case, they only disagree with Schmitt superficially. On the other hand, 
Schmitt argues that those arguments deeply committed to democratic revisionism are incapable 
of generating an overlapping consensus.
15
 That is, positivism cannot be a legitimate foundation 
for a state because, in the end, it becomes no more than a means for one segment of society to 
dominate the other using legislation. In both cases, Schmitt argues that in mass democracy the 
principles of functionalist value-neutrality and equal chance could neither realize political 
stability nor generate an overlapping consensus. 
Regarding the first argument, Schmitt believed many defenders of the Relative Constitution 
would be unwilling to follow their own arguments to their logical conclusion in exceptional 
cases. That is, they would concede that, should 75% of a population elect an antidemocratic, 
illiberal, racist party, that party would not be a legitimate ruler nor would any subsequent 
constitutional “revisions” abrogating democracy and liberalism be legitimate laws – even if that 
party adhered to the functionalist constrains of constitutional amendment law. Schmitt used 
Richard Thoma as an example, who had first criticized Schmitt’s arguments to limit the exercise 
of Article 76 based on Weimar’s Absolute Constitution but then admitted alterations to the 
                                                             
15
 David Dyzenhaus has argued there are some similarities (amidst substantially differences) between John Rawls 
and Carl Schmitt. Rawls, too, admits militant democratic mechanisms are legitimate in exceptional states. He 
argues that constitutions have a right of self-preservation, that “justice does not require that men must stand idly 
by while others destroy the basis of their existence.” (John Rawls, A Theory of Justice  (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 
1999), 192; John Rawls, Political Liberalism  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), xviii-xix.). And he argues 
that antidemocratic and illiberal movements have no right to complain when they are denied basic liberties (Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice, 190.). But, differently from Schmitt, he qualifies that liberals ought to withhold rights only 
when political stability or security themselves are endangered (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 193.). The most 
important overlap between the two is Rawls presupposition that all citizens within a liberal state embrace “the 
rules of the game”; all must accept the essentials of liberal democracy. Thus, total movements existentially 
opposed to and seeking to overthrown political liberalism (“unreasonable” comprehensive doctrines) should be 
stopped when they become a threat to political order. Rawls and Schmitt obviously were very different thinkers, 
from very different traditions, writing to address very different circumstances. But these differences make their 
overlap on this basic issue all the more interesting. 
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“sacred” principles of liberal democracy would be inadmissible no matter how popular a 
majority seeking them was.  
Today, defenders of democracy may actually draw the line when democracy becomes a threat to 
itself and admit that democracy’s “self-consumption” is not a legitimate instance of popular 
sovereignty. In these cases, their disagreement with militant democracy is superficial either 
because that defender was reluctant to admit authoritarianism was sometimes necessary or for a 
lack of logical rigor. Another case of superficial disagreement is between normative definitions 
of democracy and militant democracy.
16
 Defining democracy normatively puts the same sort of 
practical restrictions on legitimate democratic activity as militant democracy does – even if it 
does not restrict political participation outright, it does restrict certain outcomes of participation. 
So participation is effectively limited, since participants seeking or producing “illegitimate” or 
“undemocratic” outcomes have no political recourse through “democratic” institutions. The 
substantive difference between normative definitions of democracy and militant democracy 
seems to be that the former is implicit whereas the latter is explicit. But practically both have the 
same impact on the democratic process. 
Schmitt’s second argument is addressed to those deeply committed to democratic malleability or 
“functionalist value-neutrality.” He argues that “functionalist value-neutrality” is undecided 
about where its value commitments actually lie. Either the ability to modify law democratically 
is that constitution’s entrenched principle or not even democracy is a commitment. In the first 
case, the constitution is Relatived, with its “highest” value being institutionalized through its 
amendment article. Democratic malleability is the deepest constitutional commitment – in which 
case the constitution is the decision for the Relative Constitution. This position is actually a form 
of precommitment. It is just not a very strong form of precommitment because it simultaneously 
commits to the negation of its “deepest” commitment – begging the question of what 
“commitment” actually means here.  
The alternative is that “functionalist value-neutrality” actually holds that no principle, not even 
democratic malleability, is inviolable. Here, that the state has taken the form of liberal 
democratic form today is wholly accidental. This position is an extreme form of positivism – 
where the existence of the legal procedures in effect at a given moment are all that is necessary 
to determine legitimacy. Democracy is legitimate now because it happens to be in effect. But 
should democracy be overcome by another state form through its democratic amendment 
procedures, this new state form – whatever it is – is as a legitimate as what preceded it. But, if 
                                                             
16 I take a non-normative definition of democracy to be something like the following: “a method of group decision 
making characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage of the collective decision 
making.” Tom Christiano, "Democracy," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2008). 
Normative definitions of democracy restrict the outcome of democratic procedures. An example is Habermas’ 
argument that the laws passed through democratic procedures must respect the system of rights that “constitutes 
a minimum set of normative institutional conditions for any legitimate modern political order” – i.e. that 
democracy necessarily includes rights. James Bohman and William Rehg, "Jürgen Habermas,"ibid. (2011). 
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this is so, it begs the question: does it then matter whether democracy is constrained by some 
other constitutional limitation? Why be concerned about democracy at all except for fact that it 
happens to be enacted at the present moment?  
Extricating these two positions from one another is difficult. Both Kelsen and Schwartzberg 
argue that amendments to any articles or aspects of the constitution, including to democratic 
amendment procedures themselves, are legitimate because of a “commitment” to something like 
democratic mutability and to unrestricted legal change. Thus, they would argue for example that, 
as long as a party legally adheres to the procedures necessary to amend all democracy and rights 




When the theoretical commitment to absolute democratic malleability is rigidly upheld and made 
the foundational values of the constitution, it can clearly be used to undermine both the 
constitution and that “commitment.” This is a logical possibility and one that Kelsen recognized 
even before it became a reality in the case of Weimar. But what does the word “commitment” 
mean legally and normatively if it is not really a commitment to anything at all? This 
interpretation of the constitution is incapable of and does not even try to preserve itself – which 
seems inconsistent with the idea of constitutionalism. And if the commitment to mutability 
through an amendment procedure can be turned on itself, then not even that commitment can be 
said to be constitutive of the constitution. This commitment suffers the same defects that Schmitt 
pointed out in the Relative Constitution.  
Kelsen, with “moving words,” famously wrote that “One must remain true to his colors, even 
when the ship is sinking, and can take with him into the depths only the hope that the ideal of 
freedom is indestructible and that the deeper it has sunk, the more passionately will it revive.”
18
 
But how are we to make sense of this claim? Is democracy actually a value or is it an accidental 
form of the state? Kelsen’s reluctant tone suggests democratic malleability is actually a deep 
commitment for him and that an undemocratic state would somehow be illegitimate – even if 
established democratically. But his positivism compels him to accept that whatever changed 
legal situation arises out of democratic revisions is equally legitimate. But if an anti-Semitic, 
pseudo-fascist totalitarian state was produced through democratic amendment procedures, would 
someone following this argumentative chain admit to its political and legal legitimacy? Schmitt 
directed this question, sotto voce, at Kelsen in 1971. Given what we know about Kelsen’s history, 
                                                             
17 Because of their strictly procedural focus, the “content” of those procedures (even the realization of a polity 
totally lacking in democratic legitimacy) is legitimate according to their definition. 
18 Kelsen, Hans. Die Verteidigung der Demokratie (1932), Cited in Arthur J. Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink, eds., 
Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 74. 
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Schmitt assumed he probably would have answered in the negative – but what does this say 
about Kelsen’s democratic relativism?
19
 
It seems the only way to make sense of a commitment to functionalist value-neutrality is to 
interpret it as a “positive” commitment – as both Schwartzberg and Kelsen ultimately seem to 
have done. But the positivistic commitment to an exercise of democratic will holds regardless of 
its outcome. The state becomes nothing more than an exercise of “sic volo sic jubeo”: the “I want, 
I command” of an arbitrary will. And the state is thus mechanized, becoming nothing more than 
an instrument of (democratic) domination. Besides the well-known problems of political 
domination, this argument seems particularly irresponsible in an age of mass democracy. Here, 
private, indirect powers utilize their powerful psycho-technical means to manipulate the masses 
and “democratically” legitimate their interests. Schmitt argued such a state is no longer even a 
case of democratic domination but merely the subtle political domination of private powers 
ruling from the darkness of what he called the antechamber to power. He argued throughout his 
career that positivism and functionalist value-neutrality cannot serve as a stable political basis for 
the state. They offer no real foundation for a state or constitution. Facticity alone, even when it is 
the facticity of overwhelming numbers, does not create legitimacy or right. 
d. Democracy as Procedure versus Democracy as Status  
Schmitt’s criticism of the “functionalist value-neutrality” of unconstrained democratic 
proceduralism can be understood in a different way. The problem he raises could be reframed as 
the question of whether 20
th
 century democracy should be understood as a procedure or as a 
political status. I have discussed in earlier chapters how Schmitt argued that every political body 
must be grounded in some neutralizing political status: for a political community to have lasting 
legitimacy and stability, there must be general overlapping agreement or consensus on the basic 
principles that underlie its institutions. This shared commitment is the fundamental basis for 
political and constitutional legitimacy, defines the terms of Friendship within the community, 
and depoliticizes other identifies so they do not erupt into violent conflict. His criticism of 
Weimar’s functionalist value-neutrality is in part a critique of his contemporaries for mistaking 
Weimar’s state form, parliamentary democracy and its accompanying legislative procedures, for 
its political status. Their positivistic worldview had led them to conflate procedural legality with 
substantive legitimacy. Schmitt’s theory of the Absolute Constitution, and his arguments that 
Weimar needed to shift the theoretical core from the First to the Second Principal Part of its 
constitution, was his way of updating state theory to deal with the centrifugal effects of modern 
mass democracy and positivism. That is, although he believed the triumphal march of democracy 
could not be avoided, this did not mean resigning to a tyrannical majority whenever one arose. 
                                                             
19 Obviously Schmitt too was incoherent and ought to be held to account for that. But, as I have shown, I believe 
Schmitt’s theory can be fixed by jettisoning Schmitt’s practice. It seems to me, however, the opposite solution is 
needed in the case of Kelsen: his practice can be fixed by jettisoning his theory – not the other way around. 
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They could be contained by making an authoritative status commitment that constitutionally 
“trumped” the positive legal procedures its state form employed.  
For Schmitt, understanding democracy as a status meant theorizing it as more than a state form. 
If a state was to have lasting legitimacy, its democratic legislative procedures could only be 
conceived of as a superstructure resting on the foundational values of that community. It must be 
linked to some neutralizing status that could create political legitimacy, Friendship among its 
citizens. Democracy could even be conceived as a status – but it meant theorizing what values 
were required for “democracy” to generate that community and its neutralizing status in the first 
place. Schmitt argued democratic procedure alone was insufficient to do this. But a commitment 
to basic rights could be that status and those values. Thus, a legitimate democratic state had to be 
erected on a foundation of basic rights, an Absolute Constitution, that denied the most 
pathological forms of democratic tyranny. A state committed to its status would remain a 
Leviathan. 
 
2. Beyond Schmitt 
Schmitt’s state theory is only a starting point for theorizing democracy as a status or for 
theorizing militant democracy. There are clear problems with it. I already discussed Schmitt’s 
inexplicable categorization of equality before the law as a political and not a basic right and 
therefore one which need not be guaranteed. Obviously, equality before the law must be 
conceived as a basic right for the protection of an isolated individual from state interference 
(thereby meeting Schmitt’s own definition of what ought to be a guaranteed right and included in 
his definition of a liberal democratic Absolute Constitution). Kelsen’s critique of Schmitt’s 
theory of the guardian of the constitution shows some further problems with Schmitt’s state 
theory. Another problem is what has changed in the political composition of states since Schmitt 
constructed his state theory. Schmitt often quoted Heraclitus’ remark that one cannot step in the 
same river twice. Certainly political problems of the 21
st
 century are not the same as they were in 
Weimar and whatever can be retained from Schmitt’s state theory would need to be updated to 
deal with contemporary problems. 
a. Kelsen’s Critique of Schmitt 
Schmitt’s state theory sits at the extreme right of the political spectrum between authoritarianism 
and democracy. He was so disillusioned by democracy’s failure in Weimar that he came to 
believe no democracy could be as reliable as a singularly powerful and virtuous ruler. He 
accordingly sought to (re)unite political responsibility with political power and restore political 
community and the classical sense of constitution in order to overcome the instability caused by 
mass capriciousness and private selfishness. He was so alarmed by mass pathos and by the abuse 
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of political rights, he was blind to the potential for abuse his own solutions had.
20
 He did not 
think about how difficult it would be to guarantee power, virtue, and knowledge were united in a 
single governor. Precisely because Schmitt’s state theory is such an extreme solution to the 
problems of democratic extremism, it ends up summoning one demon to fight another.  
It is in this vein that Kelsen criticizes Schmitt’s discussion of the guardian of the constitution. 
Kelsen argues Schmitt is so fixated on threats to the state arising out of parliamentary democracy 
he ignores similar threats that executive empowerment presents to the state.
21
 However naïve it is 
to believe democracy cannot be tyrannical, pathologically irrational, or simply disingenuously 
manipulated, Schmitt’s solution is no less naïve in believing the same about the executive branch. 
Whether the guardian of the constitution is parliament or a president, Kelsen argues the question 
“who guards the guardian?” must be asked.
22
 Schmitt does not seem to have asked it about his 
idealized Reichspräsident. He argues that Schmitt upsets the balance of power necessary to a 
Rechtsstaat by fusing normal executive functions with the authority to determine 
constitutionality under both normal and exceptional circumstances. In doing so, Schmitt 
undermined parliament as an institution capable of checking the executive and left no basis to 
control it if it failed to defend the constitution authentically or abused its powers. In the end, 
while it was legitimate to limit parliamentary democracy for the sake of stability, it was not 
legitimate to totally undermine its ability to counterbalance the executive in the process. 
Schmitt had theorized the organizational principle of the Rechtsstaat, checks and balances, as a 
binary balancing scale because he conceived of the judiciary as a mindless extension of the 
legislative branch, which he dismisses as “en quelque façon nulle.” The only way he thought the 
legislative could be counterbalanced was by increasing the “weight” of the executive. So Schmitt 
tips the balance of power in the other direction, risking a tyrant to defend against a tyrant. Instead, 
Kelsen argues that the guardian of the constitution should be a body that does not wield power 
directly.
23
 The judiciary, already at a disadvantage in the balance of power, could offset the 
troubled relations between executive and legislative and the ideals of the constitution. Kelsen 
thus argues the judiciary was the branch best suited to act as guardian of the constitution. 
Kelsen’s proposal was intended to solve two problems of democratic states at once. First, it 
would further the ideal of a balance power by offsetting the power of both the executive and 
legislative with the third branch and move beyond conceiving of internal checks and balances in 
terms of a simple binary scale. In addition, insofar as the constitution does institutionalize the 
political status, the branch of government most suited to making rational deductions regarding 
that status is the judiciary. Ultimately, decisions on constitutionality involve weighing the 
political “status” against acts of parliament that are intended to concretize that status further. The 
judiciary is most competent, because of its specialization in the law, to cross the hiatus 
                                                             
20 William E. Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law  (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 1999), 107. 
21 Hans Kelsen, Wer Soll der Hüter der Verfassung Sein?  (Berlin-Grunewald: Dr. Walther Rothschild, 1931), 11-12. 
22 Kelsen, Wer Soll der Hüter der Verfassung Sein?, 49. 
23 Kelsen, Wer Soll der Hüter der Verfassung Sein?, 5-7. 
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irrationalis and rule on what a legitimate concretization of norms is.
24
 This deductive process is 
already a part of the normal behavior of the judiciary. Moreover, he argued that courts were best 




Schwartzberg, in her criticism of precommitment, is worried by theories like Kelsen’s that 
empower the will of any branch over popular sovereignty.
26
 She singles out judicial review for 
being undemocratic. But this argument does not seem to sufficiently account for the theory 
behind checks and balances on power. Insofar as the liberal democratic Rechtsstaat limits 
arbitrary and pathological power, equipping the judiciary against both expressions of popular 
sovereignty in the legislative (either parliamentary or plebiscitary democracy) and executive is 
not only reasonable but even realizes a more virtuous form of democracy. The denial of the 
legitimacy of checking democratic malleability is a denial of the legitimacy of this constitutional 
ideal. But when popular sovereignty becomes tyrannical, some other institution must be capable 
of reining it in constitutionally. Kelsen writes that courts naturally exercise a ‘repressive 
objective function of legality.’
27
 Courts test the legitimacy of law and repress those laws that are 
incoherent with the constitution. It makes sense for democratic states to have the constitutionality 
of legislation reviewed by a deliberative and independent institution nestled within an effective 
balance of power system.  
Kelsen suggests his debate with Schmitt over the proper guardian of the constitution is ultimately 
a question of politea versus nomoi: should Weimar be governed by a virtuous expression of 
popular sovereignty (politea) or the ideal of the rule of law (nomoi)? Kelsen seems to argue that 
having the guardian be established on a democratic basis, either in its parliamentary (i.e. the 
legislative) or plebiscitary (i.e. the executive) form, was ultimately the hope for politea. But he 
continued that, rather than explicitly grant the right to make “hard” decisions to a branch of 
government, even if it were democratically legitimated, the best state form buried them in the 
rule of law – and the best way to approximate this ideal was to establish the judiciary as the 
guardian because of its limited power and limited capacity to only make “soft” decisions on the 
concrete nature of that “Absolute Constitution.” Contrary to what Schmitt had argued, nomoi 
meant the executive should not guard the constitution. Kelsen argued instead that, if there should 
be a guardian of the constitution, it ought to be the judiciary.
28
 
A further and somewhat glaring problem with Schmitt’s arguments for the president as the 
guardian of the constitution was that, in the case of Weimar, the guardian ought to have been 
President Hindenburg. A Platonic complete guardian, which seems to have been Schmitt’s model 
                                                             
24 Kelsen, Wer Soll der Hüter der Verfassung Sein?, 15, 19, 45. 
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 Kelsen, Wer Soll der Hüter der Verfassung Sein?, 17, 24. 
26 Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change, 182ff., 187ff. 
27 David Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, and Hermann Heller in Weimar  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 151-152. 
28 Kelsen, Wer Soll der Hüter der Verfassung Sein?, 24-27. 
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for the guardian of the constitution, presupposes the marriage of perfect wisdom and perfect 
power. Yet therein lay the problem. Hindenburg, as Schmitt conceded, had no clue how to 
uphold his oath, even if he was well-intentioned. He was probably more manipulable by indirect 
powers than Weimar’s masses were, as Schmitt himself seems to have later admitted.
29
 Hitler, 
who assumed Weimar’s guardianship next, demonstrates a far worse possibility for executive 
guardianship: when invested in a vicious person, that much power and responsibility is the worst 
outcome of all – far more dangerous than overheated democracy. Even Plato, after the Republic, 
was wise enough to realize that the likelihood of this perfect marriage was nearly impossible and 
that the next best thing to it was legal entrenchment and “the rule of law” not “the rule of man” 
in any form.
30
 And Plato also recognized that, even if the best government was virtuous rule by 
one individual, the worst was its mirror: vicious rule by one individual. How one could 
distinguish between the two individuals was one of the fundamental questions of political 
philosophy. The only certain solution seemed to be to circumvent having to make that distinction 
by entrenching the authority of the law. Unlike Plato, Schmitt did not seem to come to this 
realization, clinging instead to a romantic notion that the state could indeed be an imperium 
rationis and that, in the worst case, a complete guardian would be able to guarantee that order. 
b. Militant Democracy Today 
There are relevant differences between the political situation Schmitt responded to in the early 
20
th
 century and those the world faces today. Political and constitutional thinkers today seem to 
agree that the principles of militant democracy in the abstract remain important for the practice 
of liberal democracy today. Nancy Rosenblum, for example, writes the exercise of militant 
democracy is at times justified.
31
 Similarly, Patrick Macklem writes that the European Court of 
Human Rights has identified that states may legitimately obstruct certain political projects in 
order to preserve democracy.
32
  
Yet, although the problems militant democracy was designed to contain have not totally 
disappeared from contemporary politics, militant democracy cannot be simply be dropped onto 
states and constitutions today and expected to work unproblematically. Despite describing cases 
where militant democracy is legitimate, both Rosenblum and Macklem question the extent to 
which it neatly maps onto the problems threatening states today and, by extension, the limits of 
the legitimate application of militant democratic principles once the threat of physical violence to 
states has been overcome.
33
 When it originated, militant democracy was framed by the question 
of “what counts as a sufficient existential threat to the liberal democratic constitution?” Today, 
                                                             
29 Carl Schmitt, "Im Vorraum der Macht: aus einem Gespräch über den Einfluß auf den Machthaber," Die Zeit, July 
29 1954. 
30 Plato, Statesman, trans. Robin Waterfield (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 63-70 (297b-301d). 
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 Nancy Rosenblum, "Banning Parties: Religious and Ethnic Partisanship in Multicultural Democracies," Law & 
Ethics of Human Rights 1, no. 1 (2007): 21ff. 
32 Patrick Macklem, "Guarding the Perimeter: Militant Democracy and Religious Freedom in Europe," 
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33 Rosenblum, "Banning Parties," 23; Macklem, "Guarding the Perimeter," 587. 
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Rosenblum argues, it should instead be framed by the question of “what constitutes a sufficient 
attempt to change the relationship of church and state or to undermine the secular religiously 
neutral state?”
34
 Factionalism in the 21
st
 century is characterized by the fact that potential threats 
to the liberal democratic state no longer present themselves exclusively as secular worldviews. 
Factionalism has become religious once again. And the repoliticization of religion has changed 
how liberal democratic states can legitimately respond to factionalism without compromising 
their deepest commitments. Rosenblum is rightly concerned about how bans on political parties 
can be abused to undermine the core values of the democratic state by inviting discrimination 
and exclusion against religious organizations and movements.
35
 She worries about cases where a 
party does not neatly conform to liberal democratic ideals (even if it is not a threat to liberal 
democracy) and states use this non-conformity as a basis to deny that party political rights. In the 
setting of 21
st
 century religious repoliticization, moves to ban “illiberal” or “undemocratic” 




The use of militant democratic institutions to stifle non-revolutionary parties (i.e. parties that 
may be religious in nature but have no antidemocratic or illiberal political aims) is among the 
most troubling abuses of militant democracy. There is a profound difference between 
depoliticized and politicized religious parties and movements. Parties, including religious parties, 
seeking a democratic majority to constitutionalize their illiberal and antidemocratic values are no 
longer fundamentally committed to the rules of the game – that is to a liberal democratic 
constitution. But not all religious parties fall under this category. The German Zentrum party, for 
example, emerged in 1871 as Catholics and Catholic institutions recognized they, as minorities, 
needed a political voice to guarantee their liberal basic rights were protected from political 
interference. The legitimacy of the application of militant democracy will hinge on its ability to 
reliably make this distinction – if it must make it at all.  
Jan-Werner Müller notes another significant change between the early 20
th
 century and today. 
Especially in the West, illiberal and antidemocratic movements now try to subvert the state using 
violence from without it rather than compete for power within democracy. As long as 
movements remain external to democratic processes, militant democratic institutions are 
superfluous to the defense of the core commitments of democratic states. Constraining 
democracy to preserve the core of the constitution only makes sense when parties threaten from 
within. Yet, in response to external threats, Western democracies have employed “militant 
democratic” institutions to create a sort of “state of siege” to defend themselves. These threats 
are novel because they tend to be non-state actors taking advantage of new technologies and 
porous borders. Not knowing how to respond to them, states have responded with every means at 
their disposal – including quasi-totalitarian mechanisms “legitimated” in a logic that resembles 
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militant democracy’s. And the depth and extent of this response has been alarming for liberal 
democratic commitments.  
In the United States, phenomena like the Patriot Act and the NSA’s unrestrained surveillance 
show extreme cases of the capacity of the state’s authority to be abused. The fear of terrorism 
was manipulated by the state, particularly the executive branch, to obtain widespread public and 
Congressional support for a broadened police state, through legislation like the Patriot Act, and 
to authorize a war and military actions wholly unrelated to 9/11. Although the NSA and CIA 
argue they have successfully anticipated and prevented terrorism because of their broadened 
powers, it is unclear whether they have achieved this and at what cost this success has come 
without any meaningful oversight, especially in terms of the systematic violation of basic rights. 
Because both of these examples emerge out of acts passed to limit constitutional freedoms for 
the sake of defending democracy, they could be construed as cases where militant democracy has 
gone awry. Certainly, both are examples of the democratic state no longer acting for the sake of 
its stated ends because it has sacrificed its core values, especially basic rights. The Bush 
Administration in particular has shown that “the state” is no less capable of disingenuous 
manipulation of mass emotions than indirect powers. The NSA and CIA show the state’s direct 
power may be no more a “friend” of constitutional ideals than the private indirect powers 
militant democracy ought to be preventing. And these examples demonstrate the ease with which 
the state can trample the very rights it ostensibly guarantees and protects – showing how 
important it is to have institutional checks and balances on the execution of whatever “militant 
democratic” institutions are deemed necessary.  
Neither of the above examples is a convincing case where a democracy must constrain 
democratic constitutional values for the sake of preserving its deepest commitments. It 
absolutely sacrifices the state’s existential-transcendental commitments to absolutely guarantee 
the material need for security. In doing so, it sounds like a mechanized state. Using a tool 
designed to stop revolutionary political parties from abusing political rights and democracy for 
another end is disingenuous and demonstrates the threat the state itself can present to democracy 
and liberalism. In an age of mass democracy, the state’s value consists in its ability to balance 
against private powers – but once the state can decisively trump all private power it becomes a 
threat that must itself be contained. Those examples above highlight the tendency of state, and 
especially executive, power to expand and take advantage of a twisted version of the normative 
power of the factual. Thus, in addition to “indirect powers,” the state too can be a dire threat to 
“Liberté” that must be guarded against. The state, no less than revolutionary extremists, can 
become an Enemy of a liberal democracy’s political status. 
But, pace Müller, some enemies of liberal democracy still do seek to revolutionize those states 
“from within” too. The types of extremism to which Schmitt responded with his Absolute 
Constitution are undergoing a revival today. Across Europe, right-wing populism is exploiting its 
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“democratic legitimacy” to try to undermine the rights of whichever minority it fears most.
37
 
While different in many ways, these are relevantly similar cases to the cases of extremism 
encountered in Weimar. Schmitt’s arguments can be mapped onto these cases and will continue 
to do so as long as extremism possess the will to politically mobilize and consciously or 
unconsciously adopt Leninist approaches to revolution. 
In addition, pace Rosenblum, some politicized religions do threaten liberal democracies from 
within today. In the United States, for example, Christian movements seeking to undermine 
liberal values and “restore” a Christian state invoke popular support in the efforts to weaken and 
outright throw out the Establishment Clause. They are representative of a general tension 
between democratically popularized religion and liberalism. These movements raise Schmitt’s 
questions about constitutionalism in a new format: would a substantive revision to “the principle 
of non-establishment, which prevents religious groups from using state power and authority to 
impose their views on the rest of us or to help enforce their special laws on their members” be a 
legitimate political goal for a liberal democratic state?
38
 Were two-thirds of US Congress to 
propose such an amendment, which was then ratified by three-quarters of states, would that be an 
amendment to a liberal democratic constitution or would it have changed the nature of the 
constitution itself in a revolutionary way?  
Political theorists today have rightly suggested that the principle of non-establishment alongside 
constitutional protection for the liberty of conscience and free exercise of religion determines the 
legitimate or valid political ends of a liberal democratic state.
39
 The use of terms like legitimate 
and valid imply that, even if a religiously oriented democratic super-majority was capable of 
satisfying the legal requirements of constitutional emendation to incorporate, say, its goals of 
“salvation” into the state’s end, there would still be something substantively illegitimate about its 
actions: such an amendment would be incoherent with the basic commitments of liberal 
democratic states. In such a case, Schmitt’s arguments show that militant democracy would be 
justified in stepping in and denying the party or parties driving this movement its political rights 
and the substantive illegitimacy of such an amendment, popular or otherwise. Ideally, this hard 
case will never arise. But it is a possibility inherent to any constitution that contains basic rights 
and popular sovereignty and has not established the relationship between these two distinct 
principles. Hard cases like that force a decision between “liberalism” and “democracy,” between 
the Absolute and Relative Constitution. They force liberal democrats to decide whether militant 
democracy or democratic revolution best aligns with their core values. In those cases, Kelsen 
                                                             
37 Examples include Norway’s Fremskrittspartiet, Finland’s Perussuomalaiset, Denmark’s Dansk Folkeparti, The 
Netherland’s Partij voor de Vrijheid, Germany’s Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensiv, Austria’s Freiheitlichen Partei 
Österreichs, Italy’s Lega Nord, Hungary’s Fidesz Party, and Greece’s Golden Dawn.   
38
 Jean L. Cohen, "Political Religion Vs Non-Establishment: Reflections on 21st-Century Political Theology: Part 1," 
Philosophy & Social Criticism 39, no. 4-5 (2013): 446. 
39 For a recent example, see Cohen, "Political Religion Vs Non-Establishment," 445, 449; Jean L. Cohen, "Political 
Religion Vs Non-Establishment: Reflections on 21st-Century Political Theology: Part 2," Philosophy & Social 
Criticism 39, no. 6 (2013): 512, 516.  
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argued he would rather “go down with the ship” – even if an amendment undermines the core 
values of liberal democracy, the state “precommitted” to accept the outcome of a democratic 
amendment procedure. Schmitt stood against this position, arguing that it was politically 
irresponsible to condone constitutional amendments revolutionizing the state; the liberal 
democratic state’s deepest commitment cannot be to an amendment procedure. The basic 
decision for the essence of the liberal democratic state must be for fundamental rights. 
Yet while militant democratic limits to popular sovereignty are undoubtedly essential to the 
legitimate practice of democracy, the authoritarian power to decide on “constitutionality” can 
replace one vice with another. The dilemma is how to find the virtuous state form nestled 
between two vicious ones. Value-neutral democracy risks the tyranny of the majority – or the 
tyranny of those best equipped to manipulate and exploit the majority – arising from below. 
Militant democracy risks the tyranny of the state from above. The collapse of Weimar 
exemplifies the former. But the dangers of the latter are also clear, as exemplified by 
McCarthyism. In face of this dilemma, I am tempted to agree with Rawls: it is a practical 
dilemma which philosophy alone cannot resolve. The right of the state over the people to decide 
on what “counts” as democracy should be drawn. But where it should be drawn may not be 
formalizable. Eventually, this dialectic returns to Schmitt’s defining question: quis judicabit? 
Who decides what the constitution means and how to concretize it? 
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Appendix 




I. In a 1961 letter to Norberto Bobbio, in which Schmitt congratulates him on his edition of Hobbes’ De Cive and 
mentions that he has been corresponding with Dorothy Krook of Cambridge about Hobbes, Schmitt also encloses 
an early version of the Hobbes Crystal that he drew for “some young philosophers.” This early drawing, printed 
below, includes some additional details that elaborate even more (confirming the above interpretation). It was 
first reprinted in Carl Schmitt, "Brief an Norberto Bobbio (21/1/61)," in Schmittiana: Beiträge Zu Leben Und Werk 
Carl Schmitts, ed. Piet Tommissen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 359. It is also included in Carl Schmitt and 
Armin Mohler, eds., Carl Schmitt - Briefwechsel mit einem seiner Schüler (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995). 
To the “above,” Schmitt adds that it is Offenbarung, a revelation or epiphany; that is, something that emerges 
out of nowhere and strikes one. To the “below,” Schmitt adds it is Immanenz, Immanence, or something that 
emerges out of individuals. Finally, in a postscript to Bobbio, Schmitt adds the following question. “The important 
question: Is 1-5 (that Jesus is the Christ) interchangeable or not? In Spinoza, it is of course interchangeable; also in 
Hobbes? [Die große Frage: ist 1 - 5 [that Jesus is the Christ] auswechselbar oder nicht? Bei Spinoza ist es 
selbstverständlich auswechselbar; auch bei Hobbes?]” Clearly, by 1963, Schmitt had decided the answer to this 
question was “yes” (at least for himself, if not for Hobbes too) as his Hinweise to The Concept of the Political 
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II. The three affirmations of Catholic civilization are, according to Cortés, “First, that an omnipresent, personal god 
exists. Second, a personal God, that is everywhere, reigns in Heaven and upon the earth. Third, this God, that 
reigns in Heaven and upon the earth, absolutely governs divine and human beings” (Cortés, Political Writings, 81). 
These theological qualities reflect into political order as a monarchy characterized by an omnipresent king (by 
means of his agents), who reigns over and governs his subjects absolutely.  
Cortés describes three negations corresponding to these affirmations. The first negation is deistic. While holding 
that God exists and is personal, it claims God cannot govern human affairs because God is removed from the world 
(Cortés, Political Writings, 81). For political order, it means that the king still reigns but no longer governs. This is 
the denial of sovereign exceptionality: the king is subordinated to the constitution. Cortés describes the second 
negation as pantheistic (Cortés, Political Writings, 82). Although god still exists, god lacks personal qualities. 
Instead, ‘god is humanity.’ This theology mirrors politically as the depersonalization of power. Power resides in the 
masses or the people as a whole instead of a tangible figure. The third negation is the denial of god; it is atheism 
(Cortés, Political Writings, 82). Corresponding to atheism is the annihilation of secular authority altogether. 
Because there is no higher order, there is accordingly no basis to legitimate any form of secular governance or 
authority. Spiritually, there is nihilism. This theology is mirrored politically as anarchy – all authority is replaced by 
individual self-rule.  
 















THEOLOGICAL/METAPHYSICAL → POLITICAL 
1. An omnipresent and personal god exists   The king is personal and omnipresent 
2. This personal god reigns over heaven and earth   The king reigns over his subjects 
3. God reigns absolutely   The king governs his subjects 















THEOLOGICAL/METAPHYSICAL → POLITICAL 
1. Deism: God is so high/removed from the world that he 
does not govern (the world is automated) 
  The king exists and reigns, but governs 
only through indirect legislation 
2. Pantheism: God is not personal: he neither reigns nor 
governs but is instead immanent 
  Governmental power is dispersed 
through the people as a collective  
3. Atheism: There is no god, there is only matter 
operating according to determinate and inherent laws 
  Anarchy - there is no sovereignty or 
rule; nor are there any definite 
principles by which to orient oneself 
 
Cortés argues it is not accidental that one phase follows on the heels of another – in the end, they all spring from 
protestant denials of the sovereign nature of god originating in Luther’s declaration against the will and authority, 
and the possibility of an indeterminate history and future (Cortés, Ensayo, 176). This first denial naturally leads to 
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III. Schmitt mentions other examples of political theology (or politicized theologies) besides the typologies 
discussed above in the process of disenchantment/anakyklosis – indicating his own difficulties in formulating this 
process: 






(Schlegel; to a certain 
extent Malebranche) 
(Political) Romanticism Adam Müller Political Romanticism (16-20, cf. 7-8, 
148) 
Rationalism (Hegelian 
Philosophy of History) 
Marxism (Dictatorship of 
the Proletariat) 
Marx The Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy (106, cf. 64) 
Rationalism (Hegelian 










Irrationalism (Sorel)                               
- Bolshevism                               
- Fascism 
Sorel (Lenin and 
Mussolini are 
derivative) 
The Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy (66-68); State Ethics and 




Pluralism Harold Laski State Ethics and the Pluralistic State 
(197, 204), The Turn to the 
Discriminating Concept of War (40) 
Calvinism (God ~ 
Power) 
Authoritarian State Hobbes Leviathan in the State Theory of 
Hobbes (32-33); Three Types of 
Juristic Form (60-61) 
"Deistic Metaphysics" Rule of Rationality 
established through pre-




Dictatorship (84, 90) [The 
formulations in Dictatorship are 
underdeveloped and clumsy 




The Formal Rule of Law 
(esp. generality); the 
corresponding need for a 
different institution to 
particularize the law 
because "the state" can 
issue only universals 
Montesquieu, 
Rousseau 
Dictatorship (88, 270); While Schmitt 
insists the political theorists are 
opposed (Voltaire, "the 
Enlightenment," and Montequieu), 
this position and the above appear 





Althusius Constitutional Theory (126) 
"Romantic" Deism Unclear (Republicanism?) Rousseau Constitutional Theory (126) 
Spinozan Rationalism 
(Natura Naturans - 
Natura Naturata) 
Republicanism; Doctrine of 
Sovereign Power (pouvoir 




Dictatorship (123-125); The Legal 




Juridical Positivism Karl Bergbohm On the Three Types of Juristic Form 
(64ff) 
 
